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ABSTRACT 
For almost 40 years I had the naive view that if we simply obtain more physical 
understanding of the issue, we could provide "the" answers and responses 
would be rational. I now see that there is absolutely no guarantee of this. It is 
ourselves we do not understand. 
Atmospheric scientist Graeme Pearman, personal communication, February 17, 
2009 
The broad theme of this "science and society" study is the communication of 
anthropogenic climate change over the period 1987-2001 in Australia. Adding a novel 
science communication analysis to existing studies of policy and media presented the 
opportunity to broaden understanding of how this society engaged with a unique 
environmental issue. Relying on the public documentary record, supported by 
interviews, the investigation found and analysed dramatic changes to communication in 
correlation with changing public policy and evidence of public knowledge during the 
course of the study period. Against expectation, the changes went from a high level of 
early good understanding of climate change risk and response to a high level of 
confusion and conflict by the end of the study period, while the basic science messages 
' 
remained consistent throughout. A framing lens was developed to study public language 
in the documentary record. Maj or social and cultural influences on the framing were 
identified and analysed, combining insights from other research fields with original 
evidence from the thesis research. This study thereby contributes some new insights for 
communication of environmental science, specifically climate change. It also offers a 
novel case study in Australian science history. 
V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND DISSERTATION OUTLINE--------1 
CHAPTER2 
THE SCIENCE- LOADING THE DICE: THE ANTHROPOCENE ERA-- 8 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH THEORY, DESIGN AND METHODS---------26 
DEVELOPING A FRAMING LENS FOR ANALYSIS--------42 
CHAPTER4 
EARLY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMING 
1987- 1992: AUSTRALIA AT THE FOREFRONT--------- 53 
CHAPTER 5 
l 990s POLICY FRAMEWORK AND NARRATIVE CHANGE: PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE DECONSTRUCTED------------ 99 
CHAPTER6 
INFLUENCES ON THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE I 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES AND BELIEFS------142 
CHAPTER 7 
INFLUENCES II 
MEDIA ROLE IN AGENDA-SETTING AND PUBLIC AW ARENESS--182 
CHAPTER 8 
INFLUENCES III 
SCIENTISTS' BELIEFS AND VALUES AND PUBLIC SCEPTICISM--218 
CHAPTER 9 
IN SEARCH OF CERTAINTY AND APPLYING UNCERTAINTY--- 235 
CHAPTER 10 
CLIMATE DICE: FRAMES, VALUES AND NARRATIVES IN AUSTRALIA 
1987- 2001 , KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION-- 265 
BIBLIOGRAPHY------------------ 283 
APPENDICES LIST----------------- 305 
I. TEXT DOCUMENTATION--------------
2. CONSENT FORM AND TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW 
VI 
Figures 
1. Stages of The Anthropocene ----------------- 16 
2. Biophysical Response to Accelerating Human Activity------- 18 
3. The Disputed "Hockeystick" Graph--------------20 
4. Levels of Framing Communication--------------- 45 
5. Framing Environmental Science---------------- 48 
6. Consequences of Delayed Emission Reduction-----------69 
7. An Energy-Efficient Refrigerator (Cartoon Circa 1991)-------79 
8. Frames and Drivers of Early and Late Climate Change Narratives---141 
9. Pusey: Change In Discourse Language 1970s to Late 1980s----- 155 
10. Comparison of The Sydney Morning Herald sources for Articles: 
1988- 89and2000-2001----------------199 
Tables 
1. Interview Numbers and Time Frames---------------39 
2. Chronology-----------------------92 
Boxes 
1. Global Temperatures over Time: A Case Study of Sceptic Attack on 
Evidence for Anthropogenic Change: The "Hockey Stick" Controversy--20 
2. The lessons of economics: What the universities have been teaching--157 




One of the 1nost fascinating and challenging areas of communication is the way we 
construct our own history- our cultural narrative and beliefs can shift in as little as 10 
to 20 years and the shift may not be evidence-based, as I demonstrate in this study. 
Without reviewing the historical context, we come to think it was always thus. 
A literature review spanning areas of the sciences and humanities offers many 
perspectives on this topic. Social scientists have explored how social reality is 
constructed within a civilisation (e.g., Diamond, 2005; McKnight, 2005a). Historians 
and philosophers tell us that social reality has shifted over time within our own 
civilisation and can be dramatically different from the world views of earlier 
civilisations. Psychology tells us that knowledge is a social construct. Cognitive 
linguistics explores how frames and rhetoric are "heard" and constructed. 
Moreover, research also suggests the frames and agendas that set societies' 
constructions of reality are communicated by opinion leaders who, together with the 
mass media, set the daily narrative agenda (Lakoff, 2004; Rampton & Stauber, 2002; 
Ward, .1995; Wheelwright & Buckley, 1987). Understanding the deployment of frames 
and narratives is a key to understanding how science information is constructed in the 
larger society. Understandings fro1n science and the humanities have been applied to 
the present longitudinal study, offering a novel communication perspective to the 
Australian research literature on climate change policy and politics during the study 
period. 
The study blends previously-published research findings with original research, based 
on the documentary record, to arrive at a review of how anthropogenic climate change 
(hereafter also called climate change) was communicated over the period 1987- 2001 in 
Australia. An unexpected discovery early in the thesis exploration was considerable 
evidence for a substantial amount of good public knowledge of climate change in 
Australia from 1987 to 1992. During this early study period, communication of the 
science domestically and globally- largely by scientists as the primary source for media 
and government-had persuaded state and federal policy-makers and media of the need 
to take action, documented by Henderson-Sellers, 1990, Lowe, 1989 and other authors. 
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This activity culminated in an early national emissions reduction target- ai111ing for 
20% below 1990 emissions levels by 2005. That early good public understanding and 
will to act is very significant because it highlights the 20 years of action foregone since 
that time. These findings and what followed will be discussed in detail in this thesis. 
The thesis analyses how the communication framing by opinion leaders of the 
"dominant narrative" about the greenhouse effect/climate change, its links to fossil fuel 
consumption, and the possible national responses, changed dran1atically during the 
1990s, away from the narrative of the early study period. Yet during the whole study 
period, the science information about causes, effects, and risks changed remarkably 
little (IPCC, 1990, 1995, 2001). This continued to be the case beyond the study period 
to the recent timeframe (IPCC, 2007). The main changes to Intergovernmental Panel on 
Cli1nate Change (IPCC) assessments over the study period, involved greater localised 
detail and the realisation that the planet is experiencing a level of rapid climate change, 
greater than previously expected. While the data re1nained consistent, com1nunication 
approaches within IPCC reports varied over the years. These approaches are also 
explored, along with their likely contributing influence on public understanding. 
The central research question became: after 1991, how and why was existing public 
knowledge gradually deconstructed and reconstructed differently? The evidence shows 
there were very significant changes of the public discourse during the 1990s so that after 
1996, with basically the same science data laid out in the first IPCC report in 1990, rjsk 
messages and global responsibility messages were being reframed into a hazy 
"scientific debate", particularly about human agency, that confused the public and 
helped those who blocked action. The science story became a political story and the 
do1ninant na1Tative became a familiar contemporary one: Australia as exceptional 
an1ongst countries, thanks to policy decisions to focus the national economy on n1incral 
and coal exports , and "cheap" electricity production for the domestic market, and to 
attract energy-intensive multinational industries like aluminium. The comn1unication 
fra111es on response options turned from a global ethical approach to an inward-focused 
'"national interest" argu111ent for no change from "business as usual . 
To further answer the question of why this radical shift in the dominant narrative 
happened , consistent with cognitive science understandings about constructing social 
reality outlined in the methods chapter, I explore not only the sequence of events and 
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changed communication frames but also some major influences on those events and 
communications: the values and beliefs of that period, and the media- politics interface 
in setting the do1ninant agenda. A third major focus is the role of scientists- through 
disciplinary differences and the framing of certainty or uncertainty. 
Why This Topic? 
The research interest in this topic stemmed from my experience as a j oumalist and, in 
the first instance, from reports of political interference in the arena of science 
co1nmunication about climate change. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in the 
US (http: //www.ucsusa.org/global_ warming/) has extensively documented the political 
interference in science reports in that country during the past decade. In 2007 two 
further and complementary investigations in the US continued to confirm these 
findings: there has been broad interference in the communication of climate change 
scientific results in the United States ("Dirty Tricks", 2007; UCS, 2007). In Australia, 
while there has been less documentation of direct political interference with science 
communication in the past 10 years, a long-time chronicler of the climate change policy 
story, physicist and science and society researcher Ian Lowe wrote that "the stacking 
and sacking of public boards, reviews and task forces has been driven by ideology and 
is suppressing new ideas arising from science, to the detriment of innovation and the 
environment" (Lowe, 2006, p.41 ). These reports and other aspects of the 
multidisciplinary literature confirmed my professional understanding as a media worker 
that controversial science and society research messages face many influences and 
interpretations that have little to do with the scientific "facts". 
Anthropogenic climate change may be the ultimate science and society story in that 
context. A longitudinal study was indicated _once the early good public knowledge was 
identified. Then a further examination of the literature showed that while others have 
provided a thoroughly researched chronology of policy and business influence relating 
to climate change in Australia during the period of interest, there has been little research 
conducted on related communication and its effect on public knowledge in Australia 
during this period, allowing an original contribution through this thesis. The identified 
influences on communication may help shed light on the interaction of science, media, 
and policy on this topic and possibly others that are seen as controversial environmental 
research. 
3 
At the meta level of events during the study period, the thesis looks at some 
perspectives and ideas that gained cultural dominance (hegemony) during the 1990s 
following a brief attempt to reconcile environmental and economic values from 1987 to 
1991. The upsurge of economic market fundamentalism , in tandem with a return to a 
familiar battle with environmental ideas and science, came to dominate policy 
responses. In addition to economic beliefs which arguably had little grounding in 
evidence, the values and beliefs examined in the thesis included traditional assumptions 
about human and Christian exceptionalism, and beliefs in technology and the "techno 
fix" . I suggest that these values expressed by political, business, and some religious 
elites, and amplified by the media, can help explain political responses to anthropogenic 
climate change during the 1990s as internally consistent despite their dismissal of risk 
or misreading of the science. The analysis looks at how communication was refrarned in 
the context of these and other influences. 
At the macro level, policy, media, and science information pathways and interaction are 
examined. For example, it helps to know that the media, which co-frames the discourse 
agenda and narrative with politicians, has its own structural imperatives and these also 
have implications for science communication. 
At the micro level are cultural factors within science itself, and the influence of 
changing organisational structure. Interdisciplinary differences have affected the 
communication on climate change, including shaping the views of son1e sceptic 
scientists. It is argued that the prominent role of sceptics in the public di scourse has 
been encouraged by elites hostile to the conclusions of climate change research. 
Methods 
Grounded theory and adaptive methodology proved most appropriate for a work of 
synthesis with few fixed theoretical underpinnings. The thesis is structured as a 
naiTative interplay between multidisciplinary findings from the existing literature and 
original evidence gathered from the documentary record- public documents and 111edia 
reports- and additional details from interviews with witnesses and players from that 
time. 
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From a scoping survey of relevant literature from the humanities, and a review of the 
field of science communication and public understanding, an analytical lens presented 
itself: to look at how climate change information was "framed" in the public discourse 
over time, i.e. a science history perspective with a communication focus. Applying a 
framing lens across the study period became the backbone for a qualitative review of the 
evidence. This involved first finding and then reviewing comparative documentary 
material in the public domain-examining discourse language and framing in media 
reports, government documents, and government proposals for action, in the context of 
other material from the relevant years-particularly popular science books, also public 
opinion polls which now function as history. This evidence is supplemented by 
testimony from interview data. This method allowed a communication picture to 
emerge comparing the early, middle, and later study periods. 
The adaptive methodology permitted shifts in relative emphasis as the thesis evolved. 
Thus interviews, which were originally expected to play a more central role, were 
relegated to a supporting role once it became clear that individuals' historical memory 
was not as comprehensive or as accurate in regard to events as the written 
documentation, that is, newspaper reports or government documents. This was 
particularly striking for the memory of the interim emissions reduction target set in 
1990. Interviewees selected for their participation in events of the late 1980s andl 990s, 
including former federal government ministers, had either a hazy or no recollection of 
this significant milestone. 
Overview of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 examines the background science to this study: the concept of anthropogenic 
climate change, a new idea for many people-the idea that humans are now a force of 
nature capable of altering basic earth systems such as the atmosphere. The thesis does 
not attempt to adjudicate the science but accepts as a baseline of the scientific "facts" 
the IPCC reports of 1990, 1995 and 2001, and significantly notes that these "facts" 
remained basically unchanged during the whole study period. 
Chapter 3 follows with a more detailed discussion of theory, research design and 
methods. The multidisciplinary contributions to establishing a framing lens for 
understanding and analysing communication are explored in detail. Then in Chapter 4 
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the framing lens is applied to the early record of climate change between l 987 and 1992 
in Australia. The analysis is based on extensive documentary material sourced from 
newspaper articles and government documents with supporting interview material. This 
material provides a baseline for co1nparison of later communication and framing during 
the 1990s. 
Chapter 4 also first scans the existing public understanding literature on cli1nate change 
communication to see where this topic may fit and finds that, other than media content 
analysis and sociological attitude studies, little has been done to research the intersect of 
policy, media and science with communication of climate change, paiiicularly not of 
the Australian experience. Thus in the first instance, the finding and analysis by this 
thesis research of the good public knowledge of the greenhouse effect in the early study 
period offers a novel contribution to the literature as a subset of the thesis. 
An original chronology of political and scientific milestones was assembled as 
background for chapter 5 (Table 2). In chapter 5 I first discuss and compare key 
response drivers to the climate change science starting from the early study period 
analysed in the previous chapter and then add an original analysis of the co1nbined 
political and communication shifts in Australia during the further study period 1992-
2001. Public knowledge and the dominant communication narrative in the 1990s are 
compared to the baseline from the late 1980s established in chapter 4. 
In chapters 6 to 9 I exainine the "how" and "why" questions of fra1ning this science 
communication in a social context. Several outstanding influences suggested themselves 
as guiding the communication framing of the dominant narrative. Firstly, the values , 
beliefs, and political ideology that met the science and set and reset the communication· 
secondly the role of the media, its intersect with politicians and dominant ideology and 
the structural factors that also influenced how it reported the climate change story over 
time; and, finally but not least, influential factors from within the scientific com1nunity 
itself, including disciplinary differences , the central role of communication of 
uncertainty, and a brief look at organisational restructure within the public science 
agencies and its effect on c01n1nunication. The strands are dravv1n together in chapter l 
\Vith a summary and discussion of key findings. Lessons that may be extracted for 
cnvironn1ental science comrnunication are in Appendix 3. 
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In summary, this investigation identifies some ways communication framing has been 
constructed and, using an analytical lens, shows how communication has shifted public 
knowledge of a controversial science and society environmental issue-anthropogenic 
climate change- over a 14 year time period. I also identify some key influences on 
these framing shifts during the period under review. The historical canvas is the 
Australian experience from 1987 to 2001. 
The original research findings of this study show that social and cultural factors can 
fundamentally change the understanding by audiences of an environmental science 
narrative (itself multidisciplinary in the case of climate change). The evidence also 
shows that this can happen regardless of the underlying scientific data which, in regard 
to climate change reports, remained consistent over the study period. 
In the next chapter I start with the evidence for climate change as an anthropogenic 
event in a geological timeframe that a growing body of science suggests should be 
called "the Anthropocene epoch" (Ellis, 2011 ). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SCIENCE-LOADING THE DICE 
THE ANTHROPOCENE 
What we see happening with new record te111peratures, both warn1 and cold is in 
good agreement with what we predicted in the 1980s when I testified to 
Congress about the expected effect of global warming. I used coloured dice then 
to emphasize that global warming would cause the climate dice ro be "loaded" 
- for risk of more extreme weather. 
Dr James Hansen, Director Goddard Institute for Space Studies, interview with 
Bill McKibben, December 22, 2010. 
We believe the essential message of this report continues to be that the basic 
understanding of climate change and the human role therein, as expressed in th 
1990 report, still holds: carbon dioxide remains the ffzost in1portant contributor 
to anthropogenic forcing of cli,nate change ... Further, that observations suggest 
a "discernible human influence on global climate, one of the key findings of.this 
report .. 
IPCC report, Climate Change 199 5: The Science of Clin1ate Change, prepared 
by Working Group I- 78 lead authors from 20 countries- Prologue 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis accepts a priori the evidence- assembled by the Intergovernn1ental Panel on 
Cli1nate Change, the global science review and communication channel for mainstream 
climate change scientists- that hu1nan activities are now the principal drivers of 
increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The scientists call this anthropogenic 
"forcing", which basically means the human disturbance of a previous atmospheric 
balance of greenhouse gases which has kept the earth's climate and related weather 
fairly stable and predictable during the period of human civilisation as we know it. 
In this chapter, I look at a scientific understanding about human agency in producing the 
phenomenon variously called " the greenhouse effect", global wanning, and climate 
change as background to the thesis questions . A better understanding can thereby be 
gained of how the evidence of human agency, while not a difficult concept, challenges 
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long-held assumptions about how the planet and its biophysical systems work which in 
tum has affected the public discourse though sceptic debate. 
BACKGROUND 
Naturally occurring greenhouse gases-principally water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2), 
oxides of nitrogen, ozone and methane-have provided a protective heat-transferring 
"blanket" in the atmosphere that, within the history of human beings, has kept the earth 
at a moderate temperature range, not coincidentally conducive to agriculture and 
civilisation as we know it. But there can be too much "blanket", holding in too much 
heat produced on the planet and thus raising the average temperature across the globe 
(average-not uniform, as some people mistake it) which, in tum, upsets the previous 
atmosphere-ocean-biosphere balances. These disturbances have been linked to severe 
and unpredictable weather events and sea-level rise as ice caps melt (IPCC, 1990, 1995, 
2001 and other authors). 
According to IPCC reports since 1990, no "natural" planetary drivers (such as earth axis 
tilt or sunspot cycles) have been identified to account for the present documented 
warming trend and related climate change. However, the IPCC reviews and numerous 
individual Australian atmospheric and climate scientists (including Graeme Pearman, 
Barrie Pittock, Michael Raupach, Kevjn Hennessy, David Karoly, Barry Brooks, Will 
Steffen, and Andrew Glikson), link the planetary temperature increase with increased 
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in the period since the Industrial 
Revolution. That is, the period where humans have burned coal, oil, and other carbon-
based "fossil fuels" that release additional CO2 into the atmosphere. As well, there are 
other greenhouse gases being released at an accelerated rate by human activities. 
Together and cumulatively these gases are believed to be the main contributors to the 
excess atmospheric "blanket" (Houghton, et al., 1990). Methane-emitted by cattle 
raised as livestock, as well as escaping from landfill consumer waste and from biomass 
such as melting permafrost and peat bogs-plus the loss of CO2 storage when forests 
are cut down and land is cleared of vegetation, are other potent present-day drivers of 
combined greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
The figures used in reports can sometimes be confusing. CO2-e refers to the combined 
effect of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitric oxides, expressed as a CO2 equivalent. The 
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combined rise of these gases reached 460 ppm CO2-e after the end of the study period-
only slightly below the 500 ppm associated with maximum stability of the Antarctic lee 
Sheet (Glikson, 2009). While methane is a more concentrated greenhouse gas than 
carbon dioxide, it is also short-lived i.e., 1nore quickly removed from the at111osphere. 
Carbon dioxide, on the other hand, persists for hundreds of years and its concentration 
is cumulative. 
Adding more heat-holding greenhouse gases to the atn1osphere metaphorically "loads 
the dice" for unpredictable and potentially catastrophic (to life as we know it) weather 
events, as noted by leading atmospheric scientist James Hansen in his testi111ony to the 
US Congress in 1988. The previous balances of ocean and wind currents and 
evaporation rates are disturbed, leading to heatwaves and drying trends, anomalous cold 
spells, and to the greater frequency of severe and unpredictable weather events-
cyclones, floods, earthquakes, etc. Drying is most likely in the temperate latitudes 
where most agriculture is practised (Glikson, 2009). Chain reactions and feedback loops 
may add to the severity and "unpredictability" in contemporary terms, for exan1ple, the 
potential or actuality of a northern hemisphere cooling anomaly as the continent-
warming Gulf Stream slows due to increased fresh water from ice 1nelt in the oceans , as 
discussed in a 2009 Oregon State University research report ( Ocean Current Shutdown , 
2009). 
In an open letter dated March 27, 2008, addressed to Australia's then Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd, Hansen wrote: 
Global climate is near critical tipping points that could lead to loss of all summer 
sea ice in the Arctic with detrimental effects on wildlife, initiation of ice sheet 
disintegration in West Antarctica and Greenland with progressive, unstoppable 
global sea level rise, shifting of cli111atic zones with extermination of many 
ani111al and plant species, reduction of freshwater supplies for hundreds of 
millions of people, and a 111ore intense hydrologic cycle with stronger droughts 
and forest fires , but also heavier rains and floods , and stronger storms driven by 
latent heat, including tropical stonns, tornados and thunderstorms. (Australian 
science 111edia centre, 201 l) 
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In the letter, Hansen specifically pinpointed continued production and burning of coal as 
posing the greatest danger of prompting runaway climate change. In the aftermath of the 
2011 Queensland floods, the Australian media and the Federal Resources Minister 
showed no indication of understanding or heeding this message, instead pondering (in 
ABC radio and television reports monitored) when and how coal production and export 
can resume in that state. Meanwhile, climate scientist David Karoly said in a newspaper 
report that the extreme La Nifia rain event experienced by Queensland over months in 
2011 was related to record high ocean temperatures off northern Australia, leading to 
more moisture-laden air-all compatible with rising temperatures (Smith, 2011, p. 3). 
The IPCC Reports 
The IPCC was jointly established by the World Meteorological Organization and the 
United Nations Environment Program in 1988 under the then Chairmanship of Swedish 
meteorologist Bert Bolin (who helped initiate the concept of ecologically sustainable 
development with the Brundlandt Report and shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with 
Al Gore). The IPCC's goal was to assess the scientific research, and also the research on 
likely environmental and socio-economic consequences, and to advise governments on 
response strategies to climate change (Houghton, Jenkins, & Ephraums, 1990, preface). 
Three vvorking groups were established on science, impacts and response, and this 
pattern and mandate has continued with successive IPCC reports released every five 
years. The IPCC issued four assessment reports between 1990 and 2007 (with more to 
follow). The organisation's working groups -composed of hundreds of academic 
experts in the relevant sciences, economics and policy arenas-provide global advice to 
governments. This is based on reviews of thousands of papers in the available peer-
reviewed and published literature. According to the federal government's Climate 
Change Newsletter, the 2nd IPCC Assessment report, published in 1995, was written 
and reviewed by some 2,000 scientists and technical experts from 130 countries, and 
references 10,000 papers as the basis for the scientific report ( Climate Change 
1Vewsletter, 8(1 ), 1996, p. 1; also mentioned in Climate Change Newsletter, 9(1,2), July 
1997, p. 1). 
The media and public are most familiar with the short-form IPCC Summary for 
Policymakers, which is reviewed by participating government representatives after the 
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expert panels have done their work. This is a compromise document that errs, if 
anything, on the cautious side in regard to the likely influence of anthropogenic 
activities ("forcing") on climate, according to CSIRO clin1ate scientist Michael Raupach 
(personal communication, 2007). 
The first IPCC Assessment Report of 1990 emphasised in plain English the causes and 
risks of climate change and response strategies for policy-makers (Houghton, et al., 
1990). This led to the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the key international treaty to reduce global warming and cope 
with the consequences of climate change signed in 1992. The various international fora 
convened to negotiate global emission reductions such as Kyoto in 1997, and most 
recently Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010, operate under this convention. 
Subsequent IPCC reports were issued in 1995, 2001 and 2007. The 1990, 1995 and 
2001 assess1nents provide some benchmarked dates and assess1nents used in the "event 
framework" and comparison periods for the communication analysis in this thesis. 
HUMANS AS PLANETARY FORCE 
The current rate at which CO2 is rising, 2 ppm per year, is unprecedented in the 
recent history of the Earth, vvith the exception of the onset of greenhouse 
atmospheric conditions following major volcanic episodes and asteroid and 
comet impacts, which led to the large mass extinctions [and ended planetary 
periods like the Jurassic and Cretaceous] ... (Glikson, 2009) 
The idea that the human species and its societies are a new "force of nature;' capable of 
altering planetary systems is a relatively recent one. That we have entered a new epoch 
called the "Anthropocene ," is still resisted by so1ne traditionally trained geo logists 
meteorologists, and others, and this has had implications for present-day sceptic debate. 
However, physicist and science hi storian, Spencer W cart, has described the now 
mainstrearn climate science discovery path anchored by the hypothesis of Sv1edish 
scientist Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s that burning fossil fuels could raise global 
ten1peratures. Fro1n there a complex , multidisciplinary research effort has led to the 
present-day understanding that human activities are changing the atmosphere- ocean-
biospherc balance resulting in the "greenhouse effect". Weart (2003) noted that at the 
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tum of the 20th century and for a long time thereafter, deeply embedded in human 
culture was the belief that either God or nature would take care of any human impacts: 
Hardly anyone imaged that human actions, so puny amongst the vast natural 
forces, could upset the balance that governed the planet as a whole ... It was 
traditionally tied up with a religious faith in the God-given order of the universe 
... Such was the public belief and scientists are members of the public, sharing 
most of the assumptions of their culture. (p. 9) 
Not only was it considered unlikely that humans could affect earth systems, the rate of 
change indicated by climate models went directly counter to long-held beliefs and 
principles-promoted particularly by geologists who had explained the phenomenon of 
coming and going ice ages for a disbelieving scientific community a century earlier. The 
discipline has held since, as a core understanding, that any change to planetary systems 
and climate could only be in a manner that had happened before ( and indeed there had 
been many previous hotter and colder periods) and this could be read from the 
geological evidence they could measure and analyse on the ground. 
As far as they could tell, all those previous climatic changes occurred over thousands, if 
not millions, of years, prompting a basic scepticism about rapid change induced by 
human activity. Looking to the more recent past to predict the future has been the 
training and work of climatologists and meteorologists during the early and mid 20th 
century. They constitute another prominent group of sceptics. The influence of scientific 
beliefs and values, and their impact on the climate change story, is explored further in 
chapter 8. 
During the second half of the 20th century other scientists were looking at many more 
planetary systems in detail-including the capacity of the oceans to absorb CO2, thus 
delaying measurable on-land impacts for additional decades-and they were steadily 
learning about the connections between the world's biomass and ecosystems. Examples 
are the Arctic tundra as a reservoir of methane that would be released with warming, or 
the weakening of the Atlantic Gulf Stream leading to paradoxical cooling in the north 
Atlantic. Weart chronicles that earth scientists of all stripes only gradually learned that 
climate could change rapidly in just the span of a hundred years or even a decade, not in 
fact thousands of years or geological periods as previously thought. This came with the 
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disturbing corollary that rapid climate change might manifest no differently in the first 
instance than natural variation. 
Rapid Climate Change: A paradigm shift 
How fast can our planet's climate change? Too slowly for humans to notice 
according to the firm belief of most scientists through much of the 20th century 
... Today, there is evidence that severe change can take less than a decade. A 
committee of the (US) National Acaderny of Sciences (NAS) has called this 
reorientation in thinking of scientists a veritable "paradigm shift" ... but this new 
thinking is little known and scarcely appreciated in the wider comn1unity of 
natural and social scientists and policymakers. (Weart, 2003a, p. 30) 
The same process of discovery was leading climate researchers to the conclusion that it 
was indeed human agency changing the atmosphere and the climate in this particular 
period of history. As early as the 1950s US oceanographer Roger Revelle, studying the 
uptake of CO2 in the oceans and CO2 emission from industrial processes , concluded 
with a radical idea for traditional reductionist scientists: "Human beings are ca1Tying out 
a large-scale geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past 
nor be reproduced in the future" (Weart, 2003, p. 30). 
Neither Revelle nor other researchers then foresaw just how this experiment would 
ramp up as both industrialisation and population exploded during the next 50 years, 
accelerating the level of greenhouse gas emissions accumulating in the atmosphere as 
well as other significant and so1netimes related i1npacts on earth systems. 
Enter the "Anthropocene Epoch" 
Building on this background of 20th century research, ecologists and other scientists 
studying global change during the past decades under the International Geosphere 
Biosphere Project (IGBP) have been publishing the evidence for an "Anthropocene 
epoch" i.e., the beginning of a time-span where humans are the main planetary force 
altering natural systems. The te1m "anthropogenic cli1nate change" thus refers to thi 
human agency and is used in this thesis. The IGBP project interpreted the cumula6ve 
human impact on the previous balance within the natural systems of soil, air, water 
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forests. and species. Australia became involved in 1990. The gathered evidence on 
anthropogenic impact, outlined below, was summarised in a 2008 lecture by IGBP 
alumnus Will Steffen (now director of The Australian National University Climate 
Change Institute ).The main researchers behind this summary were Steffen, Crutzen, & 
McNeill (2007) and Costanza, Graumlich & Steffen (2006). These authors propose a 
reconceptualisation of history, which tracks the evolution of modem societies against 
natural system benchmarks-in this case, CO2 in the atmosphere. The story presented 
by Steffen goes as follows. 
Stability for about 250,000 Years 
About 250,000 years ago , fully modem humans emerged in Africa. At that time, the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere was very low-somewhere below 200 ppm-
compared with today's 390 ppm. Atmospheric methane was similarly low. The 
concentration of both these gases rose for centuries at a time (but not above 240 ppm) 
and then fell for longer periods of time. This pattern steadied at 240 ppm from the 
beginning of agriculture, 5 ,000-7,000 years before the present, and through the great 
European civilisations of Greece and Rome. 
Early human activities that may have contributed to relatively small elevated levels of 
CO2 included fire-stick farming, forest clearing, and megafauna extinction according to 
the authors cited in Steffen 2008 (the megafauna reference might benefit from further 
explanation). Data for these conclusions come from Greenland ice cores. 1 There is also 
a theory that human influences on the atmosphere changed at the time of agricultural 
expansion to,vards elevated CO2 from the natural variability measured from previous 
epochs. Ho,vever the dramatic increases in CO2 levels started with the industrial 
revolution as shovm in Figure 1. 
1 Ice core data haYe been collected by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (KOAA) 
among other expert \Yorld\i;i de agencies. NOA.A's ,yebsite states that data from polar and mountain 
glaciers and ice caps are archiYed yielding "proxy" ' climate indicators from the past in oxygen isotopes, 
methane concentrations, dust content, and other parameters 
http: 1,y,,7,,-_ncdc.noaa.goy/paleo icecore.html). 
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Figure 1 Stages of the Anthropocene 
The Stages of the Anthropocene 
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From: Steffen, Crutzen & McNeil! 2006 
Figure 1. Proxy evidence from 250,000 BC to the 1800s indicates natural systems remained remarkahly 
stable in greenhouse gas concentrations until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution . (Steffen, 
Crutzen & McNeil!, 2006, in Steffen, 2008) 
CO2 Levels and the Industrial Revolution 
Steffen et al. indicate that CO2 levels re1nained fairly constant at something like 270 
pp111 or lower until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Starting around 1800 
can1e the invention of the internal combustion engine, fossil fuel energy, and other 
fonns of "progress" made possible by modem science and technology. CO2 leve ls 
started climbing s lowly. However, during the period these authors call "Anthropocene 
stage 2" (1945 to 2010 or 2020) , CO2 levels rose rapidly and are still climbing (390 ppm 
at the end of 2009). 
Theory of Background Natural Cooling 
Paradoxically, the ri se in CO 2 and other greenhouse gases, prompting higher planet 
tcn1pcraturcs, arc seen by son1e theorists as currently shielding human civilisation from 
the natural climate variability pattern of the past millions of years. The pattern is ice 
ages (the nonn) broken by short interglacial periods. Agricultural civilisations emerged 
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in a balmy interglacial that started about 20,000 years ago. According to Ruddiman's 
still controversial theory published in 2005, the planet was "due" for the start of another 
glaciation about 5,000 years ago but this was countered by early human agricultural 
activity starting 8,000-12,000 years ago. Others have offered contrary evidence related 
to the relative earth- sun rotations indicating the current interglacial period is unusually 
long-lasting all by itself, without accounting for the warming effect of anthropogenic 
greenhouse emissions (Ruddiman, 2005). 
According to Ruddiman, early agricultural activities produced enough greenhouse 
gases to offset the cooling trend-instead warming the planet by almost 0.8°C from the 
previous long-term average. A further 0.6°C has been added in the past century of rapid 
industrialisation. The theory postulates that once fossil fuels are depleted and the CO2-
induced temperature rise peaks and falls, the natural pattern will reassert itself with a 
glacial cooling. Complicating the effects of global warming or natural glaciations are 
possible systemic disruptions due to global warming-for example, evidence that 
changes to the continent-warming Gulf Stream could bring on a glaciation in the 
northern hemisphere in the short term. 
The "Great Acceleration" and Biophysical Responses 
Short-termism in human thinking, or psychological concepts of how humans view the 
world around them, including "creeping normalcy" or "landscape amnesia" 
2
, block day-
to-day comprehension of what accelerating human activities represent-whether it is 
human numbers, number of dammed rivers, forest destruction, or the impact of motor 
car emissions in a timespan that geologically is a nanosecond or less. In his study of 
how societies fail, Diamond (2005) calls global warming a pre-eminent example of a 
"slow trend concealed by wide up and down _fluctuations" (Diamond, 2005, p. 425). He 
likens the denial of climate change by leading politicians including former US President 
George W Bush (and John Howard in Australia) to the elite of "the medieval 
Greenlanders [who] had similar difficulties recognizing that their climate was gradually 
becoming colder, and the Maya and Anasazi (in Central and North America) [who] had 
trouble discerning that theirs was becoming drier" (Diamond, 2005 , p. 425). 
2 Diamond defines "creeping normalcy" as slow trends concealed in noisy fluctuations that people get 
used to without comment. "Landscape amnesia" is forgetting how different the landscape looked 20-50 
years ago (Diamond, 2005 , p. 425). 
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Figure 2 . Human acceleration of resource exploitation compared with biophysical impacts : matching 
impact curves found across many benchmarks from atmospheric CO 2 to fully exploited ecosystems and 
loss of forests (S teffen et al.. 2004, in Steffen 2008). 
The graphs in Figure 2 tell the story of how the biophysica l \Vorld has been responding 
to the human acceleration of resource exploitation. We find a matching curve of 
impacts- a\vay fron1 the relative stability of previous centuries in human history. We 
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see greenhouse gases, ozone depletion, full exploitation of fisheries, loss of forests, and 
species extinctions (among other benchmarks) zooming upwards in just over 50 years. 
The net result of maximised resource exploitation with industrialisation and population 
growth is described by the metaphor of a "global footprint". The implication is that 
humans are depleting the "natural capital" of the planet at an unsustainable rate in 
comparison to how many earths we would need to keep up with our demands (more 
than one by 2001). 
In similar fashion, humans, by burning fossil fuels and other greenhouse gas-emitting 
activities, are changing or altering climatic patterns-with impacts such as increased 
cyclone force and frequency, increased flooding, and the heatwaves of the past decades, 
all set to also accelerate. Worldwide and in Australia there is also evidence in the past 
decade of plummeting water supplies related to rainfall shifts, heat, and evaporation. 
So-called "one in 100-year" intense bushfire and extensive flooding have followed in 
quick succession, and have decimated communities and regions. Steffen and his co-
researchers postulate that by 2050, heatwaves (and their flow-on effects) will be an 
everyday event. 
The Anthropocene Stage 3 
Steffen et al. and other researchers say the evidence shows that human impact is 
different from previous natural cycles and has made a short, sharp upward change to the 
pattern that had reigned for 250,000 years and longer of rises and falls in atmospheric 
CO2. The evidence indicates that concentrations of the gas stayed below 300 ppm until 
the last 50 - 60 years and has risen to 350 ppm and beyond in that short time frame. The 
data for accelerated CO2 concentrations come from atmospheric CO2 measurements 
(Keeling & Wharf, 2004) and also from Vostock ice core data published in Nature in 
1999 by Petit et al. ( 19 researchers from three participating countries, their findings 
summarised at http: //www.daviesand.com/Choices/Precautionary _Planning/New_ Data/) 
According to a press release for the joint French, Russian and American V ostock ice 
core analysis , the highest levels of CO2 and methane (CH4) found for the last 420,000 
years is "far below" present (1999) concentrations of both carbon dioxide and methane, 
which the authors therefore call "unprecedented" (Petit & Raynaud, 1999). 
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From the perspective of the past 1,000 years, the data behind the Mann and Bradley 
( 1999) now famous "hockey stick" graph has offered further evidence of a sudden short 
sharp spike of CO2 concentrations at the end the 20th century. These data have also 
further confirmed that CO2 levels and temperature recordings have been in synchrony 
over time. 
Box 1 Global Temperatures Over Time: The "Hockey Stick" Case Study 
Global temperatures over time: A case study of sceptic attack on evidence for 
anthropogenic change-the "hockey stick" controversy 
The public, sceptic controversy generated by the Mann et al. studies of the correlation 
between recent rising CO2 levels and rising temperatures illustrated in the "hockey 
stick" graph, Figure 3, is instructive for two reasons: (1) for the scientific evidence of 
anthropogenic impact and (2) how this has been questioned by so1ne elen1ents of the 
broader academic community and by non-specialists , thereby influencing public 
understanding in the direction of "scientists can't agree," a key aspect of a pub) ic 
response of uncertainty. 
Figure 3 The Disputed "Hockey Stick" Graph 
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Figure 3 . Prox_-r records do not extend lo the present day ; fo r this reason the red star (localed on the 
graph) marks the approximate northern hemisphere temperature in I 999. Source: Relrie\·ed I I January 
J() I I , _J,-o m hrrp: IH'\\W. ncdc. noaa.govlpaleolg lohalH'arming/mann.h!ml. 
The so-called "'hockey stick' ' controversy has centered on proxy assessments ,nade in 
the late 1990s by palaeocli111atologists Mann , Bradl ey, and Hughes of temperatures in 
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the northern hemisphere for the past 1,000 years- showing a relatively sharp rise in 
temperature from the early 1900s to the present- shown in this graph. Anthropogenic 
agency is indicated by comparative evidence from all available proxy data- pollen, 
dust, growth patterns, ice cores, and tree rings, as well as historical records. The 
researchers showed that CO2 concentrations in various periods, when overlaid with the 
temperature data, give a definite correlation (Mann, Bradley, & Hughes, 1998, 1999). 
The authors concluded that while various inputs- including volcanic eruptions and the 
sun, as well as greenhouse gas emissions- were responsible for temperature increases 
in the past 600 years, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have been principally 
responsible for increases in the 20th century (Mann, Bradley, & Hughes, n.d.). 
The temperature record became known as the "hockey stick" graph because of its shape. 
Comparative proxy assessment for temperatures and atmospheric gas concentrations are 
used by researchers to gauge conditions previous to modem measurement abilities 
available from about 1850 onwards. They are a well-accepted technique within 
palaeoclimatology, with a range of uncertainties based on the nature of the data. 
After the hockey stick graph appeared in the 2001 IPCC report, exciting much citation 
including in the media, a long-running sceptical attack erupted, challenging the validity 
of these data. The challenge to the data was amplified by the politically conservative 
business newspaper The Wall Street Journal, and eventually led to a political 
investigation of the scientists involved by a US Congressional Committee (with a 
separate subcommittee investigation chaired by an avowed climate change sceptic). Of 
particular note to this thesis project was the intersect between a technical challenge by 
professionals not central to climate change research, the involvement of a respected 
media outlet, and attempts at political intimidation of the principal authors. 
"Climate of Distrust" was the headline of a July 2005 editorial in Nature that outlined 
the political nature of the Congressional enquiry, calling it the latest in a series of 
political attacks on science. It started: "The story has become so familiar that new twists 
in the plot cease to outrage. Time after time, in agency after agency, political factors 
have prevented US science from serving its time-honoured role in informing 
government decisions" ( Climate of Distrust, 2005, p 1 ). 
Leading the 2003 criticism of Mann et al. ' s statistical data and related computations 
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were two Canadians: Stephen McIntyre, an administrator (with a mathematics 
background) in mineral exploration companies; and economist Ross McKitrick. This 
offers more evidence for the thesis that climate change public knowledge is very n1uch a 
science and society exercise that can be frarned and influenced by deliberate "blocking 
activity or by honest beliefs and confusions, and sometimes by criticisms from actors 
outside of the main research stream. It is also clear fro111 the historical evidence that 
thanks to internet sites, such sceptical criticisms have a long shelf life, even when 
supposedly laid to rest. The website http: //www.realclimate.org, a popular science 
website staffed by climate researchers, delves into the 111yths that become "fact" in 
many newspaper opinion pieces and political speeches as a result. See 
(http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2004/12/myths-vs-fact-regarding-the-
hockey-stick/). This could be a valuable research project in itself. 
According to the realclimate site and other sources, in 2003 the US Congress decided to 
investigate, after an article in The Wall Street Journal publicised McIntyre's criticisn1, 
previously published in acade111ic joumals.3 The issue before Congress becaine Mann's 
reported refusal to provide data to the two Canadians (which he eventually did). This 
led to a grilling before a special Congressional subcom111ittee chaired by avowed 
climate change sceptic Congressman Joe Barton. Ba1ion reportedly requested Mann's 
(representing the team) source code, archives of all data for all of his scientific 
publications, identities of his present and past scientific collaborators, and details of all 
funding for any of Mann's ongoing or prior research, including all of the supporting 
forms and agreements. 
The Congressional investigation called on a panel of scientists convened by the 
111ainstreain National Research Council of the US National Acade1ny of Sciences, which 
a year later wrote: 
3 ln 2003. Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick published "Corrections to the Mann el al. (1998) Proxy 
Data Base and Northern Hemisphere Average Temperature Series" in the journal Energy and 
Em·iro11me11r, 14(6) . 751 - 772. raising concerns about their ability to reproduce the results of MBH (Mann, Bradley. Hughes). The IPCC 2007 report states that "Wahl and Ammann (2007) showed that this 
was a consequence of differences in the way McIntyre and McKitrick (2003) had implemented the 
method of Mann et al. ( 1998) and that the original reconstruction could be closely duplicated using the 
original proxy data.'' In 2004 Mann. Bradley, and Hughes published a corrigendum to their 1998 article, 
correcting a number of mistakes in the online supplementary information that accompanied their article 
but lea\·ing the actual results unchanged. 
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The basic conclusion of Mann et al. ( 1998, 1999) was that the late 20th century 
warmth in the N orthem Hemisphere was unprecedented during at least the last 
1,000 years. This conclusion has subsequently been supported by an array of 
evidence ... 
Based on the analyses presented in the original papers by Mann et al. and this 
newer supporting evidence, the committee finds it plausible that the Northern 
Hemisphere was warmer during the last few decades of the 20th century than 
during any comparable period over the preceding millennium. 
(Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years, 
National Research Council, 2006). 
However, the reviewers note that substantial uncertainties with data of large-scale 
surface temperatures prior to about AD 1600 lower the confidence for the whole 1,000-
year period compared with more definite events like the Little Ice Age cooling in the 
15th century and 20th century warming. 
In addition, an investigation was performed at the behest of Congressman Joe Barton by 
a panel of statisticians, chaired by Edward Wegman. The Wegman critique particularly 
took issue with the use of statistical techniques by palaeoclimatologists like Mann and 
colleagues without involving statisticians as funded partners, particularly those made 
credible by membership in the professional organisation-perhaps shedding insight into 
how some of the professional climate change "debate" becomes motivated, but also 
accepted as a valid criticism. 
These statisticians also repudiated the "hottest in a millennium" claims-saying they are 
unverifiable-and supported the original technical critique of McIntyre and McKitrick. 
Wegman and his colleagues were, in tum, repudiated by Wahl and Amman (2006) with 
consultant statisticians on board. 
So what would have happened to the "hockey stick" graph if Wegman and his 
colleagues, supporting the original McIntyre criticism, had been consulted on the 
technical adjustment at the heart of the dispute? "Absolutely nothing," according to the 
summary on http: //www.realclimate.org, which suggested: "Can we all get on with 
something more interesting now?" (The missing piece at the Wegman hearing, 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
The background physics and chemistry of greenhouse gas emissions. and their heat-
holding effects on the planet, have been explored and gradually understood since 
Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s made the connection between CO2 
emissions from burning fossil fuels and the possibility that global temperatures might 
rise significantly. While nah1ral variation in temperah1re can and does vary widely on a 
daily and annual basis, the contemporary "enhanced greenhouse effect" leading to 
global warming with related climatic i1npacts and changes (still far from predictable) 
refer to the average and steady upward temperature climb measured across the globe 
since the Industrial Revolution. This has involved accelerating burning of fossil fuels by 
humans, releasing CO2 as well as the release through human activities of other 
greenhouse gases particularly methane and nitric oxide. 
The upward curve of greenhouse gas concentrations has spiked dramatically since the 
middle of the 20th century, to levels scientists have called unprecedented in the last 
420,000 years, based on ice core evidence. The 20 th century ti1nefra1ne is characterised 
by an explosion of population and technological innovation based on fossil fuel energy 
use. Current CO2 concentrations are nudging upward of 390 ppm- a sudden ri se of 
more than 100 ppm fro1n pre-industrial levels that researchers believe remained stable at 
around 240 ppm CO2, with minor fluctuations , for 250,000 years or longer. A 
palaeoclimatological analysis indicates mam1nals only staiied flourishing on the planet 
as CO2 levels declined below 450 ppm about 34 1nillion years ago (Glikson, 2008). 
As a result of the evidence for global wanning and climate change in tande1n with 
human civilisation, and other environmental impact studies, the science community has 
delivered the concept of humans as a new geophysical force capable of altering 
planetary sys tems. The term "Anthropocene" has been coined and suggests a new 
geological epoch, dorninated by the impacts of human activities such as global-sca le 
bun1ing of coal (particularly significant for Australia). The tenn "anthropogenic cli111ate 
change,, reflects this concept and is used in this thesis. This idea is still resisted by some 
traditionally trained geologists and others whose disciplines argue that past geological 
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events or measurable aspects of the earth's composition or changes in planetary systems 
( e.g., earth axis, solar flares, etc.) can be the only accepted influences on future events. 
The so-called Mann et al. ( 1998, 1999) "hockey stick" science controversy (Box 1) is an 
excellent case study of how non-expert sceptic criticism, media, and politics can 
intersect with the science and the scientists. The case revolved around proxy data 
findings for the past 1,000 years linking CO2 and temperature rise. The Mann et al. 
research produced a visual representation of a short, sharp rise in CO2 levels in the 
second half of the 20th century - hence the hockey stick label. Despite being 
successfully repudiated, the longevity of the original criticism on internet sites is 
another notewo1ihy potential impact on public understanding, a pattern repeated with 
other sceptic criticisms. 
The IPCC has reviewed and disseminated the evidence on the science, the impacts, and 
potential responses since 1990, and this thesis accepts the evidence of the IPCC 
assessments, as the scientific basis for the following discussion. 
Postscript: the 2007 IPCC Assessment 
The 2007 IPCC assessment , while outside the study period, is noteworthy for returning 
to the 1nore definite language of the 1990 assessment and supports the anthropogenic 
theory discussed in this chapter, reporting: "Global atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of 
human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial levels determined from 
ice cores ... due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change [ deforestation], while 
[concentrations] of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture" (IPCC 
Fowih Assessment Repo1i, Working Group l, February 2007, Summary for 
Policymakers, p.2). 
This assessment characterises resultant trends and impacts as hotter days and nights 
over most land areas since 1950-1970 and on an upward trend since 1900, plus 
increased frequency of heat waves, heavy rainfall events, increased areas affected by 
drought, intense cyclone activity increasing, sea levels rising and increased incidence of 
extreme high sea levels (p.9 and p.11). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN, THEORY AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
My 30-year experience as a journalist and professional communicator influenced the 
research questions and design reflected in the chapters. Experience had taught me that 
controversial science and society stories, that often concern environmental issues, are 
best understood within a broader social context: i.e. a context of sectoral interests or 
ideological influences on policy and decision-making. These influences can raise 
significant barriers to uptake of even highly conclusive scientific findings , or throw 
them into the realm of debate. Evolving research areas in environmental and emih 
sciences which do not lend themselves neatly to measurement may be particularly prone 
to controversy and paralysis when a response is called for. Applying a science and 
society communication analysis to such a topic can offer fresh insight on how to 
overcome barriers and move forward. 
The exploration leading to several major thesis questions started with conte111porary 
evidence of societal barriers to the clear communication of anthropogenic climate 
change (Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), 2004). Evidence gathered by the UCS 
indicated that political interference in the co111munication process in the United States at 
that time included distorting and suppressing information on anthropogenic climate 
change gathered by govemrnent scientists and likewise interfering with other 
environmental and public health data as it was communicated. A statement of concern 
supporting these allegations was eventually signed by thousands of scientists, according 
to the UCS. 
This was intriguing, given the magnitude of climate change as an issue facing 
govem1nent and populations. It raised the question of whether similar political 
interference or other factors had influenced the course of communicating climate 
change to the public and related public understanding in Australia. My starting point for 
exploratory research came from this question. Informal queries (like dinner table 
conversations) soon established a considerable level of denial and confusion in the 
public discourse on this topic. At the same time I did recall , vaguely in regard to detail s 
that climate change vvas not a ne,v environmental topic and had been an issue of 
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concern since the 1980s. A subsequent review of the public understanding of science 
literature- compiled in Corbett & Durfee (2004) and in Lowe, Brown, Dessai, & de 
Franca (2006) established that little to no research had been undertaken on the 
communication of climate change in Australia or on the related interaction of science 
communication, policy and media on public knowledge. Following further investigation 
in the literature of political science, human geography and media studies, the research 
question settled on a comparative ( over time spans) science and society analysis and 
synthesis of how the science, impacts and responses to climate change were 
communicated during the period 1987- 2001 in Australia. 
From this basis as a science history analysis, the design of the thesis started to take 
shape along with the search for novel insights and findings. In the course of the multi-
disciplinary literature review, and subsequent search of documentary source material, I 
became aware of the early (1980s) level of public communication on this topic. In fact, 
a startling amount of evidence was emerging that there had been a high level of public 
knowledge about anthropogenic climate change (then known as the "greenhouse 
effect") in Australia during this early period, consistent with scientific reports, warnings 
and understanding of risk. This review included a recollection that as a freelance science 
communicator during the early 1990s I had written and produced climate change 
information for the public under federal government contract. Tliese publications were 
still in 1ny archive, for example Climate Change Program, a set of fact sheets 
co1nmissioned by the Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and 
Te1Titories (DASETT). That I was able to more or less forget that whole period 
prompted further questions about communication understanding over time. When I 
opened these publications I saw the language of scientific certainty, about risks posed 
by "the greenhouse effect" as a result of burning fossil fuels and there was also a range 
of strategies ( largely to do with energy demand management) to mitigate the levels of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases that humans were adding to the atmosphere. 
Research Questions and Baseline for Analysis 
This then led to the first guiding research question: What was the extent and 
communication style of early public knowledge of anthropogenic climate change in 
Australia 1987- 1991 and what happened to it subsequently during the 1990s? 
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A qualitative exploration of the public record ensued. It involved sourcing hundreds of 
media reports , and scores of government and other public documents- starting fron1 the 
late 1980s into the early l 990s- and yielded a hitherto unanalysed historical context: 
Australia at this time had very strong science communication and public knowledge on 
this topic assisted by consistent media com1nunication and political interest and 
leadership. In tande1n there developed a focused and bipartisan policy response at 
federal and state levels unmatched in subsequent years. This finding, which of itself 
may offer an important contribution to the science communication and science history 
literature, offered an excellent baseline for a comparative, longitudinal communication 
analysis and study of significant influences on the communication over time (1987-
2001) which is the central focus of this thesis. 
The question evolved to ask: after 1991, how and why was a very substantial level of 
early public knowledge about the causes and risks of climate change gradually 
deconstn1cted and reconstructed differently with significant consequences for public 
understanding? What were the dominant influences on the communication refra1ne of 
the scientific information and policy responses as this research was finding that the 
science risk reports did not change significantly over time? 
The ti1neframe 1987- 2001 was chosen to coincide with both the baseline data and three 
international assessment series issued on anthropogenic climate change (science, 
i1npacts and response) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
1990, 1995 and 2001.These provided the scientific input accepted by thi s thesis. 
Separately they provided an opportunity to study changed language framing between 
the three assessment reports. 
RESEARCH THEORY AND DESIGN 
Within the longitudinal framework and with few fixed theoretical underpinnings to 
build on, it was decided that 1nodified grounded theory and adaptive 1nethods wou ld be 
the 1nost appropriate theoretical frainework for designing a qualitative research protocol 
to ansvver the research questions. The other theoretical structure that becarne important 
to this analysis was constructivist theory. Both grounded theory methods and 
constructivist theory assist an exploration of how reality is socially constructed, which 
goes to the core of the research questions. 
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This thesis also acknowledges or refers to a range of additional research and theoretical 
understandings from the humanities including: discourse analysis Fairclough, 1989, 
1992, 1995, 2003; (Dryzek, 1997); cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Gitlinl979); 
media and political agenda setting (Chomsky et al. 1992; Carey, 1995; Ward, 1995, 
2001) and other authors including researchers on the agendas of neo-liberalism and its 
theories like public choice theory. Also, useful was the concept of ecological 
modernisation (Hajer, 1995) as well as, central to my framing argument, cognitive 
linguistic theories (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Lakoff 2005). These have been 
acknowledged as fields of theory or research in the body of the thesis. It was felt that a 
side discussion of each related literature would have distracted from the main narrative. 
It is a challenge for a work of synthesis to do justice to the background literature from a 
range of disciplines that contribute value to a science and society analysis. But the door 
is also open to further indepth investigations along each avenue. 
The research approach is both qualitative and narrative .. Having learned from the pilot 
baseline enquiry into 1987-1991 that the most enlightening evidence resides in public 
docun1ents , I decided to explore evidence available from three areas of the public 
don1ain for the study period: government, business and other documents; newspaper 
archives; and testin1ony through semi-structured interviews. Gathering text and 
intervievl data offered triangulating evidence. Triangulation deals \~rith validity in 
qualitative research and involves the gathering of different kinds of data to see whether 
they corroborate one another (Silverman, 2001, p .. 233). The narrative approach then 
was to integrate this evidence with other research findings available from the literature 
to tell the story of what happened and analyse it for communication changes and key 
influences over tune. The goal was to identify parameters that have governed 
communication of anthropogenic climate change over time and the links between 
science, policy and media. Ideally, the study ~rould offer insights, results and some 
theoretical suggestions useful to communicating "controversial" environmental research 
results .. 
This chapter desc1ibes in further detail the design and methods related to my use of 
modified grounded theory, including the methods for collecting and analysing these 
three areas of source material and how the relative emphasis changed as the research 
progressed. The chapter concludes ~rith a section on the framing lens that I developed 
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for analysis and longitudinal comparisons, using insights offered frorn constructivist 
theory and the fields of psychology, linguistics and neuroscience. 
The na1Tative mode was judged the best mode to explain what happened and why. and 
rests on integration of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. This 
integration of sources is particularly relevant to the chapters exploring the "why" 
questions of influence on the communication changes. In order to help the reader 
distinguish original analysis with primary sources from other people's analysis I have 
marked primary sources with a bullet point in the bibliography. 
Definition of Primary Sources 
In keeping with the science history context, I define primary sources as: 
• Newspaper or magazine articles, government and other documents pre 2002 
relevant to the topic of this enquiry and demonstrating discourse language and 
public knowledge at the time 
• Interviews conducted for this thesis 
• Popular books on climate change published pre 2002 and used as evidence for 
public knowledge at the time of publication 
• Evidence gathered specifically to illustrate issues examined in this thesis, for 
exa111ple a 2007 Sydney Morning Herald report on scientists being recruited by 
an oil company to speak against the IPCC report. 
• Scientific studies published prior to 2002- for example the relevant IPCC 
reports 
Secondary sources are: 
• J oumal articles, books, rnagazine articles for the whole study period featuring 
historical , political, scientific or other relevant analysis by a particu1ar named 
author. 
vVHY QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Why did I choose to do qualitative research in this project? Since little to no work had 
been done on how clin1ate change scientific information and policy were con1municated 
fro1n the late 1980s in Australia, Strauss & Corbin (1990 , p.19) provide a relevant 
ans\ver: "Qualitative methods can be used to uncover and understand what lies behind 
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any phenomenon about which little is yet known .... Also, qualitative methods can give 
the intricate details of phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative 
methods." Creswell (1998, p.15) writes that in qualitative research "The researcher 
builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports, detailed views of informants, 
and conducts the study in a natural setting." Creswell stresses the ability of qualitative 
methods to analyse complexity and multiple dimensions. A key distinction with 
quantitative research that Creswell notes is that quantitative analysis focuses on a few 
variables and many cases, while qualitative researchers concern themselves with many 
variables but fewer cases. 
This method seemed best suited to the comparative and narrative analysis and 
integration of texts and interviews I was developing over a historical time span. I was 
interested in the "intricate details" as well as the "holistic picture" regarding the 
changed co1nmunication frames and what influenced them. Analysing public documents 
and conducting semi-structured interviews are two accepted forms of data collection in 
qualitative methodology and are compatible with grounded theory objectives (Creswell, 
1998). 
Empirically, I was finding, in the course of collecting public docu1nents and newspaper 
articles and considering how to analyse them for rhetoric and framing ( and follovving an 
early newspaper content analysis exercise), that the documents were yielding valuable 
contextual and source 1naterial beyond the limited role of a quantitative content 
analysis. It was beyond the scope of quantitative analysis to convey the full impact of 
detail and nuance used in the language of sampled newspaper articles compared 
between periods. For that reason an early exercise in quantifying content in newspaper 
articles was not built upon for the whole study period, although it yielded some 
interesting results. 
Interviews provided the third arm of the qualitative analysis , as a form of corroborating 
(triangulating) evidence. Silverman (2001 , p.235) reviews theoretical disputes about the 
use of triangulation to arrive at a whole truth, but allows that triangulation has value 
where "it reveals the existence of public and private accounts of an agency' s work," 
combining interview and other data to make better sense of the other. 
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My professional experience provided me with interview and research skills useful to 
finding suitable subjects and developing semi-stn1ctured interviews. Rubin & Rubin 
(1995) recommend a model similar to the one adopted for starting the intervie~ process. 
That is, start with key informants who know or cover the area of interest such as 
reporters or government officials. Studying historical and political events can also lead 
to interview subjects through public records such as the documentary evidence gathered 
for this thesis. Scientists as well as those involved with the policy process and reporters 
were the three main areas of interview subject selected. 
After an attempt at a standardised interview protocol which proved unsuccessful in 
terms of eliciting reliable or useful data compared with the time demand of that process 
interview questions were tailored to the background and knowledge of the selected 
individuals in the semi-structured mode. The interviews were designed to extend 
insights or corroborate evidence identified in the documentary record where those 
selected could reasonably be expected to have first-hand knowledge. It also served to 
drill down further on a topic. Rubin and Rubin (1995, p.76) say that qualitative 
interviews "try to capture some of the richness and complexity of their subject matter 
and explain it in comprehensible ways .... but ensure that the results are deep, detailed 
vivid and nuanced." Conducting semi-stn1ctured interviews, I included some of the 
techniques suggested by Rubin and Rubin to add depth, for example, follow up 
questions to an answer at the time or later and a conversational approach - neither part 
of a strict fonnal interview protocol. 
FOCUS ON DOCUMENTARY RECORD AND COMMUNICATION FRAMING 
An understanding gained during the preliminary interview work- that interviews would 
not be reliable enough to be the primary source of evidence (further discussed below)-
placed a greater e111phasis on documentary texts and on the historical narrative 
approach. Also, as a result of the preliminary document analysis that yielded the finding 
of good pre-1992 public understanding, a constructivist investigation of ho\\ 
com111unication is taken up and changed to create "reality" became a parallel strand in 
this investigation. outlined in section 3 .1 (the framing lens,. 
Text analvsis is under-utilised in qualitative research by social scientists according to 
Sih·ennan (2001 ). Ho\\'eYer \Vritten texts and interYie\VS together underline the 
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linguistic character of many qualitative data, which is the purpose of a communication 
study. The "uncertain attitude to language" in existing methodology (Silverman, 2001 , 
p.119) was a further reason for concluding there are few existing theoretical 
underpinnings to apply to this study and to turn to modified grounded theory and social 
constructivism as theoretical approaches to answers. 
Besides allowing an analysis of rhetoric and how it changed over time, the text and 
interview data also served as primary sources in an integration of insights with those of 
other authors in order to explain the influences on the changed communication and thus 
to answer the "how" and "why" questions 
Changes and refinements as the evidence accumulated are examples of how the 
grounded theory process was used in this thesis. Grounded theory is "inductively 
derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents ... one does not begin with a 
theory, then prove it. Rather one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to 
that area is allowed to emerge" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.23). These authors also 
provide a theoretical link from grounded theory methods to constructivism when they 
say "if one is interested in extending an already existing theory, then one might begin 
with the existing theory and attempt to uncover how it applies to new and varied 
situations" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.51 ). 
Documentary Evidence 
The two areas of documentary evidence sampled were non-fiction reports and 
newspaper articles. 
To set a framework for sampling documents and newspaper content, I chose to look at 
ti1ne periods related to the release of successive IPCC reports-1990-1991, 1995-1996 
and 2000-2001. In addition, the period 1987-89 was sampled as the baseline for 
analytical comparison to later time periods after it became clear from the initial 
document searches that a wealth of material about climate change was produced during 
those years. I called the late 1980s "the early study period". 
Some 60 government, business and other public documents related to climate change 
science and policy were located and reviewed, with most available evidence of this type 
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dated from 1987-1992. About 250 newspaper articles provided evidence of the frarning 
and rhetoric employed during successive study periods. Reports fro111 umbrella 
organisations such as the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation 
Council (ANZECC) or Senate Inquiries offered important consensus views fro-m the 
time, based on their multiple inputs and overview roles. 
The non-newspaper reports included government, think tank, industry and related policy 
and consultant material as well as popular science books. These were sainpled and 
analysed from two library collections. One collection was held by the ACT 
Environment Centre library which yielded an extensive sample of governn1ent (state 
and federal) documents regarding response activities to the greenhouse effect and 
climate change frorn the early study period, as well as popular science books from the 
late 1980s and also IPCC reports. This library collection also yielded some documents 
from the remaining study period. These primary sources were judged to be mainstrea111 
publications reflecting public discourse from a given period. 
The second library, held privately by a consultant working in the area of greenhouse and 
energy policy in the early 1990s, also yielded a comprehensive sampling of 
government, industry, think tank and popular writing (e.g., in Newsweek magazine) 
fro1n 1987 to 1992, as well as some from the mid-l 990s. Further documents relating to 
the whole study period were sampled from personal archives held by CSIRO climate 
change scientists and still others were sourced from internet searches. 
Relatively far fewer government domestic action repo1is or popular science books were 
found on these shelves dating from the 1nid 1990s to 2001, lending support to the 
hypothesis gained fro1n the political/economic literature (Bulkeley, 2001; Hamilton , 
2001; Pearse, 2007; McDonald, 2005) that federal goven11nent activity and 
co111munication about risks and do1nestic response declined as the 1990s unfolded to be 
replaced by international negotiations and economic arguments for inaction. It appeared 
that the don1inant discourse shifted from science to economics and national policy. 
Considerable supporting evidence for this shift was gained from the sampled newspaper 
record and fro111 interviewees. One notable exception amongst gover11ment publications 
\Vas the Department of Energy's climate change newsletter that allowed a comparative 
study \Vi thin its pages of early and later framing. Contrarian publications and 
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publications from environmental groups filled some of the vacuum during the mid to 
later 1990s, but these have not been a primary focus of this study. 
The 1987- 1991 baseline documents were used to compare with the other early (1991), 
middle (1995) and late (2001) study periods and analyse changes in framing, agenda-
setting and rhetoric. 
The documentary analysis looked at language/rhetoric and value framing of climate 
change information in headlines, executive summaries and introductions of documents -
individually and comparatively across different study periods. I also used comparative 
framing analysis of the documentary texts, particularly the newspaper texts , to examine 
and illustrate the tenor and framing of public knowledge at different times. Several 
documents are presented in Appendix 1 as evidence of early public knowledge and 
reporting style. 
Newspaper Analysis 
The baseline criteria for snap sampling newspaper articles were years at the beginning 
and end of the study period, .i.e., 1988- 89, and 2001 and the y~ars of the IPCC reports. 
The first criterion for selecting two newspapers to review was that they needed to be 
"newspapers of record". This is a generally-accepted term for a newspaper with large 
circulation and national scope, and that generally is considered professional and 
unbiased (by the reading public if not the academic analysts). Australia, with a small 
and highly concentrated media market does not offer a wide choice in this regard. I 
decided to stay with one publisher Fairfax, but compare two titles with a different focus. 
The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and The Australian Financial Review (Fin 
Review) are two nationally-read broadsheets with different editorial missions, one being 
general interest and the other being the business press. This lent itself to reviews of 
science and political/economic coverage. 
A third national newspaper of record, The Australian, presented a special case of known 
climate change scepticism during the study period. I decided to review its influence 
based on other researchers' work in chapter 7 but not include it in the media analysis for 
this particular investigation. My aim was not to do an exhaustive media analysis but 
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rather to provide an acceptable body of evidence of how communication changed within 
the mainstream press and to use publications whose editorial stances and biases had not 
previously been investigated. There is considerable scope for further 111edia 
communication comparison and analysis, not least outside the narrow confines of daily 
print media to include broadcast, magazines, and the internet. 
In the two publications selected, stories were sampled using Factiva, in the first instance 
with a search for the phrases "greenhouse effect", "global wanning" or "climate 
change" for the defined study periods. The sampling was further refined by selecting 
those articles which mentioned these phrases in the headline or lead paragraph. In the 
1988/ 1989 sample for the SMH this method cut the sample roughly to one third- from 
353 to 118. A similar analysis for the Fin Review yielded 56 articles that headlined the 
phenomenon out of 184 for this two-year period. Using the same criteria, 193 articles 
were identified for the period January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990 in the SMH. It 
became evident there was much material at this early period, prompting its use as the 
baseline. 
The final selection for indepth review was to then take the first 15 sampled articles from 
the first six months of a given two-year period linked to IPCC reporting (for exan1ple 
1990-1991 and 1995-1996) and also the first 15 from the last 6 months of the two year 
period. In this way for the early study period 1987- 1992 inclusive (the baseline years 
and the first IPCC two-year period), 60 articles were sampled for one publication . 
Thereafter, one two-year period, yielding 30 articles, was sampled in the same way in 
1995-1996 and another for 2000-2001. 
A pilot quantitative analysis was undertaken after consulting some texts on content 
analysis. Krippendorff ( 1980, p.171) notes that traditional content analyses have been 
concen1ed with se111antic references and evaluations of attitudes. But modem uses of 
content analysis may see data as correlates of the phenoinena of interest or as causes or 
by-products: "Anything connected with the phenomena of interest qualifies as data for 
content analysts.,, 
Con1parative matrices were developed for the pilot quantitative study comparing l 
and 2000/01. In addition to criteria (A) i.e. , the mention of greenhouse, climate change 
and global \Varming and (B) 1nention of these in headline or lead, the following additional 
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criteria were added to the sampling selection for a quantitative analysis of comparative 
trends. 
C) SOURCE 
• Scientists/technical experts 
• Politicians 
• NGO/Green Group 
• Industry 
• Sceptic 
• Economists/ ABARE 
• Energy consultant 
• Opinion ( or) 
• Reporter analysis 
D)DEBATE 
• Debate (use of term) about science/predictions) 
Subset of debate 
• Theory (greenhouse/CC) 
• Uncertainty/Uncertain (scientific) 
• Sceptics/Scepticism/sceptical 
• Consensus (scientific) 
• Doubt human agency 




• politician/politician initiative 
• economic study 
• NGO/green comment 
• Weather 
• opinion poll 
• IPCC report 
• Opinion piece 
• Reporter analysis 
• Innovation consumer news 
• Industry debate 
• Other, e.g. carbon market 
• Special supplements 
• 
F. MENTION OF EMISSION TARGETS 
• Emission targets for Oz/international political action, about Kyoto targets 
• Targets: # of times mentioned incidental to other focus; e.g. Kyoto 
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G. CONTEXT - explains greenhouse effect and human agency 
H. HIGHLIGHTS UNCERTAINTY amongst scientist and/or their language 
The quantitative content analysis method yielded son1e interesting early data that helped 
inform the overall analysis, discussed in chapter 7. However, this quantitative 1nethod 
of analysis was then set aside in favour of qualitative text analysis. Consistent with 
grounded theory, the method evolved to incorporate extensive quotation from 
docurnentary and newspaper texts to impart the details and the 'flavour' of 
co1nmunication at the different study periods. 
Context for the two strands of documentary text evidence was researched and 
incorporated in the thesis narrative. Context comes fro111 the multi-disciplinary literature 
and covers the chronological, political and economic developments during the study 
period (and some before and after), and is cited in following chapters. 
Interview Methods 
Twenty seven formal semi-stn1ctured interviews were conducted between May 2006 
and January 2008 with an additional 12 infonnal interviews gathering context and 
background infonnation conducted during the same period. Follow up interviews with 
the sa1ne individual are counted as part of the single main interview. 
The fon11al and then semi-stn1ctured interviews were begun in October/Noven1ber 2006 
and concluded in January 2008 following compliance with the requiren1ent in Australia 
that research involving humans be first approved by the university (in this case 
Australian National University) Human Research Ethics Comn1ittee. A consent form 
was drawn up, approved, and presented to each interviewee (see form in Appendix 2). 
All interviews, except for several phone interviews, were also tape-recorded with the 
intervievvee 's permission - which is further evidence of consent. Almost all interviews 
were conducted face to face. One transcribed interview is attached in Appendix 2. 
Those intervicvved formally were asked to sign consent fonns that specifically asked 
pennission allovving their names to be used in the thesis report. I judged it to be 111ore 
authentic and less cu111berso111e in relaying the data to use na111es where possible. Names 
have not been used for infonnal interview material. 
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Interview subjects were chosen from three professional categories: climate scientists, 
media workers and policy professionals or politicians and a deciding criterion was that 
they were professionally active in their field during the study period and therefore had 
first hand knowledge of events during that time. Table 1 summarises the interview 
categories, numbers and timeframes. 
Table 1 Interview Numbers and Timeframes. 
Profession Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June June 2007- Totals 
2006 2006 2007 Jan 2008 
Scientist 1 3 1 1 6 
Media 2 1 5 3 11 
Policy 1 6 1 2 10 
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Interviewees were selected on the basis of establishing a representative but not 
exhaustive sample of people who were on the scene in places of influence during the 
study period and could comment on the documentary record in the three designated 
areas: climate science, media and policy. Apart from the decision to give relatively less 
centrality to the interview data compared with the documentary record, a consideration 
for the final selection of people to interview was their availability to a PhD candidate 
( travel resources for face to face interviews and also the factor of interviewee interest or 
access in taking part). 
Therefore, while several players with personal knowledge and influential roles from 
each of the three catego1ies were sought out and their evidence compared, this method 
did not require speaking to everyone who 1night have played a role in various aspects of 
this investigation. It should be noted however that key players from the time and their 
views - e.g. senior politicians - were also represented in the newspaper and document 
record and so1ne are quoted in this report. 
The project gained the recollection of two federal ministers active in the early study 
period (science and primary industries) and informally spoke to a third for suggestions 
of who to talk to. This helped to document the level of early good understanding. It was 
deemed important to speak to at least one of the federal ministers responsible for 
signing Australia's 1990 emissions reduction target (that was John Kerin). Senior 
bureaucrats from the 1990s department and ministry of environment, leading 
39 
atmospheric scientists and a Comn1onwealth research advisory comn1ittee chair as \vcll 
as specialist journalists active at the time provided other perspectives on the 
documentary analysis. 
Informal interviews were conducted with five academic professionals who had 
conducted science and society research relevant to the science history of climate change 
communication. An additional three journalists, two scientists and the fonner federal 
minister were also interviewed. 
An initial scoping exercise for the interview process and also to provide information 
for the thesis design, involved a list of formalised standard questions based on "what 
happened and why". This was presented to some scientists and policy people active 
during the study period. 
It became evident in the course of these interviews that in most cases people had 
forgotten important events or processes that were in the docu1nentary record 
(government reports from that time, media stories), e.g., that Australia was on track to 
put in place an emission reduction target in October 1990. This might be due to 
imperfect memory for events 15 years earlier; or perhaps due to elite decision-making 
style so that policy directions were not widely known or emphasised across all decision-
making sectors, or a combination of both influences. 
Clandinen and Connelly ( 1994) writing about personal experience methods in 
qualitative research and "field texts" discuss oral history, annals, chronicles and 
research interviews, but do not specifically canvass the methodology that best gets 
around the memory issue regarding peoples' experience (in Denzin & Lincoln pp. 418-
421 ). Creswell (1998) and Rubin & Rubin (1995) writing about qualitative interview 
design methods also do not canvass 1nemory, leading to the conclusion that different 
interview approaches might be trialled to revive memory and that in any event 
consistency of evidence requires cross-referencing and multiple sources, which \Ve 
kno\v as triangulation. 
I cone luded that it was most likely that the issue was interviewees ' recall of events, or it 
\Yas lack of attention at the time. since there had been many media reports in the public 
dornain. This conclusion influenced the change of approach to greater reliance on the 
docun1entarv record and less reliance on interviews for "the facts" and a se,ni-
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structured, more conversational approach to the interview questions. One method to 
sharpen recall might be to submit written questions ahead of time, which would allow 
the interviewee to consult records and "refresh their memory" or, alternately, to follow 
up with written questions which would allow the interviewee to submit additional 
com1nents having further thought about it. On request questions were sent to one 
interviewee ahead of time and some follow-up email correspondence was undertaken 
with a few interviewees, adding useful data. However this did not become a standard 
method in this investigation. 
While not being as useful in terms of oral history as first hoped, the early interview 
responses did yield interesting science and society insights. They showed that not only 
members of the public but informed participants showed fuzzy recall of risk 
assessments on climate change and policy commitments that were high on national and 
state agendas 15-20 years ago. Such material informed the next set of interview 
questions as well as informing the analysis as a whole, since the question of why we 
ended in such a haze of uncertainty is a central question. 
Parallel analysis of the documentary evidence was supplying interview questions and 
suggestions for people to interview in the semi-stn1ctured round, and questions became 
more targeted to the likely knowledge of the interviewee. It was also deemed important 
to keep the interviews confined in length to no more than two hours for consistency and 
courtesy. One interesting observation was that some interviewees could talk only about 
their professional role but could not, as citizens, recall the general public discourse 
occurring at the same time-for example compared with the wealth of public 
information during the early study period. 
An example will help illustrate this point. One interview, with a former federal science 
minister (Barry Jones), was not going as well as hoped. Jones repeated himself with 
increasing annoyance in response to a number of questions about the discourse of the 
early 1990s. He said that politics revolves around three acute issues of the day and 
there is no room for long-term issues or at least it is not talked about in daily Cabinet 
meetings. The implication was that if you're not the minister responsible for an area 
you may know nothing about ongoing policy initiatives or longer-term "vision". 
According to his interview account, even though he took credit for putting climate 
change on the map in his 2006 book A Thinking Reed once he stopped being science 
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minister in 1990, climate change dropped off his radar screen. In the interviev., he had 
nothing to say as an informed observer. He also had nothing to say about environment 
being a 1nainstream issue during the 1980s other than that it was an electoral gambit. 
However, Jones gave me a copy of a talk he presented to the World Meteorological Day 
Address in 1992 in which he made the point that green issues were extre111ely impo1iant 
during the 1980s for the Hawke federal Labor government election and re-election 
campaigns; and that in 1991 , with economic downturn, the political priorities seen1ed to 
change to jobs. Environment became framed as a luxury extra, which he called 
extremely short-sighted in this document (Jones, 1992, p. 4). In this way, he reinforced 
questions about recall in interviews on historical events and the relationship of rhetoric 
in public speeches with later recall of events and also emphasized the value of printed 
documents as evidence. 
DEVELOPING A FRAMING LENS FOR ANALYSIS 
... perceptions are shaped not only by scientists but by interest groups, 
politicians and the media ... 
... the clilnate in the future actually may depend on what we think about it ... 
what we think, will determine what we do ... 
(Wea1i, 2003, p. 198) 
If humans have become a geophysical force as presented in Chapter 2, then this quote 
fro111 Spencer Weart's book on the scientific discovery of cli1nate change makes several 
key observations about the i1nportance of communication to how we humans influence 
our biophysical surroundings. Weart notes that scientific co1nmlrnication is not a one-
,vay affair but involves "perceptions" by audiences that translate a scientific message 
according to what "we think". This thinking is shaped in western democracies like 
Australia by interest groups, politicians and the media who then influence the general 
public response. Evidence for this view is offered in chapters 6- 8. With this important 
insight, a pre-requisite for analyzing the pathway of scientific communication of climate 
change to the public becomes an exploration of how 1nessages arc "framed". ,vhich 
includes both the language of the original 1nessage, and hovv it is heard and then 
translated bv elite agenda-setters and institutions. 
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It was therefore necessary to the understanding of communication over a 14-year period 
to develop a "framing lens" as a way to compare discourse language and trends in the 
documentary evidence over the course of the study period. The question became: What 
were the hallmarks of the dominant narrative from 1987 through 1991, 1995, and 2001? 
How did the communication change while the underlying science did not? In sum, how 
did "framing" mechanisms work to incrementally disengage public knowledge from the 
scientific facts? 
In this section I look at the theoretical concepts that assist the understanding of framing. 
In the next chapter I then examine in detail the framing of the early public knowledge 
on anthropogenic climate change in the documentary evidence, as a baseline for 
comparison on how the framing changed in the subsequent decade and why. 
A Multidisciplinary Look at Framing 
As I outlined in chapter 1, social scientists have explored how social reality is 
constructed within a civilisation and how it can and does shift over time (Diamond, 
2005; McKnight, 2005). Political science tells us that the frames and agendas that set 
societies' construction of social reality are relayed by opinion leaders and networks that 
set the daily narrative agenda together with the mass media (Rampton & Stauber, 2002; 
Ward, 1995; Wheelwright, 1987). Cognitive linguistics explores how frames and 
rhetoric are "heard," and about cognitive pathways of understanding, and psychology 
tells us that knowledge is a social constn1ct (Lakoff, 2005; Yager, 1991). The 
cognitive linguistics insights have proven particularly useful and pointed to a different 
way of looking at science communication, compared with the more traditional 
information deficit model. 
Framing compared to information deficit model 
"Framing" can be seen as critical both to how a message is communicated and how it is 
"heard" at different levels. Broadly speaking, those levels are: framing within public 
policy and agenda setting; framing information to a target audience; and how we use 
language. These concepts, while well understood within cognitive science and some 
communications studies, are new to science communication as a field (Bubela & Nisbet, 
2009) and sometimes considered controversial or extraneous by some academics and 
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scientists (Leach, 2009; Nisbet & Moody, 2007). The opposing argument appears to say 
that scientists as communicators do not need to concern themselves with what people 
"hear" from communications and/or adjust messages accordingly, for fear that they slip 
into public relations "spin". 
One alternative to an understanding about how fra111ing is used in public discourse is to 
fall back on the information deficit model of communication and also on the unspoken 
academic cultural model: that scientists speak amongst themselves but rarely to the 
wider public and that someone else out there-possibly political advisers, the media, or 
educators-will translate what they say into public knowledge. Information deficit for 
the purposes of this thesis is defined as providing the same message in a one-way 
interaction-from scientist to public-on the assu111ption that the public doesn't "get it 
and that 111ore of the same will provide the enlightenment needed. This model of pub lie 
understanding and science communication has been critiqued by many researchers 
pa1iicularly from the social sciences (e.g. Nisbet & Moody, 2007; Trench, 2008). 
A More Likely Model-Message as a Social Construct 
The social constructivist analysis of science uptake offers an attractive model of how 
public knowledge is established, proffered not only by theoretical constructivist studies 
(Fine, 1996), but also by co111mon experience of communication. Indeed, from the fields 
of psychology, educational theory, linguistics, and now neuroscience comes the 
understanding that it is not what you "say" that matters but what people "hear" 
(Cho111sky, 1991; Lakoff, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This understanding has been 
applied by educators as a constructivist view of learning (Yager, 1991) but also since 
the tum of the century by propagandists (Bernays, 1928) and, more recently, by the 
public relations industry. A constructivist analysis tells us that people hear or process 
infom1ation based on the sum of their past experience, not least through the filters of 
professional training (an area explored more closely by this thesis in the section on 
disciplinary differences, in chapter 8), as well as their cores values, including religion. It 
is suggested that people interpret reality through these various filterv. 
In keeping ,vith constructivist theory, these multiple inputs 111can that evervonc reacts to 
infonnation based on their memory banks and emotional triggers. \vhich helps explain 
\Vhy communication can be so puzzlinglv difficult. Social sciences tell us that there i 
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also a cultural creation of "reality" based not only on widely held physical assumptions 
about solid matter, but also on cultural edicts like those from economics or religion. 
Thus within a given culture we agree to perceive the world around us in those ways, 
based on an implicitly agreed mix of influences, or "myths to live by" in the words of 
historical philosopher Ronald Wright (2005). Philosophical relativists argue that we can 
never know whether there is really a material world out there beyond these assumptions 
and our mental constructs. There is no resolution in sight to this debate. 
For our purposes, in looking at environmental science and communication, such 
relativism does not offer a helpful analysis, but rather a road to paralysis. So instead I 
assume in this thesis that there really are trees and mountains and an atmosphere out 
there in the real world, and that generally we agree on what they look like and how they 
feel, and that science tells us what they do and how they change. 
We must still deal, however, with our neurological, social, and cultural constructions of 
"reality" in terms of how we think about the material world and about what science tells 
us. In the rest of this discussion about framing I refer variously to meta, macro and 
micro constructions of everyday reality summarised in Figure 4. Meta framing is 
defined here as the influence of ideas, beliefs, and agenda-setting; macro is influence 
within and between institutions; and micro is the use of language to address the central 
question of how frames operate to influence the listener. 
Figure 4 
Levels of Framing Scientific Communication on Climate Change 
Micro frames are established by the use of language, metaphor, and the manipulation of 
cognitive pathways. 
Macro frames are established within and between scientific and other institutions, or 
through the structural factors guiding media coverage, as well as the disciplinary 
differences between scientists that influence how they communicate their science. 
Meta frames are established by ideological and belief systems 
Framing and Metaphor in Public Rhetoric (Language) 
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"Frame" at a micro level is a conceptual constn1ct that guides thinking. How we use 
language and metaphor is a basic part of this. Metaphor- defined as the use of a word 
or phrase that evokes a pathway of cognitive understandings- is central to human 
communication, according to cognitive scientists Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999), citing the 
works of psychologists Levi-Strauss, Geertz and Piaget, who were at the forefront of 
thinking on cultural constructivism. From this vantage point: "Our conceptual systems 
are fundamentally shaped by cultural constructs (and metaphors are) central to how we 
understand the world" (Bogost, 2005, conference paper). 
Metaphors infuse much of our language use. For example, in Western culture there is 
the influential metaphor of life as a journey: people must have a purpose-"find their 
way", have "goals to reach" or they are "lost", "without direction"; those who "reach 
their goals" fastest are admired, or maybe they have to "find a different path" and so 
forth (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 4 Lakoff applies this understanding to techniques used 
in politics to reinforce certain ideas and values. A common technique is to give a 
positive emotional value to messages, invoking metaphorical pathways, in order to 
frame how to think about things (Lakoff, 2005). A similar understanding was arrived at 
by the early 1900s from the field of psychology, and exploited very successfully by 
theorists of propaganda and public relations. Seminal work in this regard was done by 
Edward Bernays who applied the insights of his uncle Sigmund Freud (Bernays, 1928 · 
Cu1iis, 2002). 
"Freedom" is a classic example of a metaphorical pathway that evokes everything we 
hold dear about our way of life-as shorthand, the concept merges political, economic 
and cultural aspirations. Everything attached to the word "freedom" can evoke positive 
emotions. Advertising has long exploited this understanding. In the context of climate 
change response, we have the "freedom" to buy anything we want or not to buy energy-
efficient appliances or green energy, and so forth. 
The cultural values involved \Vere explored in the late 1960s by communications 
professor Herbert I. Shillec from the University of California. who wrote about the 
connection bet\Yeen mass media and American-style com111erce and consumption-
Lakoff and Johnson ·s theory about the embodied mind- that thought is mostly unconscious and abstract 
concepts arc largely metaphorical- has been called contro\·ersial in light of current practice in \Ves tem 
philosoph: . Ho\\·e\ er. the unpacking of metaphor use in e\·eryday discourse can be Yiewed as a separate 
contribution without getting into the philosophical debate. This thesis makes that distinction. 
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which is framed as the presence of freedom- in trade, speech, and enterprise. In the war 
of ideas that accompanied the resurgence of neo-liberal economics since the 1970s, this 
also came to include freedom from government regulation of business, a perspective 
applied by politicians to environmental or public health issues- both relevant to climate 
change- that might otherwise have invited regulation (Wheelright, 1987). 
Another relevant example is the use of "responsible" or "sound". Both words resonate 
positively in our mental construction and evoke perceptions of being careful, parental, 
and authoritative. "Responsible science" or "sound science" has been invoked by 
various sides of the climate change discourse as a shorthand way to influence public 
understanding of the value or status of the science- along with its antithesis, "junk" 
science. Reaching for the same emotional responses, "responsible science" is also used 
as a metaphorical euphemism for "delay", which might not sound so good. 
"National interest" "J. obs" "family" "battlers" "Australian working families" 
' ' ' ' ' 
"Australian mums and dads": these are meant to evoke a whole framework of response, 
often an emotional response. Family and jobs and country are multi-cultural themes and 
it is a reasonable premise that most Australians can understand or respond to these 
emotional levers. So by linking "jobs" and "family" and "national interest" and 
"responsible science", or "needing more research" to messages about delaying action or 
challenging the science of climate change, members of the public may be induced to 
change their understanding- for getting that once they were responding to frames about 
risk insurance, win-win energy policies, and responsible global citizenship. The 
manipulation of metaphor and cognitive pathways therefore are key elements of framing 
at the micro level. 
The communication of environmental science messages from scientist and public with a 
focus on climate change, involves institutional interactions (macro framing) and the 
influence of ideas and values (meta framing). The diagram in Figure 5, below, is an 
attempt to sketch the possible interplay of these two framing levels along a pathway 
from science message to public. It shows that this communication is likely to be a 
circuitous path subject to a host of cultural and institutional influences. 
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Figure 5 
Framing Environmental Science 
From scientists to public; influences and agenda setting 
Science report to public 
' ( Media ) ◄ 
I 
( Psychology ) 
Bala nce Denial, ' not my problem' 
( Politics ) ~ I ( Cultural values ) 
Govern ment policy Beliefs, myths, ideologies, religion 
/ 
Information from scientists 
Figure 5. Some suggested pathways of influence on frames about environmental science. 
Specifically, environmental science communications are framed through social 
institutions which, in tum, are influenced by ideas/ideologies , beliefs, values, and 
human psychology. Politics and the media are two primary institutions in the framing of 
science messages, along with scientists' own culture, which in tum is not immune to 
cultural beliefs and values. 
Fra ming the Dominant N arrative 
In this analysis, policy-makers , politicians , and the media " hear" and then "frame" the 
scientific facts according to their mental constructs-values, beliefs , and priorities. 
What they say, often using the metaphorical language already discussed, guides the way 
the rest of us tend to think about reality. This basic understanding guides the exploration 
of eYidence by this thesis and is called here the dominant narrative. It is also suggested 
that "controversial" science issues are most likely to attract various levels of framing 
rhetoric and cultural na1Tatives. Environmental science is often "controversial". in that it 
attracts interests and debate from various sectors of society. 
Lakoff (2005). in his assessment of framing and metaphor in political contests. suggests 
that rhetorical framing of issues by politicians. the media, and other opinion leaders ,.,vill 
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steer the public discussion regardless of the "facts" or evidence- in this case, the facts 
espoused by expert scientists and communicators on a particular issue. Lakoff' s 
suggestion is supported by the arc of climate change communication over time, and the 
influences on that communication, explored in this thesis. 
These understandings from cognitive science raised the question: How has the dominant 
narrative and the use of metaphor and targeted language been applied in the "culture 
wars" or "battle of ideas" that have raged around the science of anthropogenic climate 
change? An example of how it can be, and has been, applied was outlined by a very 
successful practitioner and theorist in the understanding of what people hear or like to 
hear because they identify with the underlying values. US political consultant and 
pollster Frank Luntz developed whole manuals for conservative politicians during the 
past two decades, telling them what to say to have the desired ~mpact, and he advised 
particularly about climate change. 
This area could be dismissed as "spin", but is in fact well worth studying because these 
techniques arguably helped set climate change communication for a decade and longer 
in the US, and in Australia in the same way. In a key memo on climate change, Luntz 
(2003) advised that a primary strategy had to be stoking the fires of scientific 
uncertainty and to have scientists do the stoking. Should people come to believe that 
climate science is settled, he feared they would want to act accordingly and demand 
action from their governments. This was indeed how Australia appeared to react around 
1990 when the dominant narrative proposed that the science was clear-cut and the 
government opted for a vigorous response. 
On the other hand, an Australian Broadcasting Corporation Lateline program on July 
13, 2009 featured the author of a recent book on climate change politics, Lord Anthony 
Giddens fro1n the London School of Economics. He told the interviewer that in his 
surveys of populations in different countries an average 40% of respondents were 
sceptical that scientists agreed about anthropogenic climate change. This means that the 
framing urged by the public relations consultants of the world has been quite 
successful-given the actual case, as Lord Giddens also pointed out, that perhaps 1 % of 
scientists working in the field of climate change remained sceptical of the general 
message. Of course, this also begs further analysis of whether the general public 
differentiates between scientific disciplines or treats scientists as interchangeable expert 
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voices. The pivotal influence of the "scientists can ' t agree" frame is explored further in 
chapters 8 and 9. 
T he Mass Media 
At the macro, or institutional, level of framing, the media is a key player transferring 
communication from the scientist or politician to the public and thereby producing 
public knowledge. Sociologist of science Dorothy Nelkin (1995, pp. 2- 3. cited in 
Palfreman, 2006, p. 39) argued that public understanding of science in particular is 
primarily influenced through "the filter of journalistic language and experience" . The 
view that the media is the primary framer of scientific messages is reinforced by more 
recent studies showing that in the US as in Australia, the public gets most of its science 
information through the media (Denemark, 2005; Russell, 2006). 
Taking up Nelkin's conclusions a decade later, US science writer Cristine Russell 
produced a working paper for the Joan Shorenstein Centre for the Press, Politics and 
Public Policy, which analysed the interface of controversial science, media, and politics. 
She found that: "Ultimately how the media covers or 'frames' these debates - the slant 
of the articles and the sources of scientific and political information- helps shape the 
way both politicians and other leaders, as well as the public, view scientific and 
technological issues" (Russell, 2006, p.19). 
Media " issue cycles" is a term coined by social scientists for the same area of analysis 
and here too a recent review (Broussard, Shanahan & McComas, 2008) found that a 
good rnany researchers have decided that issue cycles are socially constructed, 
particularly through national journalistic prac6ce and culture. In addition. there are 
many publics ( educational background, ethnic, religious, etc.) (Stossel, 2008). and 
constructivist analysis tells us that they "hear" messages based on the sum of their 
experiences and their core values, which appears to be a key lesson for science 
communicators. 
Policy-makers, Media and the Domin ant Narrative 
The dominant narrative is~ however, the product of more than just issue framing by the 
rnedia. Other research suggests it is most likely that the framing or narrative-shaping is 
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a revolving door between the media, and politicians and other opinion leaders, ( e.g., 
Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). Indeed, Russell and other communication scholars agree 
with cognitive scientist Lakoff that the (diverse) publics take their cues on science from 
politicians and other opinion leaders (via the media), and "filter it through underlying 
values like ideology and religion" (Russell, 2006, p. 19, quoting communication 
researcher Matthew Nisbet). 5 
In this way the media in its various guises sets the issue cycle in conjunction with 
policy-makers, politicians, and other opinion leaders, which can include scientists. 
Together they "frame" the dominant narrative of reality presented to the public. This is 
not a new concept, but it is not prevalent in the science communication literature. The 
famous Canadian critic of mass co1nmunications, Marshall McLuhan, said right after 
World War II that the mass media shapes our daily narrative of reality by delivering 
drama featuring "us and them", good and bad, winners and losers (McLuhan, 19 51). 
This has not changed. 
Theories and research on agenda-setting are also relevant here. Australian research by 
Ward (2001) has looked at how media professionals and policy-makers together set the 
issue cycle of what is considered important. Political scientists tell us that Australians 
prefer an arms-length democracy where they make a choice at election time, and then 
let the politicians set the specific agendas and expect that they are taking care of issues 
(Johnson, 1987; Ward, 2001 ). This has obvious implications for the power of political 
leadership as another key influence on framing an issue like climate change. The 
evidence from this thesis has supported the concept that, in Australia, media and 
politicians/opinion leaders together, and sometimes separately, frame the dominant 
narrative that informs our sense of "reality". Arguably in the late 1980s scientists were 
considered influential opinion leaders, judging by their influence on public 
understanding at that time. 
5 Analyses of US practice in the science, policy, and media interface are used here as corroborative 
evidence. The data collected for this thesis indicate broadly comparable patterns of influence by 
politicians and other opinion leaders, similar beliefs , and similar media structures during the period of 
interest (i.e., 1987- 2001) on the controversial science and society subject of climate change. 
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Indeed, an application of the framing lens to climate change communication from 1987 
to 2001 shows that public understanding - including by the media and the politicians-
- changed dramatically over the study period from agreeing with the science and ready 
to respond to confused and contrary, while the scientific facts or messages stayed 
largely the same. In the next chapter I look at the framing of the early study period 
1987- 1991, which sets a baseline for comparing the later shifts in comn1un ication. 
These findings about communication and of early public understanding are also a novel 




PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND EARLY FRAMING AS A BASELINE 
BACKGROUND: THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 
Corbett & Durfee (2004 ), in their report on certainty and context in media reports , 
provided a review of the public understanding literature as it pertains to climate change. 
Also, Lowe, Brown, Dessai & de Franca (2006) comprehensively reviewed the public 
understanding literature and various research methods for their study on lay perceptions 
of climate change. From this review, Lowe et al. summarised the findings that: 
• the general public gains most of its knowledge about science from the mass 
media ( and) science information is often skewed or lost in translation. 
• there has been much misunderstanding of the causes and consequences of 
climate change and also confusion with stratospheric ozone depletion, and 
perhaps most significantly for this study, "knowledge of the forces that shape 
the perceptions and response of the public is limited" (Lowe et al. , 2006, p. 436, 
quoting Bray and Shackley, 2004 ). 
Corbett and Durfee of the University of Utah found in their 2004 review of the literature 
that while general public awareness of global warming (i.e. , people had heard of it) had 
increased to something like 90% of survey respondents by the 1990s, a 2002 Gallup poll 
in the US showed that only 61 % of respondents believed the phenomenon was actually 
occurring. They concluded that this reflected a limited understanding of particular 
causes, possible consequences, and solutions amongst the general public. 
A strong hypothesis advanced by Australian researchers such as Hamilton (2001 , 2006), 
Pearse (2007), and Beder (2000), who have looked closely at the trajectory of events 
and the policy process, is that this confusion and uncertainty by 2002 is at least partly 
due to deliberate campaigns waged through politics and media, to sow doubt, and 
deliberately to exploit and broaden uncertainty, and indeed to provide misleading 
"science" to the public. There is evidence for this , canvassed later in this thesis , and the 
question I try to expand on is how exactly this relates to the manner in which climate 
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change science was communicated over time. Why is this i111portant for co111111unicators 
and policy-makers? The literature also suggests that: 
These basic misperceptions are likely to inhibit the public 's ability to participate 
meaningfully in the democratic discussion about the issue, to understand how 
their own actions affect the climate and to fully and accurately appreciate how 
climate change will affect our future. (Lowe et al. , 2006 , p. 437, quoting 
Seacrest 2006, p. 261) 
Lowe et al. (2006) also cite research that underscores the even more fraught nature of 
public understanding about rapid climate change and, one can add, extreme events. 
Rapid climate change is beco111ing clearer and more "real" as scientists delve into the 
issue, but there are still many uncertainties about specific future events (Weart, 2003; 
IPCC reports 1990-2007). Lowe et al. found that there is little research on this subject 
overall. A related area that has received little research attention is the nature of public 
understanding of anomalous weather events , such as colder weather in the northen1 
hemisphere and unexpectedly at times in Australia. I suggest that this heightens 
uncertainty for those who have accepted the concept of "global warming" rather than 
more broadly "climate change", or those who are inclined to deny the phenomenon 
altogether. 
Poll Data from Late 1980s on 
If one looks at so111e published public opinion polls in Australia and the US it appears 
that public understanding diminished as the 1990s progressed from a highpoint around 
the late l 980s- and the question that occupies this thesis is: Why? 
A September 1988 opinion poll reported in the Sy dney Morning !-Jerald began with the 
following headline and lead: "Most want action over the greenhouse effect. Three-
quarters of Australians are troubled by the environ111ent-threaten ing greenhouse effect 
and believe something must be done to halt it, the latest Saulwick Herald Poll show 
(Camey, 1988 , p. 5). 
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What happened between 1991 and 2001? If one accepts overseas studies as proxy data, 
some interesting trends and statistics emerge from a 2007 analysis of 20 years of poll 
results in the US (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). They found that there was an upswing in 
public awareness following record heat events in 1988 with related media attention-
reported public awareness jumped almost 20% from two years earlier. But a low public 
awareness response, just 7%, was recorded by November 1997-a month before the 
Kyoto conference-suggesting that the politics of climate change had not necessarily 
engaged the public. 
Between 1994 and 2000, poll data hardly shifted on the percentage of respondents (57% 
down to 54°/o) who confused the greenhouse effect with the hole in the ozone layer-
i1nplying perhaps that there was little effective science communication during this 
period. Nevertheless, the authors found what they call a "strong majority" (which breaks 
down to >50%) of the public believed throughout the survey period (i.e., from the 
1980s on) that global warming is real, that temperatures are rising and that the release of 
carbon dioxide is a cause. This might imply that at any given time at least half the 
public has not been influenced by the dominant and changing political-media narrative 
that I postulate in this thesis-or perhaps that "belief', understanding, and will-to-action 
must be closely defined as far as opinion surveys are concerned. 
The numbers declined from 68% who answered in the affirmative that global warming 
was real in 1992 to 57% by 1994, and the authors here also suggested (Nisbet & Myers, 
2007, p. 450) that this may be due to strategic communication efforts from conservative 
think tanks boosting scepticism. Also significantly for the evidence gathered for this 
thesis, from the mid-1990s to 2004, only 30--40 % of the public believed scientists were 
in agreement about scientific consensus or in agreement about climate change. I suggest 
that the application of scientific "balance" in the 1nedia, denialist rhetoric by politicians, 
and sceptic framing came to be quite effective in burying the previous consensus in 
understanding. 
A more general decline in interest in environmental issues was another factor in the poll 
data. A 2006 survey by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) reported that, in 
Australia, there was a general falling off of concern for environmental issues after 1992, 
when 75% of Australians expressed interest. By 2004, the figure had dropped to 57%, 
with young people ( aged 18-24) the least concerned. Almost 80% of young people said 
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they cared about the environment in 1992. The change in conce111 during the following 
decade could be interpreted as a consequence of national and state leadership focus on 
the economy to the exclusion of the environn1ent after 1992, and possibly the · 
reactionary stances of environmental groups during the later 1990s and early 2000s, that 
is , reacting rather than leading (Beeby, 2006). 
Linking Agenda-setting and Public Understandin g 
In the previous chapter I have postulated that establishing a dominant narrative of "what 
we think" by elite agenda-setters in politics and the media is a key framing device to be 
examined. 
However, the literature review shows that most of the relevant public understanding, 
media, and sociological studies do not make an explicit link with policy and political 
studies in order to explore how public understanding of the scientific information is 
correlated with changing policy and with media structures. To do so would arguably be 
a fruitful way to understand how these sectors set the national discourse, and that is the 
approach taken in this thesis. Lowe et al. (2006), in reviewing the available literature to 
that date, found that there is limited knowledge or synthesis of the science and society 
forces that shape public knowledge on climate change. 
No work is available on the Australian experience that links science communication or 
public understanding analysis with media and political analysis to detem1ine how 
environmental discourse agendas are set. This leaves a gap that may be filled by 
multidisciplinary studies. In the interim, overseas literature can be relevant to the 
Australian experience because of the global nature of media co1npanies operating in 
Western English-speaking democracies, and simi larities in policy formation and public 
discourse. 
Thus, Lorenzoni shed some light by reporting that Briti sh focus groups thought the 
obligation falls on politicians to "do so1nething", since they have wider scope for action 
and that the issue has been successfully framed as one of "far-off ' consequences (Lowe 
et al., 2006. citing Lorenzoni, 2003). Australian research (e.g., Johnson 1987· 
Wheelwright & Buckley, 1987) says this country also has the tendency to elect people 
and expect them get on with it. 
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In their comprehensive review of the international literature on public understanding of 
communicating climate change up to 2002, Corbett & Durfee (2004) pinpointed a 
recurring theme: that media stories and related public understanding on climate change 
during the 1990s were driven by "sources"-whether scientist or politician- who 
would "frame" events from their particular perspectives or agendas. The means for this 
communication tended to centre on conferences, IPCC reports, or by highlighting 
dramatic events (the weather), rather than by consistent communication of the inherent 
risk. 
US researchers Corbett & Durfee (2004) and Boykoff & Boykoff (2004) have fashioned 
experiments to demonstrate that the way in which science information is presented 
(whether it involves context, balance, or representations of certainty or understanding 
emerging from the scientific process) influences public understanding-particularly of 
certainty. For example, in their n1edia experiment to gauge understanding amongst 
readers, Corbett and Durfee found that adding context to an article provides the greatest 
degree of certainty to the reader. In terms of the climate change story this means putting 
a scientific report in the context of the body of evidence over time. Boyko ff and 
Boykoff showed through media analysis that the prevalent practice of "balancing" 
opposing scientific views, out of context, biased the public discourse to unce1iainty. 
An attempt at summarising citizen attitudes was reported by Lowe et al. (2006) in light 
of perceived uncertainty. A 2000- 2003 study by Lorenzoni of British attitudes (in the 
tin1e period immediately following the period of interest of this project) could be 
subdivided into four categories: those who deny that humans affect climate change and 
feel that it is not impo1iant; those who doubt that humans affect climate change but 
think the issue is important; those who agree that hu1nans are responsible but think the 
issue is not important; and an engaged group who think both that humans are 
responsible and that it is an impo1iant issue. 
In regard to changing social reality over time, German social researchers explored the 
idea that public understanding of a scientific issue, specifically climate change, can 
change in response to the social or political context (Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau, 
2000). They called it "patterns of communication disturbance" or communication noise, 
and it can undo a consensus. 
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Building on some of these understandings , there is scope for much additional \;vo rk to be 
conducted on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the public understanding of 
the climate change phenomenon in Australia, as well as the cultural values that shape 
this understanding. With the benefit of earlier international research in public 
understanding and also the insights from other disciplines that allowed me to develop a 
framing lens and a research context, I began analysing the trajectory of Australian 
climate change communication from 1987- 2001. 
AUSTRALIA'S PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF "THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT" 
IN LATE 1980s 
Public knowledge6 of climate change received little research attention in Australia after 
the early 1990s. Before that time, a significant attempt at understanding the country 's 
level of knowledge and understanding came to a startling conclusion. In their 1989 
book, following two CSIRO-coordinated "greenhouse effect" conferences and pubhc 
fora staged in 1987 and 1988, earth scientist Ann Henderson-Sellers and her co-author 
Russell Blong reported on the outcomes of a two-year media and public awareness 
campaign. They felt able to claim that "the awareness of the greenhouse issue is 
probably greater a111ongst the general public in Australia than in any other country in the 
world" (Henderson-Sellers & Blong, 1989, p. 155). 
This begs the question I attempt to address from a com111unications perspective: What 
interfered with this public awareness during the following decade? 
Henderson-Sellers and Blong used a questionnaire survey method that looked at three 
areas of public perception or awareness: how much of the science the publi c 
understood; what level of confidence or certainty they expected from scien6sts 
themselves; and how convinced they were of the truth of the "greenhouse effect" ( as it 
\Nas then universally called). 
6 In this \\·ork I use public understanding. public knowledge, and public awareness and perception 
interchangeably to denote the public discourse and, to the extent it is measured. the state of public 
understanding or the science of climate change/greenhouse effect/global warming. 
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A large majority of respondents worried that a policy response to the greenhouse effect 
would advocate nuclear power; respondents did understand the link between greenhouse 
effect action and lower use of fossil fuels, and they worried about higher temperatures 
and rising sea levels. People expressed a lack of scientific understanding but wanted to 
know. Perhaps most interesting in regard to the 1990s sceptic debate and related 
discourses of uncertainty, was that a majority of respondents demanded only 50-70% 
certainty from scientists before action was justified. 
This raises the further question: Did atmospheric scientists themselves appreciate this as 
they took cover from the sceptic barrage, and by the second IPCC report in 1995 
changed their public communication to more defensive language highlighting 
uncertainties? That this change was deliberately instituted at the IPCC level by the mid-
1990s was confirmed by leading US atmospheric scientist Stephen Schneider in an 
interview for this project in 2007 and is discussed further in chapter 9. The intent may 
have been scientific 1nethod and accuracy, but the effect was possibly to encourage a lay 
expectation that somehow 100% certainty could be achieved by calling a 95% certainty 
merely "very likely". 
The language in the first IPCC report in 1990 was plain English and definite, and sets a 
communication benchmark that is commonly overlooked in research discussions of 
IPCC reports; therefore I examine it more closely in chapter 9. In the world of science 
and policy, the 1990 IPCC report may, in hindsight, be regarded as a refreshing 
ano1naly. Henderson-Sellers and Blong report that mainstream scientists exhibiting 
conventions of scientific caution was already apparent in 1989, and that this may be a 
micro cultural phenomenon. They state that at a public presentation "Considerable 
surprise was expressed that scientists should be vehemently debating small differences 
of certainty ranging from 95-99%" (Henderson-Sellers & Blong, 1989, p. 166). 
Another interesting finding from these early days points to quite sophisticated public 
understanding. Henderson-Sellers and Blong asked whether people felt there was any 
attempt from any sector to deliberately confuse the scientific issue. Twenty-nine per 
cent of respondents thought so. The respondents thought j oumalists and politicians were 
largely to blame, while scientists were seen as somewhat responsible but not very. Other 
agents of confusion nominated were multinational corporations (self-interest) and 
extreme environmentalists (propaganda). Respondents to the surveys were overall 
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probably a more informed demographic than an average "person on the street" poll. 
Professionals who worked in planning or teaching or policy, plus son1e n1eteorologists 
predominated. They were selected from those that attended public events of . 
Greenhouse '88. The authors conclude that all those surveyed, including high school 
students, correctly understood the scientific message, while interpreting the response of 
politicians and planners as ineffectual and possibly uncaring. The young people were 
described as seeing an unsatisfactory future, but not a way to change the outlook. 
Two state surveys of Australian public attitudes that were published in 1989 come fron1 
the Electricity Commission of New South Wales and the Victorian Govem1nent's 
electricity commission, and are evidence that states at that time were somewhat serious 
about containing consumer demand for coal-fired electricity. Concen1 about cutting 
down forests, the hole in the ozone layer, and the greenhouse effect were most 
frequently mentioned as top world environ1nental problems. In the NSW survey, 
conducted by the Roy Morgan Research Centre, 95% of respondents had heard the tenn 
"greenhouse effect" and 41 % knew it was warming the earth, although an ahnost equal 
number confused it with ozone layer depletion. Respondents nominated running a car, 
burning coal, and logging forests as primary causes ( along with the ozone-depleting 
aerosols). People also expressed themselves willing to pay 1nore to have a large impact 
on emission reductions (Morgan, 1989). 
A December, 1989 Victorian survey was a s1nall, self-selected sample in response to a 
discussion paper on alternative responses to "the greenhouse challenge". The SEC and 
the Greenhouse Effect found that respondents were in favour of an even stronger target 
for e1nission reduction than 20%; people understood the benefits of efficiency 111easures 
and said coal-fired electricity should not be pro1noted for home heating and hot water 
heating in preference to gas and solar. Renewable energy was suppo1ied and 
respondents said hidden subsidies to status quo industries should be removed. Tree-
planting progra1ns were strongly supported. Respondents even pointed out the severe 
conflict between wanting to attract energy-intensive industries with cheap coal-fired 
electricity and, on the other hand, reducing CO2 e1nissions. People noted that alternative 
jobs could be created with clean-power industries , (a theme still struck by some labour 
unions in recent years) (State Electricity Con1mission, 1989). 
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A later glimpse of public awareness in Australia is provided by British geographer 
Harriet Bulkeley. Her late 1990s study of public attitudes in Newcastle, New South 
Wales, concludes that baniers to effective action are institutional rather than a lack per 
se of public understanding or information. She found that the level of public 
involvement is related to not only information, but also people's sense of moral 
responsibility, local knowledge and values, and the level of government and industry 
support. Bulkeley wrote: "These findings suggest that rather than focus on the provision 
of infonnation, policy attention should be directed to the social and institutional barriers 
that act to constrain public involvement in addressing global environmental issues" 
(Bulkeley, 2000, abstract). 
EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND FOCUS ON RISK 
Early Popular Science Books on the Greenhouse Effect 
The evidence gathered for this thesis sheds some light on how the late 1980s consensus 
was established and how extensive the communication was. From a cornmunication 
perspective, the public discourse was informed by a range of material from books to 
government documents, and a steady stream of media articles relaying a fairly uniform 
message about risks posed by climate change. 
For example, books published in 1989, taken together, leave no doubt about the 
considerable knowledge of climate change that was available to the public 20 years ago. 
Besides the Henderson-Sellers and Blong offering outlined above, another of four books 
on the subject published that year was by two English authors-one a conservation 
campaigner and the other a journalist for the Guardian newspaper. 
Stewa1i Boyle and John Ardill (1989) wrote about climate change with uncommon style 
and understanding of what people "hear", or relate to, like weather analyses: 
Many of 1988's droughts and floods, heat waves and hurricanes were random 
events, the roll of the dice. But the dice are being weighted. In coming years 
they will fall hot and stormy-side uppermost more often. Hard-nosed politicians 
with voters to cosset, powerful vested interests to satisfy and rivals to guard 
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against began to talk like prophets, ecologists and utopians ... they began to ta! k 
of a world that is fn1gal and fair. (p. 4) 
Boyle and Ardill reported that, at the time, politicians appeared to have achieved a 
"glimmer of visions" and that this was framed in language that spoke of solidarity 
equity, and accountability-in other words, an ethical framework- rather than the 
tyranny of the immediate. And they put this unusual political focus within the context of 
worldwide weather catastrophes that marked 1988. 
In 1988 the atmosphere came within one percent certainty of proving that 
humanity has upset its natural balance and that it will strike back blindly and 
with catastrophic unpredictability. Global wanning is the threat that bundles up 
all our woes into one problem and one solution. (Boyle & Ardill, 1989, p. 5) 
Other significant books were written by Fred Pearce, a long-time environmental 
correspondent for New Scientist (Pearce, 1989) and by physicist Ian Lowe, who was at 
the time Acting Director for the Commission for the Future and a faculty member of the 
Science Policy Research Centre at Griffith University. Lowe wrote for a lay audience to 
summarise the science and policy understanding of 1988- 1989 following two seminal 
greenhouse conferences, and after encountering tremendous public interest in the 
subject (Lowe, 1989). 
The books from this period challenge any notion of an incremental, one-way path 
towards greater political and public understanding over the course of the next 20 years 
(to the present). For example, Boyle and Ardill quote Mostafa Tolba, then Executive 
Director of United Nations Environn1ent Program1ne (UNEP) who said, "Po1itica1 
leaders now accept the broad scientific consensus that human activity is altering cl in1ate 
and that the changes and their impacts will become 1nore pronounced over the next few 
decades" (Boyle & Ardill, 1989, p. 6). 
Together ,vith other documents , these books provide a science history perspec6ve of 
events, understandings. and values that characterised the English-speaking world, and 
Australia's climate change knowledge and response in the late 1980s. Before moving on 
to an exploration of the Australian policy framework and shifting response to the 
sc ience during the 1990s, it is valuable to look in even more detail at the public 
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knowledge of the late 19 80s, thereby establishing a science and society baseline 
comparison for later events. 
A Baseline of Understanding 
Lowe's 1989 book Living in the Greenhouse was followed in the mid-1990s by Living 
in a Hothouse (the latter out of print and not accessed). The first book offers a 
compendium of what was known at the time on climate change-its risks and 
solutions-in notable contrast to discourses that developed through the mid-l 990s and 
into the present. Together with other documentary evidence from the period uncovered 
by this thesis project, it supports the claim for Australians' high level of public 
knowledge at the time found by Henderson-Sellers' and Blong's survey. 
There is arguably no more consistent observer and science writer about climate change 
on the Australian scene than Lowe who, first as an academic and, since retirement, as 
President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, has documented and spoken "truth 
to power" for 20 years-and for even longer has studied the science and society story 
revolving around the changing atmosphere. 7 
In 1989 Lovve was Acting Director of the Commission for the Future, established in 
1986 by then Science Minister Barry Jones, to provide a "think tank" environment, and 
a public awareness forum for science and innovation developments. The Commission 
disappeared in the early 1990s, along with other structures from the Hawke Labor 
government (Jones, 2006; Lowe, 1989). So what does Lowe's (now historical) book 
refer to? What language does it use? And how is it buttressed by other contemporary 
evidence? 
Readers may first wish to refer to the chronology of science discoveries and events in 
Table 2 following this chapter. Lowe first sketches a quick science background, starting 
vvith the revelation that the theory of the "greenhouse effect"-i.e., that increasing 
carbon dioxide. methane. and other warming gases in the atmosphere might alter the 
7 Several other Australian scientists/technologists from this era, who have continued to publish for a lav 
audience and have disputed pre-:ailing economic ideologies driving responses to climate science during 
the 1990s, include Niark Diesendorf and Alan Pears , whose books and intervie\Y material have helped 
inform this thesis. This is in addition to atmospheric scientists-CSIRO 's Barrie Pittock, \1/illem Bouma, 
Graeme Pearman, and 1Yiichael Raupach inter alia-who have spoken in many public fora and published 
for decades on this subject, and also provided major insights for this project. 
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climate- is more than 100 years old. It was named by the Swedish che1nist Svante 
Arrhenius around 1896. The natural "greenhouse effect" balance of gases has been 
beneficial in keeping the earth warm and habitable. But: 
Our contemporary problem is that human actions since the Industrial Revolution 
have been changing the composition of the atmosphere ... the scientific 
community has been concerned for several decades. By the 1950s it was 
suggested that the rate of burning fuels such as coal could be changing the 
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. (Lowe, 1989, p. 1) 
Language and issues documented from the Lowe book and by other authors or 
researchers cited as evidence in this chapter, and also language and content of 
government documents, reflect media and public discourse framing from this period. 
The language used by Lowe in the paragraph above is typical of the way the 
"greenhouse effect" was described during this period: matter-of-fact, declarative 
language, and clearly linking atmospheric pollution and human actions. The 
descriptions from this period assume that the chemistry underpinning the science is 
basic and easy to understand. Lowe notes upward trends of coal burning globally [from 
1.5 million tonnes annually in the 1920s to an estimated 20,000 million tonnes 60- 70 
years later years later,] and the simple chemistry of burning carbon+ oxygen = carbon 
dioxide. As early as 1980 the Australian Academy of Science organised a conference in 
Canberra to review the thinking of leading scientists on the issue. Lowe says "It was 
noted then that carbon dioxide levels were increasing quite rapidly and it was estimated 
that the pre-industrial level could be doubled by the year 2030" (Lowe, 1989, p. 2). 
Global Ethical Approach and Early Policy 
A global, ethical approach to dealing with the industrial pollutants threatening to cause 
climate change was used by politicians in the early study period according to authors 
like Boyle and Ardill ( 1989) and McDonald (2005) who analysed values reflected in the 
politics during the study period. This definite and ethical approach is highlighted in a 
speech given by Margaret Thatcher to the United Nations in 1989 and is quoted at s01ne 
length in the next chapter. 
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In regard to the known science, the authors writing in 1989 were aware of atmospheric 
modelling work also outlined in the 1990 IPCC report suggesting temperature increases 
of l-2°C near the equator and 4-6°C at higher latitudes within the 21 st century under 
"business as usual" scenarios and these predictions have hardly changed. (By the mid-
l 980s the world was experiencing a 0.5°C average increase). Looking back, Lowe said 
in 2007, "We've known for 20 years the impacts but we underestimated the speed of 
change; numbers have changed remarkably little. Climate change is happening a little 
faster" (I. Lowe, thesis interview, April, 2007). 
Affecting the public discourse in the late 1980s, however, was the fact that while 
scientists painted the macro effects-such as sea-level rise; and changing, extreme, and 
unpredictable weather events-vvith mostly confident strokes, they could not be specific 
about local and regional effects. Lowe and others commented at the time on some 
scientists' qualifying language stressing uncertainty, possibly in response to these 
unknowns, but the qualified language was sending signals not easily understood by 
politicians or the media, as will be discussed more fully in chapter 9. 
Confidence of Scientific Communication 
However, other aspects of the documentary record, such as newspaper reports reviewed 
for this thesis, indicate that in the early study period the public language of scientists did 
signal unambiguous confidence that the greenhouse effect was a real phenomenon 
caused by human activities. A revievv of 25 stories sampled in The Sydney Morning 
Herald for half of 1988-1989 showed most of them quoted scientists in a global context 
that involved Australia, that is, many of the reports quoted US scientists. Potential 
consequences were at that time openly discussed by government scientists and 
technologists. For example this article quoted Australian scientists, with the headline 
"Scientists warn of islands' peril": 
Australia may need to take in a wave of environmental refugees from 
coral atolls in the Pacific and Indian oceans, according to two scientists. 
The islands' inhabitants face being displaced by a likely rise in sea level 
due to the greenhouse effect, they say. The prospect was raised yesterday 
at the 26th Congress of International Geographical Union in Sydney by 
Dr Peter Roy, of the NSW Department of Mineral Resources, and Dr 
65 
John Connell, of the University of Sydney. Up to about 500,000 people 
living on small coral islands in the two oceans could be displaced if the 
predictions of a one-metre rise in sea level over the next 50 years prove 
correct. (Quiddington, 1988, p. 7) 
Looking back in 1993, Henderson-Sellers credited scientists and clear communication 
with pro1npting policy action: 
Clear statements of scientific confidence in the greenhouse pheno1nenon in the 
mid- l 980s pro1npted de1nands of policy, and hence for policy awareness. In 
Australia, as in many other countries, public and political awareness of the 
possibility of greenhouse-induced climate change increased (Henderson-Sellers 
1993, abstract). 
The evidence shows that early framing of anthropogenic climate change science 
information by scientists and media communicators did deliberately or instinctively 
address what lay audiences (be they politicians, media, or the public) were likely to 
"hear" from their own past experience. They used the language of risk, or current 
weather events, or likely i1npacts such as sea-level rises. There was early 
acknowledgement that a 60% or 1nore global reduction in e1nissions was the necessary 
response and a matter-of-fact assumption therefore that a strong response was required 
in the public interest. 
Thus, reflecting the science- policy interface at this time the Chairman of the CSIRO 
Neville Wran, told The Australian Financial Review in 1988 that regulation might be 
needed to achieve emission cuts. "The Federal government may have to bring in laws to 
control the greenhouse effect .. . legis lation would be required to either recognise 
intcn1ational agreements on controlling the greenhouse effect or to regulate the 
phenomenon in Australia" (McKanna, 1988, p. 4). 
Government Documents and Early Public Kno,vledge 
rcvie\Y of government documents from the early study period provides further 
evidence for the level of pub! ic knowledge exhibited by government officials and 
agencies . and acceptance of the science as described at the time. enate inquiry in 
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December 1989 is typical of the language and framing of the time, and is worth quoting 
in detail for comparison with later and even recent discourse. This inquiry was briefed 
to look at the contribution that Australian science and technology could make to combat 
the greenhouse effect. 
The Senate Standing Committee reported that it met with: Director of the Bureau of 
Meteorology, Dr John Zillman; senior research scientist from the CSIRO Division of 
Atmospheric Research, Dr Graeme Pearman; Acting Director for the Commission of the 
Future, Professor Ian Lowe; and a senior officer from DASETT, Mr Nelson Quinn. The 
report accepted the science of the physics and chemistry, the predicted impacts for 
Australia, the risks, and the moral obligation as a global citizen-as shown in the 
following extracts from the introduction (Commonwealth, 1989a) .. [My emphasis in 
italics] 
The experts with whom the Committee met confirmed that there is irrefutable 
scientific evidence that the composition of the atmosphere has been, and 
continues to be, altered significantly by human activities ... [ discusses ice core 
evidence in particular] ... "The changes that are likely to occur as a result of 
these changes in the atmosphere cannot yet be predicted precisely. However, the 
scientists predict with a high degree of confidence that a global warming of 
between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees centigrade can be expected to occur by 2030. 
Climatic records indicate that this warming may already be happening. This 
phenomenon is popularly known as the greenhouse effect 
On likely impacts the report stated: 
The sea level can be expected to rise between 0.2 and 1.6 metres, as the oceans 
become warmer and expand. There will be changes to the climate ... In 
Australia the prevailing weather patterns are expected to move south. Some 
areas will receive more rain but it can be expected that droughts will become 
more frequent in other areas, and that climatic extremes such as cyclones will 
occur as far south as Brisbane. 
There is a risk that if the response to this problem is delayed until the evidence 
of significant climatic change becomes irrefittable, it may be too late to avoid 
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some of the more extreme changes that could occur ... Early action is essential 
to stop or slow some of the more extreme effects ... 
This document shows that the political framing was moral and sought opportunity. 
Since our per capita emissions are large, "we would not be in a position to seek change 
elsewhere unless change is implemented here". The document said Australia should 
"serve as an example" and "develop industrial techniques and innovations" 
(Com1nonwealth, 1989a). 
Six months earlier, in July 1989, Prime Minister Hawke said the following in his 
Statement on the Environment: 
The growing consensus a1nongst scientists is that there is a strong possibility of 
global warming with major climate change, and that this is linked with the levels 
and nature of industrial and agricultural activity. Significant climate change ... 
would have major ramifications for human survival ... "(Hawke, 1989, p. 28) 
Earlier still, federal Environment Minister Grahain Richardson concurred in a Sydney 
Morning Herald interview, calling the greenhouse effect the greatest threat facing 
Australia and the world (Secco1nbe, 1988). 
Temperature Penalty for "Business as Usual" 
The evidence in these documents indicate that politicians and their advisers at that time 
were establishing a do1ninant narrative frame for early intervention, as a global good 
citizen open to regulation for the common good- which remained a rhetorical goal at 
the time of Australia's participation in the UN Framing Convention on Cli1nate Change 
1992. Also known to policy-1nakers at the ti1ne was the 1990 IPCC assess111ent of the 
cost of inaction or sticking with the status quo : 0. 7°C of additional warming by 2010 
(Commonwealth, 1992, citing IPCC, 1990), illustrated as the blue curve in Figure "'· 
CSIRO scientists were also writing about the temperature effect of delayed action in the 
early 1990s, e.g., Pittock and Enting, 1993. 
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Figure 6. "Warming to the year 2100 is shown for two scenarios: 2% reduction per annum in greenhouse 
gas emissions starting in 1990, or 20 years later in 2010. The difference is the 'temperature penalty' for 
delaying reductions." Source: IPCC, 1990, in Grappling with Greenhouse - National Greenhouse 
Advisory Committee, CSIRO Publications 1992, p.40. 
However, mitigating the risks was also recognized early on as a major undertaking. The 
1990 IPCC report on response strategies warned that "Achieving a 20 percent reduction 
from current emission levels would require major changes in global energy markets, 
plans and infrastructure and intervention by governments" (Bemthal, 1990, pp. 66-67). 
A 19 8 9 report from the Australian Prime Minister's Science Council noted that reaching 
this same target would call for "deep-reaching and pervasive energy-restructuring at 
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considerable cost and substantial government intervention" (Kolm and Walker 1989, p. 
14 7) foreshadovving major barriers that would be erected to action in the next decade: 
that is, the cost barrier, the power of the status quo and the ideological dislike. for 
regulation. 
Recognition of Communication Role 
From the perspective of science co1nmunication, it very significant that the 1990 IPC 
assessments understood that communication was cn1cial to awakening and keeping 
public understanding. For example, lists of policy options for all nations were headed by 
the need for information measures. That 1neant informing the public about greenhouse 
gas emissions and available measures to reduce them- and included research and 
development, demonstration projects, and training of "professional experts" in all 
sectors. However, in an accompanying table it is noted that the effect is short-lived. This 
has implications for what has happened (and the lesson is likely to be: repeat, repeat, 
repeat) (Bernthal, 1990). 
Evidence from Media Reports in the Late 1980s 
In the late 1980s the 1nedia also clearly outlined suggestions for response and conducted 
an open discussion about the state of Australian fossil fuel-based industries. Solutions 
were headed by energy conservation and referred to fuel conversion (to gas), 
renewables, and related jobs. The following article sampled fron1 the The Australian 
Financial Review (Fin Review) discusses the federal government's push for energy 
efficiency as a response, and quotes sources saying Australian industry is extremely 
wasteful in its use of energy: 
... ignoring even simple energy-saving projects that would have a payback time 
of less than one or two years. The study found that energy consun1ption and 
greenhouse gas emissions could be cut by 15 per cent using easily identifiable 
energy savings that would actually make rather than cost money. 
The bigger picture is that the industrial sector contributes 36 per cent of all 
Australian cn1issions of carbon dioxide, the 1nain gas associated with the 
greenhouse effect. A national target of a 20 per cent cut in en1issions by the year 
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2005 is thought likely to be adopted in the near future. If this is to be achieved, 
then industry is going to have to show it is taking the problem far more 
seriously. Otherwise it will only be inviting the Government to force it to take 
action (Roberts, 1989, p. 17). 
In other words, it was recognised in 1989 ( and in the business media) that halving 
emissions from an inefficient industry sector would get Australia a long way towards its 
target of 20% cut in emissions. 
There is also early evidence of the conflict with Australia's emerging minerals 
extraction economic direction that would come to dominate in the 1990s ( discussed in 
chapter 5). The following Fin Review article shows the conflict between emission 
reduction and the economic direction was apparent at this early time. 
The reasons for Australia's awkward position on global preventative responses 
to the greenhouse effect are simple. Ours is a carbon intensive economy. We are 
the biggest exporters of coal in the world. Electricity generation has been 
growing by 6 per cent per annum over the past two decades, to account for 44 
per cent of carbon dioxide emissions. Ninety-five per cent of electricity 
produced in Australia is generated by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and 
gas. 
Per capita, Australians are the fifth highest greenhouse polluters in the world 
behind the United States, East Germany, Canada and Czechoslovakia. 
Australians produce an annual average of four tonnes of carbon dioxide each, 
compared to the world average of around one tonne. We are the third highest per 
capita users of automotive fuel. 
Moreover, to trade out of its foreign debt burden, Australia hopes to do much 
more processing of raw materials in the 1990s. Like the wave of aluminium 
smelting investment of the early 1980s, this would be energy intensive-and 
thus greenhouse intensive-stuff. (Stutchbury, 1990, p. 16) 
This discussion foreshadowed that Australia's minerals and smelting sector would 
become a driving force for the argument that Australia had a "special case" not to make 
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changes or significantly lower greenhouse gases- an inefficient sector that was very 
sensitive to increases in the price of electricity if it wanted to remain competitive on the 
world stage. A further exploration shows that a succession of Australian policy-makers 
and industry lobbyists during the 1990s decided to keep the status quo as it was then 
and instead change the framing of the public discourse to suit that goal. 
A related framing was evident by November 1989 when it was reported that the 
Treasury under Paul Keating- in an internal argument about emission reduction 
targets- was advocating the position that Australia could increase its pollution as a 
specialist energy user. 
Senator Richardson wanted to set a 20 per cent reduction target by the year 2005 
but was defeated by the intervention of the Treasurer, Mr Keating. The Treasurer 
convinced Cabinet that Australia should instead promote itself as an energy-
efficient industrial centre. The argument was that while pollution might increase 
in Australia, there would be an overall reduction worldwide. (Dunn, 1989, p. 8) 
The articles by Stutchbury and Dunn sampled from the Fin Review illustrate the more 
neutral and sometimes critical reporting about energy-intensive industries in the early 
study period compared to a more partisan pro-industry narrative by the mid 1990s 
shown in material presented as evidence in chapter 7. 
Weather Framed Risk 
The co1npelling narrative in the late 1980s and early 1990s was often anchored by the 
observation that the weather was getting hotter with droughts, heatwaves, and changing 
rainfall patterns around the world. This was gaining public attention. 
Media stories sampled for this project from the period bear this out, as do the books 
from 1989 1nentioned above. A review of articles fro1n The Sydney Mornin_e Herald 
(SMH) for 1988- 1989 shows 118 1nentioned greenhouse effect, global warming, or 
clin1atc change in the title or lead paragraph (out of 353 that mention these words 
somevvhere ). A similar analysis for the Fin Review yielded 56 articles out of 184 for 
thi s tvvo-year period that headlined the phenomenon. Many noted the droughts and 
hcatvvaves affecting the planet at the time. If one accepts the finding that most people 
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receive their science information and therefore public understanding via the media, 
these figures demonstrate a significant public discourse at that time. 
For example, consider this 1988 article in the Fin Review, aptly titled "Government 
Officials Start to Feel the Climate of Change": 8 
... yesterday, Queensland's Water Resources Minister, Mr Don Neal, was at the 
forefront of the discussion. He pointed out the possible economic impact on 
Governments from increased flooding, more severe droughts, the effect on 
agricultural and pastoral industries and the need to redefine engineering design 
codes for roads, bridges, railways, dams and even housing ... "There is no 
longer any serious doubt that climate will change more rapidly over the next 50 
years than ever before in natural history". (Massey, 1988, p. 28) 
Risk messages were the frame for the expected weather changes. Books and articles 
from this period, and government reports, provided detailed discussion from the proxy 
record ( as well as historical records) and modelling data of a climate scenario for 
Australia in coming decades-outlining risks, and likely short and longer-term impacts 
including: temperature rise (tropical cyclones); changes in average rainfall and intensity 
(floods); sea-level rise (landslides); droughts (wildfires); and land degradation and 
health consequences. New data have refined regional detail of risks, but the record 
shows they were there in the early study period. (For example, see Appendix 1 
for"Planning Ministers' Greenhouse Seminar, Cairns, June 1990".) 
A federal environment department (DASETT) briefing minute to the CSIRO Division 
of Atmospheric Research shows that the federal government bureaucracy understood 
that "risk management was necessary" and that "action needs to be taken now" 
("Climate Change due to the Greenhouse Effect," 1987, item vi). The document speaks 
of more extreme events and erratic weather. The language-urging action despite 
scientific uncertainties on specifics, but based on a clear understanding of the risk posed 
by anthropogenic influences and the "greenhouse effect"-is evident in numerous other 
government documents published between 1987 and 1991. Some examples are listed in 
Appendix 1 along with some sample media reports from the period. 
8 Given 2010-2011 weather events in Queensland, this historical record becomes even more interesting. 
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In summary, the science messages in the late 1980s and early 1990s were fran1ed as 
matter-of-fact findings and reports on risk, affecting al I sectors of society. The clear 
science fra1nes were supported by political calls for early action, emiss ion reduction 
targets, and agendas for mitigation responses. Yet, within 10 years these messages had 
been reframed into a hazy "scientific debate" characterised by uncertainty, which 
confused the public and blocked action. 
In 1989, with the weather giving warning signs, and media plus political leadership on 
board, the documentary evidence might lead one to assume that appropriate action 
would follow step by step. And so it did- on paper. But even at that early and active 
stage, Lowe was cautious about the length of time it might take for effective global 
action. He compared the social response to the slow trajectory of action on the ozone 
hole between 1974, when discovery of damage by chlorofluorocarbons was made, and 
1987 ( 13 years later) when degeneration of the ozone layer became 1neasurable. The 
ozone story was also instn1ctive about communication and the internal issues within the 
scientific com1nunity regarding empirical evidence. "For 13 years those who wanted to 
do nothing could stall by saying the evidence is not good enough, only measuren1ent is 
evidence that warrants action" (I. Lowe, thesis interview, April , 2007). 9 
Science Events and Early Public Understanding 
The history of cli1nate change understanding in Australia and overseas was led by 
scientists with conferences and major public events in the early study period and, as this 
chapter documents, it was effective. European environmental journalist Fiona Harve 
told the (US) Society of Environmental Journalists in 2006: "When people first heard 
about global warming, it wasn't from politicians , it was from scientists through the 
media. So we got the scientific view before any poll tics got attached to it" (Harvey 
quoted by Thacker, 2006). US media research by Wilson (2000) concluded, similarly to 
the findings of this thesis , that media stories peaked between 1988 and the early 1990s, 
and that scientists were a primary source of information during the early study period. 
\Vilson 's infonnants- environmental journalists- indicated that media coverage picked 
up again around 1997 \vhen the Kyoto Protocol was under discussion. 
4 Cngar (2000) found the ozone story had also yielded some other interesting communication lessons. Despite similar sceptic and industry attacks, Ungar found the ozone hole risk enjoyed the advantages of being easily described with a metaphor (a hole in the earth's protective shield): it denoted a hot crisis (skin cancer risk) and there \\·as a comparatively simple solution to hand. 
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Lowe (1989) and others credit the 1985 United Nations Environment Programme 
conference at Villach, Austria, with putting global warming/climate change on the 
public agenda. The conference made significant risk pronouncements linking 
anthropogenic (human-originated) increases in greenhouse gases with global warming 
and climate change, and marked a consensus within the climate science community that 
"we have a problem", (Bolin et al., 1986; Bouma, Pearman & Manning, 1996). See 
Appendix 1 for full statement. 
Villach was followed in 1987 by the international agreement to ban ozone-depleting 
substances, the Montreal Protocol. This demonstrated that countries could come 
together based on scientific advice although there is evidence that the two issues-the 
hole in the ozone layer and greenhouse gas pollution-became confused in the public's 
mind. In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed by 
the UN and the World Meteorological Organisation. There was also a landmark 
greenhouse conference held that year in Toronto, Canada, that drew 330 scientists and 
politicians from 46 countries to discuss the changing atmosphere of the Earth. This 
conference led to a "call for action" on global targets to lower greenhouse gas emissions 
by 20% below 1988 levels by 2005-similar to the model for decreasing emissions that 
were widening the hole in the ozone layer. These global targets would be adopted by 
Australia two years later. 
By that time, politicians were being called to join. Lowe quotes then CSIRO senior 
atmospheric scientist, Graeme Pearman, calling the evidence facing this first global 
conference of concerned scientists and bureaucrats a "clarion call to politicians to take 
action" (Lowe, 1989, p. 4). Pearman who, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, was 
active as a science communicator on climate change (G. Pearman, thesis interview, 
June, 2006), later became Division Chief and was co-vice chair of the 1990 IPCC 
science working group. 
It may surprise those who think that the scientific evidence was thin at that time, to hear 
that the Villach Statement in 1985 reflected conclusions drawn from much recent 
research (Lowe, 1989), ranging from ice-core evidence to analysis of atmospheric 
chemicals, experiments with general circulation models, and observations on heat and 
sea-level rise. 
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A BRIEF OPEN DOOR OF OPPORTUNITY IN AUSTRALIA 
The 1990s political changes that would bury Australia's early climate change response 
strategy make the events of the late 1980s all the 111ore remarkable in hindsight. Early 
public understanding arguably reached its apex as the CSIRO, along with the federal 
govern111ent, developed the first two national greenhouse conferences as public 
awareness vehicles-featuring Australian climate change science that was of 
international standing. The conferences garnered widespread media and community 
attention. 
The December 1987 conference, Greenhouse '87, was primarily a meeting of scientific 
experts who were given a baseline that climate change would happen and were asked to 
analyse the most likely impacts and scenarios (Bouma, Pearman & Manning, 1996; 
Lowe, 1989). "The conference attracted considerable media interest, with the main 
emphasis, perhaps predictably, being on the worst cases of gloom and doom: coastal 
land possibly flooded, agricultural areas possibly turned to desert, cyclones possibly 
moving further south, and so on," (Lowe, 1989, p. 4). This media appetite for the 111ost 
dramatic possibilities may have had ramifications in following years as scientists 
themselves started drawing back from being associated with such black and white 
predictions and the definitive language that characterised the first ( 1990) IPCC report. 
At the time, a 750-page volume, Greenhouse: Planning for Cli,nate Change, edited by 
Pearman, was the authoritative scientific outcome from Greenhouse '87, which led to 
the popular science content of the 1989 Lowe book. Looking back at the historical 
record, Bulkeley (2000, p. 37) and Henderson-Sellers and Blong (1989) have confirmed 
the seminal nature of this conference and its value to infom1ing policy as well as the 
general public. 
A year later, another CSIRO project was organised with the federal govemment ·s 
Co111mission for the Future (CFF). Greenhouse '88 has been characterised as 
"extraordinarily ambitious" (Lowe, 1989, p. 5) with conferences in all capital cities plus 
Cain1s. Local meetings were held to establish planning committees for future action. 
The con1mittees were composed of generally well-informed individuals committed to 
i111proving the level of community awareness. These vvere many of Henderson-Sellers 
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interviewees for the high level of public knowledge analysis looked at earlier in this 
chapter. 
US atmospheric scientist, Stephen Schneider, gave the keynote address at Greenhouse 
'88, saying scientific consensus and evidence were sufficient to take action (Lowe, 
1989, p. 6). Other speakers included: Science Minister Barry Jones; then Victorian 
Minister for Education (and soon to become Premier) Joan Kirner; and Commission 
Chairman, broadcaster and writer Phillip Adams-and the documentary record shows 
many organisations, public and private, were also involved. 
For much of the recent historical record on climate change communication, Schneider 
played a significant role, starting with his 197 6 book The Genesis Strategy in which he 
famously predicted that in 2000 the effects of human activities will emerge from the 
background noise of natural variation (Schneider, 197 6, p. 228), which proved to be 
close to the mark. However, during the 1990s he also was instrumental in diffusing the 
scientific language of the IPCC to emphasise the uncertainties. J oumalist Geoff Strong, 
who covered climate change during these years, observed that raising the profile of 
uncertainties unwittingly played into the hands of denialists and naysayers during the 
1990s (thesis interviews, G. Strong, April, 2007; S. Schneider, October, 2007) further 
discussed in chapter 9. 10 
Local discussions following Greenhouse '88 continued for two days and organisers 
counted 8,000 people involved, claiming it was the largest conference ever held to that 
time on an environmental issue. Graham Richardson was federal environment minister 
at the time, and he and local elected officials "jostled for places on the regional 
platforms" (Lowe, 1989, p. 6). 11 Lowe also notes: 
The rnass media took up the question of possible climate change with great 
enthusiasm. The Age published a 4 page supplement in association with the 
10 Stephen Schneider died in 2010. 
11 The role of Richardson is still debated, with many informants to this project guessing that his interest 
was purely political, counting "the numbers" of potential votes which, in itself, would stand as testimony 
to the strength of public awareness. Regardless of motive, his utterances in the media documentary record 
reveal a solid understanding of the magnitude of the risk. According to Ian Lowe, "Richo at first was just 
a pragmatic political fixer but when (Greens leader) Bob Brown took him to the Tasmanian forests , he 
became a convert" (I. Lowe, thesis interview, April, 2007). 
77 
Commission. TV programs Quantun1 and Beyond 2000 111ade special editions. a 
special Sunday Conference was devoted to the issue and it seemed to be on 
every radio station. Suddenly it seemed that everyone knew about clin1ate 
change. Radio stations aimed at the youth 111arket were particularly keen to take 
up the issue, reflecting their awareness of the great concern of young people 
about environmental issues (Lowe, 1989, p. 6). 
In 1989, commitinent to climate change action continued to build around World 
Environment Day in June (Lowe, 1989, p. 6). State governments released greenhouse 
response strategies focused on energy conservation and substitution for coal; local 
government looked at specific impacts, and schools and voluntary groups got informed 
and involved. The Commission for the Future released the Personal Action Guide Jo, 
the Earth that also reinforces the early public understanding of the consequences of the 
greenhouse effect and the fact that the science in this regard has hardly changed in at 
least 20 years. The document states: "Scientists believe increasing levels of' greenhouse 
gases' will cause temperatures to rise by l .5-4.5°C over the next 40 years. Sea levels 
could rise by up to half a metre, threatening low-lying coastal areas with severe 
flooding," (Com111onwealth, 1989, p. 5). 
Australia's Early Emission Reduction Target 
Fifteen months later (in October 1990) Australia set a so-called "interim planning 
( emission reduction) target" of stabilising greenhouse gas emission at 1988 levels by 
2000, and reducing them by 20% from that level by 2005. 
I have already 111entioned the strategies that were current at the time: efficiency and fuel 
substitution measures. Public involvement efforts (i.e., communication) continued 
following the seminal greenhouse conferences and can be seen fron1 a contemporary 
publication, undated but issued probably in 1991 by the federal environment 
departn1ent, called Clin1ate Change Progran1 . The series of fact sheets refers to the l 990 
IPCC report, and the leading role of Australian scientists in producing that first 
international document and the emission reduction target. The publication's ain1 was to 
tell people how they might get involved to reduce emissions by, for instance, using an 
energy-efficient refrigerator, which "keeps the juice just as cold", as shown in figure 7 
taken from the energy efficiency fact sheet. (The original text was "keeps the beer just 
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as cold" but this was deemed inappropriate for a family publication put out by the 
government). 
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Figure 7. Illustration from "Cli1nate Change Prograin", (Commonwealth, n.d.) 
Energy efficiency was framed as a way to cut emissions significantly and as a win-win 
with cost savings. The above publication quotes a report that says efficiency measures 
and fuel substitution for heating, lighting, and transport ( e.g., use of insulation, passive 
solar, fluorescent light bulbs and solar hot water, heat recycling, conversion to gas) 
could yield an 18.8% cut in carbon dioxide emissions over time, in line with the interim 
planning target of cutting at least 20%. At the same time, consumers and businesses 
could save millions in energy bills (Commonwealth, n.d.). As we shall see, this 
efficiency approach-called demand management-eventually fell to the growth and 
"more supply" lobby as state energy utilities were privatised and forced to compete on 
an open market. 
At the time of the greenhouse conferences, Lowe records that the first rumblings of 
dissent regarding the science were audible in the background. He attributes the ability to 
attack the science on the "conundrum of 'proof in climate systems". The feeling in the 
scientific community was that there was "broad agreement among atmospheric 
scientists that we are observing changes attributable to the greenhouse effect but dissent 
is still respectable," (Lowe, 1989, p. 11 ). 
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Scientists' Role as Public Communicators 
The Greenhouse '87 and '88 events collaboration between the CSIRO and the federal 
government's Commission for the Future were arguably crucial to the early good public 
understanding. At the same time, CSIRO scientists had long been at the cutting edge of 
atmospheric research related to carbon dioxide levels and clin1ate change. They also 
assumed a need to communicate this information. People like Graeme Peannan. Barrie 
Pittock, and Willem Bouma from the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research saw 
themselves from the start as public communicators as well as scientists (thesis 
interviews, June & Nov 2006, 2009). Pearman wrote, "Scientists accepted a 
responsibility to raise the awareness of climate change issues, and to prornote the need 
for wider debate", (Pearman (Ed), 1988, p. vii). 
Bouma described in some detail the communication role of the scientists at the 
Division, particularly the many opportunities to interact with politicians during the 
1980s and into the 1990s (W. Bou1na, thesis interview, June and November, 2006). He 
said that having an interested politician sitting on the Division's Advisory Com1nittee, 
who was regularly briefed, was very helpful to the political understanding. Meanwhile 
the scientists, particularly Pearman, gave "stacks of briefings" to politicians during the 
study period, he said. That Pearman and other Australian scientists were on the IPCC 
review panels was another avenue for communication and influence. However by 1991 
the fossil fuel industry and other opposition had rallied. 
An early example comes from a scientific presentation at a Brisbane sen1inar organised 
by the Queensland government in 1989. Lowe reports that Griffith University scientist 
Roger Braddock presented a cautious paper reflecting great scientific uncertainty about 
the state of knowledge on interaction of atmosphere and oceans, that is, how. and how 
much. CO2 from the atmosphere was being stored in the oceans . 
It \Vas only too depressingly predictable that his paper would be misrepresented· 
the President of the Queensland Chamber of Mines wrote letters to politician 
and various publications, claiming that Dr Braddock 's cautious approach proved 
concern about climate change was unjustified hysteria from vvild-eyed 
extremists (Lovve, 1989, p. 11 ). 
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It is notable that in December 1991 a prominent sceptic-Robert Balling, a 
climatologist from Arizona State University-was invited to the Australian National 
University where, it was reported, he called the IPCC report "scare mongering" and said 
there was no evidence of a hotter planet. The visit was sponsored by the Tasman 
Institute, a free-market think tank. Balling's visit was one of several by US sceptics, 
brought to Australia in the early 1990s by think tanks but also supported by the CSIRO 
and universities, in the name of free enquiry and debate (Commonwealth, 1992a, 
Climate Change Newsletter). Sceptic and atmospheric physicist Richard Lindzen, with 
some of the most relevant scientific credentials of the well-known critics, was invited to 
Australia by the CSIRO and addressed the Press Club in June 1992. He is quoted in an 
industry conference paper saying "most scientists in the field do not agree the case for 
action has been demonstrated" (Daley, 1992, p. 3). 
Science Minister (1983-1990) Barry Jones recalls that before 1991 "I didn't have the 
Minister for Minerals and Energy shooting me down (and) at that time there weren't the 
hardball lobbyists" (B. Jones, thesis interview, November, 2006). However, he also 
points out that even during that early period the scientists with whom he spoke did not 
have a unified view on the human contribution to climate change, and that both the head 
of CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research, Brian Tucker, and the head of the Bureau 
of Meteorology, John Zillman, while in the minority, were personally more sceptical 
and also influential because of their positions. Both these men, perhaps due to their 
disciplinary backgrounds, were critical of climate system modelling that could not be 
measured on-ground. See chapters 8 and 9 for further discussion on the values that 
scientists brought to the issue. 
Still, while doing his job as then Chief of the Division of Atmospheric Research, Brian 
Tucker had edited a monograph on climate change science for the Australian Academy 
of Science as early as 1981. In June 1986 he would make a presentation on behalf of the 
Division to the Australian Environment Council (AEC) that helped galvanise the 
government into more research funding and also into communication activities, as 
recorded in a 1987 departmental minute to the Division ( Climate Change due to the 
Greenhouse Effect, 1987). 
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According to Bob Chynoweth, the then federal parliamentary representative (MLA) on 
the Division Advisory Committee who reported back to Barry Jones during the mid-
l 980s, Tucker and his scientific colleagues also knew how to operate in the policy 
environment: "The real work was done by shori-circuiting the bureaucracy and going 
straight to the Minister. That's how you got things done. Lobbyists go straight to the 
minister" (R. Chynoweth, thesis interview, November, 2006). 
As one of Australia's lead scientists in the new field of climate change science, Grae111e 
Pearman approached his role as a science communicator in much the same way. He 
appreciated early the integrated nature of sustainability science (going against tradition 
in an era when most scientists are reductionist) and communicated widely. He said his 
strength was to get to know and engage directly with politicians, bureaucrats, 
com1nunity groups like Rotary, and particularly the media, and that he saw this as a 
serious opportunity to benefit the taxpayer's investment in the research 
(G. Pearman, thesis interview, June, 2006). 
His colleague at the Division of Atmospheric Research, Barrie Pittock, wrote numerous 
articles during the 1980s and 1990s for professional and lay publications focusing on 
the state of scientific knowledge and risk, and he tackled the still uncertain issue of 
regional and local impacts on Australia (B. Pittock, thesis interview, November, 2006). 
For example, the following summary comes from a paper in Australian Forestry, taken 
from a sarnple of articles, book chapters, and conference speeches from 1980 to the late 
1990s (amongst dozens in Pittock's archives): 
The atmosphere beyond the year 2000 will be different from any experienced 
since before the last glaciation, more than 100,000 years ago. This will 
profoundly affect forestry locally and globally. Large percentage increases in 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases will cause temperatures at a given 
location to be far higher than any in human history, and [ also cause] large local 
changes in rainfall and hu111idity. These will greatly affect tree growth, species 
composition in natural forests , and fire frequencies (Pittock. 1987a, abstract,. 
A 1991 paper. co-authored by Pittock on climate change scenarios for Australia and 
Ne\\" Zealand bv 2010 and 2050, is notable also for the publisher- the journal Cli111at 
Change. \vhich by then \Vas in its 18th issue. In a 1987 presentation to a lav audience at 
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the Peace Research Centre, Pittock did not hedge his words: "The greenhouse effect 
throws into question the whole global trend towards increasing population, and 
industrialisation based on greater energy use" (Pittock, 1987). At the time, such plain 
speaking and policy comment was not unusual for scientists. Pittock's public 
interactions became more exceptional by the mid-l 990s, as more scientists hedged their 
language or stopped public discussions altogether. 
In the early study period, political leaders ( e.g. Science Minister Barry Jones , Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke, Environment Minister Graham Richardson) publicly interacted 
with CSIRO scientists and their advisory board. In this way, MLA Bob Chynoweth 
personally briefed Bob Hawke, according to a Hawke speech to the Division on March 
19, 1990 (Hawke, 1990). 
Chynoweth supplied this thesis enquiry with a copy of an extraordinary speech he gave 
to Federal Parliament in October, 1987, in which he laid out in clear language some of 
the scientific scenarios of likely impacts of a warmer world, "a huge greenhouse" 
(Chynoweth, 1987). Direct human impacts included increased incidence of skin cancer 
and eye disease, and immune system depression and disease related to increased 
ultraviolet radiation. Collapse of ocean ecosystems came high on the list. "We must 
now accept the very chilling announcement that mankind is actually fouling its O\vn 
nest. For the first time the life habits of one of earth's inhabitants is upsetting the very 
balance of all life on the planet". He reported to federal parliament more than 20 years 
ago the scientific prognoses of what would happen when temperatures climb 2- 3 °C. 
"Rainfall will increase by up to 50 percent in summer and there will be a decrease of 20 
percent in winter", and there will be more cyclones, expected sea-level rises, and so 
forth (Chynoweth, 1987). 
Nevertheless, Chynoweth said that despite the open exchange between scientists and 
politicians during this period, most of his colleagues did not speak of or voice concern 
about climate change. He said that many people just did not believe the sea level could 
rise. This can be seen as further evidence that leadership commitment to the issue made 
the difference in the policy arena. Then, as the 1990s progressed, green groups would 
gradually do more of the talking as the focus shifted to the political arena in the lead-up 
to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and political focus shifted squarely to economics. 
As discussed later, the shift from scientists to green groups was one element that 
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encouraged the political and media framing of less certainty and less n1ainstrea1n 
interest. 
Brian Tucker quit the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research (as outgoing chief in 
1992) and thereafter felt freer to air his sceptical views, which he did with publications 
through the free-market Institute for Public Affairs (IP A) (B. Tucker_ thesis interview 
November 2006). There, he did not hold back on adding policy suggestions, criticising 
emission reduction targets, and other responses to lower risk. As he viewed it these 
threatened to severely compromise the national economy. He suggested "planned 
adaptation" to any climate change would be the most sensible policy (Tucker, 1994, p. 
1 ). His involvement with the IP A think tank, along with other sceptic scientists like 
geologist Bob Carter, added credibility to the IP A's subsequent attacks on atmospheric 
scientists and the credibility of modelling tools. 
In regard to leadership, an important observation from the evidence gathered for the 
early study period is that climate change action was non-partisan during that time. Far 
from the political split on the subject that occu1Ted from the Howard Liberal 
government on into the present, in the early period, at state and federal levels, the 
policies and leadership rhetoric of both major political parties were publicly committed 
to taking decisive action on climate change mitigation. 
Thus in 1991 , the then chairman of the Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
Conservation Council (ANZECC) was Bill Wood, a fo1mer Liberal MLA from the 
Australian Capital Territory. He wrote in a foreword to a report on the programs 
adopted by the states since 1988 to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, that the Council 
had noted: "that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 'calculated 
\Vi th confidence' that emissions of carbon dioxide from human activities would have to 
be reduced by 60°/o to stabilise its concentration and that other gases would need to be 
reduced bet\veen 15% and 85 %" (ANZECC. 1991 , foreword p. i ,. 
The summary of state responses that follovved focused on the energy and transport 
sectors. and also on retaining native vegetation. Ne,v South Wales, for example, ,vas 
looking at mandatory insulation of homes: government leadership on energv cfficicnc 
and in\·est1ncnt in altematiYe technologies: and revie\VS leading to ne\\f restrictions on 
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clearing native vegetation-under then Liberal Premier Nick Greiner (NSW in Climate 
Strategy, 1989). 
I consider it likely that the bipartisan consensus before 1991 would have been highly 
influential in allowing response measures and public understanding to proceed as far as 
they did. This is the baseline for contrasting the public debate and confusion regarding 
human agency in climate change led by Coalition politicians after 1995, and the 
ideological division that already was evident in the internal bureaucratic debate, under 
the Keating Labor government after 1991. 
Stopping Emissions and Wishful Thinking 
Reflecting the good public and political understanding of the late 1980s, CSIRO climate 
scientist Graeme Pearman noted: "In the late 1980s we still had a chance to stop 
emissions at 350 ppm" (G. Pearman, thesis interview, June, 2009). The figure of 350 
ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere had become a scientific benchmark for a concentration 
where negative impacts are still considered reversible over the course of a century. 
Some twenty years later, in 2008-2010, influential government economic consultants 
and advisers ( e.g., the Gamaut Climate Change Review, Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS) modelling) assumed a course of "stopping" ( combined) greenhouse gas 
emissions at 550 ppm in the next decades (Gamaut, 2010). The 550 ppm figure is more 
than double the pre-industrial level- with CO2 emissions comparatively now at about 
390 ppm. The policy timelines for emission reduction in the above reviews (30-40 
years) exhibited a lack of appreciation of physical stocks and flows i.e., the long-term 
effect of accumulating gases. Instead there has been an apparent assumption that 
through some undescribed levers gas levels and related temperatures can be eventually 
adjusted as convenient to the needs of national economies (Glikson, 2008). 12 Such 
thinking is consistent with contemporary Australian government and business 
dedication to maintain and increase (with increasing population) status quo fossil fuel 
use and coal exports with no end in sight. 
12 Early deep cuts in emissions are an advantage according to the physical reality explained in the 1995 
IPCC science assessment and elsewhere. Any ability to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations is 
governed more by the accumulated amount of emissions rather than by how those emissions change over 
time. Retaining status quo higher emissions ( as Australia has done for the past 20 years and proposes to 
continue with) guarantees the need to offset by cutting more deeply in the future to have a hope of a 
stabilising even at a desired 450 ppm or 550 ppm (IPCC, 1995, p. 3). 
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It is notable that in 1989 it was already understood that a "business as usual" approach 
would set the atmosphere on track for 450- 550 ppm of combined gases or CO2 -
equivalent (CO2 plus methane plus nitric oxides) within the 21 century- a level of 
greenhouse gases that atmospheric scientists then and since have said could well lead to 
dangerous climate tipping points where feedback loops including methane escaping the 
Arctic tundra cannot be stopped. 13 
In the 20- 30 years following the early good public understanding documented in this 
chapter, most of the climate change discourse reported in the mass media became 
framed by those other than specialist climate scientists, with a preponderance of 
economists providing media commentary. Technology writer Ben Sandilands was one 
of many commentators in December 2008 who designated the federal Labor 
Government's emission reduction target of 5% of 2000 levels, based on the Gamaut 
review, as not reflecting the true risks . Sandilands blamed a popular discourse that is 
"scientifically illiterate" and a media "which is too lazy to inform itself about the 
realities" (Sandilands , 2008). 
Restructure and Re-directed Research 
The CSIRO is a government science organisation subject to restrictions by the 
··employer"-the politicians who fund and thereby direct the research agenda and the 
organisational structure. In Australia the majority of atmospheric research has been 
conducted by this semi-independent public entity in partnership with government 
departments- all subject to shifting rules about public communication. 
A corporate restructure during the 1990s shifted the organisation a\vay from public 
in terest research to sponsored research, with far-reaching consequences- including the 
ability to communicate research outcomes. examined in chapter 9 where I look at the 
decline of public interes t research and the evidence that some scientists \Vere "muzzled" 
1
; Atmospheric scientists set -+50 ppm of C0 2-e in the atmosphere as the outer limit where accumulated 
emissions lead to about 1 °C warming- a scenario where change is still re\ersible. That means \Vith ~ ~ 
appropriate emission reductions. the excess CO2 in the atmosphere could be captured \\ ithin a century ( I PCC. 199.5. pp . 6. 15- I 6: see also science discussion chapter 2 of this thesis). 
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from communicating on controversial topics such as climate change at the end of and 
following the study period. 
As public interest research was sidelined, the later 1990s and early 2000s saw 
significant tension developing between the mining and the environmental branches 
within CSIRO (W. Bouma, thesis interview, November, 2006). The latter came to be 
seen as "too green", while the mining and exploration lobby steadily gained influence 
with federal politicians and "coal became king" in Australia (Pearse, 2009). The 
historical evidence suggests that, as the 1990s progressed, funding remained intact for 
basic research of climatic processes, but not so for response strategies to reduce energy 
demand or emissions. Research on energy-efficiency measures and technological 
solutions that competed with coal as a fuel was seldom funded, particularly after 1996 
with the election of the Howard Government (Diesendorf, 2000; Hamilton, 2001 ). As 
importantly, the public awareness initiatives slowed and eventually stopped after 1992, 
during the main Keating and Howard government years. 
SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF DISCOURSE LANGUAGE AND AVAILABLE 
KNOWLEDGE 1987-1991 
The following summary account taken from a 1990 news feature (the full article is in 
Appendix 1 ), provides further detailed evidence for the public understanding/extent of 
knowledge of anthropogenic climate change by the early 1990s in Australia- the causes 
and likely consequences, and some paths to action. It also provides a clear example of 
the certain and non-debating communication style that framed the discussion about 
human agency and the central role of burning fossil fuels that emit carbon dioxide, this 
being the most common greenhouse gas under human control. 14 This is a typical 
example of the "givens" found in articles from this period. 
The summary of known facts at the time was presented by Sydney Morning Herald 
reporter Paul Cleary (1990) with the headline "It's the end of the world as we know it". 
Inter alia, the article suggested that scientific analysis of causes and impacts , and 
14 Methane, a greenhouse gas considerably more potent than carbon dioxide, received relatively less 
attention during the study period. This may be because it is largely a problem stemming from the 
agricultural sector and livestock, and from waste/landfills- both considered less amenable to early 
efficient management than the tr·ansport and heating/cooling sectors. 
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analysis of conservation/renewable technology solutions, have withstood the test of 
time. However, this article also shows the beginning of the gov eminent and industry 
economic modelling on cost that came to dominate the discourse in later years, arguably 
inhibiting decisive action during the middle and late study period. 
Cleary wrote (my comments in italics): 
• Australia's economy is carbon intensive. 
• Our output of greenhouse gases is rising at double the vvorld average and our per 
capita emissions are among the highest. 
• The Federal government (under Hawke) "has quite clearly en1braced the concept 
of global warming and is keen to put in place a range of policies". 
• The first IPCC report (1990) "provides virtually irrefutable evidence of global 
warming". 
• The world was heading toward a climate convention (to becon1e the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992) which, in tun1, should lead to binding 
emission control protocols. 
• [It was thought at the time that] there would be general agreen1ent on cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions; the target was the Toronto goal of 20°/o below 1988 
levels by 2005, which should be adopted by governments. The Toronto meeting 
of scientists and governments had agreed that significant global wanning was a 
near certainty. [ Comment: Australia adopted the Toronto target as an interi111 
planning target in October J 990 on the basis of "we 11\Ji!I ~f others do "-in order 
to protect the economy .] 
• A carbon tax on wealthy nations was seriously being considered at the tirne. 
• The 1988 Toronto conference coincided with a severe drought in North America 
and el sewhere, which ignited the 1nedia's attention. 
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• The government was being urged at the time to become a "fast follower" of 
technological opporh1nities for business development related to greenhouse 
mitigation. 
• Substantial govermnent "intervention" in the economy would be required. 
[ Comment: As we learn, this is ideologically unacceptable to market economists 
who ruled the federal industry and trade portfolios, and were able to hedge the 
language and goals of emission reduction to base it largely on voluntary efforts 
like the later Greenhouse Challenge program for industry. Communication 
should loom large with reliance on voluntary programs, but the available 
evidence shows no upsurge.] 
• Cleary accepted that "There is little doubt that the cost of achieving such a 
target, both in terms of resources and standard of living, will be huge". 
[Examples given by Cleary show that Australian resource industries were 
starting to do their own figures,· e.g., coal-miner CRA was warning that cutting 
emission by 20% would hike power charges by 40%,· raise car prices 25% and 
petrol 120 0/o-much later shown to be serious overstatements or ambit figures-
e.g., by the 2006 Stern Report and the 2007 IPCC report.] 
• Policy responses considered included "ironing out inefficiencies that had long 
been a way of life" such as: 
• state government subsidies for electric power generation that kept prices 
low 
• state electricity authorities should stop increasing capacity and focus on 
helping consumers conserve (demand management). 
• Other detailed proposals worked out how much CO2 could be saved if solar hot 
water were promoted to a reasonable level-8 megatonnes (MT) a year. There 
are similar figures for energy efficiency of appliances and refrigerators; 
switching to natural gas; retrofitting homes and calling for energy-efficient 
design of new homes as part of the building code; as well as developing energy 
audits-it was all there and could be achieved within 15 years (i.e., by 2005), 
saving about half of the 40 MT of CO2 then emitted by households annually. 
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[This article does not mention ji,el efficiencies and the auto industty. but thos 
were other areas discussed at the time ·where efficiencies could be ,nade, an 
involved federal rather than state government regulations.] 
• Energy-intensive industries , such as aluminiu111, could make process adjustments 
to save on electricity and low-energy intensive industries could n1ake savings by 
redesigning new buildings and retrofitting old ones e.g., estimates that 
aluminium could cut its emissions by one third (32 MT) annually by changing 
process from electrolysis to direct reduction. 
• Co generation ( electricity) with natural gas could cut emissions by 10% or 
25 MT. 
• Some cleaner coal burning options at the time, such as gasification, could 
achieve savings up to 25% or 50 MT. 
• One easy, positive outcome would be the elimination of another greenhouse 
gas-chloroflurocarbon emissions (18% of the total)- by 1995 , thanks to the 
global treaty to ban these gases to protect the shielding ozone layer. 
Taken together, the options outlined by Cleary posed a challenge to the status quo. but 
not a "freeze in the dark" proposition. As government analyses commissioned at the 
time pointed out ( e.g., Commonwealth, 1989a) there were plenty of dollar savings and 
job creation possibilities to 111ake it a potential "win-win" scenario. In the event, almost 
none were put into effect. 
Comparative Science Communication from the Government Sector 
One publication, released at the end of the early study period in 1992, is a noteworthy 
example of science communication of a difficult subject. The National Greenhouse 
AdYisory Committee, chaired by Henry Nix and whose main brief was to quietly fund 
research. \\·as seconded by then federal Environment Minister Ros Kelly to explain 
climate change science to the general public. The resulting publication used plain 
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English as it transferred the messages from the 1990 IPCC report and put in context a 
. few other things as well- an early attempt to set the record straight on sceptic debate 
and misunderstandings of the science. 
For example, it tackled "red herrings" and charges of "science by consensus" at the 
IPCC. It pointed out that the IPCC process was not an exercise in reaching consensus 
but instead involved hundreds of scientists who peer reviewed the body of global 
scientific evidence available at the time. This review was then communicated to policy-
makers at the national level. An example of a "red herring" was the sceptic's refrain that 
changes to the world's climate have occurred before and will again naturally-ignoring 
the unprecedented rate and rapidity of change caused by human activities. The 
publication noted: "Climate change induced by the enhanced greenhouse effect 
represents change to the planet's climate system at a greater rate than experienced for at 
least 10,000 years" (Commonwealth, 1992a, p. 41 ). (This comparison has since been 
amended to "at least 100,000 years" and more recently 400,000 years as the CO2 level 
continues to rise). 
This publication also presented the public with a graphic depiction of the temperature 
consequences of delay, calculated in the 1990 IPCC report, and explained thus: 
"If human-caused greenhouse gas emissions were reduced by 2% per year 
starting in 1990, then there would be 0. 7°C less warming in 2100 than if we 
waited until the year 2010 to take the same action. In terms of sea-level rise the 
difference would be 15 cm" (Commonwealth, 1992a, p. 40). 
CONCLUSIONS 
A significant finding of this thesis research is the level of public knowledge and public 
understanding shown by the documentary evidence for the early study period i.e. , 1987-
1992. This evidence is found to be persuasive of a remarkably good state of early public 
knowledge regarding the risks and remedies attached to what was then called the 
"greenhouse effect". The greenhouse effect was presented in books, media reports , and 
government documents of the time as atmospheric pollution caused by human burning 
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of fossil fuels and release of other greenhouse gases. Interviews with persons involved 
with events in the early study period and later, support and elaborate on the 
documentary record, as proposed in the methodology. 
Evidence from the early study period is examined in some detail in this chapter as a 
baseline for comparison with the discourse framing and communication of the following 
1990s, where much of the public knowledge appears to have been deconstructed into 
uncertainty and denial. Review of successive IPCC reports for the study period shows 
the science findings barely changed between the first IPCC report in 1990 and the one 
in 2001 , only growing more urgent with findings about possible rapidity of climate 
changes. 
Reasons for Significant Early Public Knowledge 
The review of the early study period finds that scientists, working with the media and 
with acceptance by bipartisan political leadership without contrary frarning, played a 
large, direct role in the good public level of knowledge and acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change phenomena, and the need to take action. Policy-makers took a global 
ethical approach to Australia's response strategies during this period. National I y and 
state-by-state, such strategies were developed, particularly in the energy arena. 
An irnportant finding that emerges in reviewing government documents and newspapers 
from the early study period is that scientific confidence and certainty were reflected in 
discourse language and the confidence of response activities- i.e., politicians, as we! I as 
the media and the public when it was polled, accepted the evidence at that ti1ne and 
wanted action. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the way scientists see 
themselves as com1nunicators, and use language with lay audiences and politicians, 1s 
an important (and arguably under-appreciated) driver of the public and policy discourse, 
and this could be a fruitful area for further research. 
The record indicates the important role of political and media leadership in the 
Australian democracy, showing that until 1992 the agenda set by these two institutions 
1nade climate change action a mainstream issue relevant to the wider electorate, not, as 
it later \Vas framed, as a sectoral green issue. Researchers Henderson-Sellers & Blong 
( 1989) concluded public awareness of anthropogenic climate change in Austra li a in the 
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late 1980s led the world. This thesis investigation concurs that public knowledge in 
Australia was significant. How it changed dramatically to a sceptical debate, under what 
influences, is investigated in the following chapters. 












Industrial revolution; at the beginning of this period, level of CO 2 Ll in the atmosphere 
is about 290 ppm according to the ice core record; technological advances include 
coal-fired energy with related emissions and means for expanding land clearing; 
sanitation and medical advances promote population growth. 
Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius publishes first calculations speculating that human 
activity burning fossil fuels creates "extra" CO2 that might make the earth's 
temperature rise significantly over time. 
World War II; nations expand their mission to control and exploit world oil supplies 
begun in the 1920s, adding more emission sources. Following World War II and 
technological innovations, resource exploitation, forest clearing, and population 
expansion all explode. 
Scientists suggest anthropogenic global warming is underway driven by more CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases in atmosphere due to human activities. This was known then, 
and until 1990s, as "the greenhouse effect". 
With computer technology, scientific advances allow modelling of the atmosphere, 
and understanding of climate feedback that accelerates wanning or cooling trends, plus 
the realisation that oceans would not be absorbing all the CO 2- produced by humans. 
Detection of annual rise of CO2 in the atmosphere and measurement at 315 ppm . 
Calculation that doubling CO2 will raise temperatures by several degrees; 
understanding that polar ice sheets could collapse and elevate sea levels. 
First World Environment Day signals strong upsurge of environmental interest and 
understanding. In the US the creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) creates world's biggest funder of climate research. Scientists 
begin organising with risk messages about human impacts on climate. 
Further research of proxy records (ice cores mainly) confirm possibility of rapid 
climate change within a millennium (later brought down to decades). 
Discovery of damage to the ozone layer and the beginning of a 10-year battle for an 
international agreement to restrict human-induced causes is a precursor to global 
climate negotiations, with many of the same sceptics and societal challenges evident as 
would appear with the greenhouse effect. That ozone-depleting chemicals and ozone 
itself can contribute to the greenhouse effect is shown in the next year. 
Better understanding gained of other possible influences on climate, including sunspot 
and orbital cycles. 
15 In this events table I use CO2 ( carbon dioxide) not COr e (COr equivalent, which includes other 







Second oil "energy crisis" sees upsurge in renewable energy technology, efficiency 
measures, smaller cars, calls to lower consumption- showing feasibility of these 
technologies and behavioural changes (this understanding and these technologies were 
still influential in the late 1980s, as documented in this thesis). 
First report on the greenhouse effect by US National Academy of Sciences says it is 
"highly credible" that doubling atmospheric CO 2 will raise average global 
temperatures by l .5-4.5 °C; World Climate Research Program launched. 
Election of Ronald Reagan as US President (and Margaret Thatcher as UK Prime 
Minister) starts two decades of backlash against environmental understandings and 
environmental activism. It has been noted that a related set of beliefs dominated 
Anglo/American countries- UK, US, Canada, Australia: neo-liberal market ideologies 
underpinned by beliefs in limitless resources and a self-adjusting natural world. 
The Australian Academy of Science organises a conference to review the thinking of 
leading scientists on the greenhouse effect. 
Playboy magazine covers the threats posed by the greenhouse effect, extensively 
quoting Australian scientists. 
Scientific prediction is made that greenl1ouse wanning "signals" would emerge from 
background "cli1nate noise" by 2000 and be measurable; 1981 declared "warmest year 
on record" at the time. 
Villach, Austria: United Nations Environment Programme/World Meteorological 
Organisation (UNEP/WMO) scientific conference yields major public pronouncement 
by scientists linking anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases with global 
warming- showing consensus within climate science community and calling for 
international action to curb emissions; a 541-page report is produced in 1987. The 
conference statement acts as a catalyst for global action. It opens: "As a res u It or the 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, it is now be! ieved that in the first hal r 
of the next century a rise of global mean temperature could occur whi ch is greater than 
any in man's history." 
Antarctic ice cores sho w that CO2 and temperature went up and down together during 
the ice ages. 
Scientific calcu lation that disruption- with ice-melt fresh water- of the North 
Atlantic ocean circulation (the warming Gulf Stream) can bring sudden and dramatic 
climate change in the Northern Hemisphere (i.e., paradoxical cool ing). 
CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research briefs Australian federal and state 






CSIRO, with support from Australian governments, initiates two conferences-
Greenhouse '87 and Greenhouse '88-that are credited with spurring Australian public 
understanding of greenhouse to world-leading proportions. 
Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention succeeds in international agreement to 
curb ozone emissions and is cited as an example that international agree1nent on 
atmospheric pollution is possible. 
First CSIRO national conference on greenhouse/climate change in Australia. 
News coverage of greenhouse effect escalates; framed as risks in response to record 
heat and drought in the US and elsewhere. Testimony to US Congress by leading 
NASA atmospheric scientist James Hansen that he was 99% certain climate change 
had begun, based on the series of warm years in the 1980s. In Australia, media 
coverage also in response to second CSIRO and Commission for the Future conference 
and political/public discourse on the topic. 
Intergovermnental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) established by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) to advise national governments on best available scientific 
evidence on climate change, causes, consequences, and response strategies, based on 
peer-reviewed publications; to report to second world climate conference in 1990 (first 
IPCC report). 
Toronto "Conference on the changing atmosphere" attended by· scientists, economists, 
and national leaders; call for action describes human activities as a vast, unplanned 
experiment upon the planet. 
Level of CO2 in the atmosphere reaches 350 ppm. 
"Declaration of the Hague" by 24 nations including Australia recognises global 
significance of climate change and calls on all nations to paiiicipate in a Framework 
Convention in 1992. 
Hawke Labor federal government takes a leading role internationally on climate 
change. 
April: Federal government sets up a National Climate Change Program with a National 
Greenhouse Advisory Committee of scientific advisers and a Prime Ministerial 
Working Group to assess achievable targets, and set priority research areas and 
objectives. 
The Global Climate Coalition is founded by fossil fuel companies, and other 
corporations with economic interests in the status quo, to "fight back" against climate 
science and proposed action. 
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First IPCC Assessment Report, made to second world climate conference in Geneva; 
Australian scientists play prominent roles on the panel of 170 scientists assessing the 
published science at this time, backed by 200 scientists conducting peer review or the 
draft report. First IPCC report notab le for its direct and clear language or certainty 
and risk. 
Initiation of ecologically sustainable deve lopment (ESD) working groups under 
Hawke government. A unique attempt to develop sustainable policy in nine sectors of 
the economy in "accord" style roundtable discussions by main societal sectors 
including environmental and cormnunity groups, plus government and industry. 
Greenhouse/climate change tackled by an inter-sectoral group that made significant 
rec01nmendations, later watered down by federa l bureaucracy. 
Industry concerns about economic "cost" of climate change mitigation action enter 
public discourse; coal industry moves to forefront and "debate" is initiated. 
Federal and state energy portfolio ministers in the Australian Minerals and Energy 
Council release report, and initiate studies and action to lessen emissions from that 
sector; significant because it shows early understanding by this portfolio. 
October: Federal government re leases "interim plan11ing target" to stabilise CO 2 
emissions at 1988 levels by 2000, and reduce them by 20% from there by 2005. 
Treasurer Paul Keating (to become Prime Minister in 1991) commissions both ES D 
greenhouse working group and Industry Commission to investigate cost and benefit of 
taking action; he receives widely divergent responses; Industry Commission "frame" 
focusing on economic cost becomes a pivotal turning point in the national discussion. 
Change of federal leadership in Australia, Keating replaces Hawke. 
Characterised by increasing influence and then total dominance of neo-liberal / free-
market economic policies, shunning regulation, and shifting from public to privatised 
energy infrastructure based on coal, gas and hydro-electricity. This period cements 
investments with 40+ year time span in conventional energy infrastructure and 
production (e.g., coal-fired electricity plants). Deregulation and competition in energy 
and other markets switches emphasis from lowering consumer and industrial demand 
to mitigate emissions, to an emphasis on profit via greater consumption and more 
supply. 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Earth summit); Australia still 
argues for binding emission targets, rejected by the US under President George H. W. 
Bush. 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) unveiled at Rio Summit; 
Australia is a signatory (ratified by federal parliament in December 1992). making it 






the year for returning emissions to 1990 levels, and obligating signatories to adopt 
national policies to limit emissions. 
National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) established; reflecting influence of 
dominant market ideology, NGRS rejects regulation for greenhouse response strategies 
at federal and state levels. Focus turns to business concerns and priorities, and 
voluntary industry action, but there is now a reduced focus on alternative energy 
supply-efficiency measures and renewable technologies at the state level, and 
international participation at the Commonwealth level. 
Greenhouse 94 organised by CSIRO and New Zealand scientists, leading to 1996 book 
cited in sources (below); organised to review science in lead-up to first conference of 
the parties to the FCCC. Thereafter, Australian Academies of Science, Engineering 
and Social Science report jointly in 1995. 
Scientists gain better understanding of possibilities and mechanisms of rapid climate 
change; international scientific reports and warnings of risk continue from, inter alia, 
UK Meteorological Office, the US National Aeronautic and Space Ad1ninistration 
(NASA), US Academy of Sciences, NOAA, and other international institutions. 
Second IPCC assessment rep01is on science, impacts, and responses to anthropogenic 
climate change; confinn and continue the risk analysis set out in 1990 reports; 
however, language changes to a more cautious/academic modality. 
Australian National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) published but scarcely 
implemented. 
First conference of the parties to the FCCC, held in Berlin, Gennany; leads to Berlin 
Mandate, which calls for agreement, by the end of 1997, on greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 is to establish specifics of targets and 
methods for each country. 
A key frame shift is evident at Berlin; Australia changes its position in international 
negotiations from ethical-based to an economic-based position, arguing the "special 
needs" of its fossil fuel-specialised economy. 
Change of federal leadership in Australia to Coalition and John Howard. 
Second conference of the parties to the FCCC held in Geneva, Switzerland. Australia's 
policy frame continues to shift and Australia establishes itself as a "climate change 
laggard" (McDonald, 2005 , p. 225). 16 
16 
"Immediately before the conference the government questioned the science of climate change and 
opposed the idea of the IPCC' s new conclusions on climate change impacts providing the basis for 
negotiations ... These would 'hurt Australia'" (McDonald, 2005, p. 225). Australia was joined by the 
OPEC states and the Russian Federation. US and Europe supported binding emission targets at the time , 






Transition to complete neo-liberal , economic rationalist dominance (hegemony) of 
public policies and discourses . International stance now about economic ··national 
interest" and Australia 's special case. Cuts or dismantling of research programs 
focused on energy efficiency, and renewable and alternative sources. Strong ties to 
neo-liberal think tanks. Attacks on, and marginalisation of, environmentalists. Reports 
that climate science communication is discouraged from government-funded 
institutions during this period and later. 
Australian Greenhouse Office established. National Greenhouse Advisory Panel 
( established under Hawke) of scientists, industry, unions, consumers, and government 
representatives effectively disbanded (not asked to meet after this year). National 
Greenhouse Response Strategy reviewed; outcome critiqued as weak and ineffective 
due to lack of leadership, inability to separate public interest from narrow commercial 
interests, and lack of informed public discourse. 
Australian media reports exhibit strong shift in emphasis from science story lo political 
economic story in the lead-up to the Kyoto Protocol, and document considerable 
industry resistance to action. 
November: Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC agrees nations to reduce emissions by 20 I 2 · 
signed by 163 countries including Australia (which eventually declined to ratify until a 
change of government at the end of 2007). 
New National Greenhouse Strategy developed with emphasis on voluntary action. 
March: Newly inaugurated US President George W. Bush renounces Kyoto Protocol 
on national emission reduction targets , soon to be joined by Australia ; a new stage of 
political scepticism and denial ramps up in both countries. 
IPCC Third Assessment report; echoes risks outlined in first two assessments in 
greater regional detail, using language of scienti fie probabi Ii ty and uncertainty. 
By December 2006 a report by the Australian Greenhouse Office regarding domestic 
emissions "predicted greenhouse emissions generated by rising demand for coal-fired 
electricity would increase by 62 per cent over the next four years. and by 127 per cent 
by 2020" (Beeby, 2006). 
By 2009, le\ ·el of CO:: in atmosphere has risen lo 390 ppm. Comhined 1t ·ith methane 
and nitrous oxides (CO::-e) the level is 450 ppm. 
Sources. Bouma. Peannan & Manning ( 1996): Diesendorf (2007): Flannery (2005): Hamilton (200 I): 




POLICY FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL CHANGE 1987-2001 
"It wasn't raining when Noah built the ark, but at least he listened" 
(Anonymous, cited by Moffat, 1992 in Greenhouse effect, science and policy in the 
Northern Territory) 
INTRODUCTION 
Having looked at the concept of framing and how the greenhouse effect was framed in 
the public discourse between 1987 and 1992, I now tum to the political context of 
climate change communication in the study period and discussion of the events 
chronology (Table 2). In this way I propose to start examining the dramatic changes in 
communication frames following the public understanding baseline outlined in the 
previous chapter, and to propose the hypothesis that these changes were driven by 
changing leadership and political/economic ideology rather than by the scientific 
findings, which remained relatively consistent throughout the study period. 
The evidence for the consistency of scientific findings can be found in the IPCC reports 
(IPCC 1990, 1995, 2001) released during the study period, even while the language of 
certainty in these reports changed in significant ways that also affected communication. 
Bulkeley commented that after the proactive role of the scientists in raising the issue 
and urging a precautionary approach, by the early 1990s "the role ascribed to science 
was narrower, focusing on the need to reduce uncertainties in greenhouse science" 
(Bulkeley, 2000a, p. 38). The evidence discussed in the previous chapter supports the 
proposition that scientists played a leading role in the early significant public 
understanding. Evidence gathered for this chapter also shows diminution of the 
scientists' communication role while other sectors came to the fore and this is 
considered influential to the outcomes by the end of the decade. 
The policy framework for this period has been documented extensively by Bulkeley 
(2000a), Diesendorf (2000), Hamilton (2001), Lowe (2007), Pearse (2005, 2007), and 
McDonald (2005). In particular, this project owes a debt to the in-depth chronology of 
Australian politics up to the Kyoto Protocol discussions of 1997, provided by Hamilton 
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in his 2001 book Running from the Storm, and to Pearse with his 2007 book High an 
Dry and his preceding PhD research. 
The two "popular" books by academic authors draw a picture of official denial and 
inaction, building through the 1990s, in the face of consistent anthropogenic clin1ate 
change science messages in IPCC reports. This changed discourse was facilitated by 
neo-liberal think tanks and noisy sceptics, and fuelled by a potent and high-level 
lobbying campaign of federal politicians by energy and extractive industries detennined 
to retain and expand the existing energy supply and export sector. These researchers 
note the success of this endeavour was made easier by a revolving door of ideological 
policy-makers and economic advisers switching in and out of senior goven1ment and 
business group positions. They formed a like-minded elite network directing Australia's 
response to the science. 
Unlike the well-documented policy events, a companion longitudinal study of climate 
change communication in Australia has not previously been undertaken. This thesis 
thereby aims to add a vital dimension to the 1990s political story. The integration of the 
policy and media story with communication frames in this chapter can be compared 
with the baseline of good public knowledge in the early study period. 
BACKGROUND: THEORY AND POLICY 
Bulkeley (2000a, 2001) has provided a theoretical framework and a contemporary 
record of the formation of Australian clirnate change policy, 1985- 1995, drawing on 
analysis and interviews from the mid- l 990s. She has drawn on testimony from 
participants in the events of that time-such as scientist and science communicator Ian 
Lowe, and former environmental organisation head and later senior federal bureaucrat 
Phillip Toyne, as well as energy analysts and economists George Wilkenfeld, Clive 
Han1ilton, and Hugh Saddler at the Australia Institute during that period. Bulkeley 
draws the events of this period within a framework of "ecological modernisation' ·. a 
term used by Hajer (1995) 17 and other social scientists (primarily European researchers 
studying environ1nental politics and the discourses that ensue. 
1
- Bulkeley"s analysis appears in Gillespie and Bums (2000, pp. 33- 50). Dryzek and Schlosberg ( J 998) 
devoted a chapter with various authors discussing ecological modernisation, including a paper by then US 
Yicc-presidcnt Al Gore. whose "green capitalism" they say is entirely consistent with the concept. While 
Dryzek and Schlosberg say it is mainly a European idea. it is familiar in Australia , revolving around the 
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Ecological modernisation is the premise that existing political, economic, and social 
institutions can internalise care for the environment. In the climate change discourse this 
means there is no need to alter the underlying assumptions about a growth and 
development orientation for society, and an acceptance of the ensuing tensions between 
economic and environmental/ecological discourses. A prime example of this tension has 
been the acceptance that Australia can have a growing coal-based energy and export 
economy while simultaneously addressing related emissions linked to climate change. 
In this way, Australia's greenhouse policy efforts during the study period basically 
stayed within the economic growth, "status quo", framework-notwithstanding early 
mitigation proposals like fuel substitution or renewable energy production. Throughout 
the study period, changing communication and official policies failed to meet stateq 
environmental goals according to Bulkeley (2000a) who concludes : 
The [Australian] approach is in keeping with an ecological modernist policy 
discourse that favours the rationalisation of ecology through the existing 
institutions of modernity, rather than seeking to challenge industrial modernity 
as part of the ecological problem ... it can be seen that the adoption of "rational 
ecological modernisation" by the business and government sectors through the 
principle of "no regrets" led to the scaling down of potential Greenhouse 
responses during this period (p. 49) 18 
GREENHOUSE POLICY: KEY ELEMENTS THAT CHAL~GED 
Tracing the policy arc and the communication framing from the late 1980s, a picture 
emerges of how the focus on growth and resource extraction industries-long-standing 
drivers of Australian politics and the economy-co-opted the early good public 
understanding at the start of the study period. 
That such a reversal is possible is also suggested by German research showing that 
social consensus and public understanding on a scientific issue, specifically climate 
concept that to visibly green corporations-and for business to be "clean and green"-is a "win-win", 
without changing basic products. "Green wash" is the less flattering term for aspects of this practice. 18 
''No regrets" is jargon for the notion that response strategies will not disadvantage any sector of the 
existing economy or that they are responses that would have been taken anyway (by industry largely), 
even without the pressure of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
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change, can change with the social or political context (Weingart, Engels and 
Pansegrau, 2000). 
In this chapter I first look at the key drivers of policy, including mainstream focus and 
political leadership, how those shifted during the 1990s and then at the evidence 
showing framing shifts that occurred during the same period. 
A Mainstream Issue 1980s-1991 
As detailed in the previous chapter, Australia's scientific community, global weather 
events, and political leadership-all amplified by media- were the keys to awakening 
public and policy awareness in the late 1980s. Anthropogenic climate change, as then 
understood, was framed as a mainstream issue, not a sectoral "green" issue. The whole 
decade of the 1980s still reflected in policy many of the environmental understandings 
gained in the early 1970s, which saw the upsurge of the environ111ental move111ent as we 
know it. In popular publications the "greenhouse effect" was a widely discussed 
phenomenon (e.g. March 2, 1987, Newsweek cover story "Mother Nature's Revenge" 
1987; Shears, Febn1ary 1980, Playboy, "The Greenhouse Syndrome"). I su111marise 
here, as context for later events, and further expand the evidence presented in chapter 4 
that the greenhouse effect was communicated as a mainstreain scientific and policy 
issue in the early study period. 
Two scientific awareness-raising events- Greenhouse '87 and Greenhouse '88-
becaine a cornerstone of the communication framework and informed policy. 
Inten1ationally, 1988 was a big year for public awareness leading to policy, including 
US Congressional testimony by leading cli111ate scientist James Hansen, of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Hansen testified that he was 99% 
certain that the 1980 'swarmer weather (along with a headline-grabbing drought) was a 
sign global warming had started. This was said to have galvanised the legislators at the 
time into considering rapid action (White, 1990). Australian reporters accepted the 
111essage of mainstream risk to societies . In June 1988, a Sydney 
SMH) report by Paul Sheehan fro111 Washington D.C. states: 
rninf! Herald 
Scienti sts have warned about the "greenhouse effect" for years. Now it is no 
longer a scientific nightmare: it has arrived . 
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The "greenhouse effect" is the term given to describe the gradual heating of the 
Earth's atmosphere caused by the increasing production of fossil fuels and 
pollutants. 
The atmosphere now has 25 per cent more carbon dioxide than it did before the 
Industrial Revolution. The more CO2 in the atmosphere the greater the heating. 
Bill Genaro, a scientist at the (US) National Weather Centre, said: "The four 
warmest years of this century have all been in this decade. And 1988 may 
become the warmest year recorded in history. There is only a one in 100 chance 
that this sequence could be a statistical fluke (Sheehan, 1988, p. 1) 
The 1988 Toronto Conference on The Changing Atmosphere, which was hosted by the 
Canadian government and, by invitation, attended by some 300 scientists, politicians, 
and economists from 48 countries, coincided with severe drought and high temperatures 
in North America. The conference, and its dramatic final statement of urgency and call 
for emission reduction targets, was widely reported in the 1nedia (Benesh, 1988)19 and 
helped focus world policy attention, with an action model that seemed to have worked 
to curb ozone pollution- set targets internationally and let governments work out the 
policies to meet them (Weart, 2004). The conference's experts proposed reduction of 
CO2 emissions to 1988 levels by 2000 and a further 20% by 2005. 
This "Toronto target" was adopted by Australia among other countries as an interim 
policy goal in October, 1990. Toronto paved the way to the more formal IPCC structure, 
also established in 1988. The conference statement made it clear that climate change 
would affect everyone. It called greenhouse gas atmospheric pollution an "uncontrolled, 
globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to 
nuclear war". World governments were urged to swiftly develop emission reduction 
targets (Changing Atmosphere, 1988). 
Hundreds of scientists and some national representatives on the newly formed 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were asked to review the global 
19 Benesh wrote in The Sydney Morn ing Herald, July 2, 1988 that the international call to action was 
attempting "to reverse the trend towards a hotter, drier, carcinogenic world before the pace of 
environmental deterioration accelerated beyond man 's ability to stop it". This is one of many articles 
from the period that accepted the scientific risk assessment as fact and this was before the first IPCC 
report. 
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research on causes, i1npacts , and potential responses (three working groups) and report 
to the second world climate conference in 1990 in Geneva and every five years 
thereafter. Science reporter Fred Pearce wrote that, ironically, the IPCC concept was 
promoted during the US Reagan administration as an effort to contain or dilute noisy 
government scientists talking about these climatic changes as they did at the seminal 
1985 Villach conference. 
The purpose of the IPCC was to put scientists back in the cages they had briefly 
escaped from at Villach, and to this day the IPCC's members are govem1nent 
nominees. But it was too late. The story of global warming- and what scientists 
really felt about it- was out (Pearce, 2005, p. 53). 
The Villach Statement of 1985 clearly shows the early high level of scientific 
understanding of risk and urgency felt by scientists shown in Appendix l(Bolin et al. , 
1986). 
The year 1990 became pivotal in environmental politics in Australia with federal Labor 
looking forward to an election supported by environmental votes , the first IPCC report 
on climate change released, and interim planning targets for emission controls of CO 2 
unveiled, aimed at an emission reduction to 1988 levels- based on the global Toronto 
target of 1988.20 
The recognition that greenhouse/cli1nate change science required a policy response 
coincided also with the Hawke federal Labor government's sponsorship of the 
"roundtable" Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) process in 1990. Thi s 
unusual effo11 in democratic policy formation included environmentalists at the table 
with business, goven1ment, and labour to detennine more sustainable economic 
strategies and include environmental costs in the analysis. An intersectoral taskforce 
was asked to investigate the curbing of greenhouse gas emissions fro1n the energy 
secto r. 
Overall , there is good evidence that there was a window of ti1ne- fo llowing the 
Franklin Dam fight in 1983 and peaking in 1990- 1991 - during which environmental 
20 
""
10 interviewee for this thesis seemed to remember the early emission reduction targets, which 
emphasised the need to rel y on the documentary record rather than on memory. 
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issues were brought into the policy mainstream: an attempt to close the national 
argument between economic and environmental priorities. Former Science Minister 
Barry Jones (1992) said in a 1992 World Meteorological Day address: 
Green issues were extremely important in the 1980s and contributed to the 
Hawke government's electoral success in 1983, 1987, and 1990 
. . . [but] 
In 1991 with economic recession, the political priorities seemed to change. Jobs, 
jobs, jobs, became the priority and in some quarters there was a cynical reaction 
suggesting that environmental issues were luxuries which characterised affluent 
times ... This is a criminally short-sighted view (p. 4) . 
Leadership 
As in Australia, international leadership was evident in the late 1980s, at least at the 
rhetorical level. Robert M. White, then President of the US National Academy of 
Engineering, wrote in an extensive report on the scientific-political interface of climate 
change understanding in 1990 (with acceptance of human agency) that governments 
were rushing to outdo each other on advocating action to stabilise the global climate: 
"Soviet President Michael Gorbachev, President George (H. W.) Bush, Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and French President Francois Mitterrand, share similar views on the 
climate-warming issue" (White, 1990, p. 18). 
In fact, reportedly briefed by senior scientists and advisers, British PM Margaret 
Thatcher (1989)21 made an extraordinary speech to the United Nations in November 
1989, which is worth quoting at some length because it is solid evidence of the early 
knowledge available to policy-makers, which would not be considered outdated 20 or 
25 years later. Addressing both secular and religious audiences she said: 
What we are now doing to the world, by degrading the land surfaces, by 
polluting the waters and by adding greenhouse gases to the air at an 
21 Flannery (2005, p. 246) says it was James Lovelock as an independent scholar scientist (therefore not 
tainted as a "government scientist" in free-market eyes) who convinced Margaret Thatcher to take climate 
change seriously. Others have credited (Sir) John Houghton, lead author of the first three IPCC scientific 
assessments and a leading UK atmospheric scientist, then Director General of the UK Meteorological 
Office. 
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unprecedented rate- all this is new in the experience of the eaiih. It is mankind 
and his activities that are changing the environment of our planet in dan1aging 
and dangerous ways. 
The result is that change in future is likely to be more fundamental and more 
widespread than anything we have known hitherto. Change to the sea around us 
change to the atmosphere above, leading in tum to change in the world's 
climate, which could alter the way we live in the 111ost fundamental way of all. 
That prospect is a new factor in hun1an affairs. It is comparable in its 
implications to the discovery of how to split the atom. Indeed, its results could 
be even more far-reaching. 
The evidence is there. The damage is being done. What do we, the international 
community, do about it? ... The environmental challenge that confronts the 
whole world demands an equivalent response from the whole world. Every 
country will be affected and no one can opt out. Those countries who are 
industrialised must contribute more to help those who are not. 
Reason is humanity's special gift. It allows us to understand the structure of the 
nucleus. It enables us to explore the heavens. It helps us to conquer disease. 
Now we must use our reason to find a way in which we can live with nature, and 
not dominate nature. We need our reason to teach us today that we arc not- that 
we must not try to be-the lords of all we survey. 
We are not the lords, we are the Lord's creatures, the trustees of this planet, 
charged today with preserving life itself- preserving life with all its mystery and 
all its wonder. 
In the US , options for changing the energy delivery system were considered at this early 
date and were much the same options as available in Australia- conversion to gas 
efficiency measures , renewable energy, and nuclear energy. As would happen in 
Australia in the following decade, the political response by the George H. W. Bush 
administration to reviewing the energy system was marked by an ideological 
commit111cnt to free 111arket forces and a distaste for regulation , carbon taxes , or any 
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change to the status quo seen to penalise industries, cost jobs, or change consumer 
choices (Backgrounder on US energy production, 1991 ). 
Evidence for Early Leadership in the Public Discourse 
It is clear from the thesis interviews that there is much uncertainty 25 years later on 
whether the Hawke federal Labor government was genuine in its concerns about 
environmental issues, including the greenhouse effect, or merely catering to an 
electorate with significant numbers of green voters flexing political muscle. Whether 
this matters, or is actually a chicken-and-egg debate, the public stance of the Prime 
Minister and key government ministers underscores the role of leadership in climate 
change public knowledge. Thus one senior political journalist wrote in the SMH in 
September 1988 about the federal scene: 
The greatest problem facing Australia today is not its external debt. It is clearly 
and undoubtedly the environmental threat posed by the Greenhouse Effect. This 
is not the view of some loony fringe greenie or Australian Democrat; it is the 
view of Senator Graham Richardson, Labor's right-wing hard man and 
colleague of the Treasurer, Paul Keating. (Seccombe, 1988, p. 17) 
Seccombe wrote that Richardson (then Environment Minister) understood that the big 
picture is not just the immediate economy as his colleague and soon to be Prime 
Minister, Keating, believed. The big picture might demand considerable change and 
upheaval in the Australian status quo. He wrote that amongst the steady stream of 
information crossing the Environment Minister's desk was the cost of environmental 
damage including ozone and greenhouse-induced climate change-an annual estimate 
at that time of $5 billion for the US alone. 
Nevertheless, this journalist's opinion in 1988 was that the Hawke Ministry as a whole 
did not comprehend the magnitude of the problem and was not seriously looking for 
answers-an assessment that has been seconded by John Kerin and Barry Jones who 
were in the Ministry at the time (J. Kerin, thesis interview, January, 2008; B. Jones, 
thesis interview, November, 2006). The general lack of understanding in ministerial 
ranks was also mentioned by MLA Bob Chynoweth who was on the CSIRO advisory 
board at Atmospheric Research (thesis interview, November, 2006). 
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Similar views on the importance of leadership were expressed by John Kerin who was 
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy under Hawke in the mid-l 980s to 199 l, and 
Minister for Trade and Overseas Development under Keating between 1991 and 1993. 
He co-signed with Environment Minister Ros Kelly the media release that heralded 
Australia 's emission reduction planning targets in October 1990 (Commonwealth , 
1990). In response to a question about early leadership on the issue of climate change, 
Kerin recalled: "I grew to have enormous respect for Hawke and felt his awareness of 
environmental matters was real and deep." In Kerin's view, the next Prime Minister 
Paul Keating relied more heavily than Hawke on the advice of econo1nic rationalist 
economists at Treasury. Surveying the ministry as a whole Kerin says, "I didn ' t think 
we understood at all the implications of climate change." (J. Kerin, thesis interview, 
January 2008, complete interview in Appendix 2). 
The highpoint of early action and strong leadership began in July 1989 when Pri1ne 
Minister Bob Hawke issued his call to action on climate change in the environmental 
statement Our Country, Our Future (dubbed "the world's greatest environn1ent 
statement" by the media). The first IPCC report in 1990 was released and subsequently 
quoted without debate in government documents (shown in chapter 4) as Australian 
governments were working towards a national greenhouse strategy (ANZECC, 1990). 
The planning target for emission reduction was signed and detailed action plans to 
lower carbon emissions fro1n energy production, through efficiencies or alternative 
energy, were being developed in all states and territories at this time (ANZECC, 1991). 
Led by the Prime Minister 's office, the Australian Government set up the National 
Greenhouse Advisory Council in April 1989 as part of the National Climate Change 
Program. The Council was chaired by clin1ate 1nodeller and biologi st Henry Nix fro1n 
The Australian National University and was co111prised mainly of researchers whose 
mandate was to fund further scientific enquiry (H. Nix, thesis interview, Nove111ber 
2006). 22 A Prime Ministerial working group (pa1i of the ESD process)- comprising 
government, com111unity, environmental , union, and business representatives- was also 
established at this time. Its job was to assess achievable don1estic emission reduction 
targets. Various intra- and inter-governmental di scussions with the states ensued about 
22 Nix did not recall a discussion of the Toronto targets. Many other contemporary players interviewed 
did not recall Australia's first emission reduction targets . 
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the problem and strategies to combat looming climate change. For example, the 
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) 
produced various documents reviewed by this thesis project as evidence. 
Who Was Advising the Leaders? 
Despite setting up such formal structures, the practice by senior politicians of relying on 
minders, advisers, and old friends rather than on special groups or departmental advice 
was well advanced by the late 1980s according to the observations of Nix (thesis 
interview, November, 2006). Much of the advice may have been on how to stay in 
office through the next election cycle, but the question of "who" is within the advising 
network became an important factor and one often unseen to outsiders. In Hawke's 
case, the advice of the Chief Scientist at the time-Ralph Slatyer, an old acquaintance 
of the PM-was influential, and Slatyer reportedly took a keen interest in climate 
change, according to Nix. The previously mentioned scientist influence on British PM 
Margaret Thatcher appears a similar case. In Australia's case, the strong advice to act on 
certain environmental issues offered by a highly influential political operative such as 
Senator Graham Richardson acting as Environment Minister, was also clearly 
significant. 
Another example, leading to quite a different outcome, was recounted by Hamilton 
regarding the lead-up to the Kyoto Protocol gathering in 1997. One of the most 
influential voices on climate change policy in the federal government of John Howard 
was a man described as Howard's "former flatmate" (Hamilton, 2001). Warwick Parer, 
then Minister for Resources and Energy, was a long-time veteran of the coal industry 
who was an open greenhouse sceptic and a tireless booster of coal as the cornerstone of 
Australia's prosperity. He was also alleged to be the Minister responsible for abolishing 
the federal governn1ent's alternative energy research corporation in 1998. A year later 
he resigned from Parliament, charged with conflict of interest due to his coal holdings 
(Hamilton, 2001).23 
23 Hamilton, who was a contemporary observer of much of the climate policy events l 990s-2000s, also 
contends that often trade bureaucrats, who would craft negotiation documents and strategies, were unseen 
"true believers" in a trade and market ideology that first wrecked the Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (BSD) process and later brought a "virulently anti-European" perspective to climate policy. 
They saw Australia as resource "quarry" indistinguishable from the national interest (Hamilton, 2007). 
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The Start of Hedging 
The October 1990 national interirn emission reduction target aimed to stabilise 
greenhouse gas e1nissions at 1988 levels by 2000. However, an oft-quoted caveat was 
introduced at the same time. It stipulated that there should be no adverse effects on the 
Australian economy- upon trade competitiveness in particular- in the absence of 
similar actions by other countries. Policy researchers, including Hamilton and Pearse 
point to this caveat as an indication that-even at this early date- industry lobbyists 
free market economists, and trade bureaucrats were winning with an argument that the 
fossil fuel economy must stay as it is (being Australia's "natural advantage") and that 
Australia should take no action until other countries did. These policy researchers point 
to the caveat as the start to back-pedalling in commitment to action. This slowing in 
commit1nent would gather strength during the 1990s to become a full retreat, 
accompanied by often-manufactured confusion and scepticism that marked the later 
1990s. 
The newspaper record also sheds interesting light on the early and conflicting 
understanding, within the Hawke Ministry, of Australia's reliance on coal exports and 
domestic fossil-fuel intensive energy generation, noting all the themes that came to 
dominate Australia's position in the 1990s. A report by The Australian Financial 
Review (Fin Review) writer Michael Stutchbury ( 1990, full text Appendix 1) provides 
compelling historical evidence of the early understanding, but also of the economic 
straightj acket Australia had fashioned for itself. The latter would underlie the policies of 
the 1990s and the reframe of communication that they called forth. 
Ignorance, ideological beliefs, and scepticism in government ranks- which would 
affect policy and communication- strengthened during the fol lowing Keating and 
Howard governments without the strong leadership on the environmental front 
exhibited by Hawke and Richardson, with communication framing consequences. 
The leadership shifts interacted with the bureaucracy, where a sense of urgency was not 
evident from the federal Department of Primary Industries and Energy as early as 1991. 
The depart1nent was tasked with rapidly implementing modifications to national energy 
consu111ption and production as a response to the 1990 national emission reduction 
targets. The Commonwealth directs policy on vehicle fuel efficiency standards 
appliance labelling. and also leads by example. It also assists state and territory energy 
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supply and demand, and can encourage energy efficiency-including setting up major 
communication campaigns. 
A critical 1992- 1993 report by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) into the 
Department's response again confirms the early understanding that contemporary 
greenhouse gas emissions are largely due to human burning of fossil fuels (and in 
Australia's case, very inefficient use, a recurring theme in the documentary evidence24). 
It also spells out the federal government's intentions in 1990 to take rapid response 
action, particularly to champion efficiencies (ANAO, 1993). About the department's 
response and understanding of its urgent brief, this report states that most of the federal 
government's response agenda to the 1990 emission reduction target remained in limbo: 
The Department did not fully respond in the manner expected ... Right up to the 
announcement in October 1990 it had not fully anticipated the greater priority to 
be given to the subject ... Staff meant to be available for putting the programs 
into place were heavily engaged on other tasks such as coal research grants, 
policy development and advising ... this was the case right until the time of our 
audit, more than two years after the announcement (ANAO, 1993, p. xi). 
Kerin, who relinquished the portfolio early in 1991, recalls saying to the junior Minister 
for Resources: 
There have got to be hundreds of ways of attacking this issue so, for God's sake, 
do something about local government and design and buildings and power 
saving ... But I don't think he got anywhere because a lot of this area was in 
state hands and you know how hard it is to get this Federation to work. (J. Kerin 
thesis interview, January, 2008) 
An article from that time in the SMH noted that the Department of Primary Industries 
and Energy advised Hawke that it \vould take 30-40 years to make industry more 
efficient, as old plant had to be replaced. The following excerpt explains the emerging 
24 
"Australia has a poor record of energy saving. Market research and technical studies indicate there is a 
significant untapped potential to save money and resources and stem carbon dioxide emissions. We are 
amongst the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters on a per capital basis. Our cars are amongst the 
world's most inefficient in terms of fuel consumption" (ANAO, 1993, p. xi). The audit report also says 
Australia lags behind other countries in industrial plant efficiency, in building construction and in public 
awareness of the need to save on energy. 
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paradigm, which would rule for the next 20 years, that no mandatory changes would be 
required of large industrial firms, or pollution costs be imposed. 
Almost a third of our CO2 emissions come from just 60 large finns- capital-
intensive, using equipment with a long economic life, and export-oriented. The 
costs of re-equipping would hinder export competitiveness. The alten1ative of 
exempting those industries would leave a disproportionate share of the 
reductions to fall on other sectors. (Seccombe, 1990a, p.15). 
Seccombe also wrote in 1990: 
The Federal Treasury is determined to block n1oves by the Goven1ment to 111ake 
industry cut down on greenhouse effect gases. 
On Monday, when Cabinet meets to consider targets for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases, the Treasury is set to attempt to delay the matter for up to a 
year by demanding a new inquiry into the problem (Seccombe, 1990, p 1 ). 
The signs of procrastination in the federal bureaucracy and policy arena 
notwithstanding, in the public discourse at least, strong intentions to respond were 
recorded until well into 1992, cuhninating with Australia's participation at the Rio Earth 
Su1nmit and the simultaneous establishment of the UN Fra1nework Convention on 
Cli1nate Change. The Australian delegation, also including Trade Minister Kerin, was 
headed by then Environment Minister Ros Kelly who was already fighting the 
bureaucratic battles at ho1ne. 
Meanwhile states and territories had developed action plans, which are part of the 
docu1nentary record as outlined in a 1991 document by the Australian and New Zealand 
Environn1ent and Conservation Council (ANZECC) (see Appendix I for an excerpt 
from this docu1nent). For exainple, in 1990 the ACT government released a docu111cnt 
Developing an ACT Strategy to Respond to the Greenhouse £.[feet. The Northern 
Te1Titory had a plan , and every state was working on one. The goal was to collectively 
achieve a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the interim 
emission reduction target. Energy and transpo1i sectors were identified as major sources 
of greenhouse gases, amenable to measurement and reform. The answer was regulation 
and incentives for efficient energy use in the residentiaL co1nmerciaL and industrial 
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sectors, as well as boosting areas like public transport. States promised to gear up for 
renewable energy programs. Victoria and Western Australia instituted "major" "demand 
management" programs to lower energy consumption (ANZECC, 1991 ). 
In the event, most of these programs were destined to die on the altar of deregulation, 
competition policy, and free-market ideology (further discussed in the next chapter) in 
favour of purely "supply" options in succeeding years. A major communication shift 
that ensued was the reframe from risk management to cost management. 
FRAMING SHIFT AFTER 1992 
Reframing Emission Reduction 
"The late 1980s science information didn't 'dissipate '-it was blasted away. " 
Engineer and communication consultant Deni Greene, thesis interview, August, 
2006. 
Energy analyst Deni Greene (whose archive of historical government and media 
documents provided a rare collection of documentary sources) w.as commissioned to 
prepare a number of analyses for the Hawke and then Keating government's 
Department of Environment and the ESD working groups. The brief was to identify 
opportunities to curb energy demand, quantify related savings, and explore job-creating 
new industries for energy production (Greene, 1990, 1990a). Her reports offered 
evidence that energy efficiency and conservation alone could meet Australia's interim 
emission reduction target and that it was a "win-win" option of saving money and the 
environment. Some observers at the time suspected or believed that the resource and 
energy industry associations complained about this publication to their contacts in 
government (A. Pears, thesis interview, November, 2006). In any event, the department 
subsequently drew back on commissioning her work (D. Greene, thesis interview, 
February, 2007). 
This episode from 1990 may be early evidence of what Bulkeley (2000a) has observed: 
that the late 1980s' prominence of scientific communication and the mainstreaming of 
environmental messages and concerns may have been unconventional, and that a "more 
traditional policy discourse" returned fairly quickly. This included a reframing towards 
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the familiar environment versus the econo1ny discourse as long manifested with the 
native forest dispute. The discovery that prevention of greenhouse gas pollution might 
incur costs was then used strategically to manipulate the public into unce1iainty about 
the science, according to academic and energy efficiency specialist Alan Pears who was 
advising the Victorian government at the time (A. Pears, thesis interview, November 
2006). 
A closer look at why this happened shows that by 1992 there was a strong awakening 
ainong the network of industries led by coal and alu1ninium that stood to lose fro1n 
change in the energy sectors. Backed by free market economists, they were seeing the 
implications for their "business as usual" operations and a "fightback" began in 
Australia to counter the scientific risk assessments with effective political lobbying 
(Pearse, 2005). 25 Through industry documents and political allies, the public discourse 
started to be reframed to focus on costs and jobs, and also free market and "choice" 
ideology. The evidence indicates this counter argument started in response to the 
Australian interim emission reduction target and the recom1nendations for global action 
of the UN Frainework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. 
A representative sample comes from public relations finn CRA on two occasions. A 
1989 CRA report on Australia's proposal to lower emissions by 20°/o from 1988 levels 
established some now familiar themes: it was alleged there would be little global effect 
and it would dainage Australia's econorny; holding down demand (through efficiency 
1neasures) would be costly and lead to unwelcome lifestyle changes; and battling 
climate change is just fear of change; also wanning trends may benefit some agriculture 
(Dixon & McLennan, 1989). 
A CRA repo1i in the Mining Review, April , 1992. warned of severe economic 
consequences if Australia actually imple1nents the UN Framework Convention on 
Clin1ate Change com1nit1nents to lower emissions. The aiiicle rests on the "us" and 
"' them" scenario . A theme that would become familiar was anti-United Nations and anti-
European rhetoric decrying foreign forces trying to tell Australia what do. and 
damaging Australia 's "national interest" as the UN and Europe were seen as the main 
drivers for binding emission targets. It is also an early example of the soon-to-become 
25 Pearse explored th e indus try lobbi es and their effec ts on poli cy in a 2005 ANU PhD thes is that became 
the subject of a Four Co mers Report The Greenhouse lvfafia and a popul ar book on the sa me subj ect in 
2007. 
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commonplace strategy of quoting Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) statistics that were then amplified by the media and seldom 
questioned. Thus in this article, ABARE is quoted as putting a likely carbon tax at 
$160- 200 per tonne, which would damage export industries and occasion massive job 
losses (Carruthers, 1992). (In 2011, discussion about carbon costing in Australia was 
canvassing between $10- $30 per tonne.) ABARE's Director Brian Fisher emerged 
during the 1990s as a reliable sceptic voice in regard to economics and the cost of 
response activities. 
The CRA 1992 public relations report exemplifies many of the framing themes that 
came to dominate the decade. In addition to the above themes, the following also are 
mentioned: 
• scepticism- it is not humans' fault 
• loaded images-"who is behind the greenhouse panic?" 
• market ideology-those who would push the greenhouse science do not believe 
as do "the rest of us that everyone should have options and be able to make 
choices" 
• "us and them"-much of the 20th century has been a struggle over two 
fundamental positions: freedom and choice on one side, Marxism, fascism, and 
religious fundamentalism on the other side- "such people have now discovered 
environmentalism" 
• suspicion of scientists' motives-they are just after grant funding 
• contention that the media is being manipulated by "the totalitarians and less-
than-scrupulous scientists" 
• belief that acting to conserve biodiversity is against development interests 
• argument that acting on climate change would have little global effect, but large 
costs, for Australia. 
The communication shift from risk management to cost and uncertainty was also 
spurred by the economic downturn that came to a head in 1990- 1991. The Australian 
Government's response, by then under Prime Minister Paul Keating, is described in an 
October 1991 business report in the SMH. Noting the Australian penchant for delay via 
reports and commissions, journalist Paul Cleary wrote that the most recent attempt to 
delay serious action was by referral of the problem to the Industry Commission. "The 
former Treasurer, Paul Keating ... was one of the prime movers in deferring a final 
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decision on the now-famous Toronto target, a 20 percent cut in emissions fro111 1988 
?6 levels" ( Cleary, 1991). -
However, Cleary was impressed that the Industry Commission had developed 
something called the World Economic Degradation General Equilibriun1 (WEDGE) 
model specifically to crunch the costs of responding to climate change with 270,698 
variables and 245,831 equations (Cleary, 1991 )- an interesting example of how 
economic number crunching can be accepted uncritically in media analysis. 
Energy analyst Deni Greene perceived Australian industry as a cohesive voice27 fighting 
the science and potential response messages by the early 1990s. Like other 
contemporary observers, she also perceived the leadership of Paul Keating as weak or 
disinterested as far as energy policy and climate change were concerned. Like most 
interviewees who have informed this thesis, she saw hi111 as focused on economic 
matters, starting with response to the 1991 recession, and also with econo111ic rationalist 
reforms (D. Greene, thesis interview, August, 2006). 
Keating himself has told other interviewers that he has acted as a defender of the 
natural environment and threatened ecosystems and landscapes in Australia, so111e of 
which indeed received federal protection during his tenure as Treasurer and then Pri1ne 
Minister (Labor in Power, 2010 edition of a 1993 docu111entary). 
Key Elements of the 1990s Discourse 
Mercer ( 1991) and Pearse (2005) remind us that the long-running native forest 
dispute- involving industry and both major political parties, versus so111e members of 
the public- forged a blanket en111ity on the part of rural and extractive industries (and 
the politicians who represented the111) towards environmentalists and environmental 
groups. These were seen as extremists who were against the necessary "balance" 
26 A year earli er, Cleary ( 1990) produced a length y feature in Th e Sydney Mo rn ing 1-ferald th at is notabl e 
for its contemporary summary of sc ience, politi cs, and response on climate change . Excerpts from th at 
artic le arc at the end of chapter 4 and the fu l I arti cle is in Appendix 1. 
2
- Greene sa id a lot of companies could have benefited eco nomically fro m effi ciency measures but did not 
speak out. She co ncluded that th ere was a business "kinship" response, and a lso thought th ey bought the 
"cost" argument. Indus tries that stood to lose from climate change, like touri sm and insurance. were 
equa ll y si lent or acq ui escent to the reso urce sec tor (Pea rse, 2007). 
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between the economy and the environment. They were therefore cast as special interests 
that did not have "jobs" and the "national interest" at heart. 
As the 1990s proceeded and industry groups came together to combat climate change 
action (as cited earlier in this chapter) and also documented by political analysts 
(Pearse, 2005, 2007), this framing of environmental concerns versus jobs and the 
national interest was amplified in media reports. The changed framing became more 
embedded in the public discourse once politicians and the media decided the climate 
change story was primarily political, and as green non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) rather than scientists were interviewed or quoted. This change in emphasis to 
adversarial politics by the mid-1990s is indicated in the media surveys conducted for 
this thesis, and is particularly evident in the business media represented by the Fin 
Review. 
The newspaper sample analysis conducted on the Fin Review 1995-1996 
(30 articles) showed the reporting had shifted mostly away from a focus on the science 
and policy response story in an industry context ( as seen in chapter 4 ), to an economic 
and political framework focused on the needs of industry. One of many articles from 
the mid to later 1990s reflects the general tone: "Australia's push_for international 
greenhouse policy to focus on economic issues, rather than narrow technological or 
environmental targets, is likely to receive a warm hearing at a major conference on 
climate change in Geneva" (Callick, 1996a). 
Journalist Michael Stutchbury continued to dissect the economic debate in a revealing 
manner during this period; for example, pointing out that Australia's argument for 
exceptional treatment in global emission reduction because it wants to continue trading 
in fossil fuels, is going up against emerging economies who argue that those who have 
already polluted the globe should pay (Stutchbury, 1995). 
Otherwise, the topics dominating articles from 199 5-1996 were the spectre of carbon 
taxes and industry's opposition to them, and Australia's opposition to global mandatory 
emission reduction targets at the March, 1995, Berlin Conference of the Parties to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australia had signed the UNFCCC in 
1992. 
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The themes (and some of the influential voices) that came to do111inate the public 
discourse by the mid- l 990s can be seen from these excerpts fron1 one 1996 Fin Review 
article after the Federal Government had changed parties to the Coalition under John 
Howard. Under the headline "Business Lines Up to Fight Controls", the report says 
inter alia: 
Business has warned the Howard Government to reject international proposals 
for a raft of new taxes28 to combat greenhouse gas emissions. 
The president of the Business Council of Australia, Mr Ian Salmon, has this 
week written to the Prime Minister, Mr John Howard, and other ministers 
calling for a tough stand against accepting legally binding, uniform targets for 
greenhouse emissions. 
The executive director of the Minerals Council of Australia, Mr David 
Buckingham, wrote to the Minister for Resources, Senator Warwick Parer, 
registering "strong concern" that a briefing last Thursday was "the first atte1npt 
by the Government to engage industry with the detail of the proposed Australian 
approach to this critically important treaty negotiation". 
Mr Howard last night assured the Minerals Council of Australia that industry 
and non-government organisations would be given proper involvement in 
international law1naking on the greenhouse issues ... "It will insist that 
Australia's econo1nic and trade interests are safeguarded and its specific national 
circun1stances are taken into account in i1nple111enting the convention." 
[Mr Salmon o_f the Bus;ness Council] said research by the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics indicated that a harsh approach to 
industrialised countries like Australia "would have bttle environmental impact 
given the unconstrained growth in developing country emissions, especially 
those of China, India and Indonesia in our region ." 
:2:-- ln framing terms. it is worth noting the repeated use of the term "tax" to reflect the carbon price, used 
extensively in political speeches and media reports from the mid-I 990s, and still continuing with the 
contemporary political rhetoric. Tax evokes a negative and unpleasant impost. 
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Mr Buckingham said: "Any outcome from the climate change treaty process that 
results in a 'ramping up' of existing targets and timetables would be 
fundamentally contrary to Australia's economic and trade interests." 
(Callick, 1996b) 
Other themes of the reframing, quoted in these 30 articles, were: if Australia institutes 
targets and timetable to combat carbon pollution it would scare investment away; 
Australia would lose its competitive advantage; Outsiders, Europe and ( at that time) the 
US were doing this type of damage to the country from motives of trade 
competitiveness and internal politics (in the case of the US); jobs were at stake. 
The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) remained more diverse in emphasis. It continued to 
produce straight science and risk reports, with similar unambiguous language as in 
1990, produced by science journalists throughout the decade. These were particularly 
prominent around the time of the second IPCC report in 199 5, but thereafter more 
political and sceptical coverage increased. According to two journalists with relevant 
reporting experience on the SMH and The Age, science and environment stories always 
ranked lower than economics or politics if it came to an editorial choice. Gelbspan 
(2004) noted this structural feature as well in the US press . 
Another former reporter for The Age, said that in 1987 when she worked there, 
environment was low priority and it was a "very blokey" atmosphere in terms of status 
which favoured state and federal politics, education, and health. She did not recall 
climate change being an issue during her tenure in 1986-1987, indicating that either the 
greenhouse issue was still to pick up as it did between 1987 and 1991, or that content 
analysis must be viewed in each publication separately in the context of its own 
organisation, or both. 
The structural features of the media that influenced the reframing are examined in detail 
in chapter 7. Also in chapter 7 is the outcome of a quantitative analysis, analysing the 
SMH samples over time. I found evidence for a significant framing shift to sceptical 
"balance" aided by a 10-fold increase in opinion pieces in the SMH by 2001 and a shift 
away from scientists and experts as the primary source of information-all significant 
influences on the dominant narrative. 
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The evidence suggests that the greater prominence of green groups as spokespeople for 
climate change action by the later 1990s in tande111 with a focus on jobs, costs and 
national interest, allowed a rhetorical framing of "us and the111" - i.e. mainstrean1 and 
special interests. However it has been argued by others that environmental groups have 
been equally intent on maintaining an adversarial role apart from the 111ainstream, and 
on advocating narrow legislative and technological solutions (rather than, for instance, 
alternative job creation), thereby enjoying only sectoral influence within civil society 
(Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005). 
At the government level, one manifestation of moving away from the earlier 
mainstream risk framing was that communication became more technical and boring. 
An example of this information framing retreat from the direct and accessible language 
to the narrow and technical can be traced through the content of the federal 
government's Climate Change newsletter published between 1992 and 2000 by the 
Department of Primary Industries and the Bureau of Rural Resources. 
The national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation-which in the early 
1990s had led the way with comprehensive science coverage of this issue (fon11er ABC 
science producer Geoff Burchfield, thesis interview, June 2007)- became increasingly 
dominated by a conservative board of directors appointed by the Howard Government 
and largely restricted itself to amplifying government policy (Dempster, 2005). 
Australia's only national newspaper, The Australian, took a largely sceptical stance 
during the study period and up to contemporary times (Manne, 2011 ). Analysts have 
linked this to the strong market fundan1entalist opinions of management and 
connections to free-market think tanks whose members often wrote opinion pieces for 
the paper (Manne, 2011; Knight, 2005). In chapter 7, parent company News Limited 
and The Australian are put in the context of their influence on Australia's highly 
concentrated media scene, and in chapter 6 I examine the influential econo111ic ideology 
manifested in the 1990s by both politicians and the media, setting the dominant 
narrative agenda . 
Influential Framin g in Political with Media Narratives 
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The examples I have presented show different ways that the same basic science 
communication was reframed by different politicians, journalists, and media outlets to 
form a new dominant narrative, accompanied by an upswing in debate and opinion-
focused coverage. The evidence also suggests that the most influential framing was not 
done by media stories alone, but when there was a confluence between the political and 
media narratives and across media, as would occur by the time the reframed narrative 
had become hegemonic in society. 
By 1996-1997 the revised dominant narrative was communicated principally via 
political and economic media workers in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, and reflected 
the frames set by the business and political elite: climate change was all about a political 
struggle to get the world to accept that Australia was exceptional-because it traded 
heavily (with inefficient technology) and offered coal-fired electricity to multinational 
companies and Australian consumers, as well as being a major coal exporter, and 
change from this status quo was not acceptable. Those who did not agree-the 
environmental groups, the Europeans, or the UN-were framed as the opposition to 
Australia's prosperity enjoyed by the mainstream. In 1997, the prime minister put it this 
way: "We are not prepared to see Australian jobs sacrificed and eJficient Australian 
industries, particularly the resources sector, robbed of their hard-earned competitive 
advantage" (Howard, 1997). 
Bureaucracy Power Plays and Leadership Style 
There were a number of other, institutional, factors that assisted the reframed narrative 
to take over the public discourse. For example, based on the evidence, I suggest that 
leadership style had a significant influence on 1990s outcomes. Alternative energy 
expert Alan Pears, who witnessed the policy transitions from the early 1990s on, said: 
Keating' s style was bureaucratic. Climate policy became fractured between 3 7 
committees of bureaucrats ... by 1994 a number of the threads started to 
coalesce that killed off ecologically sustainable development work while 
industry leaders and most of government thought "supply side" i.e. more energy 
development (rather than conservation) equals growth and development. 
(A. Pears, thesis interview, November, 2006) 
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The federal energy bureaucracy's internal priorities were elsewhere, as noted earlier. A 
negative effect on climate change response was compounded by interdepa1irnental 
battles that led to a stalemate on action after the early study period. Like other insider 
participants interviewed about the 1990s, John Kerin observed that the native forest 
debate poisoned relations between the Department of Environment and the then 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, and recalled the frustration he felt 
working with green groups, some of who1n he still accuses of lying at the time about 
forestry issues (J. Kerin, thesis interview, January, 2008). 29 Trade and Treasury were 
also involved in these battles over the forests. The resulting, and also ideological , 
antipathy from finance and resource industry bureaucrats to environmental action-
along with the resource industry lobbying campaigns documented by Pearse (2005, 
2007)- significantly bogged down the early climate change action plans by the mid-
l 990s under the Keating federal government. 
Sue Salmon, from an NGO background, was an adviser to Environment Minister John 
Faulkner (1994- 1995). She also says there was an internal fight going on between the 
primary industries and mineral extraction portfolios and the environment portfolio by 
that time, and that forests remained a major focus for the environment movement-
unlike climate change - during those years (S. Salmon, thesis interview, June, 2006). 
Climate change ca1ne to be considered a difficult issue to communicate in an ongoing 
fashion co1npared to forests. The head of Foreign Affairs and Trade oversaw climate 
change action proposals by that time and it was all about "the traditional conservative 
view: we have hundreds of years of coal to trade ... It was very 'us and them' and there 
was a perceived loss of power and face and control by the industry groups to accept the 
environmental perspective" (S. Salmon, thesis interview, June, 2006). She also recalled 
that the IPCC was not viewed as an important avenue for information within 
government. 
Other contemporary observers , like scientist Henry Nix, simi larly perceived tbe 
environment portfolio to be weak. In his experience during the ti111e he was chairing the 
29 
i-.
1 ix percei\·ed Kerin himself as a perhaps unwitting impediment to the environmental science message 
at the time, due to departmental rivalry. Kerin was a minister who built a strong industry department, 
whereas the environment ministers were not so interested or effective at boosting the departmental level 
(H. Nix . thesis interYiew. November. 2006). 
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Greenhouse Advisory Council, Nix said the environment portfolio was generally at the 
losing end of this argument. "Even on the best days economic arguments always 
prevailed. It was possible to modify but not change much about it" (H. Nix, thesis 
interview, November, 2006). This was consistent with the low status afforded 
environment in mass media. 
From. the rnid-1990s, industry lobbyists abounded under the umbrella group, the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (fully explored by Pearse 2005, 2007). 
Salm.on said they were very effective talking about jobs and income creation, and 
Australia's "national interest," while the environment ministry still focused on degrees 
of certainty (S. Salm.on, thesis interview, June 2006). 30 
Underlying these winning rhetorical frames were values and beliefs that elite politicians, 
bureaucrats, and industry leaders tended to have in comm.on and the dominance of 
macro economics in all policy formulation. John Kerin, who served as Trade Minister in 
the early Keating years, recalled: 
Keating and (later Howard government Treasurer) Peter Costello were suckers 
for dogrna on macro economics ... The herd instinct (became) 'the market, the 
market, the market'. In rny terms they never examined enough market structure, 
market power, market failure 
One of the things that has always worried rne about economics and science, ( and 
I set up the bureau of rural sciences in rny department, because all they were 
concerned about was trade and economics) is that economists are always 
absolutely sure they are right. Even when they're subsequently proved wrong 
they just forget about that. Scientists are never absolutely sure they're right 
because they always know there's more discovery and we learn more and more 
(J. Kerin, thesis interview, January, 2008). 
30 Working more recently with the Carr Labor government in New South Wales, Salmon said she noticed 
a similar weakening split within government ranks with the then Premier Bob Carr understanding the 
science, but the Treasurer Michael Egan blocking and presenting arguments as a sceptic and economic 
rationalist. 
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While Salmon battled in the trenches of Parliament House, Phillip Toyne had been 
drafted from the leadership of the Australian Conservation Foundation to head the 
Environment Department in 199 5. He said looking at some ice core research iri 
Antarctica "woke him up" (P. Toyne, thesis interview, August, 2007) but that generally 
neither NGOs nor government had climate change at the top of the agenda in the 1990s. 
Environn1ental and scientific submissions might prevail to a certain degree, but only for 
a short while. In his view there was "a major disconnect between what scientists knew 
and their ability to influence policy [ and this was due to] internal CSIRO traditions that 
did not promote a lot of communication with policymakers" (P. Toyne, thesis interview 
August, 2007). 
By the time Toyne headed the department ( and continued for two years under the 
Howard Government) he found the Greenhouse Advisory Council (the scientific 
advisers) to be "invisible", certainly not wielding any direct influence. Toyne agreed 
that the roundtable ecologically sustainable development (ESD) process ( during the 
Hawke/Richardson leadership on environment matters in federal government), was a 
prime example of how the environment generally and climate change had been treated 
as "mainstream". But by the 1nid- l 990s, with the industry lobbyists in full swing, the 
federal government was treating climate change knowledge as a "niche environmental" 
issue. 
Toyne and others noted that after Keating became Pri1ne Minister in 1991 he did not 
intervene when the early, prominent work on cli1nate policy and e1nission targets 
became disputed between bureaucracies and committees. The Sydney Morning Herald 
also reported: 
So far the opponents of the targets have employed the favourite trick of the 
bureaucrat- delay- to bog the whole process down in a myriad of inter-
departmental co1nmittees, studies and consultancies. The three ministers with 
central responsibility to implement the changes to reach the target- Kerin { now 
Crean), Beazley and Button- ,vere asked by Cabinet last October to report back 
by the end of last year on "recommended imple1nentation measures .. . Nine 
months later and there is little sign of them rushing back to Cabinet 
(Burton , 1991, p. 32). 
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In these ways, political leadership style- along with leadership intent- and 
bureaucratic beliefs and values appear to have played key roles in framing how to think 
about climate change at the national level in Australia from the Hawke through to the 
Howard governments. The leadership and bureaucracy facilitated a swing back to 
traditional and status quo policies in regard to the enviromnent and government 
responses, consistent also with the theory of ecological modernisation. 
ESD EXPERIMENT: FROM KEY REFORMS TO POLICY SIDELINE 
In the context of evolving climate change policy and framing, the fate of the national 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) process and analyses demonstrates how 
the same scientific and economic data can lead to widely divergent policy 
recommendations and framing-compared with the analysis of the Industry 
Commission that eventually prevailed. It also shows what can happen to good ideas or 
programs without the leadership to ensure they survive. However, ESD as conceived 
also operates within the paradigm of ecological modernisation, with the expectations of 
conventional development. ESD' s eventual sidelining indicates the difficulties of partial 
change, let alone radical revision of modem industrialisation and the institutions it relies 
on. 
The ESD process, at the time a global concept, was put into practice by the Hawke 
Labor government's 1989 decision to involve governments, industry, environmental, 
and community representatives in working groups considering how to achieve 
ecologically sustainable development within nine sectors of the economy, including 
resource and energy use. ESD was to consider community well-being, intergenerational 
equity, global impact, protection of biodiversity, and ecological processes along with 
economic development (Harris, 1997). For the purposes of this thesis enquiry, the 
important aspect was that the ESD experiment was inclusive of the natural environment 
and its spokespeople- reflected in the ESD analysis and framing. 
A combined ESD working group was asked to recommend how to lower carbon 
emissions from the energy sector. Its priority recommendation was to focus on efficient 
energy use, thereby also lowering costs ( demand management) (Bulkeley, 2000a; 
Diesendorf, 2000). This could be done by advocating or regulating smarter ways to 
operate in residential, commercial, and transport sectors: substituting gas for electricity, 
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using insulation, efficient motors, and better construction and planning, as well as 
changes in the agricultural sector to create greenhouse sinks (more recently called bio-
sequestration). According to former science minister Barry Jones, "[This] approach 
begins with the assumption that something can be done, that the argument 'this is the 
way we have always done things around here, and it can't change' is unnecessarily 
pessimistic" (Jones, 1992, p.7). 
Bulkeley (2000a) commented that the 500 recommendations that emerged from this 
ESD assessment did not challenge the basic assumptions of modem industrialisation 
and "growth" ( ecological modernisation). The degree of consensus, however, including 
from business and NGOs, may have surprised some. In the event, it proved too radical a 
process to last. Bulkeley reported that while it was generally seen as progressive and 
consensual, Australia's elite decision-making tradition emerged to drive the outcomes. 
This was achieved by the federal government developing the initial discussion paper 
and terms of reference, by the numerical preponderance of bureaucrats in the working 
groups, and through the govem111ent' s selection of the stakeholders fron1 industry, 
environment, and community groups. 
The energy sector report was taken "in house" where interdepartmental and 
intergovernmental com111ittees whittled down the recommendation list to fonn the basis 
of the National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) and the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD). "The resulting draft NGRS bore few 
similarities with the conclusions of the working group, representing instead a ' lowest 
common denominator' approach as to what governments and bureaucrats were prepared 
to accept" (Bulkeley, 2000a, p. 42). 
This experiment in participatory democracy in policy fonnulation ended in discord and 
disarray. The national Institution of Engineers, not known for its radicalism, issued a 
press release in August 1992 conde1nning the process , saying: "According to the 
Institution, bureaucratic arrogance in the National Greenhouse Steering Com1nittee 
(NGSC) has produced a National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) which 
encourages procrastination on all actions- even on those 1neasures which are well-
proven as being cost effective" (Dack. 1992 ,. 
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The response themes that would come to characterise the 1990s were evident in the 
national strategy that Dack criticised: delay, more research, voluntary action and 
rejection of demand management and mandatory efficiency measure- and a disregard 
and eventual burial of the national planning target for emission reduction. 
TRIUMPH OF THE ECONOMIST WORLD VIEW 
The ESD recommendations for energy management were in response to a request for 
input, along with a similar request to the Industry Commission, by Treasurer (soon to be 
Prime Minister) Paul Keating on the costs, benefits, and opportunities of the 
government's draft emission reduction target. The eventual triumph of the Industry 
Commission assumptions and world view would direct a decade of responses to the 
scientific information about climate change and frame the public discourse. 
Contemporary observers quoted by Bulkeley (2000a) believed that the simultaneous 
Industry Commission analysis of costs and benefits came to dominate the responses 
suggested in the National Greenhouse Response Strategy. 
Former Science Minister Barry Jones candidly compared and contrasted the ESD and 
Industry Commission reports on costs and benefits of greenhouse_action commissioned 
in 1991 (Jones, 1992). He showed that in many ways the two analyses mirror a "can do" 
versus a "can't do" view of effective response to climate change. The "can't do" 
framing (because it is against the national interest) eventually came to dominate the 
public discourse through the narrative set by politicians and the media, and helps 
explain how Australia lost a decade of valuable time and related public knowledge by 
2001. What I call the dominant narrative becomes "normal", and in this case shifted to 
an adversarial political story with Australia as the victim of outside forces. 
The "can't do" narrative may have been aided by the fact that, after the plain-English 
1990 IPCC report, many climate scientists were starting to take a more cautious public 
stance ( stressing uncertainties) in response to attacks and also perhaps because that was 
a more conventional response for a scientist. Changes were reflected in scientists' own 
language and these influences are discussed in following chapters. 
Industry Commission and rise of the "costs" narrative 
127 
The Industry Commission, a premier research organisation for the Australian 
government, initiated its inquiry in January 1991 with public hearings and submissions 
from "interested parties", a common Australian practice. The Commission repcnied in 
November of that year (Industry Commission, 1991). Given the "business as usual" and 
growth assun1ptions it entered into its modelling, the Commission found there would be 
a heavy cost to Australian industry if e1nissions were corralled to the degree suggested 
by the October 1990 emission reduction target of stabilising emissions at 1988 levels by 
2000 and reducing them 20% from there by 2005. This would require some changes 
from the status quo of Australia growing as a "raw materials economy" and affect 
existing industries like coal and oil (Jones, 1992). 
Fo1mer Science Minister Barry Jones called the Commission's approach "rigid" and 
wedded to recurrent ideas of the nation's "co1nparative advantage" as a quarry to 
developing countries, as well as the more recent idea of making Australia a base for the 
multinational aluminium industry, with enticements of cheap coal-based electricity. It 
was noted in contemporary media reports that the Hawke Government was keen for this 
to happen rationalising that the coal was "low sulphur". A SMH article pointed out that 
this view was not unanimous in the federal Cabinet. "That argument [to entice industry 
to Australia with its coal-based electricity] has potential merit, except that, as 
(Environment Minister) Mrs Kelly points out, Australia has the least energy-efficient 
industrial sector of any OECD nation- that is, it must bum more fossil fuel to achieve a 
given industrial output" (Seccombe, 1990a, p. 15). 
An inefficient industrial sector in an export environ1nent helps explain the cost 
assumptions for the Industry Commission, whose findings of cost and hardship 
supported the reframed dominant na1Tative discussed in this chapter. The "we' ll be 
ruinedn refrain should the energy status quo change, beca1ne a familiar theme in cl imatc 
change comn1unications as the 1990s progressed. Pearse (2009) also noted that 
Australia during these years made fundamental choices not to have a di versified 
economy, thereby limiting its response options. 
The Industry Com1nission issues paper foreshadowed several other thematic shifts as 
the 1990s discourse progressed- eventually avvay from the fra1ne that there is a global 
ethical responsibility and tovvard the frame that the global atmosphere is a .. commons 
and no one nation can have significant impact uni laterally "if in doing so this 
128 
significantly damages their economies or international trade competitiveness" (Industry 
Commission, 1991, p. 5). Oft-repeated thereafter, was the threat that if Australia acts 
against major industry emitters, they will simply move offshore (Industry Commission, 
1991, p. 12)3 1. With these frames, the Australian discourse came to illustrate Garrett 
Hardin's classic thesis of the "tragedy of the commons"-where an entity is unwilling 
to unilaterally look after the common interest, thinking that others will not. 
The Industry Commission initiated economic modelling that influenced other 
government advisers, particularly the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) and its industry clients. The modelling of costs to the economy 
provided the political arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to set global 
emission reduction targets after 1997. The underlying assumptions that trumped the 
ESD recommendations on efficiency and alternative energy mixes-according to 
Bulkeley and Hamilton-is a worldview about markets, their inherent perfection and 
efficiency, and thus the anathema of regulating economies or even offering incentives 
for change. This ideology was economic rationalism as practised in Australia, a major 
influence on response that is explored in chapter 6. 
In his analysis of what he calls "idealist economics"- that is, theory and policy 
divorced from empirical data-political economist Evan Jones cited the work of the 
Industry Commission as a prime example of a certain type of economic modelling and 
analysis using "a preconceived conceptual framework" to learn the likely impact of 
policy change (Jones, 2002). Arguably, ABARE's 1990s analyses were similarly 
idealised. Pearse (2007) interviewed insiders and described how assumptions favouring 
status quo industries and the likely cost of any change were seeded into economic 
modelling of the mid and late 1990s. This has been variously ascribed to ideology or 
consultancy payments from industry, or likely both. "For ABARE, Australia's big 
polluters are in fact clients. Many of them have paid vast sums for ABARE' s 
greenhouse policy research. The terms of these deals are commercial in confidence, not 
even revealed in parliament ... "(Pearse, 2007, p. 219). 
Pearse wrote that the biggest names amongst Australian fossil fuel companies figure in 
parliamentary revelations of clients who funded the ABARE model that underpinned 
31 Readers may have noted that the very same warnings, cautions or threats of economic damage have 
continued beyond the study period, i.e. , after 2001, in the dominant narrative reported in the mass media. 
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PM John Howard's climate change response after 1996. These include the Australian 
Coal Association, Australian Aluminium Council, the Business Council of Australia 
BHP, Rio Tinto, Exxon Mobil , and other oil companies. This process generated enough 
controversy to merit an auditor-general's investigation in the late 1990s, which showed 
no environmental lobbyists were on hand to wield comparable influence (Pearse, 2007). 
Australia as a Good Global Citizen 
Through the early Keating years, Australian politicians were still keen to be seen as 
good global citizens. Indeed, McDonald (2005) makes a persuasive case that an ethical 
politics, at least in foreign policy, was still at the time deflecting the inroads of 
economic rationalist thought. 
In June 1992, Australia was a signatory to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) unveiled at the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(also known as the Rio Earth Summit). The UNFCCC came into force in 1994. 
Australia became the eighth nation to ratify the convention, signalling its serious intent. 
The UNFCCC called for emission reduction of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 
2000, and targets would be set in 1997 at the Kyoto meeting of the parties to the 
convention (the Kyoto Protocol). Meanwhile signatories were also supposed to design 
effective response strategies (Bulkeley, 2000a; Hamilton & The Australia Institute 
1997). Australian states were already doing that in response to the early good public 
knowledge in this country and the global and domestic emission reduction targets. 
Project Victoria 
All Australian states reported in October 1991 on what had been achieved since their 
n1ission statements in 1988 (ANZECC, 1991 ). Victoria is the premier example of how 
far climate change response programs had progressed and what happened thereafter. At 
the beginning of the 1990s. Victoria vvas leading with a comprehensive suite of actions 
including: mandatory insulation in nevv housing; permanent controls on tree-clearing· 
incorporating the costs of environmental dainage by "providing a 10 percent cost 
advantage to energy conservation and rene\vable energy resource optionsn~ and ( soon to 
be disbanded bv deregulation and privatisation) major demand-management progra1n 
through the State Electricity Com1nission of Victoria and the Gas and Fuel Corporation 
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of Victoria. All this would require "a policy of energy conservation rather than 
increased sales" (ANZECC, 1991, p. 38). 
The Electricity Commission figured that its programs-targeted at residential, 
commercial, and industrial consumers-could save 14 million tonnes of greenhouse gas 
emissions annually while reducing demand, thereby saving consumers money, up to the 
year 2005 (i.e., 14 years hence). However, nationally as I have shown, the Industry 
Commission, and later ABARE modelling, would disregard the possibilities of demand 
management in favour of incremental growth in demand and costs. The Renewable 
Energy Authority of Victoria was taking even bolder steps to finally crack the builder 
and subdivision mentality with guidelines for solar-efficient subdivisions to be 
incorporated in the building code; house energy efficiency ratings; labelling for solar 
hot water heaters, wind farms, methane recovery at landfills; and more (ANZECC, 
1991). 
All this was to come to a dramatic halt with "Project Victoria", which brought a Liberal 
government led by Jeff Kennett to power in 1992 with the help of a "blueprint" for a 
deregulated state drawn up by the neo-liberal think tank the Tasman Institute (Cahill 
and Beder, 2005). Kennett would lead these "reforms" until 1999~ Ideology was thus 
shifting the goalposts at both the state and federal levels. 
Deregulation of state energy utilities following 1992 ( aided by the Keating 
government's enthusiasm for national competition policy) helped undo both the intent 
and the capability for reducing Australia's emissions through energy demand 
management strategies. Victoria was not alone in planning energy sector efficiency 
management. But deregulation and commercial competition in the energy sector 
favoured increasing revenue through increasing demand, the opposite of demand 
management. The response from the other states varied. In some cases, some 
conservation programs did remain for the longer term. For example, New South Wales 
created its Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) that promoted green 
power electricity and energy efficiency into the 2000s (Diesendorf, 2007). 
Bulkeley (2000a) and others (notably Wilkenfeld, Hamilton & Saddler 1995; Hamilton, 
2001) have critiqued the inherent weaknesses of the National Greenhouse Response 
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Strategy (NGRS) of 1992. Economists Wilkenfeld, Han1ilton and Saddler at the 
Australia Institute wrote in 199 5: 
The failure of the NGRS derives from a failure of governments to show 
leadership, to reconcile conflicting policy objectives and to distinguish the 
public interest from narrow commercial interests. This has been compounded by 
a lack of knowledge of the energy market in parts of the bureaucracy, and a lack 
of informed public debate and scn1tiny. (p. l) 
The Advent of Cost-neutral Voluntary Action 
In a 2000 review Bulkeley noted: "Responses were left to ad hoc govem1nent processes 
and commercial decisions," (Bulkeley, 2000a, p. 45). The strategy established a 
rhetorical fra1nework that response should be left to individual action and be "no 
regrets" (i.e., no entity should bear costs) which became finnly established in the public 
discourse and assumptions of the possible. 
In that spirit, the showpiece of federal government action by 1994 became the 
Greenhouse Challenge Program targeted at voluntary industry efficiency measures , and 
administered jointly by the departments of environment and industry. It reflected the 
federal industry depaii1nent's decision not to co1npromise growth and develop1nent on 
behalf of greenhouse gas abatement goals, regardless of inten1ational co1nmitn1ents 
(Bulkelely, 2000a, p. 47). Wilkenfeld, Hamilton and others have described the 
Greenhouse Challenge pro grain as a model of how to tackle a pressing national problem 
in an ad hoc, voluntary fashion- rather like asking citizens to voluntarily tax 
themselves for the public good. 
It reflected the ideas behind 1nost climate change response activities by the federal 
govemn1ent in the later study period until 2001 and beyond: that "the market" knows 
best on all things. A carbon tax, an effective tool in a market econo1ny, was considered 
and nevertheless rejected during the mid-l 990s as too costly to industry (Hamilton 
2002). The resource industry's role in opposing any climate change response that cost 
1noney or profits is evident from The Australian Financial Review newspaper evidence 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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A national conclave, Greenhouse 21 C, talked about funding renewable energy and a 
national sustainable energy policy, but there is no evidence it ever moved coherently 
beyond the intent stage. By 1994-1995, it was clearer that Australia would be 
overshooting the FCCC aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000 (let alone the earlier domestic interim target of 20% below 1988 levels), and 
therefore Australia would not be meeting its international commitments or indeed 
implement much of the NGRS (Bulkeley, 2000a, p. 47; Hamilton, 2001). 
By mid-1995 the federal government had formally aligned itself with the so-called 
"Juscanz" countries-standing for Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. At 
least one major environmental organisation blamed the US, Canada, and Australia in 
particular for obstructing a whole raft of environmental measures agreed to at the Earth 
Summit, including moving ahead on reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Greenpeace, 
2002). 
While Australian scientists remained involved at the IPCC level, and the scientific 
message remained similar, the 1995 IPCC report would be a cautious shadow of the 
1990 report in communication terms. Reasons proffered by various observers have 
been: behind-the scenes politicking by oil and energy producers and their support for 
sceptic scientists; the need to build consensus amongst government panel members; and 
possibly the influence of economists as panel chairs. In chapter 9 I compare the 
language of the two reports as evidence of a big shift in scientists' communication style. 
Australian National Party politician John Stone approvingly noted in an opinion piece in 
the Fin Review that the 1995 IPCC report was only "40 percent as apocalyptic" as its 
1990 counterpart. In doing so, he said he echoed the sentiment of US sceptic scientist 
Patrick Michaels. At this rate, Stone hoped the whole lot of "poppycock" would 
disappear by the end of the decade (Stone, 1996, p. 25). 
The evidence examined for this thesis supports Bulkeley who concluded in her review 
covering 1985-1995 that despite the brief window of opportunity to bridge economic 
and environmental objectives, climate change policy by the mid-l 990s "appears to 
represent a throwback to the previous era of confrontation" (Bulkeley 2000a, p. 48), 
signalling the failure of the ESD experiment and of a precautionary approach. 
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The Ref rame from 1996 On 
The dominant narrative was well on its way to changing frorn a "science and risk to 
society" story to a political and economic story about costs and "national interest" as the 
Howard Coalition government took office in March 1996. A good overview of this 
trend and related communication can be seen in the 30 Fin Review articles scanned for 
1995- 1996. They provide clear evidence of the strong economic focus that continued 
through 1996-2001 (and beyond). The following article makes manifest the 
government's identification with resource industry interests , and the language is typical 
of the later study period. (Comparisons can again be made with the language of an 
earlier, 1990, Fin Review article by Michael Stutchbury, in Appendix 1, also a typical 
example from its time.) Headlined: "Coalition Backs Industry on Climate Change" the 
1996 story reports that: 
Australian industry has applauded the Federal Cabinet's decision yesterday to 
oppose a targets and timetables approach to international climate change 
negotiations, made on the eve of World Environment Day today. The Howard 
Government's position effectively reaffirms that taken by the Keating 
government and its minister for the Environment, Senator John Faulkner. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer, the Minister for the 
Environment, Senator Robert Hill, and the Minister for Resources and Energy 
Senator Warwick Parer, said in a joint statement: "Australia will insist that the 
outcome of current international negotiations on climate change safeguards 
Australia's particular economic and trade interests. " 
Mr John Hannagan, chairman of the Australian Aluminium Council's major 
policy group, said industry welcomed this statement, "reinforcing its no-regrets 
position as its negotiating stand at the forthcoming Geneva talks." He said: "Thi 
is consistent with the Government's commitment not to support mandatory 
policy measures vvhich would damage Australia's trade and economic interests. 
We would also ask the Government for stronger efforts to involve developing 
countries in the process at the earliest possible opportunity. 
(Callick, 1996. p. 2) 
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Pearse (2007) put public relations consultant John Hannagan and his partner Noel 
Bushnell (H&B) in context: 
Some of Australia's biggest polluters have paid H&B for much of the decade to 
attend international greenhouse negotiations, write media strategies and press 
releases, organise conferences undermining Kyoto along with the rationale for 
emission cuts. Most important of all, polluter money has funded H&B to door-
knock the Prime Minister's office (Pearse, 2007, p.209). 
Compared with the early study period, few government or public documents ( other than 
newspaper reports) were found discussing greenhouse science communication from the 
mid- l 990s and up to 2001 32 . However, a significant shift in framing the issue can be 
gauged from a July 1996 document called Greenhouse, Not Just an Environmental Issue 
produced by the Australian Coal Association. The framing in the introduction to this 
document is notable because it reflects the "uncertain" way of communicating climate 
change in the public discourse that took hold during that period, as reflected also in 
newspaper reports and politicians statements. 
The coal industry document said the Australian public was being told by the media and 
by environmental groups that fossil fuels are to blame for heating the planet, but a more 
balanced and objective debate is needed. It also picked apart the 1995-1996 IPCC 
report to highlight any language signalling uncertainty about human activities affecting 
the cli1nate, and included contradictory sceptic perspectives. The report highlighted 
Australia's "competitive advantage", and called Kyoto target setting unfair. The framing 
implied the question: Whether, and to what extent, is there a human influence on the 
greenhouse effect so that action is necessary? As I have shown, in the early study 
period, reports by media and government, and even industry, assumed that this had been 
thoroughly answered by science. 
After 1996, climate change or the greenhouse effect would be commonly presented, in 
the media and in political rhetoric, as a "debate" about both the science and about 
Australia's place in the world in terms of action. Some of this can be seen in the 
32 The 1nost complete record, in the federal government's Climate Change newsletter, indicates a retreat 
into the technical and boring and away from policy reports. However, the federal government's 
Greenhouse Office website may have been an anomaly, at least in the period following 2001 when this 
thesis started, by exhibiting no uncertainty about the science and human agency. 
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November 1997 speech by the new Prime Minister John Howard on climate change. l t 
lays out the economic and jobs argument for Australia's position and barely, if at all 
mentions the science, the risk, and the need for a vigorous response. "From the start the 
Government has addressed the critical issue of global warming in a way that effectively 
promotes Australia's national interests". The speech rejects mandatory targets and talks 
about jobs, efficient industries and competitive advantage (Howard, 1997). 
Hamilton (2001) notes that this perspective to climate change response, along with an 
industry fixation to avoid a carbon tax, guaranteed that the on-ground action would be 
slim to none despite rhetoric about "leading the world" on this and that response 
initiative. Indeed, there is nothing in the documentary record of this period analogous to 
the federal and state activity record of the late 1980s and early 1990s I have previously 
outlined. McDonald (2005) agreed that effective action was minimal in light of the 
policy directions, and adds that there was also a "vicious attack on the environment 
movement" mounted during this period (McDonald, 2005, p. 225). 
Claims Australia Encouraging More Emissions 
Fu1iher evidence on the extent that both major political parties had, by the mid-l 990s 
rejected the early government response framework, in favour of framing to strengthen 
the status quo and delay action, was provided in an extraordinary letter. This was sent 
by a political party, the Australian Democrats, to a climate summit meeting in Geneva 
in 1996 and reported in the SMH thus: 
In the letter, the Democrats told Mr Chimutengwende [ the meeting chairman] 
that while the Howard Government might claim Australia's greenhouse gas 
emissions would miss the target of halting their rise by only 3 per cent in fact 
Australia's greenhouse emissions were rapidly increasing and almost all of the 
National Greenhouse Response Strategy remained unimplemented. 
"'The Government is actively encouraging more coal-fired thermal power 
stations: it does not have the commitment to stand up to the coal industry hence 
its contradictory attempt to assist marketing coal in the name of greenhouse gas 
reductions." the letter savs. 
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"The Government actively encourages more car use by building more freeways 
and infrastructure to support it rather than improving public transport; it allows 
far more clearing of native vegetation than is being replaced by tree planting; it 
increases the number of forests clearfelled for woodchips and it does not 
adequately encourage development and implementation of renewable 
technologies." (Gilchrist, 1996, p. 2) 
McDonald (2005) studied the change in Australia's value emphasis during this period 
and concluded that a major shift occurred away from a stance that was global, ethical, 
and risk averse (and open to new energy industries). He notes that Australia's refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol by the late 1990s created a "context" ( or a meta frame) where 
the refusal was communicated by politicians and the media as normal and logical 
behaviour to protect jobs and the national interest. Meanwhile, a significant narrative 
arose, aided by sceptics, in the second half of the study period that "scientists don't 
agree" and that there is significant uncertainty about the science. The considerable 
influence of scientific micro framing about certainty is examined in chapters 8 and 9. 
A related phenomenon by the mid 1990s was the incremental marginalised role of 
environmental concerns and the institutional downgrading of public interest science in 
favour of conducting taxpayer-funded science on behalf of industry. Graeme Pearman, 
former chief of the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research from 1992-2002 was an 
acting CSIRO Institute Director in 1996. He recalled that there was "enormous tension 
between the mining institute and the environment institute which was considered 'too 
green'." CSIRO was balkanised. "The CSIRO Board also became industry dominated" 
( and) "The paradigm was wealth creation and the role of science is to build 
wealth ... [this manifested as] denial or that it was politically incorrect to diverge from 
'accountability' towards this path" (G. Pearman, thesis interview, 2006). 
Through his role as a science communicator as well as administrator, Pearman says that 
he found the business community had unspoken but adhered-to rules of how it regarded 
the schism between development and environment or green issues. Even within the 
scientific community, climate change had become characterised as a special interest 
"green issue" and he became characterised as a "greenie" by the mid 1990s-a far cry 
from the early scientific mainstreaming of climate science through his efforts and that of 
other CSIRO scientists in 1987 and 1988. This state of affairs was not helped by the 
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fact that "people in boardrooms and cabinets don't understand ' science speak · on 
uncertainty" (G. Pearman, thesis interview, 2006). 
A significant event towards the end of the study period, in April 2000, was the inaugural 
meeting of the Lavoisier Group of sceptical entities, co-led by the highly influential and 
active Hugh Morgan and Ray Evans of the Australian Minerals Council. It was reported 
at the time (Taylor, 2000) that the Lavoisier Group was a spin-off of 111embers from the 
Australian Business Council who wanted to take a step backwards to dispute the very 
existence of an anthropogenic greenhouse effect. They were joined by engineers, 
academics, free market consultant Alan Oxley, and retired government officials- some 
with considerable clout like retired Labor Minister Peter Walsh, as well as Brian 
Tucker, former head of CSIRO Atmospheric Research-all of whom set about 
contacting politicians (The Lavoisier Group, 2000). 
The express aim of this group/think tank was to debunk, sow uncertainty and otherwise 
counter the science and policy responses of climate change in the lead-up to possible 
Kyoto ratification in 2005. In 2004 the group published a sceptic book penned by 
former Bureau of Meteorology staffer William Kininmonth that raised desired media 
attention and debate. This thesis notes that publication of sceptical books at critical 
policy junctures has been a repeat tactic by climate change policy critics. In the event 
Kyoto was not ratified by Australia at that time. 
However, internationally by 2000, the fossil fuel industry sceptic Global Climate 
Coalition, which had attempted to overwhelm IPCC and political negotiations during 
the 1990s, was reported to be falling into disunity. A better understanding was emerging 
amongst key global energy corporations like Shell and Texaco , and car companies like 
Ford and others, that they should consider the risks and opportunities posed by climate 
change, not just act as blockers (Windram, 2000). 
DECLINE OF PUBLIC INTEREST BY MID-1990S 
The Austral ian documentary evidence does not state explicitly what the ongoing public 
reaction to climate change information was during the mid- to later 1990s. However 
isbet and Myers (2007) . looking at US poll data. showed that public interest can wane 
considerably as a story is reframed from a science to a negative political story. as it was 
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during these years. Some suggestive data were released by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics in 2006, showing public concern for environmental issues had declined 
continuously since 1992 when 75% of Australians expressed interest. By 2004 that 
figure had dropped to 57% (Beeby, 2006). 
Since this drop coincides with the reframing period in the 1990s on climate change, it 
may reflect a loss of public awareness or interest in that arena as well as on other 
environmental issues, and perhaps for similar reasons of political diversion. Based on 
the communication analysis for this thesis, I consider it less likely that the loss of public 
interest came first and influenced the politicians and media to cloud the climate change 
discourse. McDonald (2005) notes that the literature of the period confirms the 
influence of the environment movement waned during the 1990s. As well, McDonald 
notes the campaign of deliberate marginalisation of environmental groups and issues 
after 1996. 
CONCLUSION 
By the mid- l 990s Australia had reverted to a more traditional paradigm of 
confrontation between economic and environmental interests. Additionally the 
docu1nentary record shows that Australian federal political leaders, while well-informed 
and committed to action in the period 1987-1992, were even then hedging Australia's 
response options. This is viewed in the context that Australia decided by the late 1980s 
to focus the economy on being a mineral extraction centre (some people call it a 
quarry), including becoming globally a top coal producer and exporter, and courting 
energy-intensive industries like aluminium to establish here (Stutchbury, 1990). 
History and government scholars (e.g., Mercer·, 1991; Pearse, 2009) provide a context 
for this shift backwards in economic and political focus to Australian traditional values 
of "developmentalism" and a focus on growth first and foremost within known 
industries: i.e. Australia's traditional role as a raw resource economy-now in a "free" 
and globalised market. Significant influences on this shifting policy framework are 
explored in the following chapters to offer greater detail on the values and institutions 
that drove Australian events to evolve as they did over the decade of the 1990s. 
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The evidence gathered for this chapter and the previous one shows how communication 
framing concurs with Bulkeley's (2000a) analysis that there was a brief, early window 
of opportunity for a positive and effective policy response to clin1ate change science 
which swung shut in favour of traditional values. In particular I show how the 
communication supported considerable activity by Australian governments between 
1987 and 1992 and then changed. In the context of the events and leadership changes in 
the 1990s, I am able to identify some fairly clear communication frames that evolved 
from the early "can do" response to the later "can't do" response on understanding and 
action. 
The shift was from an ethical, global responsibility and mainstream risk rnanagement 
narrative to a narrative of national self interest identified with multi-national resource 
extraction industries, costs, and threat to jobs. An "us and the1n" theme developed 
against international agencies like the UN and also the European Union. This stance 
also marginalised environmental groups, and possibly climate scientists along with 
them. The science became framed as uncertain. "Outsiders" and international forces 
were framed as trying to use this uncertain science to destroy Australian families' 
prosperity. The Australian federal government on the other hand was framed as 
safeguarding jobs, families and the "national interest" by rejecting international 
emission reduction targets and perspectives that were not about the economy. 
This do1ninant narrative became "normal" in the late 1990s and beyond and the 
consequences of these frames are visible in the difficulty of shifting the narrative back 
to a mainstreain risk concern in the present day. It is possible to isolate so1ne key 
communication frames of the early and later na1Tatives as shown in the comparative 
columns in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Frames and Drivers of Early and Late Climate Change Dominant 
Narratives and Discourses 
EARLY FRAMING 
• Scientists' voice clear and accepted by media and 
bipartisan political leadership 
• Mainstream messages that all are equally at risk in 
our family/nation/world ; weather a key driver to 
public awareness 
• Environment on equal footing in the national 
discourse 
• Australia has amongst highest per capita emissions 
and should take a leading role in global action 
• Policy framing of national interest is ethical , 
responsible as global citizen ; change and efficiency 
in energy policy= opportunities, cleaner 




Understanding that early action will mitigate severity 
of future climate change and harm 
Some regulation may be necessary to fast-track 
response strategies 
Political and media leaders tell us this, so we agree 
LATER FRAMING 
• Scientists voice uncertain; scientists don't agree; 
scientists not commun icating 
• "Them" the greenies/UN/Europe interfering with our 
prosperity, scaring investment away 
• Environmental issues and groups marginalised 
• We're exceptional on the global stage; if we don't 
pollute, sell coal , others will ; we won 't take action on 
this 'commons' until all other countries do 
• Policy framing of national interest equated with 
multinational resource extraction industry; any 
change in energy pol icy = more costs to consumers, 
less jobs, benefits not factored in 
• There will be a techno fix down the road , clean coal , 
nuclear 
• Any changes have to be voluntary "choice" of 
business and consumers 
• Political and media leaders tell us this, so we agree 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FRAMING THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE- INFLUENCES I: 
VALUES, BELIEFS AND POLITICAL ECONOMIC IDEOLOGIES IN 
FRAMING THE POLICY AGENDA AND RESPONDING TO THE SCIENCE 
An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published ;n 
professional and semi-popular journals is that the problem under discuss;on has 
a technical solution. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a 
change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, den1-anding little or 
nothing in the way of change in human values, ideas or ,norality. 
Hardin, The tragedy of the Commons ( 1968), cited in Dryzek & Schlosberg 
2005, pp. 25-36 . 
[Prince Charles] has long called on people and politicians to rethink thei, 
attitudes to the planet, economic grovvth and consumption. Recently, however, 
government policy has become based on the notion that problems such as 
climate change are best addressed through science and technology - vvithout 
compromising economic grovvth and consiunerism . 
"Greenie Charles Worries Labour," 2009 
INTRODUCTION 
Ideas: The iVIeta Influence 
In pre\'ious chapters I have looked at the theory and practice of framing climate change 
information by scientists . government. and media and how this communication changed 
dramatically during the span of the study period. I have discussed the arc of climate 
change policy eYents in Australia during the same period, and the suggestion that it 
ref1ects the theory of ecological modernisation- that all actions on behalf of the natural 
enYironment can be accommodated without changing existing social structures or 
aspirations. On both these fronts then. that is. communication and societal frame\vork, it 
is arguably important to understand the ideas that drove the opinion leaders \Vho set the 
dominant narratiYe for the public. not least because present-day evidence sho\VS that the 
same influential frames are still in use. 
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For example, in late 2009, in the lead-up to the Copenhagen Climate Change talks (the 
16th Conference of the Parties to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change [FCCC]), work by an international consortium of investigative journalists, 
including members of The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) staff, unveiled the ongoing 
and highly funded public relations campaigns by coal, aluminium, and electricity 
industries and, at times, related labour unions, to influence and deflect government 
action (The global climate change lobby, 2009). The lobbying story, even some of the 
players, were the same as previously explored by Pearse (2007) looking back at the 
1990s. The tactics were also familiar. Elite opinion-makers in politics and the media 
framed a dominant narrative for their arguments in terms of jobs and family, and of 
employers going offshore if their needs for cheap power were not met. In framing terms, 
this narrative made the economic interests of multinational companies synonymous with 
the national interest and metaphorically with every family's interests. This chapter 
therefore looks at the influence of ideology in the ongoing narrative and the next 
chapters will further explore the role of the media, and also the contributions of 
scientists own beliefs and values in this framing/reframing process relevant to public 
cormnunication of climate change. 
Political science researchers and the present study have established that lobbying by 
business and labour interests converged with political ideology and media structural 
factors to reframe a dominant narrative in the 1990s and drive the outcomes of climate 
change policy. In the face of increasing risk of climate system catastrophe according to 
scientific reports, this raises the question: Have influential opinion-leaders in these 
sectors behaved irrationally during the past 20 years and do they continue to do so? 
How can they deny the risk and subvert action in face of the overwhelming scientific 
evidence that is now empirically more evident year by year? 
From another perspective, many people seem to believe that politicians and their 
advisers are unable to think past the current or next election cycle. For them, questions 
about what values drive policy-makers in regard to the long-term implications of 
climate change risk often founder on this one idea. This explanation has been offered in 
interviews by senior public servants and former politicians, as well as by academic 
observers. That is the end of the story as far as they are concerned. 
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The hypothesis developed with the current study is that there are underlying and shared 
values and beliefs held by politicians and other influential opinion leaders that n1ake 
their responses internally congn1ent, if not always "rational" or understandable· to the 
casual observer. These values and ideas become reflected in society at large (the 
concept of hegemony). The influence of dominant ideas and values on environmental 
and climate policy is therefore further explored in this chapter. 
"Discourse" in this exploration refers to both the content of public and political debate 
guided by ideas and beliefs, and also to the practice of public discussion. 33 "Ideology" is 
used in the traditional political science sense of bodies of thought and belief e.g., 
Marxism or liberalism. As a science communication scholar, I am bo1Towing from the 
social sciences for insight into guiding beliefs and values in the period of interest (late 
1980s to 2001 ). This thesis and chapter do not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the literature or theory pertaining to political or economic philosophy, 
guiding beliefs, or cultural value systems ( or about risk perception and psychology), but 
offer the insight that these are important areas worthy of investigation in science and 
society studies. 
BACKGROUND 
A comprehensive literature review of the leading thinkers on environmental politics, 
influential during the period under study, can be found in Dryzek & Schlosberg (1998 
2005). In regard to neo-liberal econo1nics in Australia and the discourses it has 
generated, a good overview of recent Australian research directions is provided by 
Johnson (2002). Mercer, examining natural resource conflicts in Australia, argues that 
while in Australia the "environmental debate" has been conducted predominantly by 
invoking scientists and technologists of various stripes, the insights of the social 
sciences and humanities have to be given equal weight because "Environmental 
questions are inextricably intertwined with econo1nic issues and, at base, are concerned 
with values rather than so-called 'scientific facts"' (Mercer, 1991 , p. ix). 
Historically and psychologically, the denial of environmental reality is not a new 
phenon1cnon for the human species. Diamond (2005) looked extensively at the collapse 
:-J Others have referred to discourses as shared ways of interpreting the world: also cal ling them frames, 
speech genres, and interpretive repertoires (e.g., Tuler, 1998, reviewing Dryzek, 1997). 
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of previous civilisations and says the evidence indicates that, more often than not, it has 
been the values and beliefs of societal elites more than any empirical on-ground 
evidence (frequently of changing climatic conditions) that has determined the fates of 
these civilisations. 
The proposition that values guide much of environmental policy development and 
communication takes the story beyond a saga of corporate self-interest from potential 
"losers" vis a vis national climate change response in the energy sector. Facing the 
environmental sciences during the study period (from the late 1980s to 2001 and 
beyond) have been deep-seated ideologies that, I will argue, came to exercise a 
hegemonic grip on Australian society. Gramsci' s theory of cultural hegemony 
postulates that in advanced industrial societies, one group or class can rule through 
dominating everyday ideas and practices, and this is done through information-e.g., 
mass media and public relations, schooling, popular culture, and consumerism. 
In Australia, commonly held ideas and values include a "no limits" view on human 
capability versus the natural world. There are abiding beliefs in growth and progress 
(also described as "developmentalism" in the literature) as guiding principles in the 
organisation of society; plus related beliefs in the power of technology to fix all 
problems ( eventually); and deeply embedded beliefs in human exceptionalism from the 
rest of the natural world. These underlying beliefs are shared by elite opinion-makers 
and much of the public, and came together during the period of study with the peaking 
of a particular form of free-market capitalism and its related economic assumptions. 
During the 1990s, these values and ideology influenced the political and media 
responses to the scientific messages, and came to define acceptable communication 
directed at general public, in line with the definition of hegemony. 
GUIDING "NO LIMITS" BELIEF STRUCTURES IDENTIFIED BY THIS 
STUDY 
Progress, Exceptionalism and Techno Fix 
Before exploring the transparently dominant ideological influence and belief structure 
of the period-economic rationalism-it is useful to look at strong cultural values that 
provide underlying context to framing and communication. 
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Dryzek ( 1997) offered a historical overview and discourse analysis of two converging 
belief systems that have info1med the political arena during the study period and. more 
generally, Western beliefs about humans and nature. What he calls a Pro1nethean "no 
limits" discourse of industrialism informs the belief systems that incorporate 
"develop1nentalism" and techno-fix beliefs in Australia. 34 In his discourse analysis of 
the Promethean world construct, he concludes that at the ontological level Prometheans 
believe resources, ecosystems, and nature itself do not exist- at least as nothing more 
than a store of 1natter and energy "awaiting human manipulation and transformation" 
(Dryzek, 1997, p. 49). He writes: "The most important natural relationship taken for 
granted by Promethean discourse is therefore a hierarchy in which humans ( and in 
particular human minds) dominate everything else" (Dryzek, 1997, p. 50). 
This is the hallmark of the secular techno-fix world view that has predominated since 
World War II. While not necessarily denying that natural systems exist in their own 
right, proponents of this view often subscribe to a "wise use" philosophy allied with 
developmentalism to argue that not to exploit the planet is "wasteful" and that adverse 
environmental effects are overstated by special interests such as "greenies", who do not 
have jobs and the national interest at heart (Beder, 2000, Dryzek, 1997 and other 
authors). The corollary idea is that hu1nans will always find a technological solution to 
any environmental problem and that "no-limits" development is the natural order of 
hu1nan endeavour. In the words of Mercer: 
Traditional adherents to this philosophy have been the big 1nining and 6111bcr 
production companies , farmer and pastoralist organisations , professional 
engineering bodies and the like (supported by development-oriented State and 
Commonwealth govem1nents) . . . and rhetorical links with "progress". "national 
interes t", "wealth/job creation", "develop1nent", "growth", "defence" and so on 
have frequently been made. (Mercer, 1991 , p . 41) 
34 ln Greek mytho logy Prometheus sto le fire from Zeus thereby greatl y in creas ing hu man ca pac ity to 
manipulate the world to sui t humans. The ten11 ' comucopi an' is used by some hum an geographers and 
others to denote a simi lar "no li mits·· discourse of endless reso urces and unli mi ted capac ity of the natura l 
world to absorb huma n acti\' itics and po llu tants . 
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Mercer wrote this from a historical perspective in 1991, at a time when the evidence 
shows that in response to greenhouse risks outlined by scientists, countervailing ethical 
values based on the public interest and global responsibility had prevailed in 
Commonwealth and most state policies, and were being communicated to the public. 
Between 1987 and 1991, response to climate change, rhetorically and at the planning 
stage, was in fact moving outside the dominant "no-limits" ideology that Mercer 
describes- but stayed within the dominant paradigm of ecological modernisation 
regardless of new proposals for economic directions to mitigate Australia's carbon 
emissions (Bulkeley, 2000a). As Bulkeley noted, it did not take long for the "no-limits" 
world view to reassert itself in its previous form, eventually to dominate the agenda 
along with economic rationalism, as we shall see. 35 
Pearse (2009) in his ongoing analysis of the "quarry vision" guiding Australian public 
policy, further unpacks the Australian "no limits" discourse. He argues that regardless 
of the nominal differences between the major political parties, Australian values have 
been shaped across the board by a history of, and dedication to, mining the mineral 
wealth of the country. This belief that Australia's economic and cultural destiny is to be 
a (well-paid) quarry to the rest of the world has led to a highly conflicted "no limits" 
and techno-fix discourse in regard to climate change response-full-steam ahead with 
coal export and domestic use in the face of rising greenhouse gas emissions directly 
attributed to coal burning, and official rhetoric and framing on bringing emissions 
down. 
Apart from nuclear power at some future date, a government-favoured Australian 
techno-fix solution to this internal conflict has been the theoretical merits of "clean 
coal" or carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the coal-burning cycle. As Pearse notes, 
there is little scientific evidence that CCS will do what it is supposed to do. But the 
communication frames flowing from government policy would have us believe 
otherwise. 
Between the coal companies and the governments, hardly a month passes 
without the industry or its proxies proclaiming another "clean-coal" milestone 
... based on my rough calculations, a new CCS media release is issued for about 
35 Ecological 1nodemisation is a sociological term borrowed for this thesis as a theoretical framework in 
chapter 5. It describes the belief that enviromnental damage can be fixed without changing existing social 
and economic systems. 
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every 100 tonnes of CO2 actually captured and stored. The spectacular gro\vth 
industry is not clean coal, but clean coal PR. (Pearse, 2009, p. 79) 
Because it is not an existing technology, the focus on clean coal is a matter of values 
and belief, and not evidence-based. Atmospheric and earth scientists offer no techno-fix 
in any timeframe that matters to current emission statistics. The IPCC does not expect 
any technological contribution until the second half of this century (Pearse, 2009, p. 81 ). 
Pearse also quotes a representative of the National ( electricity) Generators Forum 
saying there is no solution in sight (Pearse, 2009, p. 82). This has not stopped Australian 
politicians and their economic advisers from framing the public narrative/discourse 
around the belief that it is possible to continue with the status quo energy mix and clean 
it up. 
More generally in regard to beliefs in technology and economic systems and the 
potentially moderating influence of scientific evidence, one informant to this study who 
was a federal and state policy adviser during the 1990s said: "The biggest barrier (to 
effective greenhouse action) is the intellectual mindset of economists and their be! ief 
systems about whether government should be a player in changing the economy" (F. 
Muller, thesis interview, May, 2006). He called those who advised government based 
on these beliefs "econocrats". Comparing his experience in Washington D. C. during the 
Clinton administration, (Muller) said: 
In Canberra we have not had the countervailing science influence to the 
econocrats. There are not people presenting the story to the decision-makers that 
"we can do something" about (climate change) right now. So the denial in 
government policy circles is real ... their experts are telling them they don ' t 
have to deal with it right now. (thesis interview, May, 2006) 
Muller \Vas asked why he thought the NSW and federal governments for whom he 
\vorked in the 1990s did not apply a range of existing technologies and efficiency 
measures recommended in early 1990s govern111ent documents ( ANZECC, 1990: and 
other Co111mon\vealth docun1ents). He and other interview informants have said that in 
"econocraf, thinking. based on neo-classical economics, all efficiencies are alrcadv in 
the system. Therefore promoting energy efficiency measures. for example, constitutes 
un\varranted interference in the market of the day. Technology academic Alan Pears , 
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who worked in the arena of energy conservation and efficiency in Victoria throughout 
the study period, said that in 1994 the federal Treasury Department released a document 
bowing to a "perfect market structure" and a focus on unfettered competition (A. Pears, 
thesis interview, November, 2006). 
Additionally, there is the predilection for "big hairy audacious projects" . While 
sustainability may be a myriad of small solutions, these may not be considered 
technologically "sexy". Muller noted that big projects equal jobs and big headlines in 
the view of politicians. He described the office of former NSW energy minister Michael 
Costa as accessorised with large images of coal-fired power plants. Similar observations 
have been made by some environmental journalists interacting with politicians. 
Some analysts add that the environmental movement itself subscribes to the techno-fix 
worldview, bolstering public disengagement from the policy process and making denial 
of science messages easier to justify with beliefs that all will eventually be fixed. 
In a seminal paper, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005) reported on their interviews 
with some 25 of the top leaders of US environmental organisations. While Australian 
environmental organisations no doubt exhibit regional differences, the global reach of 
ideas and strategies- along with the similarity of outcomes-allows one to argue that at 
least some of the same trends are influential in Australia. Noting the lack of a biological 
systems approach to much environmental policy, they wrote: 
Thinking of the environment as a "thing" has had enormous implications for 
how environmentalists conduct their politics ... (which) hasn 't changed in 40 
years. First, define a problem ( e.g. global warming) as environmental. Second 
craft a technical remedy ( e.g. , cap and trade [in Australia, emissions trading]). 
Third, sell the technical proposal ... through a variety of tactics such as 
lobbying, third party allies, research reports , advertising and public relations. 
(Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005 , p. 4) 
Even a reliance on individual choice for fluourescent lightbulbs or hybrid cars reflects 
this same techno-fix mindset, say these authors. They conclude that to the extent 
environmental organisations prioritise techno-fix ideas, they are subscribing to a version 
of the information deficit model- if only we have enough technical solutions 
understood by the public, this problem will be solved. 
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These authors also suggested internal reasons why environmentalist organisations could 
be marginalised as they were in Australia in the 1990s. The reasons are: very rtarrow 
tactical focus and lack of effective coalitions with other societal interests (e.g. , labour 
unions , or animal welfare organisations, or church groups). This internal "group think" 
encourages the broader society to consider the environment to be a separate "thing" 
from mainstream concerns. It also bolsters those who are inclined to think that hun1ans 
are separate from and superior to the natural world (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005 , p. 
5). That such thinking is prevalent brings us to the second major sector of "no limits" 
beliefs: belief in human exceptionalis1n. 
Beliefs in Human Exceptionalism 
A cultural mythology that humans are exceptional and not subject to the "laws of 
nature" underlies much of Western thinking and stems from Christian teachings 
(Wilson, 2005). This is related to the always forward-looking, linear mythology of 
"progress" and human betterment. Historical phjlosopher Ronald Wright wrote about 
belief in "progress" as cultural myth: "Myth is an arrangement of the past, whether real 
or imagined, in patterns that reinforce a culture's deepest values and aspirations .. . 
Myths are so fraught with 1neaning that we live and die by the1n" (Wright, 2004, p. 4). 
Historian Lynn White Jr, in his se1ninal work "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis ," published in Science in 1967, argues that the fundamental religious myth of 
humans as exceptional is both 1nost pervasive and most inten1alised in Western culture. 
"What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in 
relation to the things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs 
about our nature and destiny- that is , by religion" (White, 1967, p. 51 ). 
White asserts that in its Western fonn 36 , Christianity is the most anthropocentric 
religion the world has seen. It has a world view that denies the existence of any spiritual 
qualities (the soul and similar concepts) in other species. From there extends an 
assumed exceptional ism to the laws and needs of the natural world that brings many 
people into conflict with environmental science or ecological knowledge. "Christianity 
36 The difference with Eastern Orthodox Chris tianity according to Whi te is that the Greek Orthodox 
variant is contemplative and intellectual. wh i 1st the Western variant of Chris tianity became act ion-
focused . expressed by mastery over nature through science and techno logy. 
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... not only established a dualism of man and nature, but also insisted that it is God's 
will that man exploit nature for his proper ends" (White, 1967, p. 52). 
Some scholars have taken issue with aspects of White's conclusions in the intervening 
years, particularly his reading of the biblical injunction that Man has "dominion" over 
nature. 37 However, it is well documented that religious beliefs are deeply embedded in 
Western culture. Modem-day agnostics and atheists may forget that Western science 
and technology, born from the desire to understand God's works, coalesced with the 
Industrial Revolution in the 19th century to exploit natural resources-believed to have 
been put there by God for Man's benefit. Science historian Spencer Weart, in his 
detailed account of the discovery of global warming (Weart, 2003) underscores the 
theme that beliefs, including religious beliefs, will guide future climate change because 
they guide how we deal with our environment in this anthropogenic age where humans 
themselves can alter planetary systems. 
White also identifies the "progress myth", saying our Western (Judea-Christian) cultural 
activities are dominated by an implicit faith in perpetual progress, which was unknown 
either to Greco-Roman antiquity or to the Orient. In fact, Marxism, which is 
superficially anti-religious, is provocatively called a Judea-Christian heresy in this 
analysis, due to its beliefs, along with capitalism, in the guiding myth of perpetual 
progress. Forty years ago, when environmental studies were starting in earnest, White 
predicted that ecological crises will worsen as long as people, including many scientists, 
retain these unexamined basic assumptions and "myths". 
E.O. Wilson, Harvard ecologist and a leading theorist on the interaction of humans with 
the natural world, observes that human beliefs about our prospects on the planet fall 
basically into two categories: "human exceptionalism" and "environmentalism". He 
defines environmentalism in this context as an ideology that sees humans as a biological 
species tightly dependent on the natural world. Human exceptionalism, on the other 
hand, is the view that transcendent intelligence and technological prowess has freed 
37 Scholarly argument continues on the reading of Genesis regarding whether God was advising 
domination rather than "stewardship" over the earth. Recent evangelical movements, particularly in the 
US, towards "green Christianity", take the alternative stewardship analysis as a guiding principle. 
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humans from the iron laws of ecology that bind all other species. 38 Hurnans' conflicted 
views on their own skyrocketing population numbers is a related example of this 
thinking. 
These beliefs are not always under the surface. They can be framed in aggressive 
fashion by media commentators. For example, a 2004 opinion piece by syndicated 
columnist Angela Shanahan, who has taken stances that imply she is a practising 
Christian, slammed those citizens who would protect Australian wildlife against state 
government activities as "extreme greenies", with "unreal", "Mickey Mouse", 
"anthropomorphic" world views that deny there is "such a thing as a hierarchy of living 
things" (Shanahan, 2004). 
It can be argued that there is an intellectual kinship between Christian beliefs in the 
exceptional role of hu1nans on the planet and the more secular progress, "no 
limits","cornucopian" views of human activity and impact. Armed with these various 
beliefs in the "no limits" world view, it may seem rational to dismiss a precautionary 
approach to scientific risk assessment of climate change- and the population growth 
that implicitly drives more greenhouse gas emissions. Leading agenda-setters in 
politics, the media, and business can appear to believe ( demonstrated by their rhetorical 
narratives and actions) that what is happening to the natural world will not affect human 
culture. 
Individually or together, these belief systems, expressed as frames and pubhc 
discourses , can and did fuel denial and frequent non evidence-based debate, fron1 the 
early 1990s on, when faced with environmental or ecological science and specifically 
cli1nate change. Overt expression can be found on the websites of organisations like the 
Lavoisier Group fonned in 2000 specifically to dispute anthropogenic climate change 
evidence, the environ1nental ann of the Institute for Public Affairs (IP A) , and other free-
market Australian think tanks. In a revealing 2004 article on the activities of the 
Lavoisier Group , Th e Age journalist Melissa Fyfe characterised those who attended a 
meeting of 50 men ( only one woman) in Melbourne as follows: "Some of them were 
3
~ \Yi Ison noted that the short-termism that marks not only politi cians- but also th e spec ies in general 
when faced with anyth ing other than se lf. fami ly, or tribe- may have had an evo luti onary advantage over 
the two milli on years the spec ies evo lved. where life was mostly precarious, short and unpredictabl e. 
E\·olutio nary biologists have no ted that modem humans bring a palaeo lithic hard wire to run away 
technical success. 
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scientists. But many were engineers and retired captains of industry. Presiding was 
Hugh Morgan, President of the Business Council of Australia and former Western 
Mining boss. The master of ceremonies was retired Labor politician Peter Walsh," 
(Fyfe, 2004, p. 1 ). To the extent that "no limits" belief structures inform these 
institutions and professions, their opposition to accepting climate change science 
appears more understandable. 
Ecological Limits: Valid Belief in the Late 1980s 
Dryzek outlines the opposing discourse-what he calls "survivalism" (Wilson's 
environmentalism), which is a belief in ecological limits and limits to the carrying 
capacity of the planet, and indeed the realisation and scientific evidence that humans are 
one among many evolved species and not so exceptional in many ways. This 
understanding was popularised by the Club of Rome reports in the 1970s and the works 
of biologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich, Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute, and 
many biological and other scientists in the past 30-40 years. This discourse of limits 
arguably still informed the framing of the public discussion in the late 1980s when my 
exploration begins. As reviewed in chapter 4, environment and sustainability policy 
positions had an equal place at government policy tables at that time. 
However, the late 1980s was also a time for multinational energy-intensive industries, 
such as aluminium, to be encouraged in Australia, along with multinational and 
domestic mining companies, which have since become the mainstay of Australia's coal-
dominated energy sector (Pearse, 2007; F. Muller, thesis interview, 2006). Along with 
these shifts in the economy, the long-term "no limits" value/belief structures of 
industrialisation reclaimed the public stage in the 1990s. This was reflected in the 
communication, and in the more traditional, familiar standoff in Australia between 
environment and economy (Bulkeley, 2001 ). So we come to the major and defining 
belief structure that took the reins in the l 990s-economic rationalist ideology. 
RISE OF THE ECONOMISTS AND FALL OF "THE PUBLIC INTEREST" 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed 
the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be 
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quite exempt fiAom any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves 01 son1 
defitnct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear vo ices in the air, ar 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few vears back. I a,11 
sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with th 
gradual encroachment of ideas 
Keynes, 1936, cited in Mercer 1991 , preface. 
The economic, free-market ideology that was dominant during the study period was a 
revision of neo-classical liberal economic ideas or "economic rationalism" as it was 
called in Australia- a set of economic assumptions, beliefs , and values that was 
gathering steam in the 1980s, and came to govern Australian political economy and 
public policy increasingly thereafter (Pusey, 1991) . Eventually, these assumptjons and 
values came to dominate all aspects of public discourse ( an example of hegemony in 
action). Conversely, this study suggests that when the climate change message was first 
accepted by Australian politicians, media and public in the late 1980s, economic 
rationalism was not yet hegemonic, and some different cultural and ethical beliefs 
including responsibility as a global citizen were accepted as "normal". 
Thus, McDonald (2005) and Bulkeley (2001) have shown that in the late 1980s 
concepts of community and a cohesive public interest were still integral parts of the 
dominant narrative regarding environmental response, specifically to climate change. 
However, this was changing by the early 1990s. The evidence reflected in the 
documentary record indicates that these values shifted fro111 an "ethical " world vjew 
regarding climate change risk assessment (stressing the public interest, intergenerational 
equity, inter-country responsibilities, etc.), to a worldview promoting economic self-
interest as the dominant value. 
Further evidence that the previous moral values had been dropped in the 1990s came in 
November, 2006. It was a world-first event when 16 Australian religious 
denominations , spanning all faiths, issued a joint statement regarding the need to value 
the planet and life. Concern about climate change was described as a core matter of faith 
and 111orality for these Christians and adherents of other religions, saying that politicians 
will be held accountable to "do something" about addressing climate change. "Ifs not 
just about the price of coal. or about whether we can't do anything . .. it 's absolutely 
important that such a large issue ... is reflected in our own moral beliefs, whatever fa ith 
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they are, when you're confronted by the nature of this kind of challenge" (Crittenden, 
2006). 
Pusey, in his oft-quoted 1991 research on the Canberra policy-making bureaucracy, 
notes that in the 1960s and 1970s the general political discourse was communicated in 
the ordinary consensual language of civil society or the civil sphere (rather than top-
down and ideologically framed). He illustrates the discourse change that occurred by the 
early 1990s, reproduced as illustration in figure 9. This conclusion about a one way shift 
towards ideological discourse framing may be debatable (for example, it can be argued 
there was just a different ideology in play during those years- Keynesian welfare 
capitalism). It is beyond the scope of this study to compare communication across a 40-
year time-span. The relevant point is that the "public interest" in the public sphere was 
formerly assumed to exist as an entity- as distinct from purely economic interests of 
individuals or corporations as proposed by economic rationalism- and that in the 1970s 
policy addressed this broader interest. 
Figure 9 Change in discourse language from the 1970s to late 1980s 
Fig. 5.1 Changes in the character of political administratiue discourse in Australia 
from Whitlam in the early 19 70s to Hawke and the late l 980s . 
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Figure 9. Fr01n Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra, p.170 
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In Pusey's view, and that of others , the change in social construction and 
communication that accelerated through the 1980 and 1990s is inti1nately connected 
with the rise of a new generation of economists (some 50,000 graduates between 194 7 
and 1986) who brought both neo-liberal economic ideology and a na1Tow technocratic 
training to the policy arena. This was in comparison to a broadly hu1nanistic training 
"liberal" in another sense, common before World War II. Contemporary economic 
specialisation: "almost invariably excluded any broadening study of philosophy, 
sociology or the history of ideas" (Pusey, 1991 , p. 172). 
What is Economic Rationalism? 
In this discussion I will use neo-liberalism and economic rationalism interchangeably on 
the grounds that "neo-liberalism" is the term most often applied in critical discussion 
(Quiggin, 2005), but economic rationalism is the neologism commonly applied in 
Australia (Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and the Washington Consensus are other labels 
for variations on the neo-liberal theme). 39 
This economic worldview assumes that individuals and businesses , given the freedom 
to choose, will rationally choose to 1naxi1nise gain and profit, and everything else flows 
from that. In the discussion about climate change in Australia by the mid- l 990s these 
economic value frames and related rhetoric had arguably succeeded in pushing other 
values off the stage of acceptable public discourse , i.e. , what we talk about publicly. and 
the language we adopt. The public record I have examined in newspaper articles and 
govem1nent documents indicates that by 1996- and particularly thereafter- the 
political discourse amplified by the media mostly stopped discussing values that had to 
do with equity, morality, and the public interest in regard to climate change, as outlined 
by McDonald (2005), and instead focused on the dollar bottom line. Thi s was framed as 
concern for jobs, family, and national interest. 
>
9 Quiggin himself settles for economic liberalism as the label with least pejorative baggage and also the 
most descriptive, and points out that proponents of this ideology prefer not to label their policy approach 
at all but rather to treat it as "common sense''. Starting around 1988. "economic rationalism" was the 
name most often given to Australia ·s version of economic "neo-classical" thinking (MuITay & Pacheco. 
2000) . 
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One example of economic rationalist ideology in practice was the shift in public 
discourse on renewable energy or energy efficiency measures that happened about the 
mid- l 990s-earlier in Victoria with the Kennett "reforms" reflecting think tank neo-
liberal blueprints (Cahill & Beder, 2005). With economic rationalist economists 
installed as expert advisers, the dominant narrative changed to assign unattractive costs 
to efficiency and renewables ( compared to conventional generation of "cheap" 
electricity) on the theory that the energy market is already at maximum efficiency. 
In context, computer models are only as useful as their baseline assumptions. In keeping 
with relevant theoretical practice, which I step aside briefly to explore in Box 2, 
economic rationalist models reached their cost assessments while discounting some 
factors. They did not, for example, factor in the cost to society of government subsidies 
supporting coal-fired electricity. They also ignored "extemalities"-the costs of 
production that can be shunted outside the corporation or producer, including the cost of 
environmental consequences such as emission of greenhouse gases. Economic 
rationalist modelling would also not have given equal weight to any potential benefits 
arising from renewables or efficiency over time (for example, Industry Commission 
1991 ). 
Box 2 
The Lessons of Economics: What the Universities Have Been Teaching 
Universities have been the incubators of changing economic theory, including economic 
rationalism in Australia, during the past 40 years (Cahill, 2004; Cockett, 1995; Pusey, 
1991 ). As Pusey has argued, the lessons taught as basic economics at these institutions 
have influenced a generation of bureaucrats, politicians, and policy advisers. 40 
However, relatively little attention has been paid to what is actually taught to 
impressionable young minds, suggesting that this would be a valuable area for further 
investigation. Journalist Christopher Hayes spent an academic quarter auditing 
Principles of Macroecono1nics at the University of Chicago (Hayes, 2006) and provided 
40 Jones (2002) noted that The Australian National University School of Economics was prominent in 
producing the home-grown neo-liberal theorists and free-trade economists ( e.g., Ross Gamaut who 
advised Hawke and Keating, and regained prominence since 2007 as the federal Labor government's 
"climate change adviser" in the words of ABC radio). 
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a snapshot of what is taught. Efficiency is the defining value of the Chicago School of 
Economics (home base for the late Milton Friedman version of neo-liberal econo1nics) 
and is still the basis for instruction. "Too much" government (regulation or pub! ic 
ownership of assets or services) causes inefficient economies in the overall quest for 
capital growth. 
The (international) capital market is seen as the primary regulator of a society. [ Given 
events of 2008 and 2009 with the crash of this ,narket, courses may change.] 
The conversion of natural and human resources into capital growth will a priori raise 
everyone's standard of living, domestically and globally, without government 
intervention. With "no limits" and "endless growth" forming an embedded part of this 
thinking, questions of sustainability have not applied. 
The injunction to specialise and trade harks back to Scottish political econo1nist and 
philosopher Adam Smith's 18th century insights about "comparative advantage" and 
what creates the "wealth of nations". Former Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
regularly invoked "our comparative advantage" of exporting fossil fuels, when 
defending Australia's minimal actions domestically or refusal to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol on climate change. 
Normative models are transformed into "reality". Argu1nents about the way the world 
should be are converted into assertions about how the world actually is , without the 
need for e1npirical data or evidence (in "econ speak", conve1iing normative argu1nents 
to positive statements). Thus , "people cannot disagree with neo-classical economics 
they can only fail to understand it" (Hayes, 2006, p. 28). This field of economics 
presents itself as a value-neutral description of how the world is: therefore students do 
not perceive they are learning an ideology. (In a similar fashion, Keynesian regulated 
capitalism enjoyed a consensus of "this is the way the world is" before and after World 
War II- until the early 1970s.) 
Theory is demonstrated through economic modelling- simple supp ly and demand at the 
level of tertiary education- and is taught regardless of real-world empirical studies that 
indicate the facts can be otherwise, for example on employ1uent figures (Hayes, 2000, p. 
29). Hayes (2006) also witnessed the use of contrarian, sceptical positioning as a 
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rhetorical tactic to skewer opposing points of view, institutions or consensus. Again, 
this is noteworthy in the context of the successful deployment of contrarian rhetoric in 
the public discourse on climate change (p. 30). 
The Defining Characteristics of Present-Day Economics 
At The Australian National University Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
economist Jack Pezzey told students at a 2006 seminar that "economics is a mind-set" 
and that several relevant defining characteristics of the discipline of economics as we 
now accept it are, [ emphasis mine]: 
• anthropocentricity-there is no value unless it is related to human notions of 
value; thus environment is seen as an "amenity" or "input" 
• consumer sovereignty-the neo-liberal view that economics reflects people's 
preferences, rather than shaping them ( even though people's preferences are 
always shaped by the culture around them). [This relates to a number of other 
hallmarks of economic rationalist economics such as the anti-regulatory stance, 
the focus on the individual and voluntary action and the tenets of public choice 
theory] 41 
• non-satiation- the notion that people or firms always prefer more "well being" 
(translated as profit), rather than less 
• aggregation-the focus on average or total variables, not their distribution, 
which is the province of politics 
• finite trade-offs-nothing is beyond price 
• dynamic analysis-includes "discounting", which means that future costs and 
benefits are always worth less than today's. Thus, economically, climate change 
happening in 30, 50, or 100 years time is uninteresting. 
Why Economic Rationalists Always Talk About Costs 
41 Public Choice Theory. Consmner sovereignty as an economic concept appears to overlap with the 
theoretical assumptions of public choice theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962) about the rational and self-
serving nature of human behaviour in a political setting. Public choice theory can be invoked by neo-
liberal thinkers to explain that individualism and self-interest are the natural order. 
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The benchmark of this neo-classical economics is the marginal cost of supply- thereby 
the framework or mandate for "no regrets" solutions to climate change, meaning there 
should be no increased cost to the economy. There are other possible economic 
frameworks including environmental, natural resource, and ecological economic 
analyses practised academically. 
Ecological economics rejects many of the key concepts of neo-classical econon1ics and 
its "no-limits" assumptions, and can pose deeper philosophical challenges e.g. , to the 
anthropocentric value system (Pezzey, 2006) and may be therefore a useful tool for 
climate change cost-benefit analysis. 
A "Myth to Live By" 
Evan Jones, in his critique of "idealist economics", asserts that the Australian university 
syllabus shifted to predominantly neo-liberal content while the number of trained 
economists grew following World War II (Jones, 2002). However, he contends that 
training is not the end of the story. The context he sees as important for the ascendancy 
of neo-liberal/economic rationalist theory in Australia was the concentration of these 
theorists on tariffs and rural industries, and government support. 
The enthusias1n for "free trade" and "free markets", and the underlying nonnative 
assumptions of neo-classical economics, was also not party political in its adoption but 
was accepted as early as the 1970s in Gough Whitlam' s Labor Party and was reconciled 
more or less by successive governments with support for unions , environmental 
regulation, and other forms of social good up until the 1990s. Jones characteri ses the 
evolution in Australia of econo1nic rationalis1n into the dominant economic theory as 
opportunistic and neither coherent nor logical but rather as a convenient "myth to live 
by" driven by belief rather than evidence. He suggests "the universalism of the solutions 
is a clear indication of their religious character: ideology has rushed in to fi 11 the 
vacuu1n left by the poverty of analysis" (Jones, 2002, p . 57) . 
POLITICS AS BATTLE OF IDEAS 
In the end, pohtics is a battle o_ f ideas and a battl 
John Howard. 2002 (Johnson ~ 2002 , p. 3) 
1n1nit111ent. 
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In the context of this thesis topic, economic rationalism finds its historical place within 
a "battle of ideas" that has been waged since the environmental victories of social 
movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. Parts of the ideological underpinnings stem 
from 19th and 20th century "wise use" philosophy-akin to the technocratic, "no limits" 
worldview presented by thinkers like Julian Simon and Bjorn Lomborg (in Dryzek and 
Schlosberg Eds.,2005). "Wise use" and its variants developed in "pioneer" countries 
like the US and Australia with strong antipathy among some influential elites towards 
government regulation on behalf of the natural environment (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1998). 
In Australia, "wise use" arguments, often couched as "sensible balance", are evident in 
the environmental writings and speeches from think tanks advocating free markets, 
individual liberty and as little government as possible, led by the Institute of Public 
Affairs (IP A), the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) and others (Cahill, 2004; 
Murray and Pacheco 2000). Beder (2000) provides a good account of the wise use 
ideology, its close links with commerce and resource enterprises, and its dissemination 
by think tanks. She writes "wise use" exhibits: 
... values associated with John Locke ... in this tradition the government is best 
which governs least. (Rights) include the individual's right to appropriate wealth 
from nature. If no-one has claimed it, it's yours. In this view, the government's 
role is to help convert natural resources into private property, and then to protect 
that property (Roush 1995, p. 2, cited in Beder, 2000, p. 48). These beliefs blend 
well with libertarian philosophies and those of other free market proponents, 
including corporate executives. (Beder, 2000, p. 50) 
This philosophy is often expressed as anti-environmentalism. Wise-use ideas combine 
laissez faire capitalism with an individualistic, idealised pioneering culture (Prime 
Minister John Howard's Akubra hat was thus symbolic). These ideas include dedication 
to umegulated markets, notions of wastefulness if natural resources are not exploited, 
and the idea that nature is ever-replenishing. Wise-use also links to religious thinking of 
human domination over nature as outlined earlier. Such ideas gained renewed influence 
as they were expressed by Australian free-market think tanks and its spokespersons, by 
media columnists, (particularly in the Murdoch/News Limited press) , and by some 
individuals appointed to the board of the influential Australian national broadcasting 
service in the later 1990s (Beder, 1999). 
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Rhetoric Honed By Think Tanks 
With "wise use" thinking in regard to the natural environment as one philosophical 
cornerstone, came the advent of Reaganomics or supply-side economics in the US 
Thatcherism in the UK, and "economic rationalism" in Australia. This chapter analyses 
the Australian case within the global context of ideas imported from European and US 
thinkers. Deregulation and competition are core values of economic rationali sm (Pusey, 
1991 ), and it led to privatisation of public assets , including electricity generators, as 
well as an all-out commitment to "free trade" by both major Australian political parties 
(Labor in Power, 201 O; Sturgess and Torrens , 2009). 
The rhetorical ammunition came from right-wing or pro-market think tanks , which have 
enjoyed a revival in some Western English-speaking countries in the past 30 year-
specifically in the US, UK, Canada and Australia (Beder 1999; Cahill & Beder, 2005 · 
Cahill, 2004; Cockett, 1995; Murray & Pacheco, 1999 ;). 42 Cahill analysed how radical 
neo-liberal ideas took hold in Australia during the 1990s. Changing the fraine of the 
dominant narrative was the pathway to success. "Like other move1nents, the main 
impact of the radical neo-liberals was not direct policy influence but broader discursive 
shifts ... demonising and disorganising opponents of neo-liberalis1n" (Cahill, 2004, p. 
24). 
Shedding the Public Interest 
In this way, incre1nentally during the 1990s, this ideology was on its way to hcgc1nony 
cemented by a kinship of similar thinking that came to dominate the federal bureaucracy 
and politicians and influential elements of the media (Hamilton 2001: Manne, 2005 · 
Pearse 2007; Pusey 1991 ). Pusey, for example, found that since the early 1980s and 
-1
2 Cahill (2004), following the seminal work of Cockett in the mid-l 990s, documents how overseas think 
tanks influenced radical neo-liberal thinking in Australia and the establishment of Australian think tanks. 
"Radical neo-liberal organisations such as America's Heritage Foundation, Britain 's Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA) and international networks such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the Atlas 
Foundation served as examples for the Australian movement to emulate.'' Tactical advice, high-profile 
speakers and organisational liaison between countries was common. "Because of this, the ideas of 
Friedrich Hayek. Public Choice Theory. Milton Friedman and developments in neo-liberal theory and 
neo-liberal policy alternatives have been disseminated in Australia" (Cahill, 2004, pp. 8- 9). 
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starting with Labor under the Hawke government, a dominant pattern evolved in which 
"Ministers and their top SES staff see the world very much as male age-mates through a 
shared and restricted formative training in economics" (Pusey, 1991 , p. 8). The effect, 
as Pusey was noting in the early 1990s, has been a departure from earlier traditions of 
the Australian public service, and this was extended to the administration of such 
scientific organisations as the CSIRO as it was corporatised and directed to serve 
industry (thesis interviews, 2006). Over time there was less frank and fearless debate 
coming from the bureaucracy regarding the pros and cons of the economic rationalist 
worldview, which increasingly saw the public interest as indistinguishable from that of 
large extractive industries (Hamilton 2001 ). 
Hamilton reports that in the 1990s, the neo-liberal economic and social values were 
often driven by bureaucrats who, for example, would downplay the benefits of energy 
efficiency strategies- both economically and environmentally-in policy discussions. 
Because the view was that markets are by definition ultimately efficient, mandating 
efficient commercial or industrial facilities of household appliances must add costs and 
"intervene" in markets unnecessarily. The net effect-as Hamilton describes about the 
final ESD working groups on energy supply and energy use under Keating in the early 
1990s- was "a situation of 'industry capture' that has made progress on greenhouse 
policy extremely difficult" (Hamilton, 2001 , p. 33). 
Examining the dominant political paradigm in Australia ( even before this arguably 
comprehensive industry dominance that came to guide greenhouse policy in the 1990s ), 
human geographer David Mercer describes an axis that joins the state apparatus to the 
corporate economy: "With the state usually sharing the private enterprise ideology and 
generally perceiving its primary role as facilitating and promoting private commercial 
investment" (Mercer, 1991 , p. 4 7). Pusey wrote that this shared worldview has been 
mediated into federal and state governments, and amplified by: 
Australia' s foreign-owned media, the New Right "think tanks" and research 
centres that have had an enormous success in penetrating the Canberra 
apparatus, and thirdly, international economic organisations such as the World 
Bank and the OECD. There is also need to contend with the diminishing 
intelligence that is available from an increasingly "rationalised" Australian 
university system and, more fundamentally still, in the limitations that are 
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inherent in what Manning Clark, Donald Home and Hugh Stretton see. in the 
words of the latter, as "the poor quality of leading Australians 
(Pusey, 1991 , p. 13) 
The capture of the bureaucracy and policy advisers was further documented by Pearse 
(2005, 2007) in regard to climate change policy. During the 1990s there has been a 
significant revolving door between industry lobbyists for ( often transnational) 
corporations extracting Australia's mineral, soil, and water resources; the federal 
bureaucracy; and ministerial advisers. The agenda-setters thus shared an economic and 
cultural ideology, which allowed them to work together inside or outside government. 
In recent decades the agenda returned the country's destiny to exploiting natural 
resources. Political rhetoric initiated by economists (Jones, 2002), framed this as the 
country's "natural competitive advantage," a phrase that is a core tenet of classic free-
market economics. In this view, there is internal logic to applaud Australia's role as an 
exporter of fossil fuels (particularly coal, but also natural gas and oil, and now also 
uranium), sell soil and water through exporting 80% of agricultural production, and in 
the same vein exploit other natural elements such as old forests sold as woodchips or 
wildlife exported as kangaroo meat. Another "competitive advantage" was to lure to 
Australia energy-intensive multinational industries, such as aluminium, with the offer of 
"cheap" coal-fired electricity. 
Under those circumstances, scientific risk communication about the need to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel and other resource industries, along with 
proposals to lower de111and, threatened an economic blueprint that in greenhouse risk 
analyses is called "business as usual" or retaining "the status quo". The rnessages of 
risk and the proposals for a different energy econo111y had to be contained and 
neutralised (Pearse, 2005 , 2007; G. Pearse, personal co111111unication, 2006). 
Anglo/US Ideas on Regulation and the Public Sector 
The English free-n1arket tradition and its late 20 th century effect on the political 
econon1y of Australia is addressed by Pusey who wrote: 
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Australia was ... for much of the first half of this [20th ] century the model social 
democracy .... [now], as Canberra is swept by a locust strike of economic 
rationalism, the fate of this social experiment would seem to be in the unfriendly 
grip of ideas that come instead from Britain and the United States (Pusey 1991. 
p.2) 
English historian Richard Cockett has traced the current thinking of neo-classical 
liberalism and free enterprise to the so-called Austrian School at the London School of 
Economics. Led by Friedrich Von Hayek, Karl Popper, and Lionel Robbins this school 
began criticising the then prevalent Keynesian economics starting in the 1940s. Milton 
Friedman and his colleagues of the so-called Chicago School at the University of 
Chicago were influenced by the English economists and proposed similar radical 
remedies starting in the l 950s-to end regulation of the economy and to minimise the 
state/public sector (Klein, 2008). 
Friedman was later to have direct influence in Australia through his thoughts on 
globalisation and capital markets, taken up by both major Australian political parties, 
and as a speaker invited by think tanks (Klein, 2008). These theories and thinkers 
started their global influence with biannual international meetings_at Mt Pelerin in 
Switzerland, the origins of the Mount Pelerin Society that provides an international 
network for these ideas to this day, including in Australia (Murray & Pacheco, 2000). 
The 20th century neo-liberal theoreticians trod in the footsteps of a free-enterprise, 
minimal government and libertarian tradition strongly established in the US, and of 17th 
and 18th century political economists and liberal thinkers including Locke, Smith, 
Ricardo, and Malthus. It has been argued that these ideas re-emerge with the needs of 
capital. The latest incarnation was spurred by a slowdown of economic activity in the 
1970s following two decades of prosperity after World War II under different political 
and economic world views-social democracy and Keynesian welfare capitalism 
(Cahill, 2004; Chomsky, 1996; Davies, 2004; Murray & Pacheco, 2000). 
Keynesian welfare capitalism promoted mass markets, citizens becoming "consumers", 
and fed expectations of endless "growth" while science and technology boomed 
(Broomhill, 2001). John Maynard Keynes was the intellectual father of this phase of 
capitalism, which approved of managing consumer demand (upward and downward) 
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and industry regulation to benefit employment and social goals. These managen1ent 
rnechanisms eventually benefitted environmental protection as well, as the first wave of 
environmental awareness in the 1970s demonstrated. The period after World War II was 
also characterised by unprecedented support by governments (both capitalist and 
communist) for science. Technological advances fuelled both the post-war production 
and consumption boom, and also set up a belief systen1 in the "techno-fix" for all 
problems facing society, discussed earlier. 
Under Keynesian welfare capitalism a social democratic political approach had 
manifested in Australia in part as an "' accord" between capital and labour, and a n1ore 
inclusive approach to decision-making- including scientists and environmental 
organisations. This was in place as our story starts in the late 1980s. The ecologically 
sustainable development (ESD) workshops set up by the Hawke Labor govemn1ent in 
1990 were a peak example of this inclusive, mainstream approach, discussed elsewhere 
in this thesis (Bulkeley, 2000, 2001; Labor in Power, 201 0; McDonald, 2005). 
The economic rationalist ideas that took over were hastened by a recession in Australia 
by the early 1990s, which is in line with the analysis that these ideas gained ground as a 
reaction to the slowdown of the post-war boom of expansion and "growth". Along with 
rejecting efficiency as stifling economic growth, the rationalist ideas included a 
rejection of any "intervention" (itself a loaded word) in the market by regulating either 
consumer demand or supply on behalf of lowering emissions (Hamilton, 2000). It also 
normalised the idea that all action had to be voluntary and by choice, as di scussed 
earlier, thereby also posing a 1nuch greater challenge to any and all communication 
exercises to change behaviour in order to lower emissions. 
Rhetorical framing about "freedom", "choice" and "individual liberti es" is consistent 
with the neo-liberal intellectual frainework. Public choice theory, for example 
postulates that the individual operates opti1nally as a sole trader in a market society, 
thereby also downplaying concepts of co1n1nunity (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). 
Di staste for regulatory intervention in favour of voluntary action ("choice") and supp ly-
only so lutions are hallmarks of what economist Evan Jones has likened to a quasi-
religious belief in the powers of the market and unbridled competition (Jones 2002) .43 
4
.:; Keynesian theories of "demand management" saw no problem with regulation for the public good 
(e.g., efficiency measures or energy conservation) whi le "supp ly-side" neo-liberal theories eschew 
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The public's influence on decision-making arguably also declined with the emerging 
hegemony of economic rationalism. Researchers of this time period have documented 
the anti-democratic decision-making of the Howard government after 1996 in regard to 
greenhouse policy, for example, conferring in serious fashion almost exclusively with 
corporate leaders of the resource extraction and top energy sectors (Hamilton, 2006; 
Pearse, 2007). Such elite behaviour is consistent with the theory of agenda setting that I 
discuss in the next chapter on media and political interaction, and is also consistent with 
a belief in the wisdom of the market and its disciples. 
Growth is Good, Growth is Everything 
In this ideological environment dominated by "the market", growth remained a central 
political objective in the US (and arguably in Australia) in a culture that left behind 
traditional moral, ethical, and communal objectives and restraints in the view of 
political scientists William Ophuls and Stephen Boyan who noted in an essay on US 
environmental politics: 
Growth is the secular religion of American society, providing a social goal, a 
basis for political solidarity and a source of individual motivation. The pursuit of 
happiness has come to be defined almost exclusively in material terms, and the 
entire society-individuals, enterprises, the government itself-has an enormous 
vested interest in the continuation of growth (Ophuls & Boyan, 1998, p.187). 
They argued that American politics is a record of a "more or less amicable squabble 
over the division of spoils of a growing economy'' (p. 187). Even a superficial review of 
1990s, and more recent, Australian political economics and culture, exposes the same 
unexamined, cultural mythology of "growth" and material consumption underpinning 
society's well-being and prosperity. 44 This thinking became the "normal" response to 
an environmental challenge. For example: 
regulation in favour of voluntary action within a market economy and proffer technological supply-side 
solutions ( clean coal or emissions trading,). 
44 I use the term "myth" or "mythology" following the example of historical philosopher Ronald Wright 
who, in A Short History of Progress, said that the idea of material progress coincides closely with the rise 
and promise of science and industry, and the decline of traditional values. Growth and progress are 
related ideas in this arena. "Our practical faith in progress has ramified and hardened into an ideology-a 
secular religion ... Progress therefore has become a "myth" in an anthropological sense. Successful myths 
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US President George W Bush and Australian Prime Minister John :Howard have 
concluded their bilateral talks in Hanoi, Vietnam, confirming their stance on 
climate change ... "We don't believe that Kyoto is the answer" [Mr Howard] 
said. "We can have a debate about the severity of the problem, but there is really 
no debate about the desirability of responding to it, provided we do it in a way 
that maintains economic growth in our societies and the world. 
(Hovvard Firm on Opposition to Kyoto, 2005) 
Boyden, in his seminal text on human ecology, also notes that the current framing in 
advanced industrial societies of an unquestioned state of endless economic "growth" 
can be read as both a social pacifier (justifying inequality because there is always hope 
for more production and income) and as a defining hallmark of "modem" humanity 
(Boyden, 1987). If we do not adhere to the growth script we "go back to the Dark 
Ages", "freeze in the dark", and similar rhetoric. 
With an unquestioning belief in growth and progress and markets as saviours and 
innovators, economic rationalism is thus another arm of the "no limits" belief set that 
influenced policy and communication during the study period. Events since World War 
II have justified this scientifically flawed belief in endless growth- we see prosperity 
increased, populations booming, ever more resource extraction worldwide, and hurnan 
mortality dropping in Western societies. 
Dryzek ( 1997) in his compendium of environmental politics, agrees that 
economists have been at the forefront of the second-half of the 20th century 
"comucopian" arguments. Arguments are based on the premise that prjce is a measure 
of scarcity and then gathered pricing data that showed the real price of natural resources 
has been falling since the beginning of the 20th century. "And if price measures scarcity 
thi s means that natural resources are becoming more abundant with time" goes the 
argument (Dryzek. 1997, p . 4 7). 
Ho\vever, since at least the 1970s, there have been countervailing studies and arguments 
by bio logists, social scientists, and some economists who see people as part of finite 
are powerful and often partly true ... They are the maps by which cu ltures nav iga te th ro ugh time" 
(\Yright. 2005. p. 4 ). 
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nature and subject to gathering environmental costs associated with the boom times. 
The 1972 Club of Rome study, Limits to Growth, applied "systems dynamics" to 
economic and ecological trends. It assessed trends in resource extraction and 
measurable effects on underlying biosphere life-support systems, and concluded 
(generating much controversy at the time) that "the limits to growth ... will be reached 
sometime in the next 100 years. The most probable result will be a sudden and 
uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity" (Boyden, 1987, p. 
217). 45 
Economic Rationalist Beliefs and Greenhouse Policy 
Economic rationalist theories built on no-limits assumptions (as are other modem 
political ideologies of the industrial age) have been critiqued as more comprehensible as 
a belief system, rather than being based on empirical facts-which is why I include it in 
this axis of beliefs and values. This approach to theory and practice is one of the 
disciplinary divides between the field of economics and empirical scientific research in 
recent decades. A movement of economists and academic critics is questioning the 
orthodoxies of neo-classical economics on just these grounds. From a bio-historical 
perspective, such beliefs are naive according to Boyden (1987). Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz has been quoted as calling the dominance of the neoclassical 
model "a triumph of ideology over science" (Hayes, 2006, p. 27). 
University of Sydney economist Evan Jones in his paper on the rise of an "idealist 
economics" in Australia from the 1950s on, argues that theory divorced itself from any 
discernible empirical evidence as the "cult of the economist" became dominant in 
government policy, and expressed itself as a new emphasis on competition both 
domestically and globally (globalisation). 
The involvement of economists in public policy, as public servants, advisers or 
proselytisers, necessitates substantial involvement with economic data and 
institutions. Yet this engagement has been constrained in practice by the a priori 
45 A frequently quoted calculation, ath·ibuted to E. 0. Wilson, says that at present rates of resource 
consumption, if everyone consumed resources at the same rate as Australia or the US, we would need 
four additional si1nilar planets to remain sustainable ( e.g. , quoted by David Salt (2005) in Cosmos, 
September, p. 61 ). 
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attachment to a pre-conceived conceptual framework ... this process has been 
tangibly reflected in the work of the dominant official research body, IA 
[Industries Assistance Commission later Industry Commission, now 
Productivity Commission]. (Jones, 2002, p. 48) 
The Industry Commission and its later incarnation has played pivotal roles in the public 
discourse on climate change from 1991 on, being asked by federal politicians-sta1iing 
with then Treasurer Keating- to provide economic modelling on cost to the econon1y of 
responding to climate change as outlined in the previous chapter (Industry Con1mission 
1991 ). At the same time, economic rationalist "idealist" theories about a competitive 
economy (Jones, 2002) were adopted by both Labor and Coalition govem111ents during 
the study period. A raft of "reforms" followed, included the dismantling of regulatory 
tools such as import tariffs (which eventually doomed 111any Australian manufacturing 
industries and jobs) and the selling off of public assets and deregulation of the energy 
market under competition policy (Broomhill, 2006; Jones 2002). 
Jones wrote that The Hilmer Report into National Competition Policy (Independent 
Committee of Inquiry, 1993) "exudes limited understanding of the workings of 
co111petition in practice. The Report's central political intent is to undermine the 
dominant historical role of publicly-owned authorities in the provision of infrastructure. 
Both the presu111ed problems needing correction and the appropriate means of their 
correction are stated axiomatically without evidence" (Jones, 2002, p. 5] ). This 
disciplinary habit of "axiomatic" statement is also called normative analysis i. e., sta6ng 
w hat "should be" but not necessarily what the evidence shows. 
Jones also noted that competition policy from 1993 on (under Keating) was imposed on 
the Australian States "in a top-down process" (Jones, 2002, p. 52). National competition 
policy worked against climate change response through its effect on energy policy. a 
state responsibility. Deregulated energy utilities moved away from previous 
commitments to "de111and-side solutions" such as energy efficiency and renewable 
energy programs ( documented in ANZECC, 1990, 1991) and moved into a national 
co111petitive arena vying for new custo111ers. With time, the whole energy secto r became 
adversarial and conflict-driven, and business leaders as well as political leaders became 
dedicated to "supply-side" energy management i.e. , more energy for 111ore development 
and growth (A. Pears , thesis interview, November, 2006). 
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Pears who in the early study period advised the Victorian Government in the energy 
efficiency arena, says that whether it is commercial buildings, efficient appliances, or 
transport, Australia during the 1990s and since has experienced an "almost complete 
policy failure" in regard to curbing greenhouse gas emissions. 
We know how to make cuts in every sector, some demonstrably successful. But 
there are powerful economic groups and narrow theorists and nervous politicians 
believing that environmental action will hurt the economy. It 's been a brilliant 
PR strategy, and it's left the community confused and dis empowered. These 
beliefs are based on interpretations of crude economic modelling and reinforced 
by the preconception that you help either the environment or the economy. (A. 
Pears, thesis interview, November, 2006) 
This is despite the fact that the 1992 National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) 
committed federal and state governments to a range of greenhouse response measures, 
particularly in the energy sector which, in the mid- l 990s, was estimated to contribute 
67% of Australia's greenhouse CO2 emissions and 53.4% of total greenhouse emissions 
(Walker, 1996). However, competition policy and deregulation erected financial barriers 
to the very efficiency measures that were seen as an easy first step. For example, 
without "intervention" commercial interest rates favoured status quo methods and 
suppliers of energy (Walker, 1996). Walker also noted that not pricing energy supply 
"externalities" like environmental pollution "discriminates against energy efficiency and 
energy sources ( such as renewables or gas) which have a lower level of adverse impact 
on the environment" (Walker, 1996, p. 483). 
Broomhill argued in his 2001 study, which looked at the effects of the neoliberal 
ascendancy on Australian state government policies, that a discourse of inevitability and 
lack of alternatives to this political ideology had profound effects at the state level, as 
state energy utilities were privatised and encouraged to compete for more sales on the 
national scene.46 Nevertheless, in the context of "growth", "progress" and "no-limits" 
beliefs, such restructuring in the face of related and rising atmospheric pollution may 
46 
"vVorldwide, a powerful coalition of global corporations, right-wing economists, international credit 
rating agencies and international political institutions was promoting just such competitive neoliberal 
'reforms' as the way to a restructured economy and economic regeneration," (Broomhill, 2001 , p. 117). 
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still be seen as consistent. In the event, during the second half of the 1990s, 
conservation and efficiency finally fell off the policy agenda- in favour of supply-side 
techno fixes such as carbon capture and storage, and the nuclear option for a time. 
Pears supports the hypothesis that there was a deliberate political strategy, developed 
with the resource industries, to discredit the science and scare the electorate with 
economic modelling, such as ABARE's, on costs (A. Pears, thesis interview 
November, 2006). 
Other evidence that response strategies had veered away from the agenda set in 1987-
1991 was extracted from Bouma, Pearman & Manning (1996). This is a CSIRO update 
on climate change knowledge eight years after the seminal greenhouse conferences 
hosted by the research agency in 1987- 1988. It contains analyses, like the one quoted 
above by Walker, on barriers to effective policy response by the mid-l 990s. The 
economic rationalist viewpoint is evident fro1n the economist contribution by ABARE' s 
Fisher et al. in the same volume. On the positive side, the volume still contained six 
research articles on the potential for energy efficiency 1neasures- all based on talks at 
CSIRO's Greenhouse '94 conference, along with a further 10 on other response options 
both national and international. 
Deregulating and mandating co1npetition in the energy sector is a prime exa1nple of the 
profound influence of ideology on the cli1nate change story during the study period 
with the shift away from a previous state of political/economic consensus on market 
regulation at some levels in the public interest. 
1980S TO EARLY 1990S: NOT YET HEGEMONY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 
There were still differences in the interpretation of neo-liberal prescriptions under 
different economic advisers to prime ministers in the period under review. These help 
explain the gradual evolution, or deconstruction, of Commonwealth climate change 
policy as the 1990s wore on. For example, while econon1ic advisers and members of 
the federal Labor caucus under Hawke in the mid to late 1980s adopted the econornic 
advice that regulation of capital markets and tariffs inhibited Australia ' s economic 
developrnent (Cahill , 2004; Jones 2002) , that government nevertheless n1ight have 
intervened in the market for labour and social goals. As shown by researchers such as 
Bulkeley (2000) and McDonald (2005) as well as newspaper articles and government 
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documents gathered for this study (e.g., Seccombe, 1988; Hawke, 1989), regulation for 
the public good was at least still on the table, for example the 1990 interim emission 
reduction target for greenhouse gases. As the 1990s progressed and a hegemonic 
situation solidified, that policy option also dissipated. 
Not all researchers agree with the broad tenets of the analysis presented here. Brennan 
and Pincus (2002) for example, disputed the influence of a new ideology in the driver 's 
seat and the central role of economists in spreading that ideology domestically. They 
argued that since suppo1i for deregulation has been bipartisan in Australia, and in tune 
with developments elsewhere in the Western world, a move to economic rationalist 
policies was simply a rational response to external factors. 
Ideology of English-Speaking Democracies and Hegemony after 1996 
In 1992 jou1nalist Ken Davidson wrote (in an edited book) about the predominance of 
economic rationalism in the Anglo-Saxon world by the 1980s where: 
anyone who wanted to be a serious player in the socio-economic debate in the 
English-speaking countries has to pay obeisance to it ... Economic rationalism 
dominates the universities, the central or coordinating bureaucracies, the 
privately endowed think tanks, the business lobbies, and the media. 
(Davidson, 1992, p. 58) 
There are several insights on offer about the global hegemony of this ideology in 
English-speaking democracies in the past decades. Jones suggests that the long-standing 
classic liberal tradition (freedom, individualism) linked to capitalism in English-
speaking countries made it easier for all sides to accept this neo-classical economic 
revival. along with the pioneer or colonial cultures shared by these countries (US, 
Australia, UK, Canada). 
Although this ideology had been accepted early in the timeline of this study by political 
elites, the evidence suggests that its final ascent to hegemony can be correlated with 
later political leadership. Prime Minister John Howard and Coalition policies by the 
mid-l 990s exemplified the most undiluted expression of economic rationalism yet seen 
in Australia (Sturgess and Torrens, 2009). In terms of climate change response, there 
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was a consensus of ideology amongst politicians , financial supporters of free-market 
think tanks , and leaders or lobbyists for resource extraction and energy industries in 
Australia- mining, agriculture, aluminium, electricity generation- i.e., those industries 
that constitute the backbone of Australia's claimed "competitive advantage" and had the 
most to lose with changes in the energy economy. 
THINK TANKS AND THE "WAR OF IDEAS" 
This communication analysis of ideological hegemony and a "war of ideas" would not 
be complete without a closer look at the role of think tanks (the colloquial name for 
non-government policy centres funded by corporations, private money, and the 
taxpayer) which have surpassed earlier more informal networks (the club, the school or 
university, the corporation) as vehicles for ideological battle. Most relevant to this 
inquiry, they have adopted the trappings of academic and scientific research- the 
conference, lecture, and journal routes. Their "thinkers" are able to be far more definite 
and far less constrained by peer review than most professional or academic scientists or 
other researchers on issues such as climate change- this also includes the writings of 
sceptical scientists, published by the think tanks , which are seldom peer reviewed 
(Beder, 1999; Cahill, 2004, Cahill & Beder, 2005 ; Hainilton, 1997; Jacques , 2008; 
Murray & Pacheco, 2000; Pearse, 2007). Carey (1987) comprehensively researched the 
public relations and agenda-setting role of free-market think tanks with strong US 
influence in the '70s and '80s. 
The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) is the oldest and probably best known of the 
Australia free-market, neo-liberal think tanks. Its environmental an11 is very active in 
co111munication and it has pro111oted the publications of sceptic scienti sts like Ian 
Plimer, Bob Carter, and William Kinimnonth during the study period (their position 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8) . The Tasman In stitute, establi shed by fonner 
Monash University economics lecturer Michael Porter in 1990, like the older IPA 
adheres to economic rationalist theories and positions , with direct and indirect relevance 
to climate change policy development. The Institute's 1995 annual review revealed a 
'\vho 's \vho" of Australian resource industries among the 21 corporate members and its 
flagship project at that time was called "Markets and the Environment". Its focus was 
issues affecting investrnent in Australia ' s resource-based industries (Maddox, 2005 ,. 
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Tasman and the IP A are among at least five pro-market, neo-liberal think tanks in 
Australia that have enjoyed increasing political influence in the battle of ideas for 
controlling the public agenda since the mid-l 980s. On climate change, Tasman was 
amongst the first to criticise Australia's proposed response strategy (Economics and the 
Environment 1990). The others topping the list are the Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia (CEDA), the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) and the 
Australian Business Council (BCA) (Murray & Pacheco, 2000). The influence was 
overt in the case of the state of Victoria in the early 1990s where a state policy "reform" 
blueprint was crafted by the Tasman Institute and the Institute of Public Affairs (Cahill 
& Beder, 2005) and put into effect with the election of the Kennett Government in 
1992. It stopped Victoria's well advanced cli1nate change response agenda, amongst 
other policy changes. 
Ideas and writers from these think tanks have taken up frequent residence on the opinion 
pages of major newspapers, particularly in the News Limited/Murdoch media 
(McKnight, 2005), as well as on talkback radio and in rural publications (e.g., Jennifer 
Marohasy as environment director for the IP A wrote a regular column for The Land). 
IPA executive director Mike Nahan wrote a column in the Melbourne Herald Sun 
during at least part of the study period. According to Pearse who looked at the network 
between the think tanks and the lobbyists and, tangentially, the columnists, said "All the 
same names keep coming up" (Pearse, 2007, p. 244). 
The CIS started in 1976 in the garage of then high school maths teacher Greg Lindsay, 
who has remained the director as it went from rags to riches, thanks to corporate 
sponsorship from Western Mining's Hugh Morgan among others (Maddox, 2005). CIS 
has linked economic rationalism with social conservatism under Christian and family 
values icons, and researchers have called it a favoured brain trust for not only News 
Limited's Rupert Murdoch, but also Prime Minister John Howard during his tenure 
(Maddox, 2005; newspaper reports )-illustrating the linkages of think tank with media 
and politicians, also documented for the IP A through links with some news editors 
(McKnight, 2005). John Howard was often quoted as addressing the CIS-for example, 
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its 30th anniversary celebrations in 2006-and also frequently used the conservative 
journal Quadrant. --i 7 
During the period of this study the Business Council of Australia's President Hugh 
Morgan and his associate from the mining industry, Ray Evans, featured pro111inently in 
reports on the development of not only the Tasman Institute and ClS, but also other pro-
market, socially conservative, Christian values and scientifically contrarian think tanks 
in Australia (Hamilton, 2006; Maddox, 2005). That list includes the Lavoisier Group 
established in 2000 specifically to counteract climate change science with Morgan as 
the first President and Evans as Secretary (About the Lavoisier Group, 2006)). In 2004 
Evans told The Age reporter Melissa Fyfe that many 111embers of the group of mainly 
retired engineers and industrialists think climate change is "a sca111" (Fyfe, 2004 ). The 
group has distributed contrarian/sceptical books, sponsors speakers, and provided 
material to conservative columnists. 
That neo-liberal think tanks intersect with media via columnists is explored in depth by 
Pearse (2007), referring to columnists like Christopher Pearson, Piers Akerman, Frank 
Devine, or Miranda Devine in print media. It is an impression, begging further analysis 
that these columnists have rarely been named within the context of their organisation 
and what it stands for (for example, ideologically free-market and anti-public sector, 
anti-union, anti-environmentalist, or one of a s111all number of climate change scep6cs) 
unlike, for example, Clive Hamilton, former Executive Director of the Australia 
Institute who was frequently introduced on the ABC and elsewhere as an 
environ111entalist or from a left-leaning think tank. It may be evidence of the hege111onic 
nature of the "no-limits" ideologies that people who espouse them become the 
mainstream. 
In the next chapter, I further explore the perspective that this lack of context is due to 
shared values a111ongst politicians, the think tanks, columnists, and certain media editors 
and owners in a concentrated media market and amplified by political reporters. "Today 
-F In a speech celebrating the 50 th anniversary of the conservative journal Quadrant, Mr Howard 
reportedly named Ronald Reagan , Margaret Thatcher, and Pope John Paul II as the "towering figures" of 
the late 20th century for their moral clarity and ideological opposition to all collectivist thinking as 
"stultifying orthodoxies and dangerous utopias." In hi s speech he also addressed the hi storical battle of 
ideas for western civilisation and "the essential connection of personal , political and economic freedom ." 
The same report in The Age newspaper notes in the context of i\1r Howard 's speech that Quadrant was set 
up \Vilh funding from the CIA- the US Central Intelligence Agency (Schubert, 2006). 
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this intellectual universe and its aggressive 'war of values' sets an agenda for public 
debate. They [sic] can do this thanks to the monopolistic newspaper holdings of News 
Ltd ... in terms of circulation it has almost 70 per cent of the capital city and national 
newspaper market" (McKnight, 2005, pp. 55- 56). 
International columnists and speakers, like the far-right Canadian Mark Steyn or 
European statistician Bjorn Lomborg, have been promoted by the think tanks and the 
columnists. Of interest to communication studies is that the language of some of these 
columnists can be extreme and aggressive in the demonisation of climate change 
science and communicators as cultists, nature worshippers, and communist conspirators 
"hostile to capitalism and the market economy" (Pearse, 2007, pp. 160-161).48 
Politicians from both major parties, since at least the mid-l 980s, have accepted the 
"expertise" emanating from these think tanks, their economic rationalist ideas and 
policy prescriptions, with the most prominent public examples seen with the federal 
Coalition goverrunent after 1996.49 
The Internal Logic of Marginalising the Natural Environment 
With an understanding of the neo-liberal ideological worldview, one can better 
comprehend a response to climate change science during the 1990s that might otherwise 
be perplexing and might seem irrational in the face of the mounting scientific evidence 
that society encouraged scientists to gather. The scientific evidence is a "public interest" 
social construct suited to communal social values and understandings of risk. However, 
an ideology that society is no more than a collection of self-interested individuals and 
groups, in a belief-driven, quasi-religious relationship to "the market", is congruent with 
a rejection of the communal concept of "public interest" both in science and in policy. 
➔s A 2010 study by Hamilton exposed the link between the incivility of these commentators in print and 
on their blogs with a barrage of hate email directed against scientists and journalists involved with 
cormnunicating anthropogenic climate change (http: //abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2826 l 89 .htm). 
➔9 Examples of government acceptance can be seen in the fact that think tank-affiliated or conservative 
pundits who wrote or write for News Limited publications, such as anthropologist Ron Brunton (IP A 
Senior Fellow) (McKnight, 2005 , p . 63) and journalist Janet Albrechtsen were appointed to the public 
broadcasting ABC Board by the Howard government. 
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During the same period of neo-liberal cultural hegemony, there is ample evidence of a 
shift away from perceiving the natural environment as part of the general "public 
interest" to being tagged as a "special interest", and environmental scientists and groups 
along with it. It can be argued that by the 1nid- l 990s, Australian public discourse had 
moved away from a consensus about the environment built since the 1960s and related 
to an understanding of "the public interest" and "civil society" i.e., that an unpolluted 
natural environment, or public health are not "special interests", pushed by self-
interested groups in opposition to the mainstream economic interest. However, during 
the 1990s, successive federal and state governments- influenced by the beliefs of 
economic rationalism-framed environmentalist issues and their spokespersons-
"greenies"- as being counter to the interests of the Australian 1nainstream (Bulkeley, 
2000; interview material). 
Reasons advanced for this weakening of the public interest, in addition to ideology, 
have been the weakening of traditional community avenues for public discourse- the 
political party, the union, the Church, the community association or, indeed, a more 
diverse media. Ideologically, "A disinclination to deal with groups has been reinforced 
in the major parties by the fashionable theology of public choice theory. This has cast 
interest groups as selfish and self-serving, and has disputed their representational 
legitimacy" (Marsh, 2005, p. 222). In this environment, the combined agenda-setting 
capacity of business lobbyists, politicians and the media cemented in place the revived 
ideas of neo-liberalism with significant effects on climate change response during the 
mid to late 1990s. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In postulating that ideas , values , and beliefs have profound influence on societal 
responses to environmental questions , this thesis takes the reader down one track of a 
road exploring how and why Australia was responding to anthropogenic climate change 
between the late 1980s and the end of the 1990s. It is argued that long-standing beliefs-
- held by members of Australian and other Anglo/Western societies- in unli1nited 
grovvth, technological "fixes " and human exceptionalism were encouraged by science 
and technology innovations since World War II. These beliefs and assumptions 
intersected during the 1990s with the evolution to hege1nonic proportions of neo-liberal 
or ccono1nic rationalist, economic beliefs. Together these beliefs and values supplied an 
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internal logic for a dominant narrative of denial and procrastination in response to the 
science risk messages on climate change and its causes in emissions from burning fossil 
fuels and other human activities. 
In the early study period these values and beliefs were leavened with other values like 
ethical global and intergenerational obligations to address climate change. Changes in 
political leadership changed the dominant value hierarchy, dropping the ethical and 
obligation values off the list. The overriding influence on Australia government policy 
of similarly-trained economists, post-war, has been credited by some researchers as a 
basis for the wholesale adoption of economic rationalist thinking-a discipline based on 
normative ("what should be") assumptions about markets. Economic rationalism 
therefore can be characterised as a belief construct rather than being evidence-based. I 
have agreed with the analysis of influence based on the evidence that Treasury and other 
economists reframed climate change policy towards a purely market and trade focus. 
Related ideological policies in the 1990s to deregulate and push previously publicly-
managed state energy companies into growth and national competition-rather than 
towards demand management and efficiency -had a direct influence on Australia's 
response to climate change in the 1990s. 
The evidence and analysis presented in this chapter suggests that Gramsci's theory of 
cultural hegemony fits well the situation that developed within Australia during the 
1990s i.e., that neo-liberal/economic rationalist ideology advanced by an elite-
economists and like-minded corporate leaders, bureaucrats, politicians, and media 
managers-came in the 1990s to dominate everyday ideas and practices through 
communication and institutional "reform". I have shown how that hegemony evolved 
as a battle of ideas and values, and the influence of free-market think tanks in providing 
intellectual ammunition for the public discourse. 
Discussion: How we Generate "The Tragedy of the Commons" 
Many observers have pointed out that an ever-growing human population lies at the root 
of environmental dilemmas, including anthropogenic climate change. As populations 
grow, a belief in economic "growth" has traditionally been the bedrock of prosperity 
and social stability. The need to instead transform economies-and return natural 
resource use and population dynamics to a "steady state"-is addressed by various 
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authors including University of Canberra Professor of Public Policy Jenny Stewart who 
wrote: "We're deluding ourselves if we believe we can simultaneously have both 
economic growth and environmental stability" (Stewart, 2007, p. 17). 
Political scientists Ophuls and Boyan Jr (1998) argued that the basis of 1nodem society 
and politics is the assu1nption of "no limits" so that an endless pie of benefits can 
continue to be divided up amongst ever more people. Moreover, they say, society is 
stn1ctured to give economic special interests the most power; short-term political 
strategies have proven successful "giving everyone what they want" at minimal cost; 
and the consequences of ecological disruption are not entered into the equation. While 
these authors have studied the US political system and assumptions of democracy. much 
of what they have to say has echoes in Australia. 
Furthermore, say Ophuls and Boyan, this style of process politics is subject to a method 
of "disjointed incrementalism", which makes a virtue out of ignoring long-term goals 
or, arguably, continuity of policy. This can be recognised as finding short-term solutions 
compatible with "business as usual" and a public discourse framed with limited options: 
for example, framing the choices for climate change response as a carbon tax or an 
emissions trading scheme, and the range of other responses not mentioned or accepted. 
What these authors call "1nuddling through" is almost guaranteed they say, to generate 
the "tragedy of the co1nmons" where no-one is looking after the common space as all 
seek individual advantage in what they perceive as a growing economy. Global 
warming is the "perfect illustration" of this dile1nma that favours "business as usual" , 
which will bring on the "greenhouse effect almost by default" (Ophuls & Boyan , l 998 
p. 193- 194). 
In the next chapter I look at the agenda setting influence of the media during the study 
period and also at the structural features of the media that influenced the framing of the 
dominant narrative over time. 
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Box 3 
Postscript: Catastrophic Discourse Change 
"Kevin Rudd has put his ideological spin on the global crisis-arguing the great neo-
liberal experiment of the past 3 0 years represented by Thatcher, Reagan, Greenspan 
and John Howard has failed ... " 
Kelly, 2009, p. 1. 
Writing in the February 2009 issue of The Monthly magazine, then Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd put the case that the previous neo-liberal ideology of economic 
management and governance was indeed anti-tax, anti-regulation, anti-government itself 
and opposed to the investment in public goods, while believing in unregulated markets. 
(p. 4). A lead story report (previewing the Prime Minister's essay) by The Australian's 
political editor Paul Kelly appeared at the end of January 2009. As the world's financial 
and stock markets plummeted, the discourse changed with startling rapidity. A week 
later, Time magazine offered a straightforward revisiting of the criticisms of capitalism 
by Karl Marx (Gumbel, 2009). Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs, one of 
the architects of the neo-liberal global experiment, wrote "The Case for Bigger 
Government" in the same magazine (Sachs, 2009). 
These examples demonstrate that status quo frames and rhetoric can change in short 
order when social conditions warrant it. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FRAMING THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE- INFLUENCES II: 
THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN AGENDA-SETTING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS 
INTRODUCTION 
As Russell (2006) and Palfreman (2006) have found from research with audiences , the 
public gets most of its science information from the mass media. Therefore structural 
influences are worth reviewing within the news media and journalism. These internal 
factors are i1nportant to understanding media approaches to science and society topics 
like climate change and to understanding why the dominant narrative becomes what it 
does as the media interacts in agenda-setting with the political/ideological influences 
explored in the previous chapter. 
Corbett and Durfee (2004) and Palfreman (2006) both offered reviews of the Ii terature 
on the question of public understanding of climate change science and media 
communication through the mid to late 1990s. These studies through content analysis, 
focus groups, and other measurement tools have explored 1nedia translation of this 
issue, asking what the public is "getting" from 1nedia reports. The frequent conclusion is 
public confusion about the causes, effects, risks, and reality of anthropogenic cli1nate 
change. 
In this enquiry I apply the theory of agenda-setting and assume that it is not only the 
media that influences public discourses and views of "reality", but rather that it is a 
flexible interplay between media and other "elite" voices- primarily political voices-
that guide the daily dominant narrative for public consun1ption. The evidence in the 
literature and fro1n this enquiry suggests that whether the public is confused and 
apathetic is highly influenced by this dominant narrative and also by public relations 
strategies applied by elite players , including targeted scepticis1n to foster uncertainty. 
The media's role is the subject of this chapter. I first review relevant multi-disciplinary 
literature that sets the background to the media influence and, in regard to media 
sources, look at the results of the quantitative pilot study described in Chapter 3. I then 
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proceed with further qualitative documentary analysis to show how framing was 
deployed and agendas set in the media during the study period. 
BACKGROUND 
Elites Set the Agenda 
University of Melbourne sociologist Lesley Johnson explored media communication 
and elite agenda setting in Australia via the early days of radio programming and radio 
serials. She found that mass communication as it evolved in Australia has always 
communicated most effectively to the "consumer" end of the interest spectrum, and in 
this way political activity and public discourse have been organised around 
consumption activity. This sheds some light on why rhetoric about costs and economic 
appeals generally are potent political tools. Furthermore, she found that "self censorship 
of the media helped define acceptable world views and public discourse" (Johnson, 
1987, p. 75). Johnson proposed that Australian politics is treated by the public as a 
private choice between political leaders, who are "consumed" at home via the radio and 
print media, and more recently via TV and talkback radio. This is not a profile of an 
active body politic other than at election time. 
Research on how "issues" in Australia are decided by elites supports both Johnson's 
finding, and discussion of vested interests and decision-making on climate change at the 
government level in the study period. Higsley, Deacon, and Smart (1979) wrote that the 
data on Australian politics are "consistent with ... the so-called theory of democratic 
elitism" (p. 218). This proposes that elites in societies such as Australia maintain 
minimal democratic standards because they remain accountable to "the people" through 
periodic elections. However, between elections, policy outcomes are the result of 
political influences in which elites are the primary participants. 
Several questions arise. Firstly, has anything changed since these analyses from 40-50 
years ago? Secondly, how does the elite politics interact with the media? The evidence 
in the previous chapter looking at policy-making, hegemonic ideology, and the climate 
change story, indicates that this basic elite paradigm has not changed. How then does it 
intersect with the media? 
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Theory of Agenda Setting 
Australian political science studies since the 1970s have suggested that in this ·country 
with an elite and top-down political system of governance, the media and politicians 
together set the daily agenda of what is newsworthy and what is the dominant narrative_ 
Ward (2001) described agenda setting as the media's role with public policy and as the 
cumulative impact of the news media in indicating what issues are important. However 
he notes, little actual research had been conducted in Australia demonstrating cause and 
effect. Nevertheless, "Theories of agenda setting proceed from the premise that the 
news 1nedia are necessarily selective in their reporting of politics and public issues" 
(Ward, 2001, p. 49) and that the media routinely make "gate keeping" judgments 
about which issues to report or not, as well as deciding placement and frequency of 
coverage. 
The product of agenda setting is called the "dominant narrative" in the present study. I 
attempt to show how structural factors within mass media interplay with policy-makers 
or politicians to set the daily agenda for the public. This agenda setting defines the 
dominant "way of looking at things" and perceiving social reality. It therefore also 
affects how science findings are portrayed. 
Culture, Commerce, and the Mass Media 
In the decades leading up to and including the study period, the US has been the 
heartland of transnational media and has therefore spawned the most critiques. Larey 
( 1987) has shown how Australia gained many cultural and mass communication 
influences fro1n the US relevant to this discussion. Australia also frequently shares 
political world views with the US expressed in agenda setting. Wheelwright ( 1987) 
argued it is therefore important to review some of the scholarly critiques that co1ne from 
the US or North America. 
In the late 1960s communications professor Herbert I. Shiller from the University of 
Califo111ia wrote about the connection between mass media and An1erican-style 
commerce and consumption. The connection is framed as the presence of freedom- in 
trade, speech, and enterprise. In the \var of ideas that has accompanied the resurgence of 
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neo-liberal economics since the 1970s, this also came to include freedom/ram 
government regulation of business in the public interest (Shiller, 1992). 
Technology has greatly aided the spread of these cultural influences and their ability to 
frame "reality". As early as 1951, Canadian communications theorist Marshall 
McLuhan noted the commercial and propaganda value of the emerging audiovisual 
media (television broadcasting only gained traction in the 1950s) saying they provide 
the viewer with a ready-made image of reality (McLuhan, 1967, p. vi). McLuhan 
believed that the story-telling devices of mass communication conspired to lull 
audiences into being passive consumers of culture. He characterised newspapers as the 
daily "book" of industrial man, telling thousands of stories to an anonymous audience. 
Storytelling and personal drama were the mechanisms such that "even international 
politics are made a mirror for private passions-love, hate, deceit, ambition, 
disappointment are the persistent score backing national and international events" 
(McLuhan, 1967, p. 5). In this analysis one can recognise the story-telling features that 
came to dominate journalistic practice as we know it: heroes and villains, two sides to 
every story, and thereby the creation of drama and conflict-with this kind of "balance" 
being applied even to scientific stories in the 1990s. 
In Australia, Ward (2001) reviewed the literature that casts journalism as a narrative or 
storytelling about the world around us. He concluded that conflict and "balance" are two 
driving forces, and that journalists do not randomly choose the heroes and villains in 
their stories. 
The news frames they routinely use are not ideologically neutral in what they 
hold out as right and wrong. For example striking workers, political protesters, 
forceful feminists, Leftists, gays and Greenies will rarely be cast as heroes. 
Conversely, successful businessmen, employer associations, archbishops, judges 
and prominent-especially conservative-politicians are rarely villains. (p. 113) 
Given that spectrum, the role of environmental scientist within the study period, and 
particularly since, has arguably swung from the more heroic, or at least elite and 
unquestioned, to that of a fair target of attack. A number of controversial science and 
society issues during the 1990s, including the science role in mad cow disease, the 
genetically modified crops debate, and probably the spectre of climate change, are likely 
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to have been influential in such a shift. Bulkeley (2000a, 2001) noted a revers ion in the 
climate change story after the Hawke government i.e. , by the early 1990s, to a fan1iliar 
narrative for Australia-the conflict between long-standing beliefs about business and 
development in opposition to "green" views of limits and conservation, including 
climate science messages (also Pearse, 2007). 
Another Canadian, Dallas W. Smythe, one-time chief economist for the Canadian 
Federal Communications Co1n1nission, proposed in a 1981 book that the purpose of 
mass media and communication is to set a daily agenda of issues, values and policies 
(Smythe, 1981 ). He was one of the first to note that media co1npanies 1nass-produce 
audiences and sell them to advertisers, and recognised that the mass media are a central 
means of forming attitudes, values, and buying behaviour. Globally, "cultural screens" 
have been exported along with trade goods or imperialist takeovers for the past century" 
(in Wheelwright & Buckley, 1987, pp. 5- 6). Thus, according to McLuhan, Smythe and 
others, the mass communication media tum issues into stories that reinforce the 
dominant commercial or ideological agenda- or "ideologically organised discourse". 50 
Canadian social philosopher Ronald Wright (2004) describes the same concept as 
cultural myths that societies live by, and describes "progress" and related no-limits 
beliefs as the driving myths of Judea-Christian cultures and economies. 
Informal daily media monitoring and examples gathered for this project clearly indicate 
that agendas and issues can be changed and manipulated by political and business elites 
and their public relations advisers, and the task is 1nade simpler by the news media 
practice of discovering an issue when politicians 1nake it one. For example, the very 
sudden and heavily discussed an-ival of nuclear power in the climate change discourse 
following the study period became an instant issue in 2006 because Prime Minister John 
Howard and his Cabinet talked about it as described in The Age newspaper (Murphy 
2006) and other news publications of that year. That example is consistent with the 
finding by Klapper (1960) that "the media are more likely to reinforce than change"(in 
Ward, 2001 p.38), but that is not always the case. 
Robinson (2000) built on earlier work to develop a policy and media interaction 1nodel. 
He used humanitarian crises as case studies, and found that when the government policy 
line is clear and certain (and dramatic- like sending troops) it tends to set the news 
50 A term coined by Austra li an scholars and used by \Yard ( 200 I , p.39). 
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agenda; but when it is uncertain ( or perhaps considered boring), the media can and do 
set the agenda ( cited in Barker, 2005). Barker canvasses media research up to 2005 to 
conclude: 
Media corporations, acting as powerful corporate bodies, engage with 
credentialed policymakers to set both the policy agendas and the legitimate 
tenns of discussion ... powerful interests may still challenge official positions, 
but this will take place through more formal lobbying channels, well concealed 
from the prying eyes of the media. (Barker, 2005, p.6) 
Rosenbloom (1978) and more recent media analysts and media workers further link the 
press' decisions to the ability of citizens to make choices in a democracy. BBC editor 
Kevin Marsh, for example, is quoted as saying that choices and omissions made by "the 
press" affect democracy by limiting informed decision-making and by ignoring its 
primary professional responsibility to report in the public interest (Beecher, 2005, p.13). 
US media analyst Susan J. Douglas concludes that the mix of fact, opinion and public 
relations that has characterised much of media "news" in recent decades means millions 
of people struggle daily to decipher what is fact and what is spin a])d that "in this 
environment everything is spin and laws and facts are cast as debatable, mere opinions," 
(Douglas, 2006, p. 14). 
Loss of Media Diversity and Capacity to Influence with Ideas 
The agenda-setting capacity of the media with policy-makers has intensified with loss 
of diversity in media companies. Economist Ted Wheelwright, introducing a selection 
of left-leaning critical analyses, places the Australian media in a multinational business 
context as a result of a wave of media mergers resulting in a loss of diversity during the 
1980s simultaneously with the spread in global business links. He writes: "The services 
sector of the world economy, which includes communications and media, is now its 
largest and most dynamic sector" (Wheelwright & Buckley, 1987, p. 7). 
This collection of analyses, and other 1980s and 1990s research work such as Ward's, 
provides a useful historical perspective. They reflect a transition from a more diverse 
economic and political spectrum-at least in terms of media publications and 
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programs- to one that became increasingly dominated by the hegemony of neo-liberal 
conservative ideas. This outcome was more possible because of n1edia concentration in 
fewer hands. Australia now has one of the least diverse media scenes in the wo.rld 
(Manne, 2005). These situations came to be considered the norm in the later study 
period. 
J oumalism and commentary have reflected these trends. Rundle (2005) reflects on the 
Australian media scene since the 1960s and the more pluralistic journalisn1 of earlier 
decades. He contends this plurality of voices has steadily eroded in pa1i due to the 
pro1ninence of conservative commentators and radio talkback hosts, such as John Laws 
and Alan Jones, who amplified a neo-liberal narrative and assisted the spread of this 
ideology to hegemonic proportions, along with the News Limited press- both 
influences discussed briefly later in this chapter. The same neo-liberal narrative was 
evident in the political rhetoric promoting the economic rationalist "reforms" of the late 
1980s and 1990s, discussed in chapter 5. 
In his book on the emerging new understanding of biological and cultural systems and 
networks, physicist and philosopher of science Fritjof Capra (2003) provides a global 
perspective on how "reality" is 1nanufactured. He writes: "The culture we create and 
sustain with our networks of communication includes not only our values, beliefs and 
rules of conduct, but also our very perception of reality" (p.136). 
Similar conclusions about the changeable nature of "reality" emerge fro1n this thcsi 
investigation of framing and communication. Therefore, my working hypothesis is that 
daily "reality" is not a set thing but is framed by 111ass media corporations in 
conjunction \Nith business and political elites, reflecting their values and beliefs. 
Together they set the agenda and frame the dominant narrative. 
Development of the Internet Coincides with Study Period 
Dc,·elop1nent of the internet and the avalanche of information it has deposited global] 
coincides \Vith the study period i.e .. starting from the early 1990s. This coincidental ris 
of the don1inant con1111unication platform of the modem world must surely have had , 
and continues to have. an influence on the public understanding of climate change 
science- sceptic ,vebsites being just one example. The internet has greatly broadened 
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again the diversity of information potentially available. However, many interesting 
questions arise, for example: how uses of the internet shape peoples' understanding of 
reality, virtual and actual; how the internet influences the flow of information from 
scientist to public; how internet sites have influenced the overall public trust of the 
science given greatly fragmented audiences ( compared with even 30 years ago) who can 
select to "hear" only a narrow range of information. How does this smorgasbord of 
information relate to a growing dominance of belief and opinion replacing evidence-
based facts in the public and political discourse observable in the past decade? These 
questions are noted but await further exploration. 
Media Structural Influences on the Dominant Narrative 
An important aspect of the 1nedia influence on a dominant narrative and agenda is the 
media's internal workings or structural factors, which are not value-free (Nichols & 
McChesney, 2005; Ward, 2001). A brief historical review shows how the journalistic 
profession has diverged over time from the media's traditional role in participatory 
democracies. 
According to Nichols and McChesney (2005) a "free" press and the free flow of 
information were considered fundamental to the functioning of democracy as republican 
nations were built in the 18th and 19th centuries. The press was the watchdog of liberty. 
"Free" meant fearless and without commercial or political interference-this was 
possible because many papers were actually government-subsidised early on in the US, 
but the concept stuck. It also meant there was a great deal of diversity. It was common 
to "contextualise" political issues so that citizens could recognise seemingly random 
events as part of a coherent pattern and, as the authors note, this approach tends to draw 
people into public life. By the mid-20th century, journalism developed as a profession 
that was evidence-based. 
The 1nergers and acquisitions of the past 30 years changed much of that, and mass 
media became predominantly a multinational business enterprise that saw the gathering 
of news and issue exploration as subservient to profit-making agendas. I argue in this 
thesis-as have Manne (2005) and McKnight (2005) in their exploration of Australian 
news gathering, that news selection in recent decades has often become entwined with 
ideology related to free-market ideas and agendas. Reinecke (1987) studied the 
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consolidation of media power in Australia augmented by rapidly changing technology 
(a situation in regard to technology that has only accelerated since the 1980s, 
particularly with the advent of the internet). He suggests that increased technologic 
access to information has not made for a better-informed public because the 
technological advances have been harnessed to the needs of profit and often reflect 
"ideological orthodoxies". Twenty-five years ago he observed: 
The information with which citizens are flooded is more likely to be what they 
require to promote their material advancement, rather than helping the1n to 
question the society they live in. Instead of liberating them, the existing types 
and forms of information tend to immobilise people and create political apathy 
(Reinecke. (1987, p.10) 
Along with the mergers and acquisitions, and loss of diversity of Australian print and 
broadcast media there has been another major shift-within the profession itself. 
Professional journalism developed low-risk approaches to newsgathering and called it 
"objective and unbiased" journalis1n (Bagdikian, 2004; Nichols & McChesney, 2005). 
Influential Media Practices 
So1ne common practices, or internal structural features of newsgathering, have a direct 
bearing on the communication of science, or science and society stories, and with it the 
co1n1nunication of anthropogenic climate change during the study period. Ward and 
other n1edia researchers ( and 1ny personal observations as a professional in the field 
note that Australian reporting and editing practices reflect sin1ilar structural formalities 
and institutional li1nitations as US researchers have identified - source journalism 
contrived balance, lack of context. Therefore I analysed in the sampled newspaper 
evidence these three practices: reporting what influential (political or other societal 
elite) sources say arc the "facts" on a 1natter; using or omitting context~ and establishing 
an artificial balance to create interest. I will provide some examples from the middle of 
the decade that illustrate ho\Y these practices were used quite differentl y bv the tw 
ne\YS organisations sampled. 
The documentary cYidence shO\VS a 1nore science-focused coverage until the mid-1 
as detailed in chapter--+. Thereafter, the predominant media focus in Australia, as in the 
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US, became the policy/economic debate about climate change response as reviewed in 
Chapter 5. Political reporters thus came to the forefront. Pulitzer Prize-winning 
political journalist Ross Gelbspan (2004) suggests that the dominance of politics in the 
evolving climate change story had another internal logic: this was the perceived elite 
career path for journalists covering politics. Gelbspan sees this as putting scientists and 
their public interest messages at a remove. Since the science message did not change 
significantly from beginning to end of the study period, the evidence I explore in this 
thesis also suggests later communication of climate science reflected a reframe of this 
message through the values and beliefs of policy-makers, politicians, political 
journalists, and editors, variously and together. This is consistent with the theory of elite 
agenda-setting and also with the theory of how hegemony is imposed, as well as with 
framing analysis. 
Examples fro1n the documentary record suggests that a change to a more political focus 
was incremental and occurred differently in the two newspapers sampled, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (SMH) and The Australian Financial Review (Fin Review). The latter 
started focusing on the political and economic story much earlier than the SMH, 
arguably consistent with the Fin Review's business readership. Newspaper coverage 
sampled until 1996 in the SMH showed that science and technology reporters remained 
well aware of the risks posed by climate change and the dangers posed by Australia's 
econo1nic path- emissions from the coal industry for example. 
Thirty reports sampled in the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996 on the topic 
of climate change ahnost all focused on the science and risk messages as well as on 
international negotiations or Australian economy's dependence on coal exports. For 
example headlines included: "Malaria Spread Linked to Climate Change" (Dayton, 
1995); "Climate Change a Fact: Experts"- . a report syndicated from The New York 
Times about the 1995 IPCC assessment; A January 1996 report with the headline 
"Plu1nmeting Penguin Numbers a Crisis on Macquarie Island" explained wildlife losses 
as Antarctic waters warmed. "Global warming a warning that we must act" by scientist 
Ian Lowe, was counted in this analysis as an opinion feature ( defined as not written by a 
staff or freelance journalist). There were no sceptic opinion pieces in these samples. 
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"Australian Ploy Fails to Slow Greenhouse Action" by SMH technology \Vritcr ID 
Gilchrist illustrates how a political story that does frame in context with the scicntifi 
background can work to heighten understanding. Gilchrist \Vrote : 
Australia has sought to weaken international efforts to tackle the greenhouse 
effect by trying to undennine a landmark scientific report that calls for 
immediate action to ward off global climate change. 
It is the third time this year the Federal Govern111ent has tried to delay 
international action on the greenhouse effect: in March, a botched diplomatic 
strategy at the Berlin cli111ate convention was not adopted, and in August it 
emerged that the same diplomatic strategy was being pursued using an econon1ic 
study partly funded by the coal industry. 
(three paragraphs later) 
For the first time, the world's governments will be advised that the risk fron1 
climate change is so great that immediate action is warranted beyond n1easures 
which make economic sense, such as improving the efficiency of energy use by 
industry. ( Gilchrist, 199 5, p .1) 
In the same year, Gilchrist also wrote about a CSIRO report with the headline 
''Greenhouse Effect Will Cause Havoc in NSW, Study Claims" (Gilchri st, 1995a). 
Increased risk of severe thunderstonns and torrential rains are a pron1inent theme of thi 
report, again providing evidence that likely impacts were understood and reported . 
An1ongst the CSIRO findings Gilchrist wrote: 
Sydney \vill suffer twice as many days of extreme heat, four times as man 
severe stonns and far \Vorse flooding from huge increases in torrential rain , 
according to the latest predictions of hov-.r 
effect. ( Gilchrist, 199 Sa. p.5 
\Vil l fare under the green house 
nothcr SivIH science reporter. Bob Beale, examined the planning process for coal rnin 
dcYelopn1ent in NS\V and offered graphic statistics on the impact of Australia's coal 
focus. He \\Tote that although . "it \\'Ould take 420 million ne,v trees t 
.__ 
ak up the 
csti111ated 281 111illion tonnes of greenhouse gases produced bv the Hunter Valle-·' 
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proposed Bengalla coal mine, according to calculations by a Federal Government 
bureau", mine-lifetime greenhouse emissions were not being assessed as new mines 
were opened (Beale, 1996, p.9). In this case the information source was a goverrunent 
report that put coal mine development in a greenhouse gas context; more often SMH 
sources were individual scientists or politicians in this period. 
With a Federal Government change in 1996 to the "conservative" political party in 
Australia and with this Liberal-National Party Coalition government led by John 
Howard continuing until 2007, the evidence indicates that climate change became 
increasingly framed as a political/economic story of Australia blocking climate action 
internationally. Gilchrist reported in the SMH that: 
The Howard Government today steps up its diplomatic offensive opposing 
international efforts to protect the world's cli1nate at the historic meeting of the 
Climate Change Convention in Geneva. 
Australia, with its pro-industry stance, is set to be seen as a rebel nation out of 
step with mounting global concern about the threat of climate change from the 
greenhouse effect. (Gilchrist, 1996a) 
He uses a scientific context of risk in this story as well, citing the 199 5 IPCC report, and 
he also adds context with a background report on the economic direction of backing 
status quo energy producers and users and the traditional "economy versus 
environment" values that characterised the new Howard government's "pro-industry" 
stance on greenhouse gas emissions-also examined earlier in this thesis. This article 
thus outlines another pivotal shift in communication and framing in Australia's response 
to climate change science and describes the revolving door of like-minded executives 
between bureaucracy and industry setting the political agenda, a story also told by 
Pearse (2007) a decade later. This article in full is in appendix 1. 
Although the SMH continued to n1n well-informed and contextual science stories 
during the later study period, a framing shift is suggested from the sampling. Along 
with the change of government in 1996, there began relatively more political/economic 
coverage. This can be seen starting from 7 June 1996 and during the following six 
months where a SMH editorial and five of six articles are all focused on international 
negotiations. 
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Looking at the same two year period for Fin Review one finds that amongst 30 articl 
sampled in 1995- 96, there are only four articles focused on the science. One is on 
technical issue and is an opinion piece ( defined as not written by a staff or freelance 
journalist) and three are opinion pieces by sceptics. The same sceptical approach to the 
science was not the case in the early study period when the sampling showed the Fin 
Review ran a mix of straight-forward science reporting, defined as quoting mainstrean1 
climate scientists, and political/economic stories, some of which were candid about 
Australian industry's inefficiencies, as I showed in chapter 4. By 1995 the economic 
concerns of energy producers and big electricity users like aluminium predominated 
along with international negotiations. Unlike Gilchrist's SMH stories, they are not 
framed in the context of IPCC assessments, i.e. scientific background. 
A trend in these articles is that besides politicians, sources frequently include industry 
spokespeople urging the government to heed their concerns or agreeing with 
government about what is in Australia's "national interest", with conservation group 
spokespeople in opposition. The latter supports an observation that after the early study 
period the science information on risk and need for speedy response was more often 
represented by green groups. Three opinion pieces by sceptics were pub! ished in 199 
- by US scientist Michael Patrick, National Party politician John Stone and former 
Labor Minister Peter Walsh, (later to become a pro1ninent 1nember of the Lavoisier 
Group). 
Many Fin Review headlines in 1995 relate to fears of a carbon tax by 1nining and 
energy producers and providers , or, indeed, of any tax or international regulation that 
li1nited emissions. Here is evidence that even before the change of government in 1 
industry and government had already been reframing Australia's position from the earl 
eth icaL response-focused and internationally cooperative stance to an economic sci f-
interest stance that ignored the risk messages. In addition to Fin Rcviev1 articles from 
this period quoted else\vhere. headlines include "Business in last ditch bid to bar carbon 
tax'· (Callick. 1995): "Australia takes strong line against greenhouse rules•,, (D\vver. 
1995): ··Business Lines up to Fight Controls" (Callick, 1996) has an indicative series of 
quotes frorn industry spokespersons. Similar framing can be found in ·'Macquarie fear 
a greenhouse handicap·· (Cal I ick. 1996a) \vhere the rhetoric of the investment secto r 1 
quoted and this is later countered by a Greenpeace spokesperson. Callick \Vrites: 
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(and) 
Policy options on combatting climate change that are still before the 
Federal Government 'could destroy the competitive advantage of 
Australian mineral processing companies', according to Macquarie 
Equities Ltd 
The practical outcome, Macquarie said, would be "the loss of significant 
new investment in the Australian resource industry". Australian energy 
and commodity producers would come under increasing pressure to 
conform to the policy stance of Europe and the US as negotiations 
proceeded ....... The Europeans' position was driven by trade 
competitiveness objectives, the Americans' by the presidential election. 
(Callick 1996a, p.4) 
The construction of a story about either an industry point of view or a federal 
government point of view countered by an environmental group later in the story is 
common amongst the Fin Review stories sampled from this period. This constn1ction of 
a story reinforces the frame of "mainstream" (that is, industry-or politician) versus 
special interest, the environmental group opposing business and jobs. This article 
exhibits a number of value frames discussed in chapters 5 and 6-the rhetoric about 
Australia's competitive advantage, that if action is taken industry will go offshore and 
that "outside" attempts to initiate emission reductions are self-serving and not in 
Australia's interests. In this way political and economic reporting was establishing the 
dominant nan·ative for the following years. 
The examples reviewed variously illustrate a common media practice highlighted by 
media researchers: stories are framed as authoritative and "objective" when they report 
on what people in power say and do. Political utterances can and do set the daily news 
cycle and issue agenda (Gelbspan, 2004; Nichols & McChesney, 2005). Reporting 
political debates is presented as removing bias from story selection, and it makes 
newsgathering less expensive. News companies set up reporters near powerful people 
e.g., in parliamentary press galleries. While this may reduce journalism to networking 
and scribing or opinion pieces, it is safe. 
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In Australia the federal parliamentary press gallery dorninates the daily ne\vs coverage. 
On any given day political back and forth is the majority of what is relayed bv the 
national broadcasters, ABC and SBS. as well as the major broadsheets. Understanding 
this political reporter- politician nexus makes the agenda-setting role of government 
1vith the media more transparent on analysis. It also sheds light on why political 
leadership becomes so i111portant in transmission of a controversial science story. 
Politicians as pri111ary framers of the topic by the later 1990s and beyond can be seen in 
the coverage of the two newspapers analysed and also from interview data. When no 
politician was talking about climate change, editors were liable to assume there was no 
story, according to SMH journalist Wendy Frew and Fin Review journalist Julie 
Macken who wrote separately about their on-the-job observations in the professional 
journal The Walkley Magazine (Frew, 2006; Macken, 2006). 
Getting a story placed in the newspaper is a hurdle in itself in the internal stntcture and 
is related to the power of the editor and also often is subject to the values of the editor. 
Editors are appointed- it is suggested by Gelbspan and Nichols and McChesney-
because their values are coherent with the dominant ideological culture of the media 
group ownership and board. I suggest that media ideological agreement with 
policymakers about Australia's "comparative advantages" in export trade that made the 
country exceptional , per economic rationalist theory, grew to hege1nony during the later 
1990s in Australia ' s highly concentrated media market. 
Fre\v reports that in her experience as an environmental journalist in the mid-20 
after the first decade of the federal Howard Government. with political conespondcnt 
uninteres ted in the topic except as an international battle: 
Clin1ate change has been one of the most difficult stories to sell to mv news desk 
since I took on the environment round 1 months ago. Scientists and 
~ 
cnYironmentali s ts \Vere in no doubt it \Vas a phenomenon I ike no other, and one 
that had dire consequences for the \vorld ·s population. But \Vith the exception of 
a fe \V dramatic reports .. . ne\VS editors \Veren 't interested. (Fre\v. "--- , p. I 
:- The national press galle~ in Australia generally ignored climate change in the late l 990s. as did the 
politicians. apart from the political battle o,er the Kyoto Protocol. This continued "ell into the _ 
until recently ( Sanderson. 2006). HO\\ it might be different was shown\\ ith the a\ O\\ed turnaround of 
'\ c\\ s Limited O\\ ner Rupert \f urdoch on the topic in 2007 (reported nationally and internationally 
51 
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A similar observation comes from former ABC television environment reporter Alan 
Tate who said in a 2006 thesis interview that the influential (to editors) Canberra press 
gallery took its climate change information from the government. A former j oumalist 
from The Age who took the subject seriously and responsibly in the mid-1990s, said that 
when she suggested a climate change story her editor responded: "haven 't we fixed 
that?" She also said she was labelled a "greenie" (C. Miller, thesis interview, April, 
2007). Another reporter who covered climate change for the SMH in the later 1990s, 
Murray Hogarth, said "We were a lonely bunch in the l 990s- I knew of no editor who 
was committed to telling the story" (M. Hogarth, thesis interview, June, 2006). 
On the related subject of "source" j oumalism in Australia, Ward (2001) says: 
Many of these explorations of reporter-source relations have suggested that 
j oumalists are readily captured by the official or bureaucratic sources they 
routinely rely on for information that they can speedily fashion into news stories. 
Government and corporate sources are hence able to shape the media agenda: 
they become "primary definers" of the news. (pp. 177- 178) 
An example given by Gelbspan of how this worked in the US is that when the US 
National Academy of Science (NAS) supported and strengthened the advice of the 2001 
IPCC report (in response to an argument about "foreign" versus "American" science 
raised by then President George W. Bush), " ... few if any reporters bothered to check 
the position of the NAS. Had they done so, they would have found that as early as 1992 
... the NAS recommended strong measures to minimize climate impacts," (Gelbspan, 
2004, p. 70). 
A Shift to Opinion by 2001 and Uncertainty 
By 2000-2001 , the 30 samples from the SMH and the Fin Review respectively for those 
years show a shift to opinion balanced against the science and continued political 
May 9, 2007 e.g., Griscom Little, (2007a). We suddenly find The Australian 's national affairs reporter 
cutting through the government rhetoric and giving a cogent account of the real economics attached to 
mitigation, although the headline "Green row will be decided on economic fear" still makes it sound like 
a green sectoral issue (Steketee, 2007) . 
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coverage. Numbers of ne'vvs stories sampled remained co1nparable fron1 1987 to 2001, 
although drawn from a larger pool of stories in the early study period. Content 
continued to change towards uncertainty. The Fin Review was regularly calling global 
warming/climate change "a debate" in the 2000-2001 stories sampled and continued to 
quote sceptics as the science context. The comn1on trend by this time to disrniss 
alternative energy solutions as marginal and non-mainstream can be seen in reporter 
Nick Hordem's (2000) piece. He describes renewable energy as a manifestation of 
"green politics" and "subjectivity" that "few energy analysts" agree with. 
As shown in Figure 10, a comparative analysis of sources for 30 SMH articles taken 
from the beginning (1988-89) and then 30 articles from the end (2000- 2001) of the 
study period found that the number of opinion pieces had gone up tenfold by 2001 fron1 
a level close to zero in 1988- 1989. J oumalists' reports about climate science in the 
period 2000-2001 were at times placed on or near the opinion pages where sceptical 
tracts also appeared if not on the same day. This emphasised debate, opinion. and 
uncertainty about who to believe. The samples also suggest that by the end of the study 
period this newspaper was quoting green groups and NGOs three times as often as in 
the early days. The use of scientists and experts as sources had declined about 20% 
fro1n the early study period. This is consistent with the i1npression that green groups 
were quoted more often in an adversarial role to the govemn1ent's position. However 
na1ned politicians and industry spokespeople as sources had also gone down based on 
this sample. 
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Figure 10. Sources for newspaper articles in The Sydney Morning Herald comparing 1988- 1989 and 
2000- 2001 
The opinion articles, again defined as not being produced by a staff j oumalist, were 
produced by writers who either supported the science risk messages or debated them. 
Increased opinion articles signalled that the mainstream science findings were in the 
realm of debate, on a par with opinion. I suggest such approaches encouraged 
uncertainty, keeping in mind also the impact of the wider communication picture, not 
least the intemet's wealth of opinion-based sites established during the 1990s. 
In more detail, 2000 yielded a notable crop of opinion articles in this sampling of the 
SMH. No IPCC reports would be issued until the start of the following year and it was 
not a year of major treaty negotiations until near the end. Instead, the year started with a 
January article about what a politician thought "We're dancing on our graves Bob Carr 
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\Yams", a cautionary tale about over-population, global \varn1ing and environn1ental 
degradation quoting the then Premier of NSW Bob Carr who was known to lead on 
environmental issues. This spurred three opinion articles in following days, two of 
which agreed with Carr and the third, by a prominent Sydney politician, said carT was 
all rhetoric and no action and was still promoting more coal-fired power plants. 
Several articles followed where climate change was an aside in coverage of gardening 
and travelling ("if global warming occurs", this or that might happen). The Larr 
government was again invoked in July with an environment story about endangered 
species "Life's getting too hot for endangered species" citing a govem111ent scientific 
committee. Starting in September, a number of science articles written by either staff 
reporters or freelancers were interspersed with sceptical tracts-on different days but on 
neighbouring feature and opinion pages-lending the impression that science and 
sceptical opinion are evenly balanced. Thus two science features-about climate 
change risks to the Great Barrier Reef ( 6 September) and on the 10 October about links 
between ozone depletion and anthropogenic climate change-were followed on the 19 
October by a piece called "Hot news, the greenhouse effect is not so bad after all" by 
Larry Mounser who is credited as "a freelance writer, a physics teacher and runs a 
course." Mounser returned again later in the year. 
He argued that since the climate in recent geological time is a series of ice ages with 
brief interglacials "The onset of an ice age could take just 70 years. Being able to avert 
it by burning fossil fuels, purposely creating a 'greenhouse effect could be one of the 
luckiest flukes in human history. Yet, strangely, it's the warming of the planet that we 
fear". He wrote that documented natural ten1perature variations with the Arctic losing 
ice have caused no ecosystem harm and furthermore "there's also no hard proof that 
CO 2 is causing the warming anyway," (Mounser, 2001, p. 12). 
On 13 November several greenhouse-related articles appeared at the front of the paper 
and in the opinion sections. One was a political analvsis with a science context but 
\vithout any quoted sources. thus looking like an opinion piece. Another was a freelance 
piece stemming fron1 the ne\v career of former technologv writer Gavin Gilchrist \Vh 
quit reporting in the late 1990s to promote sustainable energy. then developed a small 
co1npany called Big SYvitch Projects Pty Ltd (Gilchrist. 2001). Several other reporter 
inter\·ie\\·ed for this thesis. including Alan Tate. Murray Hogarth and Claire Miller from 
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the 1990s, had moved on by 2001 to private careers in sustainable energy promotion or 
state government. This indicates another influential structural feature of news media-
the loss of experienced and well-informed personnel. 
One SMH writer who didn't move on was Deborah Smith the science writer. It was her 
story on the draft 2001 IPCC assessment, placed on 13 November 2000 on p.13 along 
with the two stories noted above, that was notable as a science update placed in the 
paper in features next to the opinion pages where Mounser's piece had recently run. 
Furthermore it was introduced with the words "The relations column will return next 
week". The subject matter was not opinion but a straight report on the 2001 IPCC 
assessment. Smith wrote: 
(The IPCC) tone has toughened considerably since (1995), based on new 
studies. The latest draft report by the 3,000 scientists who make up the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, to be finalised early next 
year, warns that mankind has "contributed substantially to observed warming 
over the last 50 years". (Smith, 2000, p 13) 
Smith also interviewed Graeme Pearman then Chief of CSIRO Atmospheric Research 
who stressed that the underpinning science was solid and response action should not be 
delayed on behalf of "a few remaining greenhouse sceptics". In the earlier study period 
a report on IPCC science would more likely have been main news in the front of the 
paper. In keeping with the shift to a political debate, in this November 2000 issue, the p. 
1 story focused on environmentalist dissatisfaction with the Australian position at the 
Hague climate change conference that month with the headline "Greens flex their 
muscles at 'last chance' climate summit", underscoring the government versus the 
greens frame of the narrative. 
Three weeks later on 6 December the sceptical physics teacher appeared again writing 
about "Cracks in the greenhouse ... " claiming hundreds of studies don ' t support the 
IPCC, and offering some plausible (to the layperson) alternative perspectives. He used 
rhetoric like "the high priests" and the "white coated posse" when referring to 
mainstream climate scientists and this name-calling would be a growing trend. In total 
six of 16 stories sampled for climate change in 2000 were not by either staff writers or 
freelance journalists. The opinion articles were about the science and the impact of 
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climate change, not about federal politics. Along with the effect of story placcn1cnt, this 
may arguably have contributed to uncertainty about climate change infon11ation. 
The SMH samples for 200 l presented fewer opinion pieces and instead a strea1n of 
political stories about why the US, supported by Australia, did not want to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. There were also so1ne informative stories linking weather outcon1es to 
climate change. In January 2001 the IPCC assessment, now officially released did get 
p. 1 treatment emphasizing the risk message in the headline: "Six degrees hotter, global 
climate alarm bells ring louder." 
By 2001, international response negotiations were being frained by both reviewed 
publications as a battle between environmentalists and the goven1ment backed by 
industry. A Fin Review article in November 2001, "Conservationists fail to expel 
Australian team", for exarnple, reported on non-government organisation co111plaints 
about the Australian negotiating team and its role on Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The 
government's role is defended by the Aluminium Council's representative John 
Hannagan. The 2000 and 2001 articles taken together suggest that the whole discourse 
might be dismissed by audiences as uncertain and debatable or opinion, or as a spec ial 
interest issue of little concern to the mainstrea1n. 
These sa1nple a1iicles also invite a closer look at one of the major media structural 
influences identified -along with elite/political source journalism, and with avoiding 
context- that is: contrived balance in presentation of the science. The Australian 
evidence suggests this can be done by offering opinion pieces to counter or support 
professional reporting of events or scientific research outco1nes. In Australian 
newspapers san1pled it was also done by offering diametrically opposed views on the 
significance of the science findings on risk. 
lYianufacturing Balance 
Political scientists Jules and Maxwell Bovkoff (Boykoff & Bovkof[ 2 looked at 
coverage of global \varming during the study period ( 1988- 2002) in nationallv-read 
ncv,·spapcrs. They used content analysis to look at the effect of "balancing" a single 
n1cdia report on this topic. They found. perhaps unsurprisinglv. that this adherence to 
balancc- i.c .. finding t\vo con1peting voices but not necessarilv with context- actuall 
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biased the coverage of anthropogenic climate change and issues related to response, and 
led to uncertainty. 
US human geographer Liisa Antilla (2005) did a similar study, and provides a wide-
ranging bibliography on newsroom practices and climate science communication. Her 
one-year study encompassed a survey of US newspaper national and regional coverage 
in 2003- 2004 looking at factors like uncertainty and the exploitation of media practices 
such as balance by non-peer-reviewed sceptics to create a "phony controversy". She 
arrived at findings complementary to Boykoff and Boykoff about the skewed 
infonnation going out to the public, and points to historical precedents for manufactured 
uncertainty and controversy on controversial social issues from slavery to cigarette 
smoking. 
As I show, similar conventions developed in Australia and this led at times to 
"balancing" the body of peer-reviewed reports assessed by the IPCC with isolated 
voices of sceptical scientists- a balance of voices that should have been placed in the 
context of a consensus agreement by climate scientists working in that field (Oreskes, 
2004). Often, the sceptical voices are not scientists-as in a September 2000 article in 
the Fin Review by a "former senior public servant" who quotes a small handful of 
armchair Australian sceptics like Tasmanian John Daly and tells his readers that 
"scientifically the greenhouse scare is largely over" (Scott, 2000, p.34). 
Context A voided or Used Strategically 
Context is often avoided in news reporting and this has been another confusing 
influence on climate change stories. Ostensibly this happens so that there is no 
possibility of a charge of bias against the reporter who might add the context (Nichols & 
McChesney, 2005). Applying context is also more time consuming, as it requires 
research and/or experience. Instead, the standard, "objective" and balanced approach 
reflects as a "he said", "she said" array of facts and opinions-possibly assembled in a 
number of consecutive news stories, but without background as to where this 
information fits in the ongoing evidence or science discovery process. Similarly, context 
is often omitted for people quoted or interviewed-for example, whether they speak for 
a peer-reviewed research summary in the case of scientists. A related omission is an 
interviewee's affiliation or research background that might illuminate where their 
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comment is coming from. Rarely does a news report include either a sceptic's or a 
mainstream scientist's credentials or a relevant link to a particular interest group or 
think tank. These omissions arguably encourage the public notion that sc ienti sts ar 
interchangeable. 
Corbett and Durfee (2004) showed that news consumption without context does not 
lead to better public understanding. Testing a sample audience with various treat111ents 
of a global warming story, they found controversy added to readers ' confusion- while 
context made people feel more certain they understood global wam1ing and that it was 
real but complex. 
Science context was often missing in the Australian political stories sampled, although 
sometimes it was inserted strategically to remind audiences of the scientific risk 
messages ( e.g. SMH articles from 1995-96 described previously). The reverse effect 
was also achieved by structuring a political article with sceptical science context ( e.g. 
Fin Review articles 2000). Since the uncertainty discussion involved opinion that 
sought to discredit the IPCC, ( e.g. Scott 2000) a year's worth of articles might have the 
effect of leaving readers uncertain about who to believe. In these ways, context can 
either be missing or misused, as well as being used with professional ethics as the 
experiment by Corbett and Durfee assumed. 
Australian academics have also noted the atomised nature of modern news presentation. 
For example, University of Sydney professor of government Rodney Tiffen wrote early 
in the study period: "The fragmentary formats of news presentations amid conflicting 
claims are apparently cognitively disabling for many. There is vividness without 
context, information without accountability, variety without enhancing the sense of 
choice or control" (Tiffen, 1989, p. 197). Almost 20 years later, Nichols and 
McChcsney (2005) agree: 
Professional journalism tends to pun1n1el people with facts, but rarely pummels 
people \vith a nuanced appreciation of what the facts might mean. This help 
explain the nun1crous studies that show that sustained consu1nption of the ncv-,1s 
on a particular subject often does not lead to a better understanding of the 
subject and sometimes leads to more confusion (p. I 
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Commercial Pressures and Ignoring the "Dots" 
Commercial considerations also shaped the agenda. Gelbspan reports an October 1999 
conversation with a top editor of a major US TV network who was asked why the dots 
were not connected between increased coverage of weather disasters and climate 
change. The editor said on the one occasion where they tried it, a barrage of complaints 
was aimed at the top network executives from the industry-funded Global Climate 
Coalition. 
The fossil fuel industry argument then, and still now, is that any one event cannot be 
linked to human-induced climate change; even mentioning that scientists linked a 
"pattern" of violent weather with climate change was deemed offensive. The editor said 
the network was intimidated. "The threat was implicit: if the network persisted, it ran 
the risk of losing a lot of lucrative oil and auto advertising dollars" (Gelbspan, 2004, p. 
80). (This tactical insistence on uncertainty is further explored in chapter 9 .) 
In Australia, ABC reporter Alan Tate said that his editors were also deluged with 
complaints from the resource extraction industry whenever he covered climate change 
during the 1990s (A. Tate, thesis interview, June, 2006). While not a commercial threat, 
it might be considered a political threat to the ABC. It is noteworthy that with recent 
extreme weather events in Australia such as the cyclone that destroyed Innisfail in 2006, 
the "Black Saturday" extreme bushfires in Victoria in 2009, and the extreme flooding 
and cyclones of 2011, a similar lack of "connecting the weather dots" is evident from 
politicians and media. 
Reporting Structure and Agenda-setting "Spin" 
Structurally, the way a newspaper or TV news service is organised is in "rounds", and 
many science and society issues like water and climate change will be covered across 
different rounds-political and economic, as well as science and environment. This 
affects the quality of reporting and the contextual understanding of non-science 
reporters. A SMH j oumalist working the environment round said that environmental 
reporters suffer from this cross-over more than in the past because climate change ( and 
water) had become topics that affect many rounds including politics and economics and 
everyone wants to write about them. However those reporters won't necessarily have 
205 
the background and understanding that an environmental or science reporter \Vill ha 
That can mean that any "spin" in a political press release about an environrnental issue 
might not be noticed or questioned by a non-environmental reporter. 
"Spin" was the word used by former ABC environmental reporter Alan Tate when he 
said high-energy users and production industries-alu111inium, coal, electricity, and later 
fertiliser and cement-were actively setting the agenda of "go slow" on climate action 
along with federal officials (also documented in the findings of Pearse, 2005 and 
Hamilton, 2001 ). "It was the biggest most powerful spin campaign in Australian media 
history" he said in a 2006 thesis interview. He said he understood the strategy was to 
delay action on greenhouse gas emissions until "coal was ready"-with geo-
sequestration and tax support. He said what he saw of the communication tactics was: 
First sow seeds of doubt about the science-make it a nonsense. Say let's not be 
part of the Kyoto Protocol-it's too little anyway. Then say OK we 've got a 
techno fix, geo-sequestration and nuclear. Ignore energy efficiency and 
renewables, why bother, those are green issues, it's all marginal. The uz 111a1n 
game is coal and cheap energy. (A. Tate, thesis interview, June, 2006) 
The historical record of this period, available from published documents and from the 
works of Pearse (2007), Bulkeley (2001) and Hamilton (200 l) amongst others, agrees 
with Tate's assessment of what was accomplished during the 1990s by both politicians 
and media: that is the reframe of the dominant narrative by denying, downplaying or 
confusing the risks of climate change and the cementing of 'business as usual -- 1n 
concurrence with the resource industry. Former mass media journalist Wayne 
Sanderson wrote on the political website Crikey in 2006 about the federal press gallery 
during the Howard govem111ent fro111 1996 on: 
ln atte111pting to dictate the terms of the response to climate change, John 
Ho\vard is the doctor ,vho denied the disease, but now wants to prescribe the 
cure. And the press gallery sho,vs every sign of letting him get awav ,vi th it. In 
fairness. the gallery may be doing the best they can, given thev are intellectual I 
retarded on this subject. having sho,vn little interest in it over the years . Search 
the archives. in vain. for a serious piece bv a serious "insider'' on ,vhat has been 
a 111onumental failure of national public polic,. 
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As a pack, the gallery has allowed the climate change debate to be framed by the 
government - first it wasn't happening; then it was happening, but there wasn't 
much Australia could do; now it is serious and nuclear energy will fix it. At each 
point, the stance has been either totally wrong, or at least questionable, but the 
fourth estate has been missing in action (Sanderson, 2006). 
Veteran American journalist Bill Moyers, now one of the corporate media's sternest 
critics, described the current state of a dominant political journalism culture in the US-
and it can as easily apply to Australia. 
"Instead of acting as filters for readers and viewers, sifting the truth from the 
propaganda, reporters and anchors attentively transcribe both sides of the spin-
invariably failing to provide context, background, or any sense of which claims 
hold up and which are misleading" ( quoted in Nichols & McChesney, 2005, p. 
25). 
WHERE WAS THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 
The question also arises about the role of the public broadcaster during the study period 
which I explore briefly here and is a topic worthy of further study. Veteran ABC 
reporter Allan Ash bolt contends that the ABC's main function is "to legitimise and 
stabilise the culture and ideology of the present socio-economic system" (Ashbolt, 
1987, pp. 14- 15) and that the "ABC passively accepts the ideological values passed on 
by outside institutions". In other words, without the commercial imperative, the public 
broadcaster may be a more direct reflection of the prevailing government ideology and 
the agenda of the dominant narratives. 
Alan Tate left the ABC in 1998 when he felt deep uncertainties about climate change 
had settled into the editorial policy. Other contemporary observers and insiders of the 
ABC testify that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, self-censorship and timidity marked 
the public broadcaster vis a vis federal government narratives on controversial issues 
(Manne, (Ed) 2005). My own informal monitoring (as a professional journalist) of ABC 
daily radio or tv news broadcasts in recent years, indicates that press gallery/politician 
perspectives predominate. The fact that we equate public media with a more incisive, 
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"truth-te lling" stance thus appears optimistic, but is sometimes realised in the remnants 
of investigative journalism found with ABC Four Corners and in so111e Radio National 
documentaries. 
The situation was different in the early study period. Former ABC broadcast producer 
Richard Smith recalled that he and journalist Geoff Burchfield produced a half-hour 
thematic special on cli1nate change for the science program Quantum in 1988 and that 
the special came about because the science reporters and producers decided to "force 
the issue" and sold the program to manage1nent. Asked what triggered their interest, he 
said not only was the science of climate change "common knowledge" at the time. the 
specific trigger for the documentary special was the scientific work coming out of the 
CSIRO by Pearman and others around the time of the first Greenhouse conference in 
1987. A four-part series followed with Question of Survival. However, by the early 
1990s, 1nanagement had changed within the science unit. Whether it was pressure from 
above, a perceived backlash, or personal preference, Smith did not know. But he said 
the new manager said people were not interested in environmental issues and declined 
further programs along these lines (R. S1nith, thesis interview, June, 2007). 
CULTURE WARS: AGENDA-SETTING AND IDEOLOGY 
The term "culture wars" is frequently applied in social studies to describe a 111edia 
agenda that seeks to influence the do1ninant ideas and values driving a society. Carvalho 
(2007) looked specifically at publishers' ideological input to climate change newspaper 
discourses and found that, internationally, this influence is significant. Carvalho 
reaffirmed what has been found by other 1nedia researchers and also the current stu dy: 
that selection of story and information sources, frequency and quanbty of space 
dedicated to "expe1is" and c0111mentary, all can reflect a newspaper's ideological 
intentions and preferences. 
A potent case study of agenda-setting with an ideological 111ission within the 
111ainstream 111edia ( examined pariicularly by fonner Sy dney Mornin_r;z Herald and AB 
journalist, and nO\,V unversity 1nedia researcher, Dav id McKnight and La Trobe 
ni versity political scientist Robert Manne) is the free-1narket perspective on national 
and \vorld events of Rupert Murdoch's transnational News Lin1ited publications 1n 
\ustralia. In terms of the clin1ate change story this has been reflected in Th e Australian 
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the influential national newspaper, through a stance of uncertainty and doubt regarding 
climate change science and any attempts at regulated response that would affect 
commercial activity (Manne, 2011). The Australian's world view was in congruence 
with the increasing hegemony of economic rationalism as explored in chapters 5 and 6. 
A newspaper can reflect its perspective in editorials, opinion pieces, headlines, and 
story slant. In the case of the Australian and its "culture war" McKnight writes: 
This orthodoxy is one which holds to certain doctrinaire ideals about econo1nic 
management, national identity, foreign affairs, public schools, climate change 
and many other issues. 
(and) 
It is an orthodoxy which is shared by a nu1nber of senior j oumalists at News Ltd 
and by many of their editorial writers, columnists and contributors. It is an 
intellectual universe in which a network of conservative think tanks, academics 
and writers of the right have a symbiotic relationship with the newspapers of 
News Ltd ... and most significantly the coalition government under John Howard 
(McKnight, 2005, p. 54). 
Considering that News Limited is said to control 70% of the mainstream press in 
Australia (Manne, 2005, p. 2), this is significant to communicators and the public 
discourse, particularly on issues such as climate change that might interfere with 
"business as usual" or call for regulation of business practices. 
McKeown (2009) produced a thorough analysis of News Limited publications in 
Australia and their favourable coverage, throughout this dominant media empire, of 
geologist Ian Plimer' s 2009 contrarian book on climate science. She speculated that this 
might have had a significant effect on the concurrent political discussion of an emission 
trading scheme. She also documented that a trend to release sceptical science books at 
key political time points has been an ongoing tactic of free-market think tanks that 
question climate change, particularly the IP A and the Lavoisier Group, amplified by 
sympathetic media outlets. Four such books were reportedly published in 2009, 
including Plimer' s. 
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When 1nedia editorial policy agrees with business and policy objectives on an issue lik 
climate change, it is often a congruence of cultural or ideological values amongst these 
sectors of society. The question of ·who first marks the agenda- whether n1edia or 
policymakers- may be difficult to unravel: in the climate change case it may well have 
fa llen into place through personalities and ideological agreement. But at least one 
veteran newsman and long-time ABC professional, Quentin Dempster. sees the lack of 
diversity and the concentration of media power in Australia as a sign of media 
corporations' power over the politicians, who have allowed the1n to develop 
strangleholds on the nation's sources of mainstream information. He writes: " ... we 
must re1nind ourselves that Rupert Murdoch (News Limited) and Kerry Packer 
(Consolidated Press and TV channels) are not called 'the gatekeepers' for nothing. They 
have had a testicular hold on our prime ministers from Fraser to Howard," (Dempster 
2005, p. 113). 
To digress briefly, overseas influence lies not just with global media companies such as 
News Limited. Transnational corporations in general have exerted major influence on 
Australian cli1nate policy during the l 990s- alu1ninium s1nelting, coal, and metals 
corporations topping the list (Pearse, 2005). Further, Carey52 has documented the 
strong influence of US public relations techniques and the agenda-setting role of free 
market think tanks since the 1970s on cultural institutions including on the media. t< ree 
market ideology was already a hallmark of the News Limited media along with a 
1niss ion to conve1i the public to its cultural point of view when climate change can1e 
along as an issue (Carey, 1987). 
According to 1nany media workers who contributed to Manne (2005) , Rupert 
Murdoch 's News Limited and its "culture war" did exert considerable influence in 
Australi a during the study period, beginning with concentrated ownership of Australian 
print medi a, including 1najor 1nastheads in most capital cities and the country 's onl y 
nat ional nevvspaper: Th e A ustralian, Sy dn ey Telegraph, Melbourne !-Jerald :::>un 
Brisbane Co urier 1\lfai! and A delaide A dvertiser. Manne (2005 , 2011) docun1ents how 
thi s near 1nonopoly advantage, in combination vvith political attacks on the and 
'
2 The late Alex Carey who researched psycho logy an d indus trial re latio ns at the Univers ity of Sydn e 
\\ rote extensively about the agenda-se tt ing ro le of co nservative thin k tanks that ga ined prominence in the 
past 30 years largely outside academia. and the lesso ns they learned from pro paganda studies-
documented in his seminal book Taking the Risk 0 111 of Democracy: corporate propas.?.cm da versus 
i·ccdom one/ clcmocra(r ( Carey. 198 7). 
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the broadcaster's timidity in response) plus an aggressive right-wing commentariat 
assembled on News Limited pages have had profound impacts on Australian political 
culture. Manne makes the case that this has included a significant influence on public 
understanding and discourse of anthropogenic climate change. 
McKnight gives exa1nples of the transparent and undisguised ideological bent of some 
News Limited editors and writers (in a profession that cloaks itself in supposed 
neutrality and impartiality). He writes of editor Leslie Hollings who had open ties to the 
free-market Institute for Public Affairs (IP A) in the 1980s: "For a decade Hollings was 
a key figure in fashioning the ideological stance of The Australian and News Ltd," (p. 
61 ), including championing economic rationalist goals like deregulation. In these ways 
"news" can be manufactured as a cultural construct. 
Regarding other Australian print media, Rundle (2005) noted the journalistic "decline" 
of Fairfax corporation, which owns the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian 
Financial Review (both sources for this thesis' media analysis over the study period) 
under the influence of a conservative board led by free-market competition policy 
advocate Fred Hilmer and prominent conservative businessman (sports, mining, 
casinos) Ron Walker in the mid-1990s. Rundle characterised the decline as a shift from 
being a liberal pluralistic publisher to one more closely aligned with the economic 
rationalist worldview that became hegemonic in the course of the 1990s. This provides 
some context to the change in story focus and the "balancing" of stories sampled in the 
later study period. 
Rhetorical Devices that Support Culture Wars 
Carey shed light on the convergence of ideology and rhetoric in the service of culture 
wars, compatible with propaganda studies that advise "us and them" framing. 
William Simon, secretary of the US Treasury 1973- 77 [ and formerly a bond 
trader on Wall Street] was one of the leaders of the campaign to reshape the 
political agenda that has led to the dominance of the neo-conservative movement 
in the USA. He claimed that the Jimmy Carter Administration was becoming 
collectivist, that the regulatory agencies of an "economic police state" were 
spreading "terror" among the corporations, and that the crisis of American 
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democracy was due to the pervasive influence of "un-A1nerican intellectuals." 
(Carey, 1987, p. 167) 
The use of similar "us and them" rhetoric is one fra111ing device borrowed frorn 
propaganda that has been applied by columnists and radio talk show hosts to decry 
climate change science and those who believe climate change is an urgent risk to 
society. "Us and them" rhetoric, which was gaining strength during the later study 
period, can be illustrated from a 2009 piece by columnist Christopher Pearson. a fonner 
speechwriter for Prime Minister John Howard. In "Sceptic Spells Doom for Alannist 
Religion" in The Australian he accuses climate scientists and environmentalists of 
"religious" fanaticism and calls the IPCC findings pseudo-science led by "eco-
fundamentalists" who hate the modem world and subscribe to "anti-human 
totalitarianism" (Pearson, 2009, cited by McKewon, 2009, p. 11 ). 53 "Us and them 
rhetoric is not confined to any one sector or ideological perspective in society but I 
illustrate it from this perspective because of its contributing role in re-establishing the 
hegemony of status quo values from 1996 on. 
Story Metaphors of Home, Hearth and National Interest 
Opinion polls cited by Nichols and McChesney (2005) of conservative voters ' beliefs in 
the face of contrary evidence caused these media analysts to conclude: "getting the story 
wrong matters" (p. 168). Getting the story wrong has been n1ade easier by the 
journalistic convention of repotiing issues as drainatic personal na1Tatives , fra111in g 
global issues such as anthropogenic cli111ate change in n1etaphors of personal loss or 
gain. As part of the analysis of rhetorical framing during the study period. I have shown 
th at the do111inant narrative by federal politicians and the 111edia in the late 1990s held 
that ac ti on on cli111ate change was a threat to jobs, and an attack by "then1 ' · tin tu rope or 
the United Nations) on "our national interest" (read "family"). 
In thi s \vorldvie\v 111arket capitalism is synonymous with political democracy and 
"frcedon1 "_ and there is a natural order in the type of economy Australia operates- c.g. , 
th e cn1phas is on ex port of natural resources (Han1ilton .. 2000). Thus "freedom " evokes a 
q 1Ylcdia critic Guy Rundle discusses the ideo log ica l perspec ti ve or Pea rson and fe ll ow Ca th olic 
commentator Frank De, inc. \\'ho ca ll environmentalism the "new paga ni sm" (Rundle, 2005, p. 43 ,. 
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metaphorical pathway that signals choice and lack of regulation; "national interest" 
signals growth in wealth through mineral extraction-coal being most relevant here. 
These value metaphors gloss over the reality that co-driving Australia's resource 
extraction policies are multinational corporations with their own interests, both on the 
ground and in the media. 
How these rhetorical devices are applied in public discourse and the media/political 
"culture war" is further illustrated in a 2003 book by David Flint, Twilight of the Elites. 
Flint enjoyed a power position in regard to the Australian consumer and the Australian 
media as former chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) and of the Australian Press Council during the study period. His book candidly 
sketches and approves of a campaign by the right against the left wing of Australian 
politics. Australian "sovereignty" and "prosperity" are dominant themes in this 
worldview as is a rhetorical attack on "Australia's media and legal elites" representing 
those who disagree. Labelling opponents elites ( as opposed to the rest of us) has been 
another common rhetorical tactic. He writes: "A significant feature of the elite agenda 
involves the surrender of part of our sovereignty to international organisations" (Flint, 
2003, p. 154). 
Anti-United Nations sentiment helps explain why the IPCC gains no respect from 
people holding this vvorldview. In regard to the Kyoto Protocol, Flint writes "The Kyoto 
Protocol is obviously another elite passion" (p. 17 5) and proceeds to quote the Lavoisier 
Group, and professional academic sceptics Fred Singer, Ian Castles and others on 
climate change-as well Brian Fisher of ABARE, whose economic modelling 
underpinned much of the argument about the potential severe damage to the Australian 
economy if Australia signed any significant Kyoto targets. 
THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AL"\TD RADIO 
Beder, (2000), Carey, (1997) and Delwiche, (1995) have shovvn how propaganda 
techniques are successfully applied to much of what we understand today as public 
relations and marketing techniques. 
Common propaganda techniques that can be recognised in the metaphors and rhetoric I 
have identified include the use of fear, name calling, glittering generalities, euphemisms 
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(metaphorical language or misleading labels) , and appeals to \vhat the An1ericans call 
"plain folks" and Australians would call " the battlers" . An extension of these technique 
can be seen in the public relations advice on how to frame climate change scie11ce to 
stress uncertainty offered by Frank Luntz (2003), discussed previously. Scientists for 
examp le can and were called just another "academic elite", out to keep their jobs and 
their perks. 
Ward looked at the influence of public relations techniques in setting the dominant 
narrative and news agenda. He found that the literature on public relations sheds no 
light on these questions. He says both practitioners and critics have not evaluated, or 
critically examined, the methods. In 2001 he concluded: "the first step ... must be to 
examine how it is that practitioners of public relations have managed to usurp 
authorship of the news" (Ward, 2001, p. 178). 
Public relations is matched by talk back radio in its power to influence audiences. Radio 
professional John Faine argues that a major strategic advantage for the John Howard 
federal Coalition view of the world fro1n the mid 1990s was the understanding of the 
importance of talkback radio. "Talk radio has overtaken all of the forms of 111edia-
electronic or print- as a political medium in Australia. It has become the daily agenda 
setter and the preferred organ for national and state leaders to sell policies and ideas,' 
(Faine, 2005, p.167). Consequently, the radio talkback hosts, along with the politicians 
they interview, wield relatively immense power in setting the daily issue agenda for 
public discourse. 
My analyses did not further explore either the influence of public relations or interactive 
radio but there is little doubt that both are powerful agenda-setting tools v1ielding the 
means for sowing either certainty or confusion in audiences and therefore worth noting 
for co111munication analysis of the cli111ate change story. 
CO~CLUSIO~ 
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Referring to the 1990s and early 2000s, then Labor political adviser and self-styled 
"left" media commentator Dennis Glover (2005) observes how ideological hegemony 
was forged in Australia during the late 1990s with influential media allies: 
(Prime Minister) John Howard had the powerful levers of government at his 
disposal to influence public opinion, but he had something more- a strong 
forward pack of media supporters willing to pick up a policy or a message, and 
smash through the opposing teams def enc es ... the screaming front page 
"exclusives", rabid opinion columns, unbalanced editorials, soft radio interviews 
and opponents made timid by their own ethical codes, must be close to what the 
Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci had in mind when he coined the term 
"hegemony." (p. 213) 
This ideological hegemony succeeded in obscuring earlier knowledge of what James 
Baker, former Head of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOAA) said of climate change science in 1997, "There's no better scientific consensus 
on any other issue I know-except perhaps Newton's second law of dynamics" 
(Gelbspan 2005, p.73). Much media coverage during the second half of the study period 
nevertheless treated the scientific message about human involvement in climate change 
as debatable and dismissed arguments for prompt action. The media's ability to do this 
is described as agenda setting, and it is done together with policy-makers with similar 
values. Structural factors in the media also influence the dominant narrative that 
emerges from the agenda-setting. 
An influential stn1ctural factor in Australia is the increasing concentration and lack of 
diversity of the Australian print and broadcast media in an increasingly global media 
business environment that has severely eroded journalism's traditional role as a 
watchdog of the public interest. Some scholars dispute the pre-eminence of this role 
arguing that evolution of mass communication during the past century has always been 
about telling selective stories and narratives that frame how people should think about 
matters in society. Another structural influence is that media owners and editors view 
society primarily through a political and economic lens which came to dominate the 
public communication of climate change in the 1990s. 
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This thesis proposes that the co-agenda setting role of the 1nass media w ith policy-
makers led to an early clear public understanding of the science n1essages on 
anthropogenic climate change when scientists , media and politicians agreed ori the ri sk 
1nessages and possible remedies. Later the media became instrumental in a politica l 
reframe of the public knowledge and creation of a different narrative- despite the bas ic 
science messages of public risk remaining consistent from beginning to end of the study 
period. 
Three structural features of contemporary news gathering and placement were exa111ined 
with examples from the newspaper evidence sampled for this thesis. These features 
were (a) the convention of relying on official sources , particularly politicians , to 
validate that a story is a story; (b) the use, misuse and omission of context in news 
reporting and, ( c) manufactured "balance" with sceptic perspectives in climate change 
stories or across extended coverage. The evidence shows that fron1 the mid 1 990s 
opinion pieces agreeing and disagreeing with the mainstream scientific assessment 
became 1nore dominant. Together with sceptic contributors and columnists. and 
editorial attempts to create a scientific "balance" this trend arguably fostered audience 
confusion and uncertainty about scientific understanding and the sense that "scientists 
don't agree". 
The stn1ctural dominance of political reporting is also analysed as press gallery 
journalists framed the story mostly in tenns of international negotiation s and as a dran1a 
between the federal goven1ment and green groups who were increasingly portrayed as 
being against business and jobs. A sin1ilar dramatic narrative pitched the federal 
goven1ment against outsiders, the UN or Europeans, who did not understand Australia 
and its special needs. The corporate energy sector and its priorities were frarned as the 
111ainstream. 
The influential role of News Li1nited (the so-call ed Murdoch press) is briefly exa111in cd 
because N evvs Limited owns 70°/o of Australian print media. has demonstrated a 
\Villingness to wage a "cultural war" congruent \Vith the economic rationalist worldview 
and has taken a sceptical editorial stance to climate change science and response for the 
study period and beyond. The role in changing c limate change co111mun ication of th 
inten1et, public relations methods . talk back radio and audience frag111entation arc other 
the111es of interest that vvould reward further stud,. 
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The meta issue that arises from the exploration of the intersect of science, media, and 
policy is to question the nature of perceived "reality" to which the public reacts on a 
daily basis. Both the literature and the evidence gathered for this thesis indicate that 
perceived reality can be, and is , framed and changed by elite agenda setters within 
societies. The media and politicians are the main frontline actors who set the agenda. 
With the understanding of the influence exerted by beliefs and values outlined in the 
previous chapter, not least changing economic ideology, this exploration agrees with the 
analysis of Ward. He concluded that contrary to the positivist view that there is one 
"real" world that is the source of "facts" that can be reported: "journalists do not ... 
report what really happens. Inevitably, the news media report society and politics 
selectively, not in the way the gatekeeper model suggests, but by drawing upon and 
assuming a culturally specific understanding of society and politics" (Ward, 2001 , p. 
123). 
In the next chapter I look at what emerged as the third major influence on the cEmate 
change discourses of the l 990s- scientists own views and language, which suggests a 
different perspective on at least some public scepticism. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
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FRAlVIING THE DOlVIINANT NARRATIVE-INFL UENCES Ill , SCIENTISTS 
WORLD VIEWS, EPISTEMOLOGIES AND P UBLIC SCEPTIC ISM 
"Sceptics - look at their track record; for an in1portant group of sceptics then· 
primary qualification is geology; in this argument, that offers red herrings and 
doesn't help the policy process" 
Geoff Love, Director, (Australian) Bureau of Meteorology, speaking at the 2007 5th 
World Conference of Science J oumalists Melbourne, 18 April, 2007. 
"Climate scientists are a very small cabal that actually don't study cli,nat 
change, they study weather change ... but the expert group of scientists on 
climate change ... is the people you've just re;ferred to, geologists. " 
Bob Carter, marine geologist, speaking on 6PR, Perth, Mornings with Paul Murray, 11 
March , 2011; quoted on ABC Mediawatch, 21 March, 2011. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scientists too have values and beliefs. Various authors have pointed out that the 
different world views of different scientific disciplines can be and are significant in their 
input to science and society discourses. 
Becher (1994) specialised in assessing the i1npact of what he called the "widely 
neglected" field of disciplinary differences in higher education and their wider effects. 
While focusing on the acaden1ic environment, he points out that di sci pl inary groups can 
be seen as academic tribes with their own set of intellectual values and their own patch 
of cognitive teITi tory. This sets the scene for a better understanding of the challenge 
faced by the sprawling, 1nulti-disciplinary task of unravelling clin1atc change and also 
so1nc understanding of where sorne of the staunchest sceptics have co1ne fro1n. CJ imatc 
science has required that scientists from a wide range of ea1ih and environn1ental 
sciences lean1 to cooperate, and to accept each others' data, often for the first ti1ne , to 
affect the progress that has been 1nade. 
Sarevvitz (2004) proposed that competing disciplinary approaches to the sc ientific basis 
of an cn\·ironn1cntal controversy 1nav be linked to competing value-based positions. In 
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a paper on environmental science and policy, looking at the interaction of disciplinary 
differences with social values and "normative lenses" (i.e. what a discipline considers 
should be the case) Sarewitz (2004) notes that the researcher is confronted with: 
a well-known empirical problem ... In areas as diverse as climate change, 
nuclear waste disposal, endangered species and biodiversity [lists other 
environmental research areas] ... and agricultural biotechnology, the growth of 
considerable bodies of scientific knowledge, created especially to resolve 
political dispute and for effective decision-making, has often been accompanied 
instead by growing political controversy and gridlock. Science typically lies at 
the centre of the debate, where those who advocate some line of action are likely 
to claim a scientific justification for their position, while those opposing the 
action will either invoke scientific uncertainty or competing scientific results to 
support their opposition. (p. 3 86) 
The basic understanding of the body of research he quotes (principally works by 
J asanoff and Wynne in the 1990s and N elkin in the 1970s) is that science is co-
produced by scientists and the society in which they are embedded-an understanding 
also at the core of the present study. This literature also shows- that the boundaries 
between science and policy are frequently renegotiated, which the current study also 
supports. Sarevvitz concludes that scientific uncertainty is a symptom not of lack of 
evidence but of lack of coherence between competing scientific understandings. The 
CU1Tent study supports that proposition and offers as an illustration a closer look at the 
tenets of several disciplines that have been at the forefront of sceptical debate about 
anthropogenic climate change. 
DISCIPLINARY BACKGROUNDS AND SCEPTICAL DEBATE 
In Australia, whether or not one calls economics a science, its normative assumptions 
and theories have exerted a huge influence on the public discourse and on political 
attitudes towards climate science during the study period, as I suggest in chapter 6. In 
regard to other disciplines prominent in the public discourse, many of Australia 's most 
oft-quoted climate change sceptics with seemingly relevant scientific credentials are 
either geologists - for example Bob Carter (James Cook University), Ian Plimer 
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(University of Adelaide and n1ining company director)- or meteorologists Willia111 
Kininmonth, ( fonner administrator of the Bureau of Meteorology's National Climate 
Centre), and for a while, Brian Tucker (after leaving CSIRO Atmospheric Rescarch). 5~ 
The term "sceptics" is cornmonly used to denote those who reject the IP findings on 
anthropogenic climate change or deny hu111an agency in the phenomenon. Other labels 
are "denier" and "contrarian". In this thesis I use the term "sceptic" as defined above 
with the acknowledgement that this use is problematical in scientific circles because a 
majority of scientists would characterise themselves as sceptical by training and 
inclination. 
Spencer Weart, a science historian and Director of the Centre for History of Physics at 
the American Institute of Physics, drew on hundreds of interviews as he charted the 
history of how scientists slowly came to understand climate change, its relation to 
human activities and that significant changes (heating, freezing, flooding etc) could 
happen more rapidly than scientists had thought possible a decade previously (Weart, 
2003). The scientists' task from the rnid 20 th century was to isolate the chief influences 
and effects, delineate the scope and rapidity of likely changes and, by the 1980s, give 
voice to a growing urgency that we have a problem and convince policy-n1akers and the 
public. This has not always been an easy cooperative venture. 
The influence of disciplinary differences, uncovered by Weart, helps explain the 
perspective and tenacity of some scientific sceptics who arc not necessarily linked to 
corporate special interests and whose continuing public debate in the face of 
overwhelming evidence 111ay appear puzzling. The history of disciplinary differences is 
thus relevant to cli111ate change communication over time. While the general pub! ic and 
n1any journalists may think that anyone called a climatologist or a meteorologist or 
geologist n1ust be an expert on climate change, and some may be, the disciplinary 
assun1ptions of these professions , pariicularly from training dating back 30- Su years 
Two of the leading 1990s US sceptics invited to Australia during the study period, Patrick Michaels and 
Robert Balling. were climatologists by training or employment (SourceH 'atch). Displaying their own 
disciplinary perspectives. economists and statisticians like [an Castle and Bjorn Lomborg have entered 
the debate with a sceptical point of vie\V. Hamilton in his book Scorcher also discusses the Austra li an 
sceptics. as docs the\\ ebsitc SourceH·arch which provides backgrounds on prominent sceptics. Tucker is 
an interesting case . The former head of CS fRO Atmospheric Research on retiring became an adviser t 
the sccrtical In stitute for Public Affairs. noted in this chapter. 
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may be quite different from that of today's specialised atmospheric and climate 
scientists. Biological scientist Peter Doherty (2009) says as much in a recent essay on 
the complexity of moden1 interdisciplinary science which collates a huge amount of 
interrelated data from various disciplines. Referring readers to the website of the 
Geological Society of America for an updated scientific view regarding climate science 
he notes: "A few old geology and meteorology practitioners, in particular, are very 
uncomfortable with this process and over-state the case that their 'historical knowledge' 
is being ignored" (Doherty, 2009, p. 9). 
Weart shows how geologists, climatologists and meteorologists come from disciplinary 
backgrounds grounded in beliefs that past or present conditions are the only valid 
predictors of weather, climate or future planetary situations. In this view, modelling data 
of an uncharted future can always be attacked as weak and unsubstantiated. These 
disciplinary backgrounds also would incline the practitioners to promote a natural 
variation explanation and reject the anthropogenic component of climate change 
phenomena. 
"Balance of Nature" and Other Beliefs 
In a previous chapter I considered the influence of beliefs-whether economic, religious 
or "techno fix"-on the climate change discourse. In regard to anthropogenic influence, 
the concept of belief appears relevant in disciplinary terms as well. 
Weart notes that, until very recently, there was an implicit belief among those studying 
earth processes, that there is a "balance of nature" that would correct any disturbances 
created by human activity. Indeed, that human activity is insignificant against the great 
planetary forces that shape and reshape our world. Calculations made since the late 
1800s by Arrhenius and others about the heat-holding significance of a 
rise in CO2 levels in the atmosphere drew arguments that there are compensating or 
balancing mechanisms such as increased cloud formation: 
These objections conformed to a vievv of the natural world that was so 
widespread that most people thought of it as plain common sense. In this view 
the way cloudiness rose or fell to stabilize temperature, or the way oceans 
maintained a fixed level of gases in the atmosphere were examples of a universal 
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principle : the Balance of Nature . Hardly anyone in1agined that hun1an actions, 
so puny among the vast natural powers , could upset the balance that governed 
the planet as a whole .... This view of nature - suprahuman, benevolent and 
inherently stable - lay deep in most human cultures. It was traditionally tied up 
with a religious faith in the God-given order of the universe. (Weart, 2003, pp. 
8-9)55 
While by the mid 20th century everyone also knew that there could be pivotal global 
changes such as ice ages- in fact the exploration of ice ages fanned the genesis of 
cli111ate change studies- the assumption was that this only happened on vast timescale 
not on human time scales, so it was believed there was no i111mediate worry about any 
potential climatic changes. Geologists were at the forefront of 111apping out the ice ages, 
which brought them into climate studies, and their basic disciplinary assu111ptions 
conformed to the so-called "uniformitarian principle"- that the present is always 
representative of the past. Ian Plimer, for example, was listed on the neo-liberal Institute 
for Public Affairs website in 2007 with a review article entitled The Past is the Key to 
the Present: Greenhouse and Jcehouse over Time (Plimer, 2007). Writes W cart: 
This [ uniformitarian] principle held that the forces that 111olded ice, rock, sea and 
air did not vary over time, or, as some put it, nothing could change otherwi se 
than the way things were seen to change in the present. The principle was 
cherished by geologists as the very foundation of their science, for how could 
you study anything scientifically unless the rules stayed the sa111e? (Weart 2003 
pp. 9-10) 
W cart and also science historian Naomi Oreskes describe tbe fascinating background to 
tbis belief. According to these researchers, it came fron1 a painful , di sputative 
disengagen1ent mnong geo logists from "catastrophist" theories of global change rooted 
in religious traditions such as Noah's flood. Given this history, geo logists were not 
about to entertain new theories of rapid, catastrophic change without a battle. At the 
55 Lynn \\.hite Jr·s I 960s seminal study The Historical Roots o_(our Ecological Crisis se t the stage for 
en\ ironmental history studies that acknowledged the ingrained Christian beliefs in western cu l lure about 
the roles or God. humans and nature. 
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same time, many scientists, like other members of society, privately retained a view that 
the world was governed by a "normal" God-given order. 56 
Normality and Consistency Frames in Climatology and Meteorology 
Beliefs in normality and consistency pervaded the related fields of climatology and 
meteorology. If one thinks about how the weather is still reported, even in a country as 
manifestly variable as Australia, it is in deviations from some hypothetical or statistical 
norm. 
Weart writes that the science of climatology has traditionally informed the exercise of 
averaging seasonal temperatures and rainfall and has been based on the belief that 
statistics of the past 100 years, since records began, could reliably predict future 
decades and that "climate" equalled a set of weather data averaged over the ups and 
downs. Principal clients were farmers and engineers who needed statistics to decide on 
crop plantings and 100 year floods. While climatologists predicted seasons, 
meteorologists were using similar means to look at the next day's weather by looking at 
the recent past. 
Thus, all three of these disciplines had developed a culture of relatively narrow, 
quantitative empiricism that viewed modelling and theorising outside the box as 
problematic territory. Meteorologist Brian Tucker, former Chief of the CSIRO Division 
of Atmospheric Research, provided scientific analyses for the sceptical Institute for 
Public Affairs as a Senior Research Fellow from the mid 1990s, emphasising 
uncertainty and caution. In a letter to this thesis project following a 2006 interview he 
wrote: "although perceptions of possible climate change depend almost entirely on 
numerical climate modelling, model results are generally accepted uncritically, with 
little cognizance given to the weaknesses inherent in model specifications, the 
mathematics used and the poor precision of model results. "5 
56 Oreskes, in a detailed analysis of the geological disputes over continental drift, writes that 
uniformitarianism was the geologists' answer to dealing with the problem of inductive (field) evidence 
and from the "eighteenth century association, particularly in England, of geology with theology in general 
and with scriptural exegesis in particular". Given this background,, sudden or dramatic change, 
'unaccounted for by the normal processes of daily geological life were all too close to miracles for most 
geologists 'comfort" (Oreskes, 1999, p. 204). 
57 Tucker and other sceptical scientists who involved themselves in the science and policy debate over 
climate change do not appear as ready to apply the same criticisms to economic modelling and its 
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In Australia, the influence of this epistemology can be seen also in the relative absence 
of the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) from the evidence I found of public discourse in 
Australia during the 1990s and the eventual ernergence of a top BOM scientific 
administrator, Bill Kininmonth, as a prominent sceptic following his retire1nent. John 
Zillman, Director of BOM from 1978 to 2003 was engaged with climate science policy 
advice to government but the record indicates this was mainly confined to acting 
through the processes of the World Meteorological Organisation and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). His perspective can perhaps be 
gauged from how he communicates, with an example. His cautious public stance may 
reflect the ambivalence of climatologists and meteorologists when faced with 
reconciling evidence on the ground and modelling data. He was described as "quite 
conservative" about cli1nate science in a detailed 2004 article on the Australian sceptics 
and the Lavoisier Group (Fyfe, 2004). The article quotes him as saying he is now 
convinced of the mainstream science of climate change and human agency, although he 
would not have been "10 years ago"- i.e. in the mid 1990s. 
ill man discussed his views in the internal j oumal of the Australian Acaden1 y of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE). According to Beder (1989) engineer 
and their technological colleagues also enjoy a subculture and related technocrat1c 
world views. This manifests as caution and a preference for the conventional role of 
scientists removed from the communication role to the general public. In 2006, Zill111an 
wrote in an A TSE focus article that "very strident statements" by the climate scientists 
and policy-1nakers who met at the pivotal meeting in Villach, Austria in 1985 (and 
advised the world that govem1nents needed to act) necessitated the fon11ation of the 
(IPCC) through the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations to 
provide a balanced review of the extant data. He also wrote that the media can violently 
111i sreprcsent the IPCC 's findings and credibility. The scientists' role is to avoid even 
subtle rni srepresentations of their findings- presumably by avoiding public 
interpretation wherever possible (Zillman, 2006). 
i nhercnl. normati \ e assumpt ions. Thus. in a criti ca l pi ece \Vf i tten fo r the [nstitute for Publi c Affairs (IP A ) 
Tucker quo ted at length fro m an economic analys is produced fo r th e Elec tricity Suppl y Assoc iati on of 
\ ustra lia in August 1994. Th is analys is predi cted 50 and 60 percent increases in energy pri ces and the 
elim inatio n of the aluminium industry if the 1990 interi m nati onal emi ss ion reducti on target of a return t 
1988 le\ els by the year 2000 and further reducti ons we nt ahead. \Vhile this eco nomi c modelling was 
accepted at face \·aluc. Tucker's view was that cli ma te sc ience based on modelling was un certa in , and in 
any case any impr1cts \\·ou ld occur slowly over centuri es and that the poli cy response verged on pani c-
much in line with \\' eart' s discip linary descriptions (Tucker. 1994 ,. 
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Scepticism about Human Agency Consistent with Disciplinary Beliefs 
Zillman's former colleague Bill Kininmonth became active after his retirement in 1998 
promoting the view that climate change is a purely natural variation that takes place 
over long time spans and that human impact is minimal. This is consistent with the 
understanding for some climatologists, meteorologists and geologists that past cycles 
always inform the present. Kininmonth told ABC science program Catalyst in 2005 
that: 
the science underpinning the greenhouse scenario is flawed. The computer 
models are at a rudimentary state of development. The actual science of climate 
would suggest that we are near the peak of global warming and that the prospect 
is in fact, in the longer term we 're talking now thousands, to tens of thousand of 
years, is a gradual cooling. (Horstman, 2005) 
On the same program, atmospheric scientist Graeme Pea1man, who has communicated 
risk messages to the public since the 1980s retorted: "I think it's rubbish. I think he's 
not an expert, he hasn't tested his ideas in the open literature, that's what scientists have 
to do" (Horstman, 2005). 
Like other sceptics in retirement from active science, Kininmonth has "found fame in 
the twilight of his career", according to Fyfe (2004 ), who noted he has been promoted 
by the climate-science antagonist Lavoisier Group in Australia. He was named as a 
Science Adviser, along with Australian geologist Bob Carter, at the US Science and 
Public Policy Institute. British professional sceptic (Lord) Christopher Monckton has 
been the Chief Policy Adviser for this neo-liberal think tank dedicated to "sound science 
including climate scepticism" (Science and public policy institute, about). 58 
Emeritus Professor Garth Paltridge is one of the few atmospheric physicists active on 
the Australian sceptic scene. He had been based in Tasmania as the Director of the 
Institute of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies until his retirement in 2002. His 
58When Kininmonth 's book denying anthropogenic climate change was launched by the Lavoisier Group 
in 2004, Zillman agreed to launch it and then gave a remarkable speech supporting freedom of debate but 
criticising Kininmonth 's assistance to those who denied the anthropogenic influence when the 
preponderance of the evidence now pointed to it (Zillman, 2004). 
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emeritus age demographic is common amongst Australian public sceptics. He advances 
a frequent complaint 111ade by these critics- rejecting the science populari sa tion and 
policy dual role of the IPCC: 
Revamped IPCC scientific reports have appeared with much fanfare every few 
years since 1991. Each of them is accompanied by a "Su111111ary for Policy 
Makers" which is the only thing read by 99.9 per cent of those concerned with 
the matter. It is the real determinant of public and political opinion on the 
greenhouse issue. It is also that part of the report whose wording is more-or-les 
beyond the direct influence of the average scientist. 
Each of the successive summaries has been phrased in such a way as to appear a 
little more certain than the last that greenhouse wanning is a potential disaster 
for mankind. The increasing verbal certainty does not derive from any advances 
in the science. Rather, it is a function of how strongly a staternent about global 
warming can be put without inviting a significant backlash fron1 the general 
scientific co111munity. Over the years, the opinion of that community has been 
manipulated into more-or-less passive support by a deliberate campaign to 
isolate - and indeed to denigrate - the scientific sceptics outside the central 
activity of the IPCC. The audience has been actively conditioned into being 
receptive. It has thereby become gradually easier to sell the proposition of 
greenhouse disaster. (Paltridge, 2004, p.14) 
Like other co111111entators on various sides of this issue, Paltridge overlooks or does not 
acknowledge the early communication framing: the strong and direct language of the 
first, 1990, IPCC report. He thereby makes a case that is not based on all the available 
evidence. 
ATTACKS ON ENVIRONMENT AL SCIENCE AI\1D TARGETED SCEPTICISM 
While it is argued that disciplinary di fferences have pre-disposed some scjenti sts t 
sceptical and debating stance in the public di scourse on climate change, the evidence 
sho\vs there has also been a more targeted attack on climate science, an d environmental 
science generally. c01ning from certain political an d corporate interests during the 
period of interest of this study. Sarne of these attacks have publicly involved sceptical 
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scientists. At the same time, in the US in particular, there is evidence of political 
interference and political attacks on scientists and their data, see Box 1, hockey stick 
case in chapter 2, for a prominent example. 
In March 2004 the US Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) published an "open letter" 
called Scientific Integrity in Policymaking signed by 62 prominent scientists, including 
Nobel laureates, and heads of federal agencies and universities (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2004). According to the UCS website, around that time another 5000 
scientists signed a similar statement (by 2010, 12,000 scientists are said to have signed 
this document). The letter said that the Bush administration in the US (2001-2009) 
encouraged systematic interference and misrepresentation of findings, including those 
on climate change, and that this compromised the integrity of science communication. 
The letter spoke of "consistent misrepresentation of the findings from the National 
Academy of Sciences, government agencies and the expert community at large". The 
UCS also asserted this misrepresentation was accompanied by "disreputable and fringe 
science reports and [by] preventing informed discussion on the issue" (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 2004). 
A 2007 survey of working government scientists in the US supported these findings 
with personal testimony. 59 There are documented complaints about government reports 
being shelved, conclusions being altered or deleted, political operatives second-guessing 
scientists and cases of scientists being harassed by Congressional committees. The 
survey found that more than 40% of respondents reported pressure to eliminate words 
like "climate change" and edit reports to change their meaning. Other practices found in 
this US survey included: not issuing press releases, changing press releases by injecting 
uncertainty or making communication so bland or technical that nobody would give it a 
second glance. (Atmosphere of Pressure, 2007) 
There is not a similar body of evidence of this level of interference in Australia. But a 
dampening effect on communication can be assumed given charges of government 
scientists being "muzzled"' from 1996 when the Coalition came to power federally 
(Cohen, 2006; Pockley, 2006; Hamilton & Maddison, 2007) and given the closely allied 
59 Atmosphere of Pressure: Political Interference in Federal Climate Science report was published by two 
non-government agencies: the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and Union of Concerned 
Scientists (USC). The UCS and GAP surveyed almost 300 scientists, carried out 40 interviews and 
searched thousands of agency documents (Atmosphere of Pressure, 2007). 
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political and economic vievvs of Australia and the US through the latter part of th 
l 990s and early 2000s. Thus a pro111inent science co111municator from the 1 990s 
described what the Howard Coalition government signalled to public science a·genc1es: 
"Scientists were told you don ' t say anything that might emba1Tass the govem111ent or the 
minister." He said control was also exercised through the increasing en1phasis on 
commercialisation within the CSIRO and a de-emphasis through budget cuts on public 
interest science agencies such as Atmospheric Research and Wildlife and Ecology. 
"These divisions were the target for political pressure during the 10 years of the 
Coalition .... with the extraordinary notion that scientists have nothing to do with policy 
in these areas of climate and natural resources" (thesis interview, June, 2006). 
The larger context is the considerable body of docu111entation, largely outside the 
academic journals, about what some call a "war" on environmental science that started 
in the United States during the 1970s and, coinciding with the 30 year neo-liberal 
experiment started under President Ronald Reagan in the US , which gained traction in 
Australia during this period (Ehrlich, 1998; Beder, 2000; Mooney, 2005). The neo-
liberal perspective on environ111ent is related to the value structures and beliefs outlined 
under "war of ideas" in chapter 6. 60 
Links between Sceptic Books and Neo-Liberal Think Tanks 
So111e sceptic scientists with epistemological grounds for questioning the cli111ate 
research methods , have joined, or been recruited by, neo-liberal think tanks such as the 
IPA or the Lavoisier Group in Australia and others in the US. Neo-liberal criticism of 
climate change science is consistent with the ideology's coolness towards 
environ111entalis111 and antipathy to public interest science and policy generally, 
consistent w ith the 111arket and private sector fundai11entalis111 that marks this economic 
philosophy (Beder, 2000; Mooney, 2005). 
In 2008, a trio of US social and political scientists published a study that quantified th e 
links between scientific climate change sceptics and neo-liberal think tanks (Jacques 
Dunlap & Freeman, 2008). Given the background we have just looked at in most cases 
there is no evidence to believe that, for the scienti sts involved, links to think tanks hav 
Before anthropogenic climate change became a debate. an earlier and simi lar science and societ 
\\ rangle was the l 0 year battle from the mid I 970s over accepting human responsibility for the hole in the 
o;:onc layer (I. Lo\,·e. thesis interview. April 2007). 
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been anything but sincere outlets for their arguments or to stem the information deficit 
from their point of view. Other authors have argued that some scientists have been 
exploited and used as public relations voices or were cynically taking payment for their 
views (Beder, 2000; Rampton & Stauber, 2002; Mooney, 2005). Jacques et al. found 
that more than 92 percent of sceptical books published in the US were linked to 
conservative/neo-liberal think tanks and that 90 per cent of conservative think tanks 
interested in environmental issues take a sceptical stance to the evidence. Jacques et al. 
found that the framing by sceptics of themselves versus the science was often not 
neutral: 
Environmental scepticism is an elite-driven reaction to global environmentalism, 
organised by core actors within the conservative movement. Promoting 
scepticism is a key tactic of the anti-environmental counter movement 
coordinated by conservative think tanks (CTTs ), designed specifically to 
undermine the environmental movement's efforts to legitimise its claims via 
science. 
Thus, the notion that environmental sceptics are unbiased analysts exposing the 
myths and scare tactics employed by those they label practitioners of 'junk 
science' lacks credibility. Similarly the self-portrayal of sceptics as marginalised 
'Davids' battling the powerful 'Goliath' of environmentalists and environmental 
scientists is a charade, as sceptics are supported by politically powerful CTTs 
funded by wealthy foundations and corporations (Jacques et al., 2008, p. 364) 
The evidence explored for this thesis supports the proposition that there is a close 
ideological affinity between free-market, neo-liberal North American (including 
Canadian) think tanks and those in Australia like the Institute for Public Affairs (IP A) 
which receives considerable funding from the resource sector (Beder, 2000; Pearse, 
2007) and also the Lavoisier Group-the latter established specifically, under the lead 
of mining sector representatives, to counter climate change science (About the 
Lavoisier Group). The ideas from these think tanks have been amplified by media, 
particularly by the News Limited media led by The Australian as shown in the previous 
chapter. Rhetoric and frames on think tank-related websites and in newspaper columns 
have charged climate scientists with self-serving agendas and motives but with little or 
no corroborating evidence. The Brown Congressional enquiry reviewed later in this 
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chapter compiled a list of common fran1es and strategies. In an early 2000s Australian 
examp le , the editor of the IPA Review Mike Nahan editorialised in an article entitled 
""The Demise of Science": 
Why have so many scientists succumbed to being myth-makers? One answer is 
money. Shock and horror not only sells newspapers and generates donations for 
NGOs, it also generates funding for research. And as Professor Bob Carter 
discusses in "Science is Not Consensus" (pages 11-13) changes to the funding of 
science in recent years have increased the incentive for scientists to join in the 
doom and gloom. (N ahan, 2003) 
Aids to Uncertainty and Inaction 
New Scientist reported that the same techniques which arguably distorted the public 
discourse in Australia and the US during the 1990s were still operational in Britain in 
the 2000s, featuring familiar global mentors. In an editorial "Still in a mess over cl in1atc 
change" (2006), the science magazine echoed what some environn1ental groups and 
investigators have reported from the 1990s on (e.g. Greenpeace's Exxonsecrets at 
www.greenpeace.org); Mooney, 2005; Gelbspan, 2004; Beder, 2000) about the oil 
company Exxon Mobil's long-standing and extensive funding of lobby groups, think 
tanks and individuals that, the science magazine said, misinform the public on climate 
change. 
Ne1vv Scientist reported charges against Exxon Mobil stem1ned fron1 no less than the 
Royal Society in London which sent "a 1neasured complaint" to the oil company about 
these practices, only to be ignored. New Scientist fumed that such arrogance toward 
one of the world's oldest scientific institutions "seems to rival their contempt for good 
science itself' (Still in a 111ess, 2006, p.5). Nevv Scientist drew a picture of public 
discourse in Britain in the 1nid-2000s beset by familiar public relations and propaganda 
tactics of so\ving confusion recognizable as the "big lie" or "name calling" techniques. 
vidence for the corporate strategy of using scepbcal scientists to sow uncertainty into 
the public discourse surfaced in the Australian media in 2007 and involved cxxon 
ivJobilc. Follo\ving the release of the fourth IPCC assessment the :)vanev JVJor11111 
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Herald revealed in a page one report that Exxon was offering $10,000 to scientists to 
dispute the IPCC findings (Bribes for experts, 2007). 
Calling the global scientific consensus a "debate" has been one of the most familiar 
rhetorical framing devices of the past 10 years. A recognisable propaganda technique 
involves distortion or misuse of a commonly understood concept to engender negative 
emotional reactions in an audience. Decrying those who want to "shut down debate" or 
"politicise the science", or are said to merely seek self-advancement/research funding if 
they speak publicly, have been frequent examples. Lack of "sound science" has been 
another recognisable frame along with the one about misleading the public with 
"scaremongering". A review of public discourse and framing, particularly through the 
mass media, and even a cursory look at the blogosphere, leads to the conclusion that 
such negative labelling techniques are not confined to anti-climate science activists but 
have polluted public debate on a wide front, arguably leading to more public 
disengagement and confusion. 
A Recipe for Confusion 
In the mid- l 990s a US Congressional Committee investigated-charges of biased 
science, made by conservative members of Congress (Brown, 1996.) The resulting 
report- Environmental Science under Siege, Fringe Science and the 104th Congress-
documented attacks against climate scientists and others working with environmental 
and public health regulations. The Congressmen who made the allegations and the 
sceptic scientists they called to testify alleged that environmental scientists couldn't be 
trusted. The Committee found there was no basis to this and made a useful summary of 
how science communication has been confused as a result of attempts to discredit the 
scientists. 
They said strategies used by sceptical individuals and organisations included: abusing 
the goodwill of democratic and scientific practice by diverting time and attention to the 
views of a few dissenting scientists; launching sceptical attacks that consistently mix 
scientific data, opinion and policy advice while mainstream scientists do not have this 
luxury; dismissing or misusing scientific conventions including peer review, consensus 
and uncertainty. The committee identified a recipe for confused public discourse and 
inaction that can erode public trust in science. In the 10 years since, the discourse 
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indicates that not just climate scientists but aspects of science itself has arguably con1e 
under siege as a narrative of mistrust is elaborated- but this is beyond the scope of the 
present enquiry. 
A year after the Brown report, a concerted attack on environmentalists and climate 
change science appeared on mainstream British TV on Ch4 and was repeated by the 
ABC in Australia in 1998. The 1997 two-hour Against Nature video program directed 
by Martin Durkin, 1nade good use of a number of familiar media techniques including: 
opinions from alleged "expert" scientists without background context on who these 
people are and failing to mention the larger context or balance of evidence- the IP 
international scientific reviews. 
One of the experts interviewed, Dr S. Fred Singer, a retired US space physicist and 
science administrator, has been characterised as a consultant/career sceptic who aided 
the battle to deny industrial responsibility for ozone depletion before moving on to 
anthropogenic climate change. As such he is a good example of a professional 
contrarian. He is one of the leading US sceptics who were invited to present their views 
on climate change in Australia during the 1nid to late 1990s, sponsored by conservative 
free-market think tanks but also by the CSIRO (Beder, 1997). During the latter part of 
his career he did not publish his critiques in the peer-reviewed literature, a co111mon 
hallmark of retired sceptics. 
In the 1990s, Exxon Mobile supported Singer ' s policy research group and he first 
ean1ed his "sceptic" tag by appearing as an expert for the tobacco industry in a contest 
that honed many of the public relations and communication strategies still used by 
corporations today. The tobacco ca1npaign popularised the phrase "junk science" which 
subsequently has been used by both sides to discredit opposing views . The tobacco 
cainpaign also popularised the use of scientific experts rather than corporate 
spokespeople to make the industry ' s case (Ra1npton & Stauber, 2002 ; Beder, J 997). 01 
The UK 's Independent Television Comn1issio11 subsequently found that A£ains! Natur 
\Vas 1ni s lcading and disto1ied interview infonnation. edia enquiries at the time found 
"Singer ,,·as also a lead author of the high ly criti cised but effecti ve Leibzig Declarati on on Global 
lirnate Change that showcased dissenti ng opini ons (Beder. 1997. p.238,. 
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that while the script echoed extreme conservative arguments against environmentalists, 
the program's director describes himself as a Marxist. The rhetoric was that of a small 
far-left group, the Revolutionary Communist Party, which also had links to several of 
the featured "experts". This group believes that sustainability or environmental concerns 
are conspiracies against progress for Third World people. (Monbiot, 1997). It seems the 
attacks on environmental science come into the public arena from various directions 
within western society. 
A followup program called The Great Global Warming Swindle was made by the same 
director and UK Channel 4, yielding similar complaints about distortions and 
inaccuracies of the science, found to be valid complaints by the British broadcasting 
regulator (Cubby, 2008). In July 2008 the program was controversially shown on ABC 
television in Australia and received a large audience. The slick packaging, persuasive 
images and "experts" with science labels, led to anecdotal responses that this program 
successfully created public confusion or uncertainty. 
British journalist George Monbiot was asked in 1997 after the first Against Nature 
program how ideas like the ones showcased in that program could receive a three hour 
prime time television slot. His analysis was that: 
Many television executives hate environmentalism. They see it as a grim 
memento mori at the bottom of the pictures, spoiling the good news about cars, 
clothes and consumerism. So when the film-makers suggested an all-out assault 
on environmentalists, their proposal fell on fertile ground. (Monbiot, 1997, p. l) 
CONCLUSION 
This exploration of disciplinary differences and climate change scepticism offers some 
reasons for why and how some disciplines appear to have spawned more sceptics than 
others. For geologists, meteorologists and climatologists it can be largely a matter of 
their training and a perspective on research that relies on the past always predicting the 
future. The unprecedented nature of human effects on the planet, would clearly have 
posed a novel challenge in these disciplines. This may be a generational phenomenon, 
less prevalent in newer ranks, but this thesis has not explored that aspect. 
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Sceptic scientists from these disciplines have played an important role in creating 
uncertainty in the Australian public discourse during the study period. Science.history 
offers useful evidence as to why geologists, prominent amongst Australian sceptics, 
may be particularly prone to challenge the mainstream climate change scientific 
methods that rely on modelling future events. However, it is not only disciplinary 
differences that have influenced and confused the public understanding. This chapter 
shows how institutional support for sceptic voices can frame the discourse and I explore 
some of the techniques regularly e111ployed to do so. Evidence from the United States 
adds the element of deliberate communication barriers being placed in the way of 
mainstream government climate scientists and, at a less overt level, this may have 
happened in Australia as well. 
Surveying the tactics used by sceptic scientists in the public arena led to a revealing 
summary by a US Congressional Co111mittee in the later study period of ways in which 
n1ainstream climate scientists have been at a disadvantage in public con1munication 
despite their 99-1 advantage in global numbers and consensus. I have shown that 
Australia's discourse has been actively addressed by sceptical scientists- usually non-
specialists in climate change research- who fail to adhere to the same communication 
rules as the 111ainstream ( e.g. by neglecting peer review while actively offering 
opinions). 
The effectiveness of fostering unce1iainty is indicated when this con1munication activity 
is shown to correlate with public confusion and official inaction fro111 the mid to the 
later 1990s and beyond. One can further suggest from these events that in the public 
mind one scientist may be much the same as the next, an in1pression fostered by the 
n1edia. 




IN SEARCH OF CERTAINTY AND APPLYING UNCERTAINTY-EFFECTS 
ON THE CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE 
"Since the early 1990s, the fossil fuel lobby has mounted an extremely effective 
campaign of deception and disinformation designed to persuade policymakers, the 
press, and the public that the issue of climate change is stuck in scientific uncertainty. }} 
Gelbspan, 2004, p. 40 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks in greater depth at the theme "certainty/uncertainty" identified in 
earlier chapters as a key framing strategy both deliberate and incidental in the public 
discourse. Because this framing is so central to expressions of public understanding, a 
more in-depth exploration of it as well as some science history context can make a 
useful contribution to understanding communication of climate change and ether 
controversial environmental science. 
The significant role played by the scientific communication of certainty in the early 
adoption by Australians of greenhouse public knowledge was summarised by 
Henderson-Sellers in 1993 as follows: 
Clear statements of scientific confidence in the greenhouse phenomenon in the 
mid-l 980s prompted demands for policy, and hence for policy awareness. In 
Australia, as in many other countries, public and political awareness of the 
possibility of greenhouse-induced climate change increased. (Henderson-Sellers, 
1993 , abstract) 
This and other evidence from that period discussed in chapter 4 indicates that scientists 
and journalists and policy-makers expressed "certainty" in the early 1990s and that this 
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vvas a key driver in the political and public understanding exhibited between 1987 and 
1992. The evidence presented in earlier chapters suggests that the language of scientifi 
certainty/uncertainty not only changed, but that uncertainty was also delibcratc'ly 
constructed to throw doubt on the scientific conclusions. 
This was so not only in Australia but also globally. In the United States, whose clin1ate 
change "science and society" discussions closely resembled those in Australia 
atmospheric scientist James Hansen (who has spoken out about the risks of 
anthropogenic climate change over the course of two decades) addressed the US 
Congress in 1988. He said he was 99% certain that global wanning had begun, based on 
the series of warm years in the 1980s (White, 1990). "The public took notice. His 
opinion prompted Congress to consider whether the prudent course was to move rapidly 
to legislation aimed at preserving the habitability of the planet fro111 catastrophic 
consequences" (White, 1990, p. 22). I emphasize legislation in this quote because it is 
indicative of the times, when regulation on behalf of risk containment was not 
considered out of bounds. 
BACKGROUND 
In his co111prehensive review of the arc of US climate change public communication up 
to 111id-l 990, Robert M. White, then President of the US National Acade111y of 
Engineering, recounts that internationally, political leaders took action between 1988 
and 1990 based on the certainty of scientists' language and also thanks to the drought at 
the time that greatly focused attention. White's own reaction was caution about 
accepting the science, nevertheless he presents a broad account of the issues and 
influences at that time. After the politicians got on board with the climate science, the 
counter-framing started. White recounts how sceptics in the sc ientific com,nunity joined 
open debate in the pages of Science on the certainty and validity of climate sc ience 
(vVhite, 1990, p. 22). 
He 111akcs clear that public knowledge at the ti111c acknowledged that the cnerg 
econo1nv of current civilization ,vas the issue along with land and ,;vater use and the 
effects of population increase. Interestingly, while syn1pathetic to the sceptics. he had 
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no quarrel with the concept of human agency, saying that this understanding has deep 
historical roots within science. He also describes intervention in the policy process by 
advocates of uncertainty in the form of sceptics Richard Lindzen and Frederick Seitz, 
who, together with a long-range weather forecasting expert and several other scientists, 
wrote to President George H. W. Bush questioning the science and urging research 
rather than action. "Thus the great climate debate had been joined" (White, 1990, p. 22). 
Previous studies on scientific certainty on this topic are also enlightening with 
particularly relevant work from US science historian Naomi Oreskes. In a 2004 study 
she tested the argument that behind the conventional scientific language, couched in 
degrees of certainty or uncertainty, there is no consensus in the published literature on 
the occurrence of anthropogenic climate change. Oreskes showed this is not so. She 
pointed out that not only the peer reviews conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) but major scientific bodies and professional societies in the US 
including the national Academy of Sciences, have issued statements that the evidence is 
compelling for the understanding that humans are warming the planet and she showed 
that there is no large body of dissenting opinion. 
Oreskes62 analysed 928 abstracts published in the refereed literature between 1993 and 
2003, listed in the ISI database with the keywords "global climate change". She found 
no disagreement on the existence of this phenomenon: 
... scientists publishing in the peer-reviewed literature agree with the IPCC, the 
National Acaden1y of Sciences, and the public statements of their professional 
societies .... Politicians, economists, journalists and others may have the 
impression of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but 
that impression is incorrect. (Oreskes, 2004, p. 1) 
Five years later, in 2009, a survey published by Peter Doran and Maggie Zimmerman of 
Earth and Environmental Sciences at the University of Illinois came to a similar 
62 Oreskes told a reporter she decided to test the consensus after her hairdresser said she wasn 't worried 
about global warming because scientists "don ' t know what's going on". 
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conclusion as Oreskes. They canvassed more than 10,000 eaiih scientists and received 
responses from 3146. Of these more than 97% of the specialists on the subject (i.e. 
"respondents who listed climate science as their area of expertise and who also· hav 
published more than 50% of their recent peer-reviewed papers on the subject of cli rnat 
change") agree that hurnan activity is "a significant contributing factor in changing 
mean global temperatures" (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). 
They state in conclusion: "It seems that the debate on the authenticity of global 
warming and the role played by human activity is largely nonexistent among those who 
understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term clin1ate processes" (Doran & 
Zimmerman, 2009, p. 23). Relevant to the discussion in the previous chapter about the 
epistemic values of some geologists and 1neteorologists, they found that these two fields 
had the lowest "yes" response to the question about whether human impact is changing 
mean global temperature ( 4 7% and 64% respectively compared with 82% for the group 
as a whole.) 
Oreskes (2004a) also addressed the related issue of a demand for "proof' in the climate 
change discourse: arising both from a misunderstanding of scientific conventions and 
the deliberate deployment of uncertainty by climate change contrarians of various 
persuasions. Referring to the societal defenders of the economic status quo and their 
attack on environmental science in general, Oreskes notes that mitigation of 
environmental impacts inevitably raises costs for some sectors who seek to influence 
the policy process against any such actions. Demanding proof of environmental impact 
has long been a convenient stalling mechanisn1. Thus: 
.... informed defenders of the status quo ... argue that the scientific infonnation 
pertinent to an environmental claim is uncertain, unreliable, and fundamentally 
unproven. Lack of proof is then used to deny demands for action. But ..... in all 
but the most trivial cases, science does not produce logically indisputable proofs 
about the natural ,vorld. (Oreskes, 2004a, p. 369 
.ccording to Oreskes (2004a) the historical record shows that no 1najor scientific 
paradign1 shifts in understanding on hov,1 the planet works (e.g. the once radical and 
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contested evidence for continental drift or ice ages) have waited for absolute proof. 
Against that science history context, one can ask whether the contemporary desire for an 
ideal relationship between science and policy based on incontrovertible proof or "the 
truth" may be influenced by the normative structures of economics, a discipline that has 
yielded a good crop of sceptics on climate change. Normative assumptions and beliefs 
are not based on empirical data but tell us how the world should operate. Practitioners 
can therefore make or expect absolute pronouncements. 
From the same paper (Oreskes, 2004a), contemporary climate change discourse can be 
compared to the story of what happened with marine biologist Rachel Carson and her 
seminal 1962 popular science book Silent Spring. That research and book were about 
the effect of pesticides on biological systems including humans. The book was credited 
with giving the public a first-time understanding of the potentially disruptive effects 
when synthetic chemicals enter the environment and about environmental pollution 
generally. But not before Carson was pilloried (an onslaught that is still a staple of 
contrarian websites) for relying on case studies rather than on the certainties of 
statistical evidence, notwithstanding the book was aimed at the popular 1narket. She was 
also charged with engendering fear (therefore charged as being emotional and 
unscientific) about the consequences if humans continued down a reckless path vis a vis 
the natural environment. 
This classic case of science history highlights the difficulties that continue to face many 
environmental scientists dealing with complex and evolving systems within a 
reductionist scientific culture that does not recognise evidence unless it is counted and 
1neasured. Parallels can be drawn with climate change where measurable evidence lags 
behind modelling and proxy data, leaving the door open to disciplinary arguments about 
certainty. Indeed, scientists interviewed for this investigation point to the demands for 
measurable evidence in both the ozone depletion research of the 1970s and more 
recently with climate change - in both cases encouraging years of delay to effective 
action ( e.g. I. Lowe, thesis interview, April 2007). 
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On the other hand, the tenor of the support Rachel Carson gained fro1n a 196 ..... 
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) review (under President John F. 
Kennedy), is also very instructive. 
Oreskes describes this review as notable for its brevity and clarity (good 
communications). It acknowledged the trade-offs of all human activities, but concluded 
on balance that more harm than good might be the long-term outcome of pesticides for 
plants and animals including humans. "PSAC never claimed that the hazards of 
persistent pesticides were 'proven', 'demonstrated', 'certain', or even well understood; 
they simply concluded that the available data were adequate to show that harms were 
occurring, warranting changes in the pattern of pesticide use ... " (Oreskes 2004a, p. 
374). The panel took seriously suggestions for alternative technologies; did not accuse 
Carson of hidden agendas; and did not use uncertainty as a justification for inaction. 
Perhaps most significantly-compared to discourses of recent decades and the study 
period which are quite different-the PSAC placed the burden of proof and certainty 
not on the public interest scientists but on the emitters or polluters, in this case, those 
who argued that persistent pesticides were safe. The climate change analogy is that 
those who argue that humans are not having an i1npact would face the burden of proof. 
This perspective is recognizable in the aims of the ecologically sustainable development 
process 1ninted internationally with the Brundtland Report in the late 1980s and initiated 
in Australia during the Hawke federal Labor government (Hawke, 1989). 
Equally relevant is the way Oreskes characterises the scientists who attacked Larson 
and her ·work in the 1960s. Carson's opposition came principally fron1 industries that 
1nade or relied on environmental chen1icals including the food industry and their related 
scientists . Allowing that n1any had ties to the pesticide industry, Oreskes argues that 
n1any also had other "episte1nic" interests (systemic beliefs and values). Recognizable 
as a constructivist analysis, she writes: "All debates involve underlying co111mitments 
and clarity requires addressing those commitments .... Many of Carson's critics were 
food scientists dedicated to a large and inexpensive food supply ... they \1/ere not 
ashamed to Yalue im1nediatc human concerns over long-ten11 ecological concerns" 
(Oreskes. 2004a, p. 3 76) . Si1nilarly .. so1ne of the more aggressive but persuasive 
argun1ents for de1nanding proof and certainty from cl i1nate change science have come 
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from people committed to equity and "progress" for developing societies through fossil 
fuel energy technologies. 
HOW SCIENTISTS' LANGUAGE CONTRIBUTES TO "UNCERTAINTY" 
Looking back throughout the study period, observers interviewed for this thesis had 
gained the impression that many specialist climate change scientists retained the basic 
scientific convention of cautious communication. Journalists were not the only ones to 
comment on this. It was noted as early as 1989 that there was a disjunct between 
scientific and public understanding when percentage uncertainties were cited. 
Climatologist Ann Henderson-Sellers told a reporter that: 
There was a big furore in the USA during the past year when a scientist told a 
Senate enquiry, he was 99 percent sure that the Greenhouse Effect was with us 
now. Unfortunately, a number of my colleagues disagreed with him because 
they're only 95 per cent sure, and the media had fun with that. Yet when I 
surveyed a number of people about what level of confidence they wanted from 
the scientific community- before they'd start planning for the future- the 
answer was 50 per cent. (McKenzie, 1989, p. 34) 
In 1997, Canadian researcher Henry Hengeveld examined the contribution of scientists' 
own style of communication in promoting the confused public discourse that had taken 
hold by the mid 1990s and has continued. ·He reviewed 885 papers published on climate 
change in 1994-95 and noted the effects on policy. He wrote: 
Although misinformation spread by self-interest groups is a factor, the scientific 
community has been ineffective in communicating its information and concerns 
in a manner useful and comprehensible to lay audiences. Furthermore, when 
advising politicians, the scientific community has devoted considerable attention 
to uncertainties, and has sought to adopt a position of "objective neutrality" that 
has allowed advocacy groups with vested interests to dominate the advice on 
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options for policy response. Some authors have sugges ted that sc ienti sts should 
take a more proactive role as policy advisors, while in Australia pretty \ve ll the 
opposite happened over the 1990s. (Hengeveld, C!i,nate Chang 
1997, p.21) 
wsletter, - , 
The Age journalist Geoff Strong said he has pondered why it has taken so long for the 
scientific messages about climate change to push through to real action. One problem he 
highlighted is that the scientific definition of certainty sounds like equivocation to the 
general public and to their elected and often scientifically ignorant representatives 
(Strong, thesis interview, July, 2007). Elsewhere Strong notes that he was reporting on 
the greenhouse pheno1nenon 20 years ago and that scientists emphasised the 
unce1iainties even then, and continued to do so during subsequent years. He says they 
wrote in terms like: 
Well we are not 100 per cent certain but . .. in science-speak, that means they 
could have been 95 to 99 per cent certain but were leaving the 1 per cent 1nargin 
for error in case somebody ripped them apart in a scientific paper ... The 
world's greatest ga1nblers , the insurance industry, didn 't need that level of 
certainty. It had been banking on scenarios being right since at least 199 5. 
63 (Strong, 2005, p. l) 
Reflecting on the co1nmunication framing by the 1nid 1990s, CSIRO Divis ion of 
Atmospheric Science adviser and communicator Willem Bouma told Strong that in 
hindsight perhaps scientists should have worded their predictions di fferently an d 
conveyed rnore certainty because two decades have been lost. Strong amplified thi 
senti1nent thus: "By appearing uncertain, they might have protected their backsides, but 
allo\ved a \Yholc army of vested interest groups such as the fossil-fuel lobby and ri ght-
\Ving think tanks to attempt to lever apart the argument and create 20 years of dela ,, 
(Strong, 2005, p2). 
"; This article by Geoff Strong found its way \·ia the internet to a climate change blog - desmogblog.com 
( .. \\c·re here to clear the PR pollution that clouds the science on climate change .. ). The \\Titer. Jim 
Hoggan. contrasts Strong·s article to the CS Cape Cod Times for 30 Oct, 2005 which. he says, provides a 
perfect example of\\ h: c Ii mate change deniers are sti 11 in there \\·ith a fighting chance. The Times lauds a 
climatologist for perfect integrit::, .. the absolute insistence on total scientific certainty ..... (desmogblog 
.com 200.5) 
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It is arguable that the later retreat from the active and definite language in 
communication that characterised the early study period simply removed an atypical 
anomaly fro1n scientific communication and that the highlighting of uncertainties 
signalled a return to more comfortable communication for many scientists. On the other 
hand, reviewing the evidence from 1992 on, it also must be considered whether there 
was a deliberate element to this retreat into convention: defence against an increasingly 
hostile ideological environment. 
This enquiry has found evidence in the early study period that when the language of 
scientists and journalists was couched without uncertainty caveats, clear scientific 
1nessages can be identified in correlation with government policy action to a remarkable 
degree. This enquiry also found that political leadership, values and ideology and media 
agreement and co-agenda setting, all played significant roles in that consensus, as 
presented in earlier chapters. 
The evidence from government, business and other public documents , and several 
hundred popular news articles from the whole study period show clearly that a certainty 
of language framed the discussion about climate change in the early period and was 
absent later - leading over time to impressions of debate and uncertainty. Three 
exa1nples illustrate how the language expressed certainty: IPCC report, sample 
newspaper article and government document. 
PUBLIC LANGUAGE OF CERTAINTY AND EARLY ACTION 
The 1990 IPCC Report 
Research for this thesis analysed the first, 1990, IPCC report (Houghton, Jenkins & 
Ephraums, 1990) that has been all but forgotten in conte1nporary discussion of the IPCC 
assessments delivered to national governments. Two things stand out from the 1990 
report in comparison to the 1995 and 2001 reports. Firstly, it provides confirmation that 
the basic science findings and impacts hardly changed over the study period. Secondly, 
the communications style and language did change markedly in later reports- to a 
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language of greater uncertainty and, stylistically, reverting to disciplinary jargon and 
technical detai 1. 
The 1990 report is in fact characterised by a notable level of "plain English". The 
scientific assessn1ent repoti executive summary starts: [my emphasis in italics] 
We are certain of the following : 
There is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the Earth warmer than 
it would otherwise be. 
Emissions resulting fro,n human activity are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide. methane 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. These increases will enhance th 
greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth -s 
surface. The main greenhouse gas, water vapour, will increase in response to 
global warming and further enhance it. 
We calculate ·with confidence that: 
inter alia 
Continued emissions at present rates of long-lived gases carbon dioxide. nitrous 
oxide and CFCs will commit the Earth to increased atmospheric concentrations 
for centuries ahead. 
[I111pacts] Under a business as usual scenario a global mean temperature increase 
o_{ahout 0,3 degrees C p er decade \Vith an uncertainty range of 0.2- 0.5 degree 
C- this is greater than that seen over the past 1 0.00u years. ith contr 
under different scenarios. the rates of increase could drop by 1/2 or 2/3. 
The authors admit many uncertainties in predictions of timing, magnitude and 
regional patterns due to incon1plete scientific factors such urces and sink ... , 
clouds. oceans polar ice sheet Houehton et al. 1 
'-' 
. p. XL. 
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The introduction that follows this executive summary again speaks plainly and with 
confidence making the document very accessible to a politician, journalist or other lay 
reader. This first IPCC scientific report was described by its Chairman Dr John 
Houghton as the work of "most of the active scientists working in the field. Some 170 
scientists from 25 countries have contributed either through international workshops or 
written contributions". A further 200 scientists were involved in the peer review of the 
draft report (Houghton et al., 1990, foreword p .v). It therefore summarised the known 
body of research at the time and felt able to report with certainty. 
Houghton acknowledges minority opinions exist but says the peer review of the draft 
report helped to ensure a high degree of consensus amongst authors and reviewers of the 
information presented (and presumably of the language used to communicate). "Thus 
the assess1nent is an authoritative statement of the views of the international scientific 
community at this time," (foreword p.v). He finishes his foreword in July 1990 on a 
hopeful note: 
-
I am confident that the Assessment and its Summary will provide the necessary 
firm scientific foundation for the forthcoming discussion and negotiations on the 
appropriate strategy for response and action regarding the issue of climate 
change. It is thus a significant step forward in meeting what is potentially the 
greatest global envirorunental challenge facing mankind (foreword p .vi). 
However the next 10 years would see this confidence undone. 
1988 and 1990 news articles 
Newspaper reports and government documents from that period provide triangulating 
evidence of similar matter-of-fact certainty in Australian media and government sectors 
during the same period. Along with evidence I have presented in chapter 4 in greater 
detail, the following 1988 and 1990 documents show the framing of language at the 
time, consistent over almost all articles and government documents accessed from that 
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period. The 1990 article incidentally also provides historical evidence on the role of 
government economists, whose considerable influence is explored in chapter 6, and vvho 
succeeded in blocking Australia 's early attempts at an active greenhouse response in th 
face of clear science messages. 
ENVIRONMENT PROBLEMS SEEN WITH FOSSIL FUELS 
By Sarah Sargent, 26 July 1988, The Australian Financial Revie1, •, p.48 
Environmental problems associated with the "greenhouse effect" could force the 
world to replace fossil fuels with nuclear energy - which would give Australia 
the opportunity to become the foremost uranium supplier, according to a leading 
petroleum industry expert. 
Mr Bob Foster, general 1nanager, external relations , for BHP Petroleum said last 
week: "Australia can lead the world on how to mitigate against the greenhouse 
effect". 
He said the Australian conservation movement 1night realise that the greenhouse 
effect, caused by an upper-atmosphere build-up of gases when fossil fuels were 
burnt to supply energy, was more damaging to the environment than nuclear 
power generation, which did not produce gaseous wastes. 
POLLUTERS PUT ON THE BACK-BURNER 
By Mike Seccombe, 6 September 1990, The Sydney Morning J-Jera!d, p. l 
CANBERRA: The Federal Treasury is determined to block moves bv the 
G0Yem111ent to 111ake industry cut down on greenhouse effect gase .... 
On Mondav. \vhen Cabinet meets to consider targets for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. the Treasury is set to attempt to delay the matter for up to a 
year by den1anding a ne\v inquiry into the problem. 
0Yemn1ent sources belieYe the suggested inquirv \Vill be a cost-benefit an 
by the Industry Commission of the likely effects of curbs on industr,. 
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Such a rnove would stymie a submission by the Minister for the Environment, 
Mrs Kelly, for the immediate imposition of a target reduction of emissions by 20 
per cent by 2005. 
The Treasury would not confirm that its preferred course was referral to the 
Industry Commission, but said it believed that no conclusive reports on the value 
of targets had been done, and more investigation was needed. A promise of 
quick action on establishing greenhouse emission reductions was a key plank of 
the environment policy which played a major part in the Government's election 
win this year. 64 [My emphasis in italics, highlighting the repeat patterns of 
public knowledge and election promises.] 
The Treasury view also ignores the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which says drastic cuts in emissions of about 60 per 
cent are needed for the problem to be stabilised. 
In a speech yesterday, Mrs Kelly called again for immediate action. She stressed 
the IPCC findings and said that "the sensible course of action is to do what we 
can, as soon as we can". 
1989-1992 government reports 
In December 1989, an Inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee on Industry Science 
and Technology showed its understanding of the phenomenon and looked at ways and 
means to reduce the impact of the greenhouse effect with these words: 
The experts with whom the Committee met confirmed that there is irrefutable 
scientific evidence that the composition of the atmosphere has been, and 
continues to be, altered significantly by human activity. 
There is the risk that if the response to this problem is delayed until the evidence 
of significant climatic change is irrefutable, it may be too late to avoid some of 
the more extreme changes that could occur ... slowing and reversing the changes 
64 In 1990 and 2007 prornises of action on climate change were credited with helping swing a Federal 
election -- only for the pr01nised action to eventually evaporate. In both cases the electorate was credited 
with being aware and eager for action. 
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in the atmosphere will be slow and difficult. Consequently, it is essential that an 
early start be made in implementing changes ... (Common\vealth. 1 a, p. 1 
In its own words, this Senate committee accepted the scientific evidence of atmospheric 
change, and that it was induced by humans. It did not require 100% measured certainty 
of climate change in order to take action, which was understood to become more costly 
with delay. The committee com1nunicated all this in certain language. 
In 1989 the Australia and New Zealand Environment Council (ANZEC) in an agenda 
iten1 on the draft National Greenhouse Strategy urging all state governments "as a 
matter of priority to pursue all available measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' 
(ANZEC, 1989). I have already shown that by 1990 many states had developed 
response plans. 
Also in 1989, the Hawke government released a state of the environment report wherein 
a response to anthropogenic cli1nate change featured pro111inently. It said "The growing 
consensus amongst scientists is that there is a strong possibility of global warming with 
major climate change and that this is linked with the levels and nature of industrial and 
agricultural activity. Significant climate change ... would have major ramifications for 
human survival" (Hawke, 1989, p.28). This document (which also phased in the era of 
Landcare and tree planting) agreed that waiting for "conclusive scientific evidence .. was 
not necessary but an early start on action was. A year later, in October 1990, the Federal 
Government adopted its interin1 planning target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions b 
20° o (from 1988 levels) by the year 2005 (Common\vealth, 1990 ,. 
As late as 1992, as the Earth Su111mit at Rio introduced the Frame\vork Convention on 
Clin1atc Change to drive the international agenda on this topic. one continues to find 
certainty of language in Australian federal government documents. For example. a I 
Federal Govemrnent climate change ne\vsletter confirms that the discussion had gone 
\\·el I bcvond debating \Vhether the greenhouse phenomenon exists or not and \Va 
dealing \\·ith the en1i ss ion reduction targets. Significantly. this ne\vslctter ackno\vledge 
that energy dcrnand n1anagement (i.e. efficiency) could make a major contribution to 
achic\·ing the go\·emment's reduction target ~ ~ ~ mmon\vealth. l '-J'-JLa ,. 
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At the time, the newsletter was edited by the Department of Primary Industries Climate 
Change Group where it remained until late in the 1990s, produced by the Bureau of 
Rural Resources. The change in its language over the study period is telling. From the 
perspective of this thesis, what is most notable, and typical of the early study period, is 
the language of acceptance and certainty, as well as the framing of do-able responses, 
that were subsequently reframed as being unacceptable or undo-able. For example the 
February 1992 lead article outlines the government's ESD (Ecologically Sustainable 
Development) Greenhouse Working Group report to the Department of Arts, Sports, 
Environment and Territories and its scientific credentials. 
The target (in emission reductions) was achievable with: "no reductions in business-as-
usual levels of energy services by a combination of demand and supply-side measures 
but that achievement would require high levels of government intervention" 
(Kretschmer 1992, p. 1 ). The high level of government intervention, principally 
through managing demand by encouraging efficiency, fuel substitution and urban 
planning would become unacceptable, ideologically, during the remainder of the study 
period. But while it was a real option, it shows how certainty appeared in tandem with 
strong policy response. 
"UNCERTAINTY" MARKS REFRAME AFTER 1992 
Through much of the 1990s there raged a war of ideas for influence between 
bureaucratic departments, particularly between environment and industry plus foreign 
affairs and trade (J. Kerin thesis interview, January 2008). This war of ideas in the 
bureaucracy reflected the society-wide economic versus environmental ideological 
paradigm. It was a valuable tool for those who framed Australia's "national interests" 
as synonymous with the existing energy and export system, to characterise as 
"uncertain" the environmental science that challenged the economic policy agenda and, 
similarly, to marginalise environmental scientists and advocates within the dominant 
discourses. 
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Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology acade111ic Alan Pears advised the Victorian 
government on revising its energy policies before the politics in that State shifted to 
economic rationalism by 1992. He says that a powerful weapon wielded to keep th 
energy supply status quo in the 1990s was to discredit the science. Along with econon1ic 
modelling on costs , uncertainty about the science helped to reframe the public discourse 
to jobs and costs by the mid 1990s. "By 1994 ABARE had convinced the Department of 
Energy with its [economic] modelling" (A. Pears , thesis interview, 2006). 
Pears described 1992 as the tipping point- away from policy progress on climate 
change action backed by public knowledge, definite communication and positive 
leadership. This correlated with the ascent of Keating federally and with the change of 
government in Victoria- and the evolving dominance of economic rationalist policies 
as discussed in chapter 6. Public messages became framed as "any action is going to 
hurt" , costing jobs and driving up prices, while the science is uncertain. 
Fonner policy adviser Sue Salmon saw this first hand in Parliament House in Canberra. 
The weak position of the Department of Environment which was the conduit for the 
science, was later reflected in the further 111arginalisation of the environment movement 
under Prime Minister John Howard (1996 on) and the lack of interest in what the 
science, including the IPCC, actually had to say. "There was a whole lot of that ' bring 
in a sceptic ' strategy and it was understood that public confusion made it easier to 
continue \Nith business as usual ," (S. Salmon, thesis interview, 2006). She also recall 
the strong presence of lobbyists from the coal and paper industries. "Their message was 
effective and povverfu l. It was about income and jobs while we were talking about 
degrees of uncertainty',. 
Thus. uncertainty assun1ed a more prominent role in the fra111ing of the di scourse as the 
1990s progressed. One journalist \VOrking at The Age at the time remembers the 
uncertainty that crept in: 
The question \Vas. is it real or scaremongering? Legiti macv comes w hen th 
government is taking it seriously. Under Ha\Yke it \Vas big profile. Keating 
couldn · t give a stuff about the envi ronment an d it \\·ent back to a junior mini 
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the media follows what politicians are talking about so then politicians stopped 
talking about it and the media stopped too; meanwhile the community thinks it is 
being "fixed" (C. Miller, thesis interview, March, 2007) 
IPCC language change by 1995 
Not only were there domestic scientific sector, political and ideological changes 
promoting uncertainty by the mid 1990s, there was also a change in IPCC language 
after 1990. According to the late US atmospheric scientist and IPCC member Stephen 
Schneider, polemical commentators from the ( anti greenhouse science) Global Cli1nate 
Coalition were pressuring IPCC members and, at the same time, politicians got more 
involved in the reporting process (S. Schneider, thesis interview, July 2007). Ironically, 
it had been Schneider who was reportedly persuasive in 1988 in convincing 
governments and scientists at the seminal Toronto conference-which led to the 
establish1nent of national emission reduction targets-that plain and forceful 
communication was the way to go. 
Then Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) journalist Leigh Dayton, in setting up context for 
the 1995 IPCC report, painted a vivid picture about the anxiety to communicate 
forcefully that drove participants at the Toronto conference: 
The anxious experts feared that if human beings continue to load the atmosphere 
with heat-trapping greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide- produced, largely, by 
burning coal, oil and wood-the world would be doomed to an "impending 
crisis" of unbridled climate change: global warming, increased storms and 
droughts, sea-level rises and other extreme and hard-to-predict weather events, 
not to mention the human chaos and suffering that would ensue. 
But what could a group of scientists, administrators and environmental 
hangers-on do? "Give the public and politicians firm answers, not statements of 
scientific uncertainty," vehemently argued one young turk, Dr Stephen 
Schneider, now a leading climate modeller at Stanford University in California. 
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And so they did. To this day the final staten1ent from that extraordinary 
meeting remains one of the most unnerving scientific pronouncements ever 
made: ''Humanity is conducting an enormous , unintended, globally pervasive 
experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global 
nuclear war"; it is "imperative to act now". (Dayton, 1995, p.29)65 
A few years later Schneider had changed his mind. Looking back in 2007, he cited the 
pressure fro1n corporations in oil, coal and gas on the international IPCC process. In 
response he said he was the driving force behind correlating the terms "likely" and 
"very likely" to percentages of certainty in subsequent IPCC reports in an effort to 
standardise the language. I asked him: "Did it work"? 
Well it worked for scientists. Not sure what the public got out of it. But I 
believed that the public would settle for lower percentages if framed by credible 
scientists. Credibility of the scientists is key. (However) there is the related 
problem of scientists not drawing conclusions under the framework of not 
overstepping the policy line because of politicians' censure (S.Schneider, thesis 
interview, 2007) 
I observed [post study period] an example of how that scientific uncertainty framing 
plays out in popular discourse during an exchange between scientist/science 
co111municator Tin1 Flannery and journalist Tony Jones on ABC Lateline in May 2 
Flannery \Vas asked to comment on the British Channel 4 documentary that the AB 
proposed to screen, Th e Great Cli,nate Change S1\'indle, which critici ses the concept of 
anthropogenic climate change as a hoax perpetrated against the promise of Third World 
deYelopment. Flannery said the documentary did not reflect the consensus of scienti sts 
globally. namely: that it \vas '·90 per cent certain' ' that human acti v ity produced the 
enhanced greenhouse gases causing climate change. Phrasing it thi s \vav. caused Jone 
65 Leigh Da:1on and her colleague at The Sydney 1\lor11ing Herald Ga, in Gilchrist wrote a number of 
detailed and unequi, ocal articles in the months follo,\·ing the 1995 release of the 2nd IPCC assessmen t 
report outlining the e'dreme \\ eather and other risks posed by ongoing global \\ armi ng and clima te 
change. These articles like others from the period from The Sydney .\forning Herold and The Age pro \ ide 
an e:--.cellent historical record for the assertion that many science reporters remained com·i nced and certain 
and that most of\\ hat is current!: under~tood abou t climate change,, as understood then as we ll - despite 
the pos~ibk communication barriers of a less user-friendly IPCC report. 
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to respond "yes but, that means there is 10% uncertainty, which surely leaves an 
opening for this sceptic debate?" 
CSIRO atmospheric scientist Michael Raupach explained in a 2007 thesis interview: 
The sceptics [internationally] have been very active throwing "sand in the 
gears" and causing the IPCC to use very carefully calibrated language. Lots of 
people including me think the IPCC has been erring on the conservative side. 
The sceptics have been very influential on our government so scientists have 
had to moderate their language so people in policy would listen. [In so doing] 
CSIRO has been pulling its punches on climate change, especially in the 
mitigation area - we have failed at plucking the so-called 'low-hanging fruit' 
[the easy solutions like energy efficiency]. We are not doing anywhere near 
what is needed. [ At the same time] sceptics like the Lavoisier Group have 
wedged open any uncertainty. (M. Raupach, thesis interview, May 2007) 
In the same interview, Raupach gave a scientist's unvarnished view of what was going 
on and what was needed. He said Australia at a minimum had to put in place a 3 % 
annual reduction from current energy consumption generated through conventional coal 
and oil-fired means. He said that governments had failed to grasp this necessity and that 
"all this talk about cap and trade [ emissions trading], nuclear and clean coal, are just 
"greenwash" to avoid confronting the need for real strategies for rapid, sustained 
reductions in fossil fuels. 
Uncertainty pressure on the media 
By the later 1990s, as the federal Coalition increased the uncertainty rhetoric, some 
journalists, who continued to interpret in plain English what the scientists were saying, 
were also feeling the pressure according to Geoff Strong at The Age. "I was taken to the 
Press Council in 1999 by a reader for writing about global warming a decade on. My 
alleged crime was I hadn't given oxygen to those who didn't believe" (G Strong, thesis 
interview, July, 2007). Former ABC environmental journalist Alan Tate, who says the 
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ABC vvas "co1npletely supportive" during the 1990s of reporting on cl i1nate chang~, 
recalled that his bosses there were inundated with en1ails frorn sections of corporate 
Australia decrying that coverage and calling for his sacking (A. Tate, thesis interviev. 
June 2006). 
Tate said the strategy as he saw it coining from industry complainants was to "sow 
doubt about the cli1nate science". How did they operate? 
Through se1ninars, forums, and climate sceptics. The coal industry and Rio 
Tinto had the ear of the Prime Minister and the Canberra press gallery and [111osl 
of] corporate Australia was disengaged until after 2000 ... the green moven1ent 
was still heavily focused on forests and also disengaged. [This led to] a 
co1npletely confused public discourse. 
Tate concurred with others who have said that the Canbe1Ta press gallery drove the 
media point of view through most of the 1990s and beyond. By the ti1ne Tate left the 
ABC in 1998 the "deep uncertainties idea" had settled with the editors at the national 
broadcaster. 
In this way, public knowledge was nudged towards 1nore 'balance' that became a 
normal part of reporting on cli1nate change, as shown in chapter 7, and balance was 
hedged by uncertainty. Another environn1ental journalist active in the 1990s, Murray 
Hogarth, said it was easy to find an opposing point of view and that often there was a 
problem with Australian scientists willing to be quoted at all, or quoted in a sin1ple and 
understandable way (M. Hogarth , thesis interview, June 2006). 
Government and Media Texts in M id-1990s 
Bv 1995. language in the IPCC science summary for pohcy-makers (which may be the 
only docu1nent n1ost politicians and journalists read) had becon1e more diffuse and 
technical and open to interpretation. \1/hile saying the 1990 predictions and scenari 
254 
had held, the science summary is considerably less to-the-point than the 1990 version 
and 1nore long-winded. Thus the reader must get to p.4 before learning that: 
The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global 
climate; Any human-induced effect on climate will be superimposed on the 
background "noise" of natural climate variability ... [ and p.5] our ability to 
quantify the human influence on global climate is currently limited because the 
expected signal is still emerging from the noise of natural variability, and 
because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include the magnitude and 
patterns of long term natural variability and the time-evolving pattern of forcing 
by, and response to, changes in the concentrations of greenhouse gases and 
aerosols, and land surface changes. (IPCC assessments 1995, Working Group I, 
pp. 4-5) 
The 1995 Working Group 3 su1nmary for policy-makers on social and economic 
responses reads like an academic economics treatise, perhaps reflecting its authors' 
disciplines (Lee & Baites, 1996). It sends no urgent signals and may well have 
remained unread by policymakers because of its communication style, limiting its value 
as a research summary on potential response actions. 
A relevant insight on this form of official or bureaucratic communication is in a report 
published by two US science policy pressure groups: the Government Accountability 
Project (GAP) and Union of Concerned Scientists (USC). The report, Atmosphere of 
Pressure: Political Interference in Federal Climate Science, (2007), documents tactics 
during the George W. Bush administration in US federally-funded departments and 
agencies dealing with resource and environmental matters. One of the documented 
communication tactics (gleaned from some 300 interviews with scientists) is to retreat 
into the difficult, technical and inaccessible. Other strategies include denying media 
access, political operatives changing language intended for the public and changing 
press releases to insert uncertainty. 
The next, 2001, IPCC science report continues with a technical style of language and 
delivery with an emphasis on measurable changes in greenhouse gas composition and 
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vveather outcomes. The su111mary for policymakers announces within the second 
paragraph that it describes the current state of understanding of the climate system and 
''its projected future evolution and their uncertainties" (IPCC assessments, 200 i, 
Working Group 1, p. 2). It lays out its "judgmental estirnates of confidence" along the 
likely, very likely continuum. Thus, virtually certain = greater than 99% chance that a 
result is tn1e; very likely= 90-99% chance; likely= 66 -90% chance ... and so on down 
through 111edium likely, unlikely. 
In the 2001 report the reader is told that it is "very likely" that the 1990s was the 
warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year in the instrumental record since 1861. Proxy 
record data going back 1 000s of years is "likely" to be certain, which trans lated sti 11 
allows a range up to 90% certainty. Measure111ents of climatic changes like precipitation 
(rainfall), and night-ti111e te111perature increases are similarly hedged. 
The uncertainty and desire for another opinion that this language is liable to cause in a 
lay audience was suggested earlier in this chapter. In this 2001 IPCC report- targeted at 
the lay decision-makers in policy circles-it is not until p.5 that a discussion about 
hu111an agency in global warming is initiated and that discussion is quite technical. 
Anthropogenic or human influence is described thus: "The influence of external factor 
on climate can be broadly compared using the concept of 'radiative forcing' "footnoted 
with a technical explanation. 
Technical language in the 2001 repo1i talking about positive or negative "radiative 
forcing" 111ay be compared with the easily understood 1990 report that describes the 
san1c processes as wanning and cooling or mean temperature increases. Similarly, what 
the 1990 report called emissions resulting from human activities that are increasing 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (see citation from 1990 assessment earlier in thi 
chapter) is later called "increased concentrations of atmospheric constituents" in 2001. 
It is not until the second last page (p. 7) that the reader learns human activities have 
con tinucd to increase greenhouses gases and "their radiative forcing" si nee the I 99 5 
report and that thi s is due to fo ssil fuel burning and "land-use changes"- a benign-
sounding jargon tcnn that 1nostlv refers to deforestation. This end section docs have a 
plain-English su1nmary of the influences and measured outcon1cs of anthropogenic 
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climate change. I suggest a good communication practice to a lay audience would have 
put it at the front of the document. On the other hand, the reader is offered the intensely 
debated (by sceptics) hockey stick graph. This graph (Figure 3 in Box 1, chapter 2) 
shows that CO2 has spiked since the late 1800s, roughly paralleled by rising 
temperatures. 
Overall, while it is possible that the 200 I summary for policy-makers assumes the 
readers already have a grounding in the science of human-induced climate change and 
thus would appreciate a technical update highlighting uncertainties-with the plain-
English sum1nary at the end-the risk is that policymakers would again find it hard to 
decipher or to grasp an urgency to act. This might be particularly so in the political 
context that prevailed with George W. Bush presiding over the US government and 
John Howard over the Australian Federal government. Both governments for political 
and ideological reasons welcomed the delay potential of uncertainty. 
The Federal Government's Climate Change newsletter had also largely retreated into 
technical reports by the latter 1990s compared with its earlier direct and accessible news 
reports. The overall picture is that a focus on measurement and technical, quantified 
reporting became the yardstick of credibility and also a way to justify 'go slow' as the 
1990s wore on (I.Lowe, thesis interview, April, 2007). 
Assisting the climate of uncertainty by the late 1990s was a new 1nedia trend to frame 
climate change as debate and opinion, analysed in detail in chapter 7. This involved 
"balancing" sceptic tracts against science stories on or near opinion pages in The Sydney 
Morning Herald (SNIH) and, in the business pages of The Australian Financial Review 
to regularly call climate change a "debate" and to quote sceptical opinions as science 
context66 . The upsurge in opinion pieces in the SMH is shown in Figure IO. There was 
also a trend to treat each IPCC report as discovering anthropogenic agency for the first 
time, as shown in the following 200 I SMH story. 
66 Sceptical treatinent was not monolithic in The Australian Financial Review, possibly adding to reader 
confusion. At the time of the 2001 IPCC report, several stories appeared, including about the insurance 
industry's concerns, that were frained as quite certain about climate change and its connection to the 
fossil fuel-based economy. For exainple Huck and Macken ' report Fossil Fools (2001) . 
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SIX DEGREES HOTTER: GLOBAL CLIMA T 
LOUDER 
LARM BELLS R 
By John Schauble, Herald Correspondent, 23 January 2001 
World temperatures may increase by as much as six degrees Celsius over the 
next century, leading climate change scientists say in an alarming report that 
adds new urgency to the warnings on global warming. 
The projected increase, which would be the most rapid temperature change in 
the past 10,000 years, is expected to push sea levels up by nearly a rnetre 
threatening tens of millions of people, and generate more floods, droughts and 
fires. 
The report found that the 1990s were the hottest decade since instrument 
records were first taken in 1861 and that 1998 was the hottest year. Andfor th 
first time scientists agreed that the warming is mostly due to hinnan activity 
[ emphasis mine]. 
The last sentence above is demonstrably untrue, as can be shown from reports since 
1990 (IPCC 1990, 1995, 2001) and examples quoted earlier in this and other chapters. 
This "just discovered" human agency can be identified in media reports on successive 
IPCC assessments. I suggest it provides a further example of how communication 
rcframing can proceed in the media as well as of reporters' dispensing with context and 
background. 
\\'hat ,vas Happening to Public Interest Science? 
Another a\·enue to the perception of uncertainty was the incremental chi 11 ing of 
scientists · abilitv to comrnunicate the consequences of climate change as thev \Vere 
likely to affect policy and societv. Here I take a brief look at evidence for this micro 
influence on the discourse and suggest it is an important topic for further exploration. 
early as 1987, change \Vas affecting the major scientific bodv inYolved in Australian 
atn1ospheric research. An October 1 
sounded the alarm: 
goYemment internal memo on climate chan 
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The recent restn1cturing of the CSIRO and the modification of the criteria used 
for determining research priorities under its recently adopted corporate 
management strategy, may, however, curtail the continuation of this work unless 
a major funding sponsor comes forward. There does not seem to be similar 
research being undertaken by any other organisation within Australia. ( Climate 
Change due to the Greenhouse Effect, 1987). 
Former MLA Bob Chynoweth who was on the advisory board of the Division of 
Atmospheric Research in the early study period said the public interest science in the 
CSIRO was gradually "squeezed down" as the organisation was reorganised (R. 
Chynoweth, thesis interview, November, 2006). This was to have significant bearing on 
scientists' ability to communicate freely, particularly from 1996 on with the Howard 
Coalition Government. Lowe (2007) wrote what others had been saying privately: that 
CSIRO under former CEO Geoff Garrett during the Howard years developed "a culture 
of managerialism so wary of offending government, that scientists have been instn1cted 
not to comment on issues that have policy implications. Even within universities ... there 
is now increasing pressure to conform" (Lowe, 2007, pp. 60-q 1 ), in the face of a 
disapproving govenunent that controls the purse-strings. 
As the organisation was restructured to serve the needs of industry, CSIRO climate 
change and other environmental researchers arguably came to face a double barrier 
consisting of a government with a particular policy frame along with critical energy and 
resource industry "partners", many of whom came to sit on the CSIRO Board and on 
Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) and flagship boards, as detailed by Pearse (2007). 
Former Atmospheric Research Division Chief Graeme Pearman says that the defined 
role of the CSIRO changed and became a directive "to build wealth" at the expense of 
sharing with society the outcomes of public good research (G. Pearman, thesis 
interview, June, 2006). Long-time science journalist Peter Pockley agreed. "A policy 
line is set, often on the basis of ideology or whim, and science is effectively urged to get 
on board the policy bandwagon .. .it has taken four reports and 15 years to say what 
people like Graeme Pearman were saying in 1990" (Pockley, 2007, p. 31). John 
Williams, former chief of CSIRO Land and Water, is quoted in the same 2007 article as 
saying: "we must get around the view that there is a clear definition between science 
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and policy. It's nonsense to say that presentation of scientific infonnation is a form of 
advocacy which must be avoided". 
In terms of communication, notes Lowe, the long-term effect has been that those who 
agree with the govemrnent policy position feel free to speak out while those who know 
better are intimidated into silence (Lowe 2007, p. 61 ). In a retelling of the organisation 
trouble encountered by Graeme Pearman by 2004 while still a pron1inent member of 
CSIRO Atmospheric Research, Lowe quotes Pearman explaining the dilemma he was 
faced with: 
As a climate scientist, I might inform [media] that the lifeti1ne of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere means that the only way of stabilising global cli1nate is by 
reducing emissions by 50 per cent by 2050 and by 80 per cent by 2100. In the 
current environment, that is seen as commenting on government policy of not 
setting reduction targets. (Lowe 2007, p. 63) 
In 2004, a report was released by the Climate Group, a business scientific alliance 
convened by the insurance company IAG and the World Wide Fund for Nature in 2004 
that involved Pearman for scientific advice as well as some of Australia's 1najor 
corporations outside the mining and resource sector. The report synthesised evidence 
that climate change was starting to affect Australia (Lowe, 2007, p. 62). A 200 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation Four Comers television program, The Greenhous 
Mafia, reported that Pearman caine under CSIRO ad1ninistrative pressure as a result of 
his work with the Climate Group. In the television progra111 , reporter Janine Cohen 
asked, "Talking about the need for a reduction in emissions and how much would be a 
safe level, is that really government policy? Isn 't it about good science?' - l.Jraeme 
Pearman said, ''Well, I believe it is ... for 30 years all I've tried to do is convey to the 
co111munity and to sectors of the com1nunity what good science suggests is the way 
fonvard" (Cohen. 2006, transcript, p. 7). 
Peannan says he \Yas subsequently ,nade redundant by the CSIRO, in the Di vision he 
had led as Chief from 1992-2002 (G. Pearman, thesis interview, June . In context, 
his co111111unication \\'Ork. together with that of scientific colleagues with the seminal 
greenhouse conferences in 1987 and 1988 and certainty in public communication 
thereafter. played a significant role in the early good public understanding of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
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Graeme Pearman, his colleague Barrie Pittock and also Ian Lowe stand out as 
Australian scientists who withstood the pressure from the mid-l 990s into the 2000s and 
continued to speak out clearly and publicly about the risks of climate change. 
Another public sector scientist told this thesis enquiry in an informal interview of 
dealing with the federal bureaucracy during the study period. He said analyses he was 
contracted to produce for the federal government on the likely environmental impacts of 
population growth were never published because, he believes, they did not give the 
desired answers in line with population growth policies. A detailed account of this 
1990s collision between science and official immigration policy can be found in Lowe, 
2007, pp. 65-70. Lowe also raises the difficulties encountered by renewable energy 
researchers, who feared loss of funding if they spoke out on government policy 
regarding the Australian energy sector. 
These communication restrictions accompanied a more fundamental redrawing during 
the late 1990s under the Howard government of what constitutes "the public interest". 
-
Research into renewable energy, integrated pest management, tropical rainforests and 
the Great Barrier Reef was defunded (Lowe, 2007) along with the wind-down of the 
former CSIRO Division of Wildlife and Ecology and eventually Land and Water. The 
federal government instead redirected funding into corrunercial pursuits including 
research for the coal industry. "By steering research funds away from activities 
promoting the public interest, the government has replaced the concept of the public 
interest with an economistic view, equating the good of the private sector with the good 
of the community" (Lowe, 2007, p.71). This is entirely consistent with the ideology of 
economic rationalism as explored in Chapter 6 and further illustrates the wide-ranging 




The evidence from the documentary record supports the analysis that com111unication of 
anthropogenic climate change and related public understanding hinged considerably on 
the framing of certainty/uncertainty during the study period. 
Science history shows uncertainty arguments and demands for technical, quantitativ 
111easurements have been used against environmental research findings since at least the 
publication of Rachel Carson's seminal Silent Spring in 1962 on the effect of pesticides 
in the environment. Similar argu111ents provoked lengthy delay in policy action in regard 
to the hole in the ozone layer in the 1970s. Invoking uncertainty or demanding certainty 
can be a deliberate strategy or a misunderstanding of how science operates. 
In regard to anthropogenic climate change, there is a compelling body of evidence 
supporting the mainstream scientific conclusions- including the need for effective ri sk 
management-without 100 percent "proof', because that is the nature of scientific 
discovery. However, that can be framed as insufficient. This is a challenge for emerging 
phenomena that defy si1nple on-ground measure1nent. On the other hand, as early as the 
1960s in the United States, policy-makers have shown themselves capable of rejecting 
these uncertainty arguments in favour of risk management and precaution. 
A precautionary policy response to science 1nessages on cli111ate change occurred in 
Australia in the early study period at a tin1e when on-ground data were still emerging-
i.e. vvere less well-1neasured than later. Communication of certainty about the key 
ele111ents of the pheno1nenon, in the 1990 IPCC report and other scientific 
cornmunication, as well as in government documents and newspaper reports at the 6rne 
happened concurrently with the positive policy response. It is therefore reasonable t 
suggest that certainty influenced policy. 
Thereafter. \Yith changed political leadership and a different policy agenda, a gro\vmg 
"debate·· \Yas generated not only about response but about the previously accepted 
science- rapidl y amplified by the business press and eventually by the general-interest 
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broadsheet analysed. This was characterised by attempts to "balance" the science with 
contrarian views, not seen in the newspaper analysis from the early 1990s. The same 
newspaper analysis also showed a 1narked rise in opinion articles by 2001 on either side 
of the issue and science updates placed in the opinion features, effectively underscoring 
debate and uncertainty. The contributions of sceptic scientists, think tanks and corporate 
opponents in encouraging uncertainty were considered in chapter 8. 
An important influence on the framing of uncertainty in the discourse was a public 
retreat by scientists after the early 1990s to the conventional scientific language of 
uncertainty both out of habit and arguably as a defensive posture in the face of the 
attacks on the science and on climate scientists. In this chapter I show that the plain-
English 1990 IPCC summary for policy-makers, was followed in later years by IPCC 
assessment summaries that highlighted degrees of uncertainty and reverted to technical 
jargon from the various disciplines involved in the assessments. It is suggested the more 
hedged and conventional scientific style was not well understood by the media, 
politicians and other lay audiences. 
Characterising the science as uncertain in public communication became the dominant 
frame by the late 1990s, regardless of the consistent nature of the baseline risk messages 
and research findings. The impression of the public arguably became: scientists can't 
agree and proof is lacking. The impression of uncertainty helped boost the legitimacy 
of a reframed policy agenda favoured minimal response in support of a status quo 
mining and energy industry economy. The uncertainty frame was also fed by feuding 
bureaucracies representing environment and industry/trade, and media executives 
subject to persistent corporate complainants when reports linked climate change to on-
ground weather impacts that the public could experience. Possibly contributing to 
confusion was the media habit to report the research on anthropogenic causes as newly 
discovered with later IPCC report (1995, 2001)-although this was first established in 
1990. 
In this chapter I also briefly examine the evidence that climate change and other 
environmental scientists were effectively silenced or "gagged" by the late 1990s and 
thereafter from publicly contributing research findings that might be seen as contrary to 
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official policy, be that on the need for emission reduction targets or on population 
numbers. The concurrent demise of "public interest" science in Australia invite 
separate and further investigation. 
Combined, the various communication paths to framing uncertainty may well have 
resulted in a level of public confusion that paralysed further calls for action. This can be 
seen as deliberately or incidentally consistent with the public relations position that an 
uncertain public will not demand action on climate change (Luntz, 2003). 
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CHAPTER TEN 
ROLLING THE CLIMATE DICE: FRAMES, VALUES AND NARRATIVES IN 
AUSTRALIA 1987-2001, SUMMARY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
KEY FIND IN GS 
Some major findings from the public documentary record together with interviews 
investigated for this thesis are as follows. 
1. The scientific message about anthropogenic climate change stayed remarkably 
consistent during the study period from 1987-2001. Briefly recapped, it states that a 
phenomenon called the enhanced greenhouse effect has been identified for some time in 
the atmosphere around the earth. The increase of greenhouse gases (water vapour, 
carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, ozone and methane) in the atmosphere causes 
incremental average warming of the planet thereby threatening a range of severe 
climatic disturbances (still being explored). In historic times the enhanced greenhouse 
effect is linked to human activity-primarily emissions from burning fossil fuels, but 
also emissions from agriculture and deforestation. If not mitigated by drastic cuts in 
greenhouse gas emissions from industrial activities and by slowing the rate of 
vegetation clearance ( a sink for greenhouse gases) along with vegetation replacement, 
the climatic disturbances of drought, fire, flood, severe storms and sea level rise could 
become catastrophic for hu1nan populations and other species. 
2. Research of the public record, including newspaper reports and government 
documents, found that during the early study period (1987-1991) Australian public 
awareness and public knowledge about climate change were high. Scientists used direct 
and certain language and were often quoted (without debate from sceptics). Political 
leaders were preparing for action with a greenhouse gas emission reduction target of 
stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at 1988 levels by 2000 and reducing them by 20 
percent from that level by 2005. Response options, starting with energy efficiencies and 
renewable energy options were extensively explored and related research was funded. 
Some regulation was considered acceptable and necessary. The early good public 
understanding correlated strongly with unequivocal language signalling certainty in the 
first, 1990, IPCC assessment reports, no public debate about human agency which was 
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repeatedly reported as a major cause, empirical evidence in the fon11 of severe \Veather 
and a science/risk management (rather than a political/econon1ic) focus to news 
reporting. 
3. The dominant political/media narrative shifted gradually but radically after 1991. 
The shift was away from acknowledgement of mainstream risk posed by global 
warming/anthropogenic climate change, as the greenhouse effect came to be known 
and away from the narrative that response required a global citizenship value set while 
offering do111estic opportunity for new industries and cost saving. The shift was to a 
dominant narrative of national self interest, said to be threatened by outside forces like 
the United Nations and the national interest was identified with industries that extract 
and/or rely on fossil fuels, notably coal. The economic modelling of cost to 111ainstream 
Australia of change to status quo energy industries- without addressing a balancing 
benefit to society - helped to successfully marginalise the ongoing narrative of risk 
from green groups and scientists. This was now framed as counter to the national 
interest. Any action had to be voluntary, cost-neutral and 1narket-focused. 
4. This reframing of the dominant narrative reflected a shift from an evidence-based 
science-informed discourse of Australia's national self-interest, options and 
responsibilities, to a pri111arily normative economic discourse of how things should be 
for Australia- amplified in 111edia and policy docun1ents. 
5. Separate analysis of influences on the dominant narrative and its shift during the 
1990s revealed that public communication on this topic closely reflected shifts in 
dominant beliefs , values and elite agendas. Specifically, I looked at the values and 
agenda of an economic rationalist ideology that took on hegemonic proportions in 
Australian society during the study period. I examined the economic value shift in the 
vvider context of societal "no limits" beliefs in growth and progress, techno-fix solution 
and human exceptionalism. Values and beliefs were reflected in rhetorical fra111ing 
\vhich can be studied from the public documentary record- news and feature report 
and govem1nent and industry documents. The reframe from ethical , risk management 
and globally responsible policy positions and a corresponding dominant narrative in 
response to climate science to a narrative emphasizing scepticism and national self 
interest svnony111ous \vith no change from "business as usual" happened regardless of 
the underlving science, \,Vhich did not shift. The refrained narrative was communicated 
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by value-laden (jobs, family, "us and them" rhetoric) which I examined with the 
assistance of theory from cognitive linguistics. 
A related finding is that communication narrative and public discourse shifts strongly 
correlated with changes in national leadership style, more so than with changes in 
political parties and that early positive climate change response was non-partisan at 
federal and state levels. Changed public communication from political leaders strongly 
correlated with vocal opposition to climate change action, or even acceptance that 
climate change is real, coming from elite business groups and market-oriented think 
tanks as the study period progressed through the 1990s. Similar results can be identified 
at the level of state politics and response, e.g. ideological and leadership changes in 
Victoria were notable after 1991 with the effect that the state's early leadership on 
climate change response, such as comprehensive energy efficiency strategies, came to a 
standstill. State politics have not been a focus of this enquiry but offer enlightening 
case studies, given the state control of energy production and also land-use management 
that are linked to levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
6. This enquiry found much evidence to support the hypothesis that politicians and the 
media are the co-agenda setters of the dominant narratives in the public discourse, 
consistent with the theory of agenda-setting but contrary to any proposition that the 
media alone frames science stories. A framing lens was developed and applied to the 
documentary evidence to analyse the differences in communication over time. By the 
mid 1990s the two major newspapers studied (with the exception of some science and 
environment reporters) amplified and did not counter the dominant narrative changes 
towards debate and uncertainty, in regard to response but increasingly also in regard to 
the science, coming from national policymakers. This was in contrast to the early study 
period (1987-1992) when the same mass media had relayed risk messages from 
scientists and positive policy responses in a language of certainty. By the mid 1990s the 
1najority of media stories had shifted from a science to a political focus (along with the 
"national interest" economic focus). Political journalists became the dominant 
interpreters of the climate change story and they followed the changing political 
narrative, without much evidence that they contextualised with the science and the risks. 
This study agrees with the suggestion in the literature that while that mass media and 
politicians are co-agenda setters of the national discourse, sometimes one sector is 
leading the way. 
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This can be seen by the shifts in reporting, evident from the newspaper record, fron1 th 
early to the later study period. When political leaders and scientists were in agrcen1ent 
on the risks and response options regarding climate change, the media repo1ied it as 
matter-of-fact news. Later, under different leadership and hardening market ideology 
newspaper articles helped reframe the story for public consumption, - regardless of the 
consistency of the scientific risk messages from early to late study period and the fact 
that science reporters, outside the business press, continued to report those rnessages. 
The impression left with audiences was arguably confusion and uncertainty. 
Internal structural features of the media, aided by the highly concentrated nature of 
Australian media ownership and a culture of short-term interest, by the later 1990s led 
to a response of "balancing" the climate change "debate" which helped cement a 
climate of uncertainty about the science. Media concentration was a 111eaningful 
influence. The prime example in Australia is that of a major multinational owner, News 
Limited, which owns more than 70% of the nation's print media. The company took a 
sceptical editorial stance during the study period and played a leading role in reflecting 
the econo111ic rationalist ideology overtaking Australia- in tun1 the foundation for the 
normative economic narrative of the mid to late 1990s. 
7. Media debate was aided by the emerging public role, encouraged at times by think 
tanks and corporations, of sceptic scientists, many of who111 are geologists, 
climatologists and meteorologists. Regardless of what the titles imply to the lay public, 
these disciplines are not synonymous with climate change specialist. An analysis of the 
disciplinary beliefs of geologists and the other two professions in the second half of the 
20th century gives so111e insight into why these professions are prominent amongst the 
public sceptics: they share doubt about the validity of computer model ling of future 
climate impacts (but, according to the evidence, 111ay not extend that doubt to econon1ic 
modelling). They may have entered the debate with strong disciplinary beliefs that the 
past ahvays predicts the future and that meaningful evidence must be measurable on the 
ground. A US Congressional com1nittee found public sceptics routinely played outside 
the svste1n by not publishing for peer review~ by abusing scientific conventions of 
courtesy and den1ocracy and by mixing fact and opinion or policy reco1n1ncndations rn 
their state111ents. Media conventions of conflating all scientists to equal status of 
expertise (''scientists say~') aided the sceptics and further confused the discuss ion. 
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8. An analysis of the influence of communicating scientific certainty and uncertainty 
found both to be closely correlated with levels of public knowledge and with the 
substance of policy response. A shift from early to mid study period was documented in 
terms of climate scientists' own use of language-e.g. a shift from plain English certain 
"this is happening" to uncertain "this is xxx percent likely" . Scientists' professional 
acceptance of unce1iainty and the fact that there is never 100% proof in science did not 
translate well to politicians, particularly sceptical ones, reporters and other lay people 
who were liable to hear "we don't know" or "we can't agree". Some climate scientists 
working with the IPCC during the study period link the shift in language of certainty to 
a reaction against increasingly vocal sceptic activity and hostile debate generated in part 
by multinational energy and auto companies at the international level as well as 
challenges to Australian climate scientists. Another interpretation is that the shift was a 
natural reversion to a more comfortable level of scientific communication highlighting 
uncertainties. 
Characteristics included a reversion to professional jargon; a posture of objective 
neutrality; and, a retreat from explaining implications that might be seen as prescribing 
policy. My analysis showed that the IPCC reports reflected this change to the more 
technical and less reader-friendly in the 1995 and 2001 assessments. A major US review 
of government scientists showed that encouraging the technical, obscure and difficult in 
scientific reports to the public and media has been one tactic by governments to 
generate delay, disinterest and inaction. 
9. I looked briefly at the influence of policies to corporatise Australia's public science 
agencies and to diminish public interest research during the study period-a perspective 
that deserves more indepth study. The evidence indicates that the corporate 
restructuring, along with an increasing government mandate for industry-related 
research and internal guidelines discouraging scientists ' from addressing policy issues, 
all had a chilling effect on climate scientists' and alternative energy researchers' 
freedom to communicate publicly. 
10. Looking more closely at the language and framing of the changed dominant 
narrative from "can do" towards "can't do" regarding emission reduction that evolved 
by the later 1990s, I noted that much political and media communication closely 
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resembled public relations advice on how to manufacture uncertainty and persuade 
audiences in order to negate public calls for action on climate change. The 
understanding of how this is done rhetorically can be gained from cognitive research-
of how audiences hear messages and thus how to manipulate audiences' e111otional core 
va lues with rhetoric and metaphors about nation, family, jobs- in order to maintain the 
status quo. Documented public relations advice reco111mended that uncertainty and the 
belief that "scientists don't agree" would suffice to stop the public from demanding 
action on climate change. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Deconstruction of Public Knowledge as Science Communication is Reframed 
The hypothesis that emerged from the results- consistent with grounded theory- is that 
public knowledge can change dramatically over a short timeframe, reflecting shifts in 
dominant social values and delivered by narrative communication frames. Gradually 
established from the early 1990s in Australia by politicians and the media as co-agenda 
setters, the changed framing on climate change becaine increasingly uniform by 111id-
decade, rarely disturbed by competing 111essages from domestic scientists. 
Political and cultural "hegemony" is a theoretical term that well describes the spread 
throughout Australian society of the tenets of economic rationali sm that proved hostile 
to the global, urgent, risk management response to anthropogenic ch111ate change that 
characterised the late 1980s into the early 1990s. A reframed narrati ve and related 
public language became consistent across politics, media, and other aspects of publi c 
life fro111 the mid 1990s to the 2000s. 
The nevv narrative accepted by audiences was that domestic action to lower em issions 
\Vas linked to job loss and severe economic penalties for average Australian fami li es 
\Vith anv change to the energy production status quo. The revised narrative focused on 
Australia's spec ial place in the vvorld- a clai1ned exceptional ism based on Australia ·s 
historic role as an export quarry of natural resource. After l 996 , the national political 
narrative. amplified by the rnedia. held that economic decisions to become the wor ld 
largest coal producer for export and for cheap electricity at home (which had helped 
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elevate the Australian standard of living) meant it was in the interests of Australian 
families to delay on tackling related greenhouse gas emissions- if climate change was 
even linked to emissions from burning of fossil fuels, which this narrative also debated. 
The evidence shows that the interaction of beliefs and values in the leading policy 
sectors and in media, and the co-agenda-setting role of these institutions, are major keys 
to understanding the science and society framing of climate change communication in 
Australia. A public climate of uncertainty supporting a lack of effective policy response 
to climate change was the outcome for almost 20 years. 
Maj or Influences on a Climate of Uncertainty 
I looked at three areas of influence on the dominant narrative during the study period. 
These were cultural values and ideologies, the mainstream media and its structural 
features, and disciplinary differences and values within science and their effect on the 
expression of scepticism, as well as other drivers of sceptic communication including 
energy corporations and free market think tanks. These influences came together to 
support the parallel rise of uncertain language from the climate change specialist 
scientists and cormnunication signalling uncertainty from politicians and media as 
discussed in chapter 9. The power of uncertainty can be judged in the context of public 
relations understanding. One prominent US public relations adviser counselled 
politicians that fostering uncertainty, specifically on climate change, would be enough 
to stop action. 
The combined result on public understanding was that lay audiences including 
politicians, reporters and citizens came to treat the science as debatable opinion creating 
an impression that "scientists don't agree", despite the fact that research showed this 
i1npression to be inaccurate and that instead agreement within the key disciplines was at 
a level of about 99-1 , judging fro1n publications in the mainstream climate change 
literature. However these comparisons were apparently not reaching or persuading the 
public. 
The ideology of free market economics became a major influence at all levels of public 
discourse during the 1990s and also affected the ability of scientists to contribute to the 
discourse as public interest research was diminished in the later study period. Federal 
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budget cuts from l 996 affected research programs that earlier pro1nised response 
strategies (such as solar thermal, fuel efficient or electric motors , bio-gas etc). The 
culture changed to favour an anti-regulatory, voluntary and private-enterprise slant to 
every potential response, and the public came to accept this as nonnal or reality. 
The results of my research suggest that additional influences on the changed don1inant 
narrative of the 1990s were: a lack of positive leadership e111bracing action co1npared to 
1987-1991; the use and misuse of scientific uncertainty- both strategically and in 
scientific argumentation; a media increasingly dominated by political reporting and 
applying internal strategies including increasing numbers of "balanced" opinion articles 
as well as often 01nitting context or using it to introduce sceptics; and, the 
marginalisation of environmental groups and scientists. These influences were receptive 
to an assault on the science by the mid 1990s, with intellectual arguments supplied by a 
small cohort of non-mainstream scientific sceptics, and by free-n1arket think tanks 
heavily supported by the resources sector, resulting in a national message of delay and 
uncertainty. This suited the "business as usual" interests of the resource industry and 
energy sectors, as amply documented by other researchers and supported by the 
evidence gathered here. 
The conclusions of this enquiry take issue with any belief in the scientific co111n1unity 
that rnore and better information alone will lead to rational action. Instead it was found 
that- after the early period of good public knowledge spu1Ted by clear scientific 
communication, clear media reports and supportive national political leadership-
changing national leadership and certain social constructs of belief and values had a 
stronger impact on policy and political outcomes and, through communication, on 
public understanding than the scientific input. 
The driving values of agenda-setting elites and much of the general pub I ic in the study 
timefran1e can be grouped under "no lin1its" beliefs- including assumptions about 
progress, growth and the benefit of developing natural resources ( one belief set is that 
tbev are limitless) allied with beliefs in a saviour "techno-fix" and deepiv-held beliefs in 
hun1an or Christian exceptionalism. The renewed emphasis on these (traditional for 
Australia) values under econo111ic rationalist government policies are explored in detail 
in chapter 6. The hypothesis is that they strongly reasserted themselves after the early 
study period. fanning the basis of the ideology of l 990s hegemonic culture. Thi 
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conclusion is also supported in earlier work by British geographer Harriet Bulkeley who 
found that the traditional values reasserted themselves in short order after the late 1980s 
in Australia. 
How to achieve cultural hegemony of values was also indicated from surveying internal 
media stn1ctural features. One documented method was the stacking of media 
companies' boards of directors with ideologically like-minded individuals. Values also 
adhered to editorial policies, with politics and economics at the top and environment 
and science somewhere near the bottom. Together, politicians and their economic 
advisers and media workers specialising in politics and economics, e.g. the Canberra 
press gallery ( along with some media owners) were the agents that primarily 
deconstn1cted the early good public understanding and political will to act. 
Looking at media coverage specifically from the documentary record and through 
interviews, it appears that after the early knowledge of the science displayed in news 
accounts of 1987-1991, the editorial decision-makers during the 1990s became 
disinterested, ill-informed or ideologically bound and they were also under pressure 
from the corporate sector. The shift of the climate change story to political reporting did 
not help shed light on the scientific facts and political reporter£ were open to factual 
distortions because they did not know better. Opinion overrode fact in commentary by 
newspaper columnists. Columnists, think tank publications and talk-back radio hosts 
lambasted climate scientists as being self-serving seekers of research grants. While 
science and technology reporters did continue throughout the study period to retell and 
update the original science story of risk much as they had in the early study period, their 
voices became outnumbered in aggregate by political reporting and sceptical opinions. 
It is likely that reporting with both certainty and scepticism in the same time frame 
simply led to public confusion. It may also encourage the response that science 
communication can be heard according to what an audience believes or wants to hear. 
The establishment of the internet during this period arguably played a role in the 
longevity of some of the critical debates and erroneous scientific arguments that 
audiences could chose to hear. The influence of the internet during the study period 
merits further investigation in regard to fostering a belief-driven communication 
environment. 
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While the traditional ''no limits" and developmentalist values and beliefs have been 
strong part of Australian culture for most of the country's existence, it is shown that in 
the late 1980s these traditional values were mitigated by the 111ainstrearning of · 
environmenta l concerns under the inclusive national leadership style of Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke (which ended in 1991 ). Beliefs and values (aligned with leadership) thus 
arguably are major keys to understanding the influences and barriers on climate change 
communication as it developed up to the present. 
Lessons from the Early Study Period and a Historical Context 
One of the most novel findings of this enquiry is the extent and depth of political/public 
knowledge during 1987-1991 that led to an early (interim) emission reduction planning 
target in October 1990-a more ambitious and coordinated response to the scientific 
message of risk than anything devised since. The response involved fonnal 
commitments at federal and state levels to a suite of policies that would have overhauled 
principally the energy demand and supply equation in Australia to minimise polluting 
greenhouse gases. In the first instance, it was proposed to do this through efficiency 
measures in the household, commercial and industrial sectors. 
Newspaper reports at the time pointed out that Australia made very inefficient use of 
fossil-fuel based energy compared with similar industrialised nations. Vehicle emissions 
and appliance labelling were both within the federal government's portfolio. It was 
understood that a key response would be to hold down demand for more energy and 
commentators at the ti1ne took it for granted that significant "demand management 
rnight require regulation ( or to use the free market jargon "intervention"). However, any 
form of market regulation was anathe1na to the influential free n1arket economists 
within the federal government during the 1990s. 
Four pheno1nena stand out fron1 the early period of the study ( 1987-1991 )- and n1ay 
offer an enduring 111essage for communicators: scientists gave a clear message in 
una1nbiguous language that did not focus on uncertainties; politicians provided 
leadership and supported the science 111essage; environment was accorded a mainstream 
role in politics and in the public discourse, which also meant that ch mate change risk 
\Vas fran1ed as affecting everyone and as not a sectoral "green" issue: and, medi 
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reflected and sometimes drove the agenda in congruence with the values of the political 
elites but also respecting the scientific message. 
Media analyses- primarily from the USA-support the finding of this thesis that 
scientists were the primary sources of information in the early days of media reporting 
on climate change i.e. the late 1980s and early 1990s but that politicians and interest 
groups (both industry and environmental) became more prominent sources as the 
decade wore on (e.g. Corbett & Durfee, 2004). The present study shows a marked shift 
in media sources occurred in Australia, depending on the publication-e.g. industry 
perspectives allied with national politicians became very predominant in the business 
press ( compared with earlier neutral or even critical industry coverage) but industry was 
not prominent in the general daily broadsheet, while politicians were frequently quoted 
throughout the study period. Environmental groups played a greater spokesperson role 
in both publications as the decade unfolded. 
An analysis of the general interest daily newspaper also showed a significant sh1ft to 
opinion as information source by the end of the decade. The number of opinion pieces 
on climate change in The Sydney Morning Herald had gone up tenfold by 2001 from a 
level close to zero in 1988-1989 
Language and Rhetoric 
This thesis analysed and compared the communication language and rhetoric employed 
during the period of early understanding with the re-framing that took place during the 
1990s. The later rhetoric not only publicly re-asserted traditional values, but moved 
away from ideas on moral leadership and global responsibilities to a more inward-
focused, nationalistic discourse on climate change. Th~ revised rhetoric was commonly 
used by think tank publications and related newspaper columnists and a generation of 
like-minded market economists and political leaders in general agreement with 
extractive and energy industry perspectives. 
Framing analysis, based on cognitive linguistics theory supported by insights from 
propaganda studies and public relations advice, shows how use of language can elicit a 
favourable response to "no change" and "can't do" policies. The rhetoric used 
metaphorical frames that appeal to core values like home, family, nation and jobs. These 
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were identified with the national interest and Australia's exceptionalisn1. ''Us and the1n 
became the subtext. In the lead-up to the Kyoto Protocol summit in 1997 and later as 
ratification loon1ed in the early 2000s , the rhetoric suggested that outside interests were 
seeking to interfere with the Australia's national interest and prosperity. The rhetoric 
implied that "them"-the United Nations, Europeans and green groups- were seeking 
unfair emission reduction targets that would hurt mainstream workers and fan1ilies. 
Controversial Science, Understanding Agendas and Framing 
In summary, this longitudinal thesis investigation of climate change communication and 
framing in Australia suggests that environmental science, when it might be 
controversial, may best be communicated with a strategic understanding of 
contemporary social and cultural influences- particular the joint agenda-setting and 
framing roles of political leaders and the media. A useful tool is an understanding of 
how rhetorical framing is constn1cted, what values are being spoken to, and what 
audiences are likely to "hear". 
This investigation also highlights the contribution of an historical context that afforded 
a co1nparative review of the daily narratives that shape "reality" for audiences and direct 
what society does. If we accept that we live in a ti1ne where hu1nans have unprecedented 
if unguided control over planetary systems, then what we do to our environment is a 
function of what we think is reality. And what we think changes: it is guided by the 
values, agendas and rhetoric communicated by opinion leaders in our society. 
Ulti1natcly, what we think will affect the future clin1ate. 
The conclusion of this study is that public knowledge of anthropogenic c] i1nate change 
was successfully re-constructed and re-frmned during the l 990s from a baseline of good 
understanding in 1987-1990. In this way one can argue that reality, as conveyed by 
scientific discovery, can be reinterpreted or changed in public discourse even as the 
scient ific data scarcely change over ti1ne. 
276 
Science messages re-framed outside 
of science 






From the results and conclusions I have extracted a list of possibly useful implications 
for communicators of controversial and environmental science. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE COMMUNICATION AND FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This thesis offers some implications for communicating controversial science and 
society research findings, specifically climate change. 
Scientists need to be aware of what audiences "hear" when they speak of uncertainties 
in their findings-it's usually not the same as their own scientific convention of 
uncertainty. A very contemporary example comes from an ABC radio report in March 
2011. The interview was with Australian Conservation Foundation President Ian Lowe 
who said that there is uncertainty still in climate science but it is in regard to the severity 
of likely impacts which may have been underestimated: his point being that things could 
get much worse than predicted. The reporter led into the story saying: "Scientists are 
still uncertain about climate change" (full stop). That is what he heard. The lesson 
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therefore is to reconsider the urge to use stock phrases and consider what is likely to be 
heard as "controversial" and picked out for that reason. 
Science communicators should take into account what is happening in the real world of 
policy and agenda-setting and who the "stakeholders" are when dealing with science 
and society topics. 
Science communicators would benefit from understanding how the mass rnedia operates 
in Australia, the power of talk back radio and the fact that 111ost people probably now 
receive their science and political news from television or radio. Com111unicators might 
explore what else is out there as a communication channel-for example independent 
local newspapers or niche and organisation publications or broadcasts. The extreme 
level of media concentration in Australia should also be understood along with its 
impact on the public discourse. The prime example for Australia is News Limited 
which owns more than 70 % of Australian metropolitan newspapers and The Australian. 
For example, if communicating climate change research findings it is helpful to know 
that these publications have not been editorially neutral on the science and if/how to 
reduce e111issions. That can change and knowing the editorial stance is part of the 
equation. The issue for a science communicator is how a press release or infonnation is 
liable to be used under such circumstances and how to gain the most factually corTect 
outcome. 
Editors have considerable influence. This is exerted by story inclusion, placement and 
headlines. Science co111municators 111ay find their story is not used in a way that reflects 
the research outcomes. Editorial antipathy or indifference was described by science or 
environmental joun1alists who tried to keep the climate change story alive during the 
1990s. 
A related lesson is that political and economic stories are generally considered priorities 
by the media hierarchy and by politicians- together they set the daily agenda of what is 
ne\YS. Therefore the parliamentary press gallery is often interpreting climate change or 
other environ111ental or science issues without the specialised background that would 
benefit their co111n1unication. Conflict and controversy are the bread and butter of 
political journalism, and that is where climate change has landed. The way out of this 
dead-end in Australia is not clear cut. 
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Talk-back radio is arguably under-used by scientists/science communicators but should 
be recognised as a potent tool for setting the daily news agenda and is used in that way 
by politicians. In regard to climate change communication the challenge is that most 
talk-back radio hosts in Australia are hostile to the concept of anthropogenic climate 
change and more readily interview sceptics (documented by an ABC Mediawatch 
program in 2011 ). Other controversial topics might fare better. 
The internet is another confounding factor that emerged in the study timeframe of this 
thesis. It offers many communication opportunities but also much potential for creating 
confusion and doubt. 
Framing climate change information in ways that many audiences understand-harm or 
risk minimisation, insurance, health and family benefits- reflects an understanding of 
what diverse audiences may have in common and what they hear in a positive or neutral 
light. This may be attacked as spin by some scientists but the challenge for them is to 
get beyond the information deficit trap of repeating similar information in "science-
speak" that includes very often the scientific concept of uncertainty. The information 
could, for example, instead be translated into an insurance framework that includes 
probabilities. 
One of the best analogies I have personally heard for climate risk and the current level 
of scientific certainty came from a businessman who asked: "Would you put your 
children on a plane with 70-80-90% certainty it would crash? Of course not." 
Research in 1989 indicated audiences might not expect much more than 50% certainty 
from scientific findings in order to support action to counter the greenhouse effect. And 
yet the political discourse in the 2000s was still debating 90% certainty of negative 
impacts. 
The barrier that looms for communicators is not a lack of facts but rather belief 
structures and denial. The analysis for this thesis suggests that understanding embedded 
beliefs affecting an area of environmental research-in the climate change example 
beliefs are limitless growth and progress, guaranteed techno fix to problems, and human 
exceptionalism to biological impacts-may help inform more effective communication 
approaches. While not covered in the thesis , understanding the psychology of cognitive 
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dissonance and resolution may also be an interesting study: Australia's role as th 
world 's largest coal producer while rhetorically proposing to counter coal-based 
em iss ions would be an excellent subject. 
Research shows that context aids understanding. A current example would be to 
include in a discussion of a price on carbon the information that fossil fuel production 
has never reflected what it really costs: taxpayer subsidies before the n1arket and 
pollution afterwards that society has to clean up. Another context is the opporiunity for 
new industries to emerge on a level playing field if the old energy economy is no longer 
subsidised. 
Cognitive scientist George Lakoff points out that audiences react according to their self-
identity and values, which is what must be addressed- e.g. through group opinion 
leaders/innovators- for a message to penetrate. It is possible to identify other national 
discourses that betray a significant value, identity and belief base (that may drive policy 
rather than peer-reviewed scientific evidence). One example is the different perspectives 
on the appropriate "management" of kangaroos- treated either as a pest based on long-
held n1ral beliefs and values, as a resource to be "harvested" like trees ( or whales), or as 
a valuable part of Australia's biodiversity and an econo1nic asset in tourism. 
A message is heard through a filter of social values- therefore underscoring benefits 
from climate change action such as: new jobs in new industries , better health. a clean 
environment and doing something about global warming in1pacts- might have a greater 
chance of being heard by diverse audiences than a message about investrnent security 111 
the energy sector which 1nay pri1narily interest the industrial sector. Politicians know 
this but they often overdo a few phrases- jobs (generic without context), Australian 
hard-working fami lies, etc, to the point of becoming unheard. 
The sa111e is true in reverse. The scare campaign around the word "tax" is an excell ent 
exa111ple of using emotional triggers to engender a negative response, in a context where 
tax has been vilified as bad for a decade and more. 
Language choice is i111portant partly because repeating rhetoric and frames reinforces 
the messages of those who set an agen da. This has been very appa rent from the public 
discourse on cli111ate change in Austral ia which for a decade and longer \Vas hijacked to 
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talk only of costs and not of benefits of early action or the opportunities of new 
industries. The message for communicators regards active versus reactive 
communication. 
In this context it helps to understand the ideological underpinnings of the political 
economy. There is nothing fundamentally true about the message that "tax is bad". 
Rather, it reflects the ideology of economic rationalism which took root in Australia 
during the 1990s. It reflects the ideology that the government, which might receive a 
tax, is incapable of efficient action on behalf of society. This ideology is also against 
government regulation. 
Another example of helpful context in regard to the dominant narrative since the early 
1990s on acceptable government responses, is that regulation has been ruled out for 
similar ideological reasons. This was not the case in the late 1980s, thus indicating this 
is a normative assumption that has been communicated as reality. This thesis found the 
emphasis on voluntarism and individual behavioural change stems from this recent 
version of reality. To seek historical context may broaden options for effective 
communication. 
Communicators on controversial topics can also benefit from contextualising where 
opposition is coming from and what disciplinary values a critic holds. For example, 
with climate change sceptics, it is helpful to be able to identify the values of older 
geologists and meteorologists, or economists and suggest that argu1nents may be 
specific to the training, values and assumptions of the speaker. Other sceptics may have 
ties to think tanks or corporation and that too is useful context for an audience. 
In summary- the implications are to be proactive not reactive; carefully consider 
language, framing and what audiences hear; understand the media and choices for 
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APPENDIX 1 
1985 Villach conference statement 
SCOPE 29 - The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic · 
Change, and Ecosystems 
Statement by the UNEP/WMO/ICSU International Conference on 
THE ASSESSlVIENT OF THE ROLE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND OF 
OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES IN CLIMATE VARIATIONS AND 
ASSOCIATED 11\IIPACTS VILLACH, AUSTRIA, 9-15 OCTOBER 1985 
A joint UNEP/WMO/ICSU Conference was convened in Villach (Austria) from 9 to 
15 October 1985, with scientists from twenty nine developed and developing 
countries, to assess the role of increased carbon dioxide and other radiatively active 
constituents of the atmosphere (collectively known as greenhouse gases and aerosols) 
on climate changes and associated impacts. The other greenhouse gases reinforce and 
. accelerate the impact-due to CO2 alone. As a result of the increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases, it is now believed that in the first half of the next century a rise of 
global mean temperature could occur which is greater than any in man's history. 
The Conference reached the following conclusions and recommenda~ions: 
1. Many important economic and social decisions are being made today on long-
term projectsmajor w~ter resource management activities such as irrigation 
and hydro-power, drought relief, agricultural land use, structural designs and 
coastal engineering projects, and energy planningall based on the assumption 
that past climatic data, without modification, are a reliable guide to the future. 
This is no longer a good assumption since the increasing· concentrations of 
greenhouse gases are expected to cause a significant warming of the global 
climate in the next century. It is a matter of urgency to refine estimates of 
future climate conditions to improve these decisions. 
2. Climate change and sea level rises due to greenhouse gases are closely linked 
with other major environmental issues, such as acid deposition and threats to 
the Earth's ozone shield, mostly due to changes in the composition of the 
atmosphere by man's activities. Reduction of coal and oil use and energy 
conservation undertaken to reduce acid deposition will also reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases, a reduction in the release of chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) 
will help protect the ozone layer and will also slow the rate of climate change. 
3. While some warming of climate now appears inevitable due to past actions, 
the rate and degree of future warming could be profoundly affected by 
governmental policies on energy conservation, use of fossil fuels, and the 
emission of some greenhouse gases. 
These conclusions are based on the following consensus of current basic scientific 
understanding: 
• The amounts of some trace gases in the troposphere, notably carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrous oxide (N20), methane (CI-Li), ozone (03) and chlo(o-
fluorocarbons (CFCs) are increasing. These gases are essentially transparent to 
incoming short-wave _solar radiation but they absorb and emit longwave 
radiation and are thus able to influence the Earth's climate. 
• T~e role of greenhouse gases other than CO2 in changing the climate is 
already about as important as that of CO2 . If present trends continue, the 
combined concentrations of atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases 
would be radiatively equivalent to a doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial 
levels possibly as early as the 2030's. 
• The most advanced experiments with general circulation models of the 
climatic system show increases of the global mean equilibrium surface 
temperature for a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration, or 
equivalent, of between 1.5 and 4.5 °C. Because of the complexity of the 
climatic system and the imperfections of the models, particularly with respect 
to ocean-atmosphere interactions and clouds, values outside this range cannot 
be excluded. The realization of such changes will be slowed by the inertia of 
the oceans, the delay in reaching the mean equilibrium temperatures 
corresponding to doubled greenhouse gas concentrations is expected to be a 
matter of decades. 
• While other factors such as aerosol concentrations, changes in solar energy 
input, and changes in vegetation may also influence climate, the green- house 
gases are likely to be the most important cause of climate change over the next 
century. 
• Regional scale changes in climate have not yet been modelled with 
confidence, However, regional differences from the global averages show that 
warming may be greater in high latitudes during late autumn and winter than 
in the tropics, annual mean runoff may increase in high latitudes, and summer 
dryness may become more frequent over the continents at middle latitude in 
the Northern Hemisphere. In tropical regions, temperature increases are 
expected to be smaller than the average global rise, but the effects on 
ecosystems and humans could have far reaching consequences. Potential 
evapotranspiration probably will increase throughout the tropics whereas in 
moist tropical regions convective rainfall could increase. 
• It is estimated on the basis of observed changes since the beginning of this 
century, that global wanning of 1.5 °C to 4.5 °C would lead to a sea-level rise 
of 20140 centimeters. A sea-level rise in the upper portion of this range would 
have major direct effects on coastal areas and estuaries. A significant melting 
of the West Antarctic ice sheet leading to a much larger rise in sea level 
although possible at some future date, is not expected during the next century. 
• Based on analyses of observational data, the estimated increase in global mean 
temperature during the last one hundred years of between 0.3 and 0.7 °C is 
consistent with the projected temperature increase attributable to the observed 
increase in CO2 and other greenhouse gases, although it cannot be ascribed in 
a scientifically rigorous manner to these factors alone. 
• Based on evidence of effects of past climatic changes, there is little doubt that 
a future change in climate of the order of magnitude obtained from climate 
models for a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration would have 
profound effects on global ecosystems, agriculture, water re- sources and sea 
ice. 
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
1. Governments and regional inter-governmental organizations should take into · 
account the results of this assessment (Villach 1985) in their policies on social 
and economic development, environmental programmes, and control of 
emissions of radiatively active gases. 
2. Public information efforts should be increased by international agencies and 
governments on the issues of greenhouse gases, climate change and sea level, 
including wide distribution of the documents of this conference (WMO, 1986). 
3. Major uncertainties remain in predictions of changes in global and regional 
precipitation and temperature patterns. Ecosystem responses are also 
imperfectly known. Nevertheless, the understanding of the greenhouse 
question is sufficiently developed that scientists and policy-makers should 
begin an active collaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative 
policies and adjustments. Efforts should be made to design methods necessary 
for such collaboration, · 
1. Governments and funding agencies should increase research support 
and focus efforts on crucial unsolved problems .related to greenhouse 
gases and climate change. Priority should be given to national 
scientific programme initiatives such as (a) the World Climate 
Research Programme (WMO-ICSU), (b) present and proposed efforts 
on biogeochemical cycling and tropospheric chemistry in the 
framework of the Global Change Programme proposed by ICSU, (c) 
National Climatic Research Programmes. Special emphasis should be 
placed on improved modelling of the ocean, cloud-ra<;liation 
interactions, and land surface processes. 
ii. Support for ·the analysis of policy and economic options should be 
increased by governments and funding agencies. In these assessments 
the widest possible range of social responses aimed at preventing or 
adapting to climate change should be identified, analyzed and 
evaluated. These assessments should be initiated immediately and 
should employ a variety of available methods. Some of these analyses 
should be undertaken in a regional contest to link available knowledge 
with economic decision-making and to characterize regional 
vulnerability and adaptability to climate change. Candidate regions 
may include the Amazon Basin, the Indian subcontinent, Europe and 
Arctic, the Zambezi Bas in, and the North American Great Lakes. 
4. Governments and funding institutions should strongly support the following: 
1. Long-term monitoring and interpretation with state-of-the-art models 
of: 
a. radiatively important atmospheric constituents in addition to 
CO2, including aerosols, 
b. solar irradiance, and 
c. sea lever. 
ii. Study and interpretation of the past history of climate and 
environment, specially regarding interactions among the atmosphere 
oceans and ecos ys terns. 
111. Studies of the effects of atmospheric compostion and of changing 
climate and climatic extremes on sub-tropical and tropical ecosystems, 
boreal forests, and on water regimes. 
1v. Investigations of the sensitivity of the global agricultural resource base 
with respect to: 
a. direct effects of increases in atmospheric CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases, 
b. effects of changes in climate, and 
c. probable combinations of these. 
v. Evaluation of social and economic impacts of sea-level rises. 
v1. Analysis of policy-making procedures under the kinds of risks implied 
by a significant greenhouse wanning. 
5. UNEP, WMO and ICSU should establish a small task force on green- house 
gases, or take other measures, to: 
1. Help ensure that appropriate agencies and bodies follow up the 
recommendations of V illach 19 85. 
ii. Ensure periodic assessments are undertaken of the state of scientific 
understanding and its practical implications. 
111. Provide advice on further mechanisms and actions required at the 
national or international levels. 
1 v. Encourge research in developing countries to improve energy 
efficiency and conservation. 
v. Initiate; if deemed necessary, consideration of a global convention. 
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In September 1990 the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC). inter 
alia, noted that the Intergovernmental Panel on elirnate Change (IPCC), . caJculated with confidence that 
emissions of carbon dioxide from human activities would have to be reduced by 60 percent to stabilise its 
concentration and that other gases would need to be reduced by between 15% and 85%. 
ANZECC further stated in Towards a National Greenhouse Strategy for Australia that its proposed Australian 
target of a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 1988 levels by 2005 and stabilisation of emissions 
before that date, was achievable through the implementation of energy efficiency and ~newable energy options 
and fuel substitutions. These measures were also considered to deliver other environmental and economic 
benefits. At the September 1990 meeting, ANZECC reaffinned its adoption of its national planning target and 
strongly supported the need for a national strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
On 11 October 1990, the Commonwealth Government adopted an interim planning target of stabilising 
emissions of greenhouse gases (eg carpon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide), not controlled by the Montreal 
Proto.col on Ozone Depleting Substances, based on 1988 levels by the year 2000 and reducing these emissions 
by 20% by the year 2005. All State and Territory governments endorsed this decision at the October 1990 
Spe.cial Premiers• Conference and agreed to cooperate in the development of the National Greenhouse 
Response Strategy. 
ANZECC has prepared this paper on measures already underway to achieve a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. In recent times, efforts of the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments on the climate 
change issue have been concerned with the development of a policy framework for achieving reductions in 
greenhouse gases in national fora such as the Special Premiers' Conferences. ANZECC has also promoted at 
leading national fora the need for consideration of the development of national coordination during the 
implementation of greenhouse gas reduction initiatives and impacts response strategies, in the next phase of 
deliberations on this issue. 
The following documentation provides information on those measures implemented or recently approved on a 
government by government basis, to reduce or restpct greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the measures arise 
from government .Programs with the primary purpose of reducing greenhouse gases, others do so as a 
by-product of other policy objectives. 
Many of the measures focus on community and industry energy consumption practices and in particular 
efficiencies for the energy and transport sectors. These sc---etors are identified as major sources for greenhouse 
gases, particularly carbon dioxide. 
For example, the State Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) has developed programs to 
promote efficient energy use in the domestic, commercial and induslrial sectors. These demand management 
programs include restructuring energy tariffs, education and a joint promotion (with industry) of energy 
efficient lighting. SECWA also operates Australia's only commercial wind farm at Esperance, and islooking 
to increase the contribution of renewable energy sources to the W estem Australian energy grid. 
Following the release of The Greenhouse Challenge stateme_nt in 1989, the Victorian government has 
implemented a range of measures designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: including, in 1990 the 
introduction of mandatory insulation controls in new housing and_ permanent controls on the clearing of native 
vegetation. The promotion of energy conservation and renewable energy is a high priority and accordingly, the 
Victorian government has adopted an interim policy to incorporate the costs of externalities in government 
planning by providing a 10% cost advantage to energy conservation and rene~able energy resource options. 
Major demand management programs have been launched by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
(SECY) and Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria. The SECY is committing $55 mjllion over three years to 
this program in addition to its existing Cogeneration and Renewables Incentives Program. 
Transport efficiency programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have also been established as part of the 
South Australian Greenhouse Strategy. The South Australian prograQls aim to reduce emissions by motor 
vehicles through promoting, amongst other things, efficient driving techniques, applying restrictive speed 
limits, promoting alternative modes of transport, establishing greater vehicle occupancy rates and promoting 
more suingent fuel consumption targets. The Victorian and Western Australian governments have established 
similar initiatives. The Australian Capital Territory government is actively seeking to maximise the utilisation 
of public transport and encouraging the multiple use of cars by providing areas for free parking for vehicles 
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"best state-of-the-science advice, June 1990" 
NOTE: TIIlS IS NOT A FORECAST 
use for sensitivity studies only 
+ 1 or 2 °c in northern coastal areas 
+ 1 to 3 °c in southern coastal areas 
+ 2 to 4 °c inland 
More in dry season, less in wet 
+10 to 20% in summer rainfall region 
-10% in winter rainfall region (southwest) 
More· intense rainfall events 
·Monsoon more intense 
5 to 15 % increase 
Could form and move further south 
Some may be more intense 
Preferred paths may alter 
Frequency change - affected by Ei'fS 0 
Future behavior uncertain 
Probably El Ninos & anti-El Ninos will continue 
to occur, ie., drought and flood years 
Up I00mper 1 °c 
W eak:er trades 
Westerlies further south 
Strong squalls with severe w~ather events 
Global average up about 20 cm by 2030 
3 to 10 cm rise per decade . 
Weather changes will affect magnitude & 
frequency of extreme events 
lv'fagnitude and frequency of extremes generally 
change more rapidly than the aver.iges 
Generally beneficial to C3 plants (eg. wheat) 
but not to c4 plants (eg., sugar cane , 
sorghum) 
1/EATS: These are generalised best ~stimates, reL:uive to the l 980's. based on IPCC and CSIRO 






Early 1990 Australian Financial Review article demonstrating the good 
understanding of the climate change risk message, the political barriers 
and the neutral to critical approach to industry lobbies by the business 
press at this time. 




7 March 1990 
Australian Financial Review 
16 
English 
Copyright of John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd 
KEEN to be green, Mr Hawke and Mr Peacock are falling over each other to prove 
their environmental credentials on issues dear to the hearts of swinging voters, such as 
mining in national parks, logging of native forests and pollution of beaches. 
Typical of this election campaign, by far the biggest environmental issue confronting 
the world and Australia in the 1990s - the international response to the greenhouse 
effect of global temperature warming - has hardly rated a mention. -
For the next Australian Government, the big environmental problem will not be 
global warming (which will come later to a highly uncertain extent), but the likely 
international agreements designed to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases 
produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. 
A 20 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005 is the 
benchmark set by the 1988 Toronto world conference on the changing atmosphere 
and which is being examined, with Australian bureaucratic input, by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
As early as 1992, a global "carbon" tax, perhaps applying more heavily on"rich" 
nations such as Australia, is being taken seriously by officials in Canberra as one 
possible outcome of the international deal-making. Such a carbon tax would be 
designed to promote use of alternative energy sources and to provide funds to bribe 
developing countries into developing less polluting technologies. 
Another possible outcome would see Australia forced to "buy" the right to bum fossil 
fuels in the form of internationally tradeable emissions permits. 
Whatever the mechanism, an idea of the enormous economic and social implications 
for Australia is contained in the current projections of energy use. These suggest that 
carbon dioxide emissions in Australia will increase by around 50 per cent by the year 
2005, a long way from the mooted 20 per cent fall. 
The reasons for Australia's awkward position on global preventative responses to the 
greenhouse effect are _simple. Ours is a carbon intensive economy. We are the biggest 
exporters of coal in the world. Electricity generation has been growing by 6 per cent 
per annum over the past two decades, to account for 44 per cent of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Ninety-five per cent of electricity produced in Australia is generated by the 
burning of fossil fuels such as coal and gas. 
Per capita, Australians are the fifth highest greenhouse polluters in the world behind 
the United States, East Germany, Canada and Czechoslovakia. Australians produce an 
annual average of four tonnes of carbon dioxide each, compared to the world average 
of around one tonne. We are the third highest per capita users of automotive fuel. 
Moreover, to trade out of its foreign debt burden, Australia hopes to do much more 
processing of raw materials in the 1990s. Like the wave of aluminium smelting 
investment of the early 1980s, this would be energy intensive -and thus greenhouse 
intensive - stuff. 
As the "world's greatest environment statement" issued by Mr Hawke last year put it: 
"We are likely to find it much more difficult to reduce carbon dioxide levels than 
some other countries. We may even need to increase the levels to accommodate 
growth of internationally competitive export industries." 
Australia's position can be contrasted against that of Japan, which is exporting its 
greenhouse emissions by shifting its industrial base offshore. 
Instead, Australia is aiming to plant one million trees to provide a bigger"carbon sink" 
to absorb carbon dioxide discharge from our industry and transport systems. At the 
IPCC, Australian officials are pushing the idea of targetting "net" carbon dioxide 
additions to the atmosphere. 
Despite Mr Hawke's boast in the "great debate" that his Government is at the forefront 
of the international negotiations of greenhouse responses, it is clear that Australia has 
more of a vested interest to protect than in its leading ·role on combating ozone 
depletion, driftnet fishing and mining in the Antarctic. 
Compared to the greenhouse, these were easy issues. Substitutes are becoming 
available for the ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs (which double as a 
greenhouse gas); Australia does not driftnet; and we don 't mine the Antarctic. 
In Canberra, the Treasury line reveals the extreme nervousness of the" econocrats" 
over greenhouse responses, such as carbon taxes. which would add to the cost 
structure of local industry. 
The Treasury has urged a "cautious approach", suggesting that a tax on the burning of 
coal could simply drive energy intensive industries offshore and produce little or n 
reduction in global greenhouse emissions. It even suggests that subsidies to the 
"cleaner" natural gas could simply increase overall energy consumption. 
The Federal Opposition, in contrast, has accused the Hawke Government of having 
"deliberately squibbed" on setting targets for reducing greenhouse emissions and 
rejected arguments against "unilateral" action. It has committed itself to a 10-20 per 
cent cut in non-CFC greenhouse emissions by the year 2000, to come from lower 
vehicle emissions, cleaner power stations and increased use of alternative energy 
sources. 
How it will force business and households to achieve these targets is not clear, 
although it supports a tax system which "would reward all those individuals and 
companies who act with the greatest degree of environmental responsibility and 
which penalises those who do not". 
But the feasibility of cutting greenhouse gases by 20 per cent or so within 15 years is 
subject to considerable debate and uncertainty. A study last year commissioned by 
coal miner CRA Ltd produced the pessimistic conclusion that it would require a 40 
per cent real increase in electricity tariffs, a 25 per cent real increase in car prices to 
pay for fuel efficiency gadgets, and a 60-120 per cent real jump in petrol prices. 
Not surprisingly, the study suggests that such OPEC-style increases in carbon-based 
energy prices will have dire economic effects: even lower real wages and the loss of 
$30 billion of economic output, equal to two years'growth in GDP. 
At the other extreme, a study commissioned by Senator Richardson's Environment 
Department argued that potential energy saving efficiencies available from existing 
technology in road transport, energy and in the home were capable of meeting the 
Toronto emissions target with little economic pain. 
But the magnitude of this task is highlighted by the fact that solar energy still only 
amounts to less than 0.1 per cent of energy consumption in Australia. The energy and 
greenhouse "intensity" of the Australian economy has actually increased in the past 
few years, with lower real oil prices encouraging bigger motor vehicle engines. 
For the 1990s, one possibility is that the magnitude of getting global co-operation on 
greenhouse prevention from the indusLrialised and developing countries will prevent 
any effective international agreement. 
If this is the case, then Australia and the world in_ the 20th century will practically test 
the claims of some economists that the costs of trying to prevent the greenhouse effect 
are likely to be less than the costs of adapting to a warmer global climate. 
Document afnr000020011110dm37003ne 
.Mid 1990 article in the general interest Sydney Morning Herald cited in chapter 4 
illustrating the frames and public knowledge at that time 
IT'S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 
PAUL CLEARY 
1901 words 
5 June 1990 
Sydney Morning Herald 
1 
English 
Copyright of John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd 
FORGET the big house, the central heating and the two- or three-car family. In the 
future Australians will be first encouraged and then coerced into becoming 
environmentally-conscious world citizens - all in the name of global survival. 
If you think this sounds far fetched, think again. The greenhouse effect -the warming 
of the planet - means governments are taking seriously the warning of scientists that 
we have to act now to prevent the greatest environmental and economic disaster in the 
world's history. 
A Hawke Government committee is already working on the re-education of the 
Australian community and effective measures that will result in fundamental changes 
to our lifestyles. 
On a very basic level, this working party recommends a public education program 
which would encourage people to live in smaller houses, use electronic transactions 
rather than personal travel, switch to solar power, drive their cars less frequently and 
become accustomed to warmer/cooler indoor temperatures in summer/winter. 
Our industries will face legislation aimed at reducing the emission of greenhouse 
gases. They will be forced to become more energy efficient. 
Australia's economy is carbon intensive. Output of greenhouse gases in Australia is 
rising at a rate of about 2.4 per cent a year, almost double the world average, and its 
per capita output is among the highest. Between 1973 and 1986, energy consumption 
in Australia rose 34 per cent, compared with an International Energy Agency average 
of 7 per cent. The Federal Government has quite clearly embraced the concept of 
global warming and is keen to put in place a range of policies. 
During the election campaign, the Government committed an additional $1 7 million 
over the next three years to research into the greenhouse effect. 
The Prime iVIinister, Mr Hawke, said it was the "greatest global environmental 
concern". 
The international work on the greenhouse is being done by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Under the auspices of the United Nations and the World 
L\'{eteorological Organisation. the [PCC has brought together more than 1,00 
scientists from around the world who, over the past two years, have exa11:1-ined the 
likelihood of global warming, the likely impacts and a series of tough policies. 
That work, which is expected to be made public in a few months, provides virtually 
irrefutable evidence on global warming. The debate now shifts to what can be done. 
One of three IPCC papers examines options for stabilising greenhouse gases, which in 
effect means a 60 per cent cut in cumulative production between now and 2005. 
The IPCC process will come to a head in November when all UN countries will 
attend the Second W odd Climate Conference. The Genev~ conference is aimed at 
achieving international agreement on a world climate convention. 
It is envisaged this will entailgeneral undertakings on cutting greenhouse emissions. 
But this is leading up to a final conference planned for 1992 at which it is hoped that 
binding protocols on cutting greenhouse emissions will be signed. 
There is little doubt that the cost of achieving such a target, both in terms of resources 
and standard of living, will be huge. 
But, even if the greenhouse effect is proved to be the greatest beat-up by the scientific 
community this century, it can be argued that there is an opportunity to gain 
enormously. Governments will have been forced to make enormous efficiency gains 
that would otherwise have been inconceivable. And they will have increased the 
world's knowledge about climate systems by leaps and bounds. 
' -
The threat of global warming and the realisation that, perhaps, something should be 
done to curb output of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases was first raised by a 
conference in Toronto in 1988. It was agreed that significant global warming was a 
near certainty, and that a 20 per cent cut from 19 8 8 levels should be adopted. 
That conference coincided with a severe drought in North America, and it captured 
the world's imagination. Since then, it's been smooth sailing for scientists in putting 
the greenhouse high on the policy agenda. 
Target reductions in emissions will be on the table at the November meeting and are 
being examined by Canberra officials working on Australia's response. A "carbon tax" 
on wealthy nations is being seriously examined by Canberra officials. 
One of four papers presented to the Prime Minister's Science Council on the 
greenhouse says Australia should become a "fast follower" because of the 
opportunities for technological development and new industries. But that paper, by 
J.E. Kolm and Ian Walker, warns that substantial government intervention with deep 
reaching and pervasive effects will be needed. 
Similarly, a report produced last year by coal miner CRA says cutting greenhouse 
gases by 20 per cent would involve a 40 per cent increase in power charges , a 25 per 
cent rise in car prices and a rise in petrol prices of up to 120 per cent. 
Nevertheless, it is expected that Cabinet will agree to a position before the IPCC 
meeting. 
Even the policy proposals slated for immediate implementation are in many ways 
quite profound. 
The first responses should involve ironing out inefficiencies that have long been a 
way of life. 
Most prominent are abolishing State government subsidies for power generation, 
which allow power authorities to operate at a low level of profitability, and to end 
cross-subsidisation of consu~ers by large companies. The NSW Government 
estimates such a change would involve increasing power charges for residents by 17 
per cent, while making power authorities run profitably would involve increasing 
power costs by 5 per cent, according to the Industry Commission. 
It says State electricity authorities should stop increasing capacity and instead focus 
on helping consumers use less power. 
Australia annually produces about 260 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide(CO22) 
and its equivalents like methane and CFCs. 
The report proposes detailed strategies for pruning back this output. 
Residential power demand accounts for about 40Mt of CO22 a year. The 
government's working party, for example, proposes increased use of solar water 
heating would cut emissions by 8Mt a year, based on a reasonable penetration; 
improved energy efficiency of refrigerators and other domestic appliances would save 
about 7Mt a year based on a 20 per cent improvement in average performance, and 
use of natural ·gas for space heating and cooking would save about 3Mt. Refitting 
homes and redesigning new homes to be more energy efficient would save 3 .5Mt a 
year, and this could be achieved in about 15 years. 
Officials concede that these are "ball park" estimates. Nevertheless, the fact that these 
kinds of estimates have been produced show that a number of influential people are 
thinking very seriously about how each of us can cut back on energy consumption. 
Energy intensive industries, such as aluminium, could save about 8.4Mt in the short 
run, which the report says is only a small amount because these industries are well 
aware of efficiencies. Low energy industries could save 7.7Mt a year. 
Low energy industries can achieve most savings from, for example, redesigning new 
buildings and refitting existing ones which would save about l0Mt a year. The report 
talks about developing national building codes, and introducing "energy audits II of 
companies. 
But the -report concedes these policies will only bring about modest reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. To make real progress, this will involve "substantial 
outlays and perhaps major economic and social structural adjustments 11 • 
The report says that, although there is uncertainty about the threat, action should be 
taken now, just in case the scientists are dead right. 
Long-range solutions fo~ energy production centre on switching from coal to natural 
gas, or a combination of the two. 
But these involve bringing forward the obsolescence of power plants worth billions of 
dollars, while huge investment in new natural gas pipelines would also be required. 
Some of the options include: . co-firing power stations with natural gas which would 
cut emissions by 10 per cent or 25Mt; building new power plants that use new 
techniques such as gasified coal (turning coal into gas); and pressurised fluidised bed 
combustion (burning coal under pressure) which would achieve savings of up to 25 
per cent or 50Mt. 
Energy intensive industries, such as aluminium, could cut their emissions of around 
32Mt a year by a third by using a process of direct reduction rather than electrolysis. 
Cutting emissions at source, like improving reticulation systems in town gas lines, 
would also require huge investment. However, the Australian Gas Company is 
investing $400 million in the Sydney reticulation which alone is justified on cost 
recovery. 
Chlorofluorocarbon emissions account for 18 per cent of Australia's greenhouse gas 
emissions, and these are expected to be eliminated by 1995. Companies producing 
aerosols have replaced damaging CFCs with less harmful hydrocarb<?ns. 
The CS IR O's chief research scientist and assistant chief of the division of atmospheric 
research, Dr Graeme Pearman, is one of 12 Australian scientists working on the 
international project. He co-ordinates the CSIRO's climate change program. 
The main finding from the scientific work is an even stronger likelihood of global 
. 
warmmg . 
The CSIRO has already developed a sizable research program on glob_al climate 
change. It covers a series of divisions: atmospheric research, wildlife and ecology, 
water resources, environmental mechanics and plant industry, and oceanography. 
According to Dr Pearman, the most recent research says that by 2020 the planet will 
warm by more than 1 degree celsius. By 2070, the. average temperature of the plant 
will rise by about 3 .5 degrees. 
When international scientists first came together in 1985 to develop forecasts, they 
said the earth would warm by between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees in the next 30 to 50 years. 
(That meeting, of about 100 scientists in Villach, Austria, was the first time that broad 
consensus on global warming was achieved.) 
The IPCC work shows that scientists have been able to be more precise about likely 
warm1ng by narrowing their ranges on a global scale. 
Rainfall is expected to rise by about 3 per cent by 2020, and be up to about 7 per cent 
by 2070. The sea level is expected to rise by between 10 and 30 centimetres by 2030, 
and by between 30 to 80 centimetres by 2070. The Villach conference was only able 
to establish a ris·e in the sea level of between 20 and 140 centimetres by 2030. 
Dr Pearman concedes, however, that the rise in the Earth's average temperature this 
century of about half a degree Celsius is within the bounds of normal variations but 
that by 2030 greenhouse gases will have doubled. 
"If you add those gases to any of the models, then what they do is attract more heat to 
the Earth's surface," he says. 
He argues that the research is extremely useful for Australia because it helps us 
understand drought, flood and extreme precipitation. 
Climate models suggest that Australia will become wetter, but this is very uncertain at 
a regional level. It is generally accepted that climatic zones will move towards the 
Antarctic. 
CSIRO's research, however, has been focused on regional impacts in Australia and it 
is developing regional climate models in Melbourne on a super computer, called a 
Cray computer. 
The models will attempt to describe, in detail, how patterns of rainfall and 
temperature variation will change. 
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Mid 1996 article providing evidence of the changed political framing and also of 
the use of science context in a political story 
Climate Changes: Why We Are Seen As Rebels 
By GAVIN GILCHRIST Technology Writer 
917 words 
8 July 1996 
Sydney Morning Herald 
1 
English 
Copyright of John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd 
The latest effort to tackle global warming from the greenhouse effect begins in 
Geneva today. For the first time, Australia's pro-industry position will face 
international scrutiny. Today The Herald begins a two-part series, The Greenhouse 
Stand-Off examining Australia's stance. 
The Howard Government today steps up its diplomatic offensive opposing 
international efforts to protect the world's climate at the historic meeting of the 
Climate Change Convention in Geneva. 
Australia, with its pro-industry stance, is set to be seen as a rebel nation out of step 
with mounting global concern about the threat of climate change from the greenhouse 
effect. 
Today's conference, to be attended by the Federal Environment Minister, Senator Hill, 
will be the first time ministers from the world's governments have met to debate the 
alarming scientific verdict last December that global air pollution from burning oil, 
coal and gas, together with the impact of agriculture and clearing forests, has begun to 
shift the world's climate. 
Since last century, global temperatures have climbed by up to 0.6 degrees Celsius. 
Rather than this being a natural phenomenon, the world's top climate scientists say, 
"the balance of evidence suggests" it is from the build-up of greenhouse gases 
trapping more heat around the planet. 
While the finding has prompted many advanced nations to accelerate action plans to 
cut greenhouse gas emissions, the Howard Government has subtly but significantly 
shifted Australia's position in the opposite direction. 
Federal Cabinet's decision on the greenhouse issue a month ago was a triumph of 
strategic long-term lobbying by the Business Council of Australia, which represents 
Australia's biggest 100 firms, and about 20 other industry associatio!ls. 
More than five years of intensive lobbying behind the scenes in Canberra paid off 
spectacularly. A Herald investigation has revealed how the outcome was achieved: 
* Key links into departments were cultivated through the strategic head-hunting of 
well-placed bureaucrats; 
* A government economic study supporting industry's view was co-funded, then 
handed to diplomats to promote around world capitals; 
* More recently, an intensive round of lobbying ministers and their new advisers was 
completed. · 
Industry's influence over the bureaucracy in Canberra was aided by a revolving door 
between the groups. 
Prominent examples include: Mr Paul Barratt, the former head of the Business 
Council of Australia, who was recently appointed head of the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy by the Howard Government; Mr Tony Beck, former senior 
economist in the research arm of that department, who now runs the greenhouse 
campaign for the Business Council ; and N!r David Buckingham, the top lobb yist for 
the mining industry, who was recruited from the Department of the Environment. 
Also, Mr David Coutts, chief lobbyist for the aluminium industry, a major contributor 
to greenhouse gases was, until two years ago, a senior official within the Qepartrnent 
of Primary Industries and Energy. 
In preparing for the Geneva climate conference, Cabinet accepted without reservation 
the industry's view that Australia - because of its big energy sector - deserved special· 
treatment in any international action on climate change. 
Critically, industry's position that developing nations should also be included in the 
convention negotiations was accepted by the Howard Government. Australian 
companies feared their expansion was going to be restricted while their competitors' 
in developing countries would not. 
Environmental groups who had argued the scientific evidence demanded tougher 
action by Australia gained no concessions. It was winner take all. 
"It was a victory for old-style resource-intensive development over the creative, 
technologically sophisticated firms of the future," said Dr Clive Hamilton, head of the 
Australia Institute, a Canberra think-tank. "The Howard Government made a big play 
about promoting small business but Cabinet's greenhouse decision was an emphatic 
victory for big business over small business." 
A government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said: "The Australian 
position has changed from being a very wide one that recognised the science, the need 
to be putting new technologies into developing countries and giving them financial 
assistance, and that recognised the need for adaptation strategies but also included 
trade concerns. 
"Now, instead of the holistic approach, we've zoomed in on the bottom line and trade 
is the only driving consideration." 
Australia is the world's biggest coal exporter, a major natural gas exporter, and a 
major exporter of aluminium smelted using vast amounts of electricity from coal-fired 
power stations. That makes Australia one of the world's highest producers of 
greenhouse gase~ per capita. 
Canberra insiders say the final position of the Howard Government on greenhouse 
shows that when lobbyists for vested interest groups succeed in winning over 
bureaucrats, they invariably win the policy debate. 
"If a bureaucracy and a lobby group are as one mind, it's almost impossible for 
governments to receive alternative advice," said Mr Bob Gordon, managing director 
of Australian Business Links, a business consultancy which represents companie 
with renewable energy interests. "In which case, the interests of the public can be a 
major casualty." 
The Geneva meeting is the first top-level conference of the Climate Change 
Convention since it was signed into force in Berlin last vear. 
Held at the historic Palais des Nations, it will be opened by the German Minister for 
the Environment and host of the Berlin meeting, Ms Angela Merkel. 
Tomorrow Part 2: Europe and the US react to our stand in Geneva. 
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policy in Australia, by examining the science communication pathways 
including barriers to effective or clear communication of the science -
complementing earlier works that provide a political chronology and economic 
analysis of policy development and work on the influence of 
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Interview Transcript - Maria Taylor (MT) & John Kerin (JK) 
23/1/2008 
MT Do you mind if I tape this? 
JK - (indicates he doesn't mind) 
MT - As Minister for Energy you signed the October 1990 policy on an 
Australian emission reduction target, which is actually how I recognised your 
involvement there, do you recall much of that? 
JK-No 
(MT and JK laughter) 
JK - so much was happening; when was the climate change conference in Rio? 
MT - 1992; this was earlier, so in the late '80s, (87-91), when you were the 
minister for (industry and) energy, climate change was very much on the agenda 
in Australia as a burgeoning issue. Do you recall anything from that time? 
JK -Well, I recall the debate was about climate change and °from the agricultural 
perspective and the advisors in that department - even when we took on resources and 
energy, as well - were very much of reduction economic trade mindset. So, it was all 
adaptation to climate change rather than any real emphasis on implications of global 
warming. All of this is as I recall, I'd have to go into boxes full of stuff ... 
MT - What was portrayed in the newspapers was very much mitigation, like, 
'we have to do something' and Hawke's policy at that time (1990) was billed as 
the 'world's greatest environment policy'. 
JK - That was when Peter Cook and I got the money for Landcare because Landcare 
at the Commonwealth level was formulated in my office and in the department when I 
was minister for Primary Industry and then Primary Industry and Energy. The people 
in the department were John Kerr, a fellow called Te_rry Smart, and in my office was 
Tony Gleeson, John Tanser and Jeff Gilmore. I got the super ministry ~e first 
minister with me was Peter Morris and he came from. transport and was somewhat 
aggrieved as he'd been on equal footing with me and ... it was a bad arrangement. 
Then Peter Cook became Minister for Resources and I gave Peter all this work we 
were doing and it was his stroke of genius to give it to Toyne and Farley and it w3:s he 
that also spoke with Heather Mitchell and Joan Kerner in Victoria and that's where 
the name 'Landcare' came from. It was created in that State. I vividly recall this, Peter 
came back to me and said 'they want the lot!' because it was just a great big body of 
work. What I was concerned with was that foresters thought the next hill was theirs 
and fisherman thought they could go out a bit further to sea, the fish were there, so it 
was access to public resources, y'know? But we were sitting there like two big brown 
hungry dogs. When Hawke decided he was going to have the world's greatest 
environment statement, that's how we got the money for it. But, most of the memories 
that come back to me are from the economic heavies and the producer minded people 
in Resources and Energy saying, adaptation. I think we were pushing for mitigation 
but we didn't use that word, we probably used amelioration and I don ' t think we 
understood at all the full implications of global warming. We shouldn't be using 
'climate change' as a phrase in my opinion, it should be 'global warming' because 
we've always had climate change. This is the most variable climate in the world. 
Australian agriculture is subject to, one study I saw, 220% higher level of climate 
change. climate variability than any other developed agriculture producing nation. 
1\-IT - In terms of language, in those days it was referred to as 'The Greenhouse 
Effect' and it seemed to be well understood. It was a source of pollution, it wa 
described in those terms ... people weren't seemin2: to have much trouble with 
that concept. All the States and Territories at that time developed a strategy to 
ameliorate, or whatever you called it. 
JK - It was all a bit like ESD. I was sort of responsible for getting the ESD program 
.up and running, and the Resource Assessment Commission, trying to get some facts 
out in a very heightened debate which was mainly about trees in the late '80s. I guess 
out of that process came the phrase ESD, the acronym, and I was, to my discredit, 
somewhat cynical of the States because they were putting ESD into every Act and 
Legislation and I felt roughly the same way about States having those sorts of 
strategies so all these things doesn't depend on the words it depends on the will. Carr, 
Bob Carr, now is just brilliant on climate change and global warming. So it depends 
on various individuals. 
I went to Rio and Ros Kelly was the person there, I was only sent to try to put one · 
sentence in her speech. She promised she would but she didn't subsequently put it in ... 
She played it for the audience back home which was smart .politics, we didn't 
articulate a position there. So this again reinforces the view that we're all into a bit of 
lip service. And I must say, to my discredit, I just was too bound up in thinking that 
agriculture could adapt. When Alan Griffiths came along as my Minister of Resources 
I recall, and he had John Brumby with him as head of his Chief of Staff, I recall 
saying to him 'there have got to be hundreds of ways of attacking this issue so, for 
God's sake, do something about local government and design and buildings and 
power saving. I don't think I said friendly light bulbs or anything but I was always 
taken by the fact these great big tall building in Sydney with glass, they're great heat 
banks - you can actually use them. I know it costs a bit more and there's a few 
buildings around but you really do save energy. But I don't think he got anywhere 
because a lot of this area was in State hands and ·you know how hard it is to get this 
Federation to work. 
MT - It's true. I mean, certainly the states were talking along similar lines. 
Firstly the thing I wanted to ask you about trees and Landcare, was there some 
sort of link? An intellectual link between growing more trees and climate 
change? The one billion tree program, was that somehow ... ? 
JK - Yeah, well they were greenhoL:tse gas friendly. But then again I didn't 
understand all the science of it because it's subsequently been proved just planting 
trees doesn't do much and old forests don't produce as much as new forests and the 
older the forest is ... y'know there's so many aspects of it and different tree forest 
types do produce more or less . A lot of people have (s_ince) done a heck of a lot of 
research. There wasn't anywhere near the amount of information then that there is 
now. 
MT - Do you remember greenhouse '87-'88, those first greenhouse conferences? 
Just as a citizen even? I'm just wondering if they were high on the radar screen. 
JK- I'd seen papers, but you get 20 reports a day when you're minister. And there's 
always some hot topic that takes all your damn time. 
MT - To what extent do you reckon the shift away from interest in this topic was 
really a matter of personalities, if you like, away from Hawke and Keating in 
terms of their own interest in environmental issues or thinking that the electorate 
cared about it? 
JK - I don't know. The Prime Minister's job is to keep his mob elected, I guess. I had 
very little time for Hawke before I got into his ministry and then cabinet. But he 
looked after me very well and I grew to have enormous respect for him and on 
agricultural matters. I felt his awareness of environmental matters was real and deep. I 
never had that feeling with Keating in as much as I felt he was the one who sabotaged 
the ESD project and Resource Assessment Commission. I can't swear to that, I know 
PM and C was a bit sick of it. I felt there was a lot more we could have done there. 
Personalities do count. Richardson was interested in votes, it's very hard for a Prime 
Minister or political party to resist the man that's more into votes than being into 
policy. I don't think Richardson was any kind of driver, I never got to talk with him 
much. I talked with Simon Balderstone and some of the people in his office; Tony 
Fleming and one woman there whose name I forget. They were pretty good people. 
Ah yes, her name was Judy. I thought she had the sense of humour of a hub-cap but 
she was a very nice person. 
MT -I knew all these people. This was the interesting thing about, I guess, 
memory ... 
** Chit-Chat** 
JK -There's quite a few people who think I'm the devil-incarnate because of the 
brawls Richo and I are having in some areas . Because Richardson so happily endorsed 
everything that the people who seemed to think that policy is sold by bumper stickers. 
I always see policy and policy prescriptions and policy formation as pretty complex 
because it's got to be implemented. 
MT - But. .. I think this is pretty interesting. It raises the question of leadership 
too because if I go back over newspaper archives, Richardson gave some pretty 
passionate interviews where he said all the right things. He said 'this is not a 
short range issue, this is the big issue of our generation and the next'. He 
certainly sounded like he understood the implications, so he was providing 
leadership by talking· like that. 
JK - Well, I didn't know that. Maybe we're all in our bunkers a bit too much. It was 
very different dealing with Richardson than it was dealing with Barry Cohen, who I 
could talk to, and Ros Kelly who was interested in ... she realised she couldn't keep on 
the Richardson agenda and got more into brown issues. I would have expected her to 
pick up more on this sort of thing. 
**Chit-Chat** 
MT - Getting back to Keating. It has raised an important issue to me in terms of 
what happens to policy because it was said about him that his style was quite 
different to Hawke's. Hawke came out of the 'accord' and was really consensual 
and believed in getting everyone around the table. Whereas Keating was much 
more bureaucratic. 
JK - Keating sort of doesn ' t read. I guess tertiary education would have ruined him. 
These are very, sort of, subjective views. And I do think he 's not very physically 
strong. Now, I know the good side of Keating and all the rest of that, how as a young 
person he'd identified new issues such as: republic, aboriginal conditions, these sorts 
of things. But Hawke was strong and intellectually strong and really, I just think in 
politics you have to be very physically and mentally strong. I n_ever saw Keating in 
that context. I wasn't in his cabinet because I had Trade and Overseas Development 
then and certainly as Minister for Trade I was pus hing climate change, global 
warming things. I ceased being Primary Industry and Resources and Energy Minister 
in 1991 and then start of '92 I was Trade and Overseas Development and that was a 
time when I started talking to other countries about this. And that was always pretty 
high on the agenda in briefings from that period on. 
:\IT - Getting back to what you said about Keating not being phys ically strong. 
\Vhat you mean is that .. what does that imply? 
JK - He put so much effort into Question Time, which used to excite the press and 
the back bench. but he was emotionally. ph vs icall v and mental l v drained bv each 
weekend. I don't think he had the capacity to read and absorb the amount of material 
that Hawke did. He depended very heavily on the people around him and he could ju~t 
so pick up words and synthesise them into short political messages. That was his 
enormous skill; I could never do this. · 
MT - And to what extent do you think the economic rationalists/fundamentalists 
of that breed were getting to him at that time? 
JK - Keating was just like Costello; both of these people were suckers for treasury 
dogma. And I'm not saying treasury dogma is wrong, but it needs to be qualified. In 
the area I was dealing with it was applied micro economics and agriculture science. 
Macro economics, I have great difficulty in macro economics. It's not that I don't 
understand it is powerfully intellectual but it is prone to bandwagon effects and urges. 
The herd instinct: 'The market, the market, the market!'. In my terms they never 
examined enough market structur~, market power, market failure. Power structure 
behaviour and the prospect of failure and anyone that believes in anything absolutely 
gets in all sorts of trouble because governments can't control everything, a small 
economy like Australia. There are examples in history where the whole neo-liberal 
Marshalian (Alfred Marshal, one of the great economists) consensus was resisted by 
all the universities in the United States during the depression. So I've always been 
worried about this adherence to macro economics, knowing you can't ignore 
macroeconomic indicators, knowing that it's powerful intellectually. So, I just 
disagreed \ivith some of the treasury minds. Someone such as Keating, without any 
economic or tertiary training, and someone such as Costello being from a legal 
background, it doesn't matter how innate! y intelligent they are they become suckers 
for all the levels and sophistication of economic analysis and dialogue. This is just an 
intellectual fact. 
MT - *Paraphrased* It's an intellectual thought to say that all these are just 
constructs and assumptions. It's been likened to a religion because it's belief 
based. 
JK - Then there's the business paradigm and politicians using and abusing 
economics. No one was querying junk bonds in the '80s. Now it's derivatives and 
hedge funds all this sort ·of nonsense. The business community agreed will always 
carry them away. And you'll have the economists sort of either not looking at it and 
people saying the fundamental_s don't count. The worst thing Keating ever did, he 
managed the economy by pulling leavers. Well do you think we were responsible for . 
or could control the Chinese and Indian economies and their economic reform? Do 
you think we can control Bush's mad fiscal policies? Do you think we could have 
done anything about the sub-prime mortgage market in America? 
MT- That's the market. 
JK - It's a speculating market and greed always beats 'the facts'. 
MT - What about Keating and the sense that, what I was told, under his 
government things like ESD and any greenhouse strategies got dissipated in 
about 30 different departments or committees? 
JK - I don't know, I was out of the country for 149 days in 1992. Once you're out of 
cabinet and once you're in a portfolio like that y'know ... _though as I said, always in 
the briefing was climate change. I remember going to India and people telling me 
'you seem very aware of this' and all the rest of it and I was looking out the window 
at these small little brick kilns just pouring out really dense black smoke. 
MT - So it was on the agenda? 
JK - Oh, yeah. It was on the agenda in all the countries I went to and the Pacific 
countries, even then, were worried about sea levels rising. 
lVIT - So what happened to the department? I understand later on it was Trade 
and Industry that really became the blockers? Was it purely ideology? 
JK - I don't know. I just don't know. Well. .. yeah I guess all the time. I mean we 
really are a producer economy, we really do go for the production first paradigm, 
don't we. Departmental advice is always conservative in as much as it is generally 
careful. One of the things that has always worried me about economics and science, 
and I set up the bureau of rural sciences in my department, because all they were 
concerned about was trade and economics. Economists are always absolutely sure 
they are right. Even when they're subsequently proved wrong they just forget about 
that. Scientists are never absolutely sure they're right because they always know 
there's more discovery and we learn more and more. We' re just learning now about 
the role of predators in fisheries - no one ever told me about predators in fisheries and 
how the food chain works. And the Barrier Reef's health, for example, is dependent 
on not taking out too many of the predators . That's just an example. 
MT - That's a very good point, it's another light on the whole issue of the world 
view of the different disciplines. Different scientists, but also then compared to 
economists and their view of the world. • 
JK - Well all of the agriculture and producing industries are mounted on the bas is of 
scientific physical engineering research. Then economists come along and talk about 
the optimal allocation of resources within the industry, from a technical point .of view, 
but welfare value distribution, equity, all of these things generally tend not to be 
addressed as thoroughly. 
MT - Also as new politicians succeed each other, new people come in, strictly 
ideological people may rise to the top 
JK - There are some ideologues in treasury, because I eventually became Treasurer 
and a few I just couldn't comprehend because they were always working on outdated 
statistics and on theory, to some extent. Some of the real heavies. I tended to rely 
more on Bernie Fraser and the Reserve Bank because they were actually dealing in a 
market and they were actually dealing with people taking decisions every day. That 
was far better than working on outdated statistics, which always needed correction, 
and theory. · 
MT - You put your finger on something there ... the theorist versus the real 
world practitioners. In a lot of cases some of the Treasury people or the 
departmental people were said to be more hardcore/inflexible in these economic 
analysis than the busin_ess people were. 
JK - Well I think you need someone like that and the Department of Finance are 
there for that. Dept of Finance are the accounts and Treasury is there for the 
management of the whole economy and you probably need people like the Church of 
Rome but it's up to a cabinet to really decide on the basis of a lot of thought how far 
you'd go with dogma. And that's my position. 
i\tIT - So then when you come up with a person like Howard who totally agrees 
with the dogma then it 's all. .. 
JK - But it's all small business dogma. Don 't get me on Howard ... I loathe the little 
sod. Howard's just like Richardson: Whatever it takes. He's left us with a terrible 
legacy. 
**Chit-Chat** 
lvIT - One last question. You said something in our phone chat about 'such a 
poisonous environment between the Environment and Industry portfolio . 
Stalemated action I gue..,.., ... 
JK - Yeah, it was pretty bad. It was just so much political cause. I thought Dr. Bob 
Brown was a pathological liar with a messiah complex but I now tend to agree a lot 
more with what he says. But, in the early days in the Tasmanian forestry debate; A-
the environment movement told lies; B- they really didn't know what they had or 
wh3:t was there. This was eventually confessed to me by a fellow named Keith 
_Tarlow. So some was ignorance and some was just the undergraduate campaign• and 
you can't blame Graham Richardson for giving them wins or them for taking wins on 
some of these issues. But, if science has convinced me something is rare and 
endangered well, the debate is over. 
MT - So who was setting you straight on these issues? 
JK - Getting other advice. The Australian Heritage Commission eventually did a lot 
of work~ I've got the reports somewhere. And I used Henry Nix on the South-East 
forest just to get the facts out because ... The unions were telling me what terrible 
things the forest big five concession holders were doing and they were putting 
absolutely first-class logs into chippers for print. There was so much left on the 
ground, the forestry practices were truly terrible ~d all the rest of that, so I knew 
things were pretty bad. But just the grind of having to deal with it all the time! I had to 
·stand over the Tasmanian Government and then you get down to Florentine sticks, 
Farmhouse Creek down there where I drew lines and buffers. Then they said 'we want 
buffers on buffers', then you negotiate that, then you find the ACF (Australian 
Conservation Foundation) agrees with a position (they're mainstream and more 
conservative) and the Wilderness Society had another proposition ... so the grind of it 
really poisons the atmosphere between industry and you get to a position where you 
can't get a bottom line. It grinds you down because you don't have time when other 
things are happening: I had a farm crisis, wool, dairy industry ... You name it - they're 
all happening at once. 
MT ...: Actually that's a very good perspective .... one of the things I was observing 
looking back was the environment.movement during Hawke time and the ESD 
time were considered mainstream. and the ref ore they probably had a fair bit of 
influence .. 
JK- I was the cabinet redneck, yeah. 
MT - As time went by they became more and more marginalised .. 
JK- Probably because people realised they'd been fibbing. Walshie and all the really 
hard men., particularly Peter Walsh, accused me all the time of being absolutely too 
soft on the Greenies. To this day he really wacks into me every time he sees me. 
Because really, I'd been .in environmental organisations since the mid-'60s. 
MT - So you were a conservationist of the traditional school, if you like. 
JK - I only used the word conservation. I'd never- heard 9f land degradation I'd heard 
of soil conservation, y'know. But I observed what happened on the farm, I left school 
and swung an axe and pushed a hargan saw and I realised what would happen through 
fires and what would happen when the bush was cleared and how resilient Qry 
sclerophyll forest was and r realised there's different forest types. Even though I had 
very little education. 
